Taming the Messiah

THE FORMATION OF AN OTTOMAN POLITICAL PUBLIC SPHERE, 1600–1700

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CONTENTS

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CONVENTIONS USED

ABBREVIATIONS

DBİA   *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*

DİA   *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*

EI2   *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed.

EI3   *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, 3rd ed.

TRANSLITERATION AND DATES

Names, terms, and citations have been transliterated with a version of the *IJMES* system adapted to Ottoman Turkish by adding ü, ö, ş, ç, ğ and making the concurrent vowel changes. For Ottoman geographical names, modern Turkish orthography is adopted, except when there is an English equivalent for the latter: hence, for instance, Istanbul instead of İstanbul, Cairo instead of Kahire, Damascus instead of Şam. For terms that appear in *Merriam-Webster's Dictionary*, Anglicized spellings have been preferred—for example, sharia, waqf, vizier, janissary.

Terms of Arabic origin that have broader relevance in the field of Islamic Studies have been retained in standard *IJMES* transliteration. Hence, *samāʿ* instead of *semāʿ*, Mujaddidī instead of Müceddidī. In cases where a transliterated edition has been used, I follow the editor's transliteration choices—for example, Seyahatname instead of Seyaḥatnāme.

Although the original sources discussed here use the *hijrī* calendar, throughout this book dates are given in the Common Era.

Introduction

An empire is a constant dialogue between unity and diversity. So is mystical theology. Historically, proponents of empire idealized empires as safe havens of unity and harmony, overemphasizing imperial capacity and potency. At no time was the idealization of imperial power stronger than in the sixteenth century, when powerholders across the Mediterranean competed in the adoption of sacred languages of kingship that promised imperial subjects nothing short of a "heaven on earth." Much ink has recently been spilled on the Sufism-infused language of absolutism prevalent in the early modern Islamicate empires, which underlined the ruler's cosmic status as the delegate of godly authority, or, in other words, as the caliph and the messiah.[1] The Ottomans were part of this messianic age, particularly during the long reign of Süleymān the Lawgiver (r. 1520–1566). Chroniclers, scribes, jurists, and illuminators under Süleymān worked hard to create an imperial image characterized by serenity, omnipresence, and pervasiveness.

By the early seventeenth century, however, the global age of messianism had given way to a dramatically different reality for both the Ottomans and their neighbors to the east. Decentralized governance replaced the strong centralist pull of the previous century, shifting away from ambitious universalism. Instead, the reality of fragmentation took center stage, displacing fictions of unity. The new political reality, which began to take shape as of the late sixteenth century, became undeniably visible through ritual and visual representations of power in seventeenth-century Istanbul. Whereas idealized representations of power had emphasized pomp, grandeur, and seclusion in

the early sixteenth century, the theater of power was now filled with multiple new actors. Urban publics staged political spectacles; the city's residents began to appear as rightful protesters in chronicles, while city streets finally found their way into visual depictions of the capital alongside imperial monuments.[2] The changing nature of imperial politics impelled the ruling elite to devise new ways of inhabiting power, inventing new rituals and political spectacles. The regular staging of political acts for the eyes of the public, such as performative executions *of* rebels or *by* rebels, was emblematic of a radical transformation of Ottoman political culture. As imperial rulers relied increasingly on public engagement for support and legitimacy, the importance of power brokers across society grew exponentially. Preachers, Sufis, and other nonofficials came to take a prominent place in what a contemporary observer called "the theater of of the city," a forum of power that experimented with integrating the public into politics as simultaneously audience and actors.[3]

Taming the Messiah narrates this transformation of Ottoman political culture in the seventeenth century, which evolved to generate, foster, theorize, and negotiate with a lively public sphere. The book joins a recent historiographical effort to capture the seventeenth-century transformation of the Ottoman Empire into a decentralized polity characterized by the effective delimitation of dynastic authority. This historiography has made major strides in showing the rise of new political practices of the limitation of sultanic authority, based on analyses of social and economic developments and histories of urban rebellions. While the practice of a new form of decentralized politics has been demonstrated, therefore, the intellectual changes accompanying this grand shift have not received due attention. The main contribution that *Taming the Messiah* makes to this literature is to uncover the intellectual and conceptual shifts in political thought that accompanied shifting political practice. The book sets out to answer the question of how the new publics understood, legitimized, and performed their newfound political power vis-à-vis other contenders in an increasingly crowded public space. This space was a complex political realm where multiple forms of sovereignty coexisted to negotiate and form partnerships; political power ultimately resided in the sum total of these shifting and dynamic partnerships.

Focusing on the emergence of an Ottoman public sphere, this book explores Ottoman early modernity from the perspective of the formation of new kinds of public political agency that challenged, negotiated with, and ultimately reshaped the Ottoman social order. By uncovering the histories of these

political publics and documenting the emergence of a robust public sphere, the book aims to supplement and enrich the story of Ottoman early modernity, which is often understood primarily as one of state formation through the gradual elaboration of a complex bureaucratic apparatus, and thereby increasingly effective central governance. However, these two developments—namely, state formation and public formation—were not antithetical. On the contrary, I contend that the formation of an effective Ottoman political and social order was made possible by the involvement of a wide range of nonofficials in key social and political institutions, from the imperial court to the mosques and courthouses of the provinces. The public sphere was an indispensable component of early modern state formation in the Ottoman Empire, as elsewhere during this period.

Taming the Messiah studies a premodern, non-Western public sphere. The project thus challenges two common assumptions: first, that public political participation originated in the West, and, second, that civic culture was only introduced to the non-Western world with the Westernization efforts of the nineteenth century. Contrary to these assumptions, which measure the public sphere against an idealized European prototype, the book suggests a new method of studying public political life: focusing on the variety of religious visions and lifeworlds. The book thus joins a recent effort in understanding the intertwined nature of religious and political authority, and in studying religious literature in relationship to political sovereignty.[4] In the early modern Ottoman world, public political participation took place through competing visions of religious and moral authority. In the changing political landscape of the seventeenth century, mystical theology, which a century earlier had been deployed to champion absolutist rule, was used to legitimate the participation of the broader society in local and imperial politics. In demonstrating the contribution of mystical theology to this new pluralist culture, the book also presents an important challenge to the recent literature on the caliphate and mysticism, which treats mystical theories of the caliphate solely as utopian images of unity and uniformity under a single divinely ordained ruler. Instead, I show that mystical theories of the caliphate could and did function to legitimize the authority claims of nonroyal political agents and serve to curb royal authority. The ideal of every man's caliphate was thus one of the cornerstones of the early modern Ottoman public sphere.

Undeniably, the sixteenth century was a period of messianic political theology, not only for the Ottomans but also for their contemporaries in the

Mediterranean, Iran, and the Mughal Empire.[5] Both the Ottomans and their rivals to the east and the west coveted two related epithets of rulership: "Messiah" and "Lord of the [Auspicious] Conjunction."[6] The terms combined the anticipation of the end of time with the perfection of moral and political authority, the latter to be established by the messiah right before the end of human history.[7] Two factors enabled this global moment of messianic political theology. First, the approach of the 1,000th year of the Islamic calendar, corresponding to year 1596 of the Roman calendar, sparked creative imaginations of a millenial apocalypse.[8] In this charged moment, a true expectation of cosmic change was palpable in both the Islamic world and Europe. Second, the emergence of imperial rivalries with the Safavids and the Habsburgs in the sixteenth century ignited the Ottoman use of messianic discourse, which "divide[d] the world into prophets and tyrants," thereby attributing a divine mission to earthly rulers.[9] Messianism therefore elevated the Ottoman sultans from ordinary state-makers to cosmic warriors against evil, or against the enemies of Sunni Islam.

The apogee of Ottoman messianic political theology was the first half of the sixteenth century, specifically, the reign of Selīm I (r. 1512–1520) and the first decades of Süleymān the Lawgiver (r. 1520–1566).[10] After this point, the title "messiah" lost its apocalyptic signification, yet continued to be used to signify the unification of spiritual and temporal authority. It was to join a menagerie of similar terms—such as "renewer" (*mujaddīd*)—that, despite their technical differences, came to be employed in the same sense as signifying the divinely ordained nature of Ottoman rule.[11] The most significant of these sacralized notions of rulership was that of the caliphate. Hüseyin Yılmaz has demonstrated that in constructing Ottoman rule as a caliphate, Ottoman authors relied heavily on Sufi thought and its theories of sainthood.[12] As Azfar Moin emphasizes, the merger between these languages of authority at various levels and in related yet different realms—namely, the religious and the political—had significant repercussions, creating "a series of interrelated cultural meanings about embodied forms of sovereignty."[13] The study of early modern sovereignty, therefore, necessitates going beyond official discourses to explore everyday language about and performances of spiritual authority.

Messianic imaginations of sovereignty offered a conjunction of power and reformism couched in Sufi terminology. Recognizing this underpinning of political theology, this book reconsiders the use of Sufi terminology in not only sustaining, but also *taming* and circumscribing political claims to absolute

authority and to authoritarian reformism.[14] Of the two key ingredients of messianic political theology—namely, conceptions of authority and time, the concept of messianic authority and its relationship to Sufism has been widely studied. Yet, theories of messianic kingship were also closely linked with political theories of time and reform; the messiah's main mission was to provide guidance to reform a world heading toward the end of time. The themes of time and reform, therefore, were key concepts of early modern political theology that remain insufficiently understood, despite their significance.[15] In this book, I study a progressive early modern vision of time and Islamic tradition that objected to reformist traditionalism, particularly puritanism and its discourse of eradicating innovations undiscerningly. In its puritan mode, history was but a series of corruptions after a designated golden age of moral purity. As I show in the following pages, the declinist-reformist understanding of time and tradition was far from being uncontested or predominant. A progressive understanding of time sought to redeem innovations, not as inevitable practicalities, but as the natural, even desirable unfolding of history.[16]

By offering an alternative, progressive vision of history and tradition, the early modern Ottoman Sufis of this book also challenged the reformist authoritarianism to which the Ottoman center resorted throughout the seventeenth century. This reformist authoritarianism, which I call "state-religion" in this book, was marked by the instrumentialization of Islamic reformist discourse for the augmentation of central authority.[17] While this early modern political move toward the identification of religion and politics has been studied, the strong criticisms of the use of religious politics for the augmentation of power (salṭanat) have escaped attention.[18] Therefore, studies have assumed that early modern thought simply assented to the identification of religious and political authority, thus missing the complexity of an important strand in Ottoman politics. The Sufi criticisms of state-religion and its efforts at the identification of religious and political was a key marker of the formation of the Ottoman political public sphere.

In this book, I focus on the strategies by which the Ottoman religious publics challenged the identification of religious and political authority and impeded the state's efforts to expand its reach through this identification. First and foremost, I focus on a Persianate Sufi discourse that explicitly disputed the equation of Islam with sharia. Second, I focus on the insistence on a neutral space within sharia discourse (mubāḥ) that defined an area of practice and doctrine that was not subject to legal discipline and enforcement.[19] These two

modes of argument—namely, Persianate Sufi and juristic arguments against puritanism—were closely enmeshed within the Ottoman anti-puritan discourse that took shape in the early modern era. By focusing on these early modern objections to the identification of religion and sharia, I would like to underline that the early modern identification of political and religious authority was a project that was criticized consistently by a multiplicity of authors and actors. Throughout the book, I use "state-religion" to refer to the specific project of the mobilization of a sharia-centered religious discourse for the augmentation of state authority. In so doing, my aim is to differentiate this centralist-authoritarian notion of civility from a host of alternative arrangements of religion and politics that have so far remained underexplored.

This book argues that in the early modern period, Sufi thought was simultaneously used to justify the sovereignties of nonstate actors, resulting in a theory of multiple sovereignties. Sufi theories that envisioned the differentiation of, yet cooperation between, temporal and spiritual power challenged the messianic assumptions of the unity of these two forms of power. This conception of politics as a partnership between multiple forms of sovereignty was highly appealing to the new political claimants of the time, such as the military elite, the secretarial bureaucracy, and the urban publics. Furthermore, the language of partnership also allowed older power magnates, who had had limited impact on imperial politics until the sixteenth century, to increase their influence from the provincial to the imperial level. The Mevlevī Sufi order, which is at the heart of this book, embodies this new language of partnership on both the practical and the ideological levels. The descendants of Celāleddin Rūmī (d. 1273), called *çelebi*s, were the formal heads of the Mevlevī order, while Sufi sheikhs were the order's spiritual leaders. The formal authority of the descendants of Rūmī was a function of economic, historical, and religious factors: landholding and other economic priorities, a historical claim to partnership with the founders of the Ottoman state, and spiritual authority. Despite all of these assets that made the *çelebi*s effectively yet another dynasty, they largely remained provincial power magnates until the seventeenth century, a period that this book shows to be an age of Mevlevī revival. Their rise was due to the shifting mode of imperial politics toward partnership. The Mevlevī order further developed a legitimizing framework for a novel notion of plurality of authorities. This political theology resonated with other aspirants to power, whose realities of sharing authority with the court did not find a suitable mode of legitimation in the predominantly absolutist idioms

and assumptions of Ottoman political writing. The close relationships between the Mevlevīs, on the one hand, and the military elite, civil bureaucracy, and urban publics, on the other, attest to the strong appeal of this novel language of multiple sovereignties for the Ottoman public sphere.

By virtue of negotiating the boundaries of state-religion and faciliating sovereignties at multiple levels, early modern Sufism allowed an expansive public sphere to establish claims to political subjecthood, that is, civility. In using "civility," I refer to a distinctly Ottoman understanding of cultural identity that was constructed and performed through a combination of conduct, speech, learning, and social connectedness that Ottoman authors referred to as "Rūmī identity."[20] In contrast to ethnic or local belonging, the Rūmī identity was adopted through acculturation into certain aesthetic, literary, and moral preferences through education and social formation.[21] The Rūmī identity was closely connected with an Ottoman subject's formation of political agency. In fact, studies on Rūmī identity have underlined the epithet "Rūmī" as an equivalent of a supra-ethnic Ottoman identity that was shaped and expressed by the ruling elite.[22] Yet, this book shows civility to be a much broader early modern phenomenon; in agreement with Cemal Kafadar, I understand Rūmīness as "a category shaped by the civil society."[23] Specifically, within the context of the seventeenth century, when politics became entrenched in the city rather than being limited to the imperial court, Rūmī identity and civility became the basis of political subjecthood for officials and nonofficials alike. Sufi networks played key roles in the dissemination of Rūmī self-fashioning in and beyond the elite circles; they functioned as informal institutions promoting education, intellectual formation, and upward mobility, and as such were prime venues for social and political commentary.[24]

The legitimation of newcomers to the social and political realm was made possible through the Sufi injunction that every man is a caliph in his own sphere. In the words of a Mevlevī author,

> Every person has a certain share of the divine caliphate in accordance with his capacity. Examples are the sultan's management and control of his domain, every governor's administration and control of his province, a homeowner's management and control of the house and those inhabiting the house.[25]

This notion of every man's caliphate (ḫilāfet-i ʿāmme-i nās) implied each individual's governance over a moral and political realm in accordance with his station. This striving for moral authority—more precisely, familiarity with

the cultural codes surrounding moral authority—was the basis of a broadly accessible civility. Through association with Ottoman Sufi orders, new political agents—whether former elites who enjoyed an aggrandization of power, or newcomers who had recently joined the military and political elite—construed themselves as legitimate political actors. Adopting a complete language of civility through acculturation in Sufi networks, new political actors and eventually the urban public countered the elite Ottoman authors' dismissal of their public participation as simply that of upstarts or strangers (*ecnebī*).[26] In these networks, the Ottoman public found not only informal training in civility, but a political theology that reckoned with a plurality of authorities, rather than an insistence on the monopoly of the center on both spiritual and temporal power.

Taming the Messiah traces these new mystical trends of the seventeenth century that defended plurality and novelty against an absolutist traditionalism, from the offices of Istanbul's bureaucratic class to an exciting new social space, the coffeehouse. In these spaces, ideas and performances developed in Sufi circles were employed to create new languages for limiting political surveillance. These theories were first developed within the context of Sufi rituals, such as music or dance. In defending their arguments, Sufis developed a conception of "legal privacy," a space of discourses and practices that were not within the purview of sharia enforcement.[27] Within this space of legal privacy, communities could exercise divergent interpretations of sharia without the interference of legal institutions. While initially employed with attention to Sufi communities, arguments for the delimitation of sharia-based political surveillance were employed in other disputes in the early modern period, most notably in the coffeehouse debates. This book shows the employment of a limited notion of sharia as public law, first developed within the Sufi debates on Sufi innovations, and then employed in addressing other pressing issues in the early modern period that involved the ideals of an all-pervasive state and of the autonomy of substate communities. In other words, the Sufi notion of legal privacy was the Ottoman solution to the two conflicting, coexisting forms of early modern governmentality: effective state surveillance and communal autonomy.[28] This book conceptualizes the seventeenth century as the clash of these two modes of governmentality, which created two distinct notions of citizenship and civility.

In seventeenth-century Ottoman society and politics, civility served as a powerful paradigm that relocated sovereignty and order from the person of a

cosmically approved ruler to a vibrant public sphere. This shift was not without conflict and turmoil, as the dynastic state and its supporters sought to delimit the political influence of the new publics. Furthermore, in an era offering more opportunities for upward mobility and political participation than ever before, the expansion of political participation was one of the key markers of the period.[29] However, it remains unclear precisely who was allowed to join the political nation, and what criteria were used to distinguish good, deserving citizens from undeserving ones. These were the main questions that the Ottoman public sought to settle in the first three quarters of the century, through contesting norms of legitimacy and civility. This book reconsiders the intense religious debates of the seventeenth century as a clash of visions of civility; in other words, as diverging Ottoman responses to the question of what constituted political and social authority.

According to the first, better-known vision of civility, sharia abidance was the litmus test of Ottoman legitimacy and citizenship—that is, whether one was a proper Rūmī Muslim. A puritan movement of preachers known as the Ḳaḍızādelis advocated this position vocally from the 1620s to the 1680s, occasionally finding support from the dynasty and the ruling elite. According the dynasty center stage in a moral battle against the undisciplined masses, the puritan movement's vision of religious and political authority promised to expand the central authority's control over its subjects.[30] The puritan movement had two main targets, who, it claimed, had tarnished pure religion by adopting innovations: Sufi networks and urban crowds.[31] However, while the motives of the puritan movement have received much scholarly attention, the responses of these two targeted groups are understudied, resulting in an unbalanced portrayal of the century as an age of puritan-minded conservatism. By focusing on Ottoman reactions to the puritan movement, whether from Sufis or from other urban groups, I uncover a second, equally influential vision of civility that explicitly criticized the puritan project of sharia-based moral surveillance and advocated its delimitation.

The main contribution of this book is to restore to seventeenth-century Ottoman religious debates their bilateralism. On a related note, the book establishes the broader political implications of these debates as disputes on the norms of political legitimacy and civility; in other words, on the formation of moral and political selves. In contrast to the predominant portrayal of the period as one of sharia-minded conservatism, I argue that the century saw the rise to prominence of major Sufi networks that defended Persianate conceptions

of ethics and morality. The prime markers of this Persianate piety were a refusal to reduce morality to sharia, a pro-innovation dispensation, and a pluralistic vision of authority that countered the puritan push for uniformity.

The book also presents a new understanding of the concept of "Persianate." While there is a considerable secondary literature on "Persianate," the main focus of this literature is the movement of texts in the Persian tongue across the early modern Islamic world.[32] Instead, I focus on the question of what the Persianate canon meant in a given place and time: in early modern Ottoman intellectual life. I uncover an early modern understanding of the term that considered Persian and vernacular literatures that develop in connection with Persian—hence, Persian*ate*— as a term symbolic of the constant presence and desirability of progress within the Islamic tradition. The contribution of Persian-language works to the Islamic canon was considered to be an undefeatable argument for a progressive notion of tradition, an argument similarly applicable to other recent contributions to the canon—in this case the Ottoman contributions in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish.

THE EARLY MODERN OTTOMAN PUBLIC SPHERE: HISTORIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

The story of the Ottoman state begins with a loosely organized, largely tribal *ghāzi* (warrior) state opportunely located on the Byzantine frontier. This early warrior state quickly expanded beyond its territory, despite major challenges, such as defeat at the hands of Timur in 1402 and an ensuing interregnum. The real turning point in the transformation of this *ghāzi* state into an empire came with Meḥmed II and his conquest of Constantinople in 1453. This event marked the beginning of an intensive and comprehensive process of Ottoman imperial centralization, complete with the elimination of potential power magnates and systematic regulation of the legal system and court procedure. This process was continued by subsequent Ottoman sultans, albeit with different approaches. By the reign of Süleymān the Lawgiver (r. 1520–1566), the Ottomans had firmly established themselves among the world's most powerful empires, alongside their rivals to the west, the Habsburgs, and their archenemies to the east, the Safavid Empire.

In this age of global imperial rivalry, competing discourses of cosmic dominion became the dominant idioms of political ambition and aspiration across Eurasian empires. The Ottomans were no exception. Mystical theories

of kingship conjured images of Ottoman rulers as the pinnacle of the entire cosmos. As recently argued by Hüseyin Yılmaz, Ottoman political thought achieved this goal by diverging from the early Islamic meaning of "caliphate," which denoted political leadership of the Islamic community by a deputy (literally, caliph) of the prophet Muḥammad (d. 632). Before the Ottomans, caliphs of Islam had been part of a continuous chain of transmission of deputyship, required to fulfill certain formal conditions for eligibility—primarily belonging to the Prophet's tribe.[33] Diverging from this classical interpretation of the caliphate, however, the Ottomans emphasized a mystical notion of kingship that not only eradicated the formal requirements of the caliphate, but also supplied a new language of cosmic rulership.[34] The mystical notion of "caliph" was based on the Sufi concept of the perfect man (*insān-ı kāmil*), according to which every human has the capacity to reach spiritual perfection through spiritual training. At the station of spiritual perfection, one fully attains God's qualities, and becomes "[God's] caliph on earth."[35] As Yılmaz aptly puts it, once Ottoman political authors adopted the mystical notion of "caliphate," "God himself . . . became the primary model for a ruler."[36]

In early modern Ottoman political theory, therefore, the conception of kingship was inspired by the attributes of God—predominantly his oneness, but also his aloofness and omnipotence.[37] However, despite distancing the ruler from the rest of society in theory, when put into practice mystical theories of rulership invited public political participation on a number of levels. First and foremost, the continued use of the title "caliph" was itself a reflection of the Muslim community's need to conceive of the rightly guided rule established by the Prophet as permanent. Therefore, Ottoman messianic theories of rulership were more than a mere power strategy deployed by the state to augment its authority; they constituted a discourse designed by the state to garner public support and legitimacy.[38] As a corollary to this public aspect of mystical rulership, the successful adaptation of mystical and moral languages of rule was only made possible by the cooperation of a wide range of actors. This cooperation rendered the political caliphate a platform for the formation of public political agencies.

Messianic languages of rulership were crafted and sustained through negotiations between various actors. Therefore, despite their absolutist façade, these ideologies played a key role in creating platforms for broader political engagement. For instance, in a recent study of the life and political vision of the distinguished chancellor and historian İdrīs-i Bidlisī (d. 1520), Christopher

Markiewicz underlines the role of highly mobile Persianate bureaucrats in establishing the messianic ideology of empire. Throughout his study, Markiewicz also illustrates that the theory of godly rulership (ḫilāfat-i raḥmānī) was not the product of the court of Bayezid II (d. 1512) but was crafted by a highly mobile, well-connected Persianate circle of litterateurs. Significantly, these agents of political theory saw themselves not as mere servants of the state, but as critics of its actions.[39] In other words, the production of discourses of the caliphate and the moral scrutiny of political authority were two sides of the same coin—namely, of self-formation as political subjects.[40]

Yet another compelling case study for considering the caliphate as a joint project shaped by a large social base comes from the Indian Ocean world. In her study of Indian Ocean Sunni Muslim networks, which she labels "*khutba* networks," Elizabeth Lambourn underlines the agency of Muslim merchant communities as a strong, well-connected interest group from the fall of the Abbasids well into the Ottoman era. These *khutba* networks expressed their identity through the ideal of a Muslim universalism. Building on Lambourn's insights, Giancarlo Casale argues that the adoption of the concept of the caliphate should be seen as a "proactive reinvention of the traditional *khutba* network," rather than as an ideology carefully and exclusively crafted in and by the imperial capital.[41] In promoting and reproducing the language of the caliphate, these networks did not selflessly serve the Ottoman state. Lambourn describes a process that she calls the "barter of *khutba* for cannon," whereby the *khutba* networks expected their ideological cooperation to be reciprocated by Ottoman support.

In other words, upholding the ideal of God's kingdom on earth was the shared interest of multiple actors in the early modern Ottoman world, official and nonofficial alike, who established their own political agency by participating in the imperial project. Recognizing these semiofficial and nonofficial engagements drives home the collective and public-forming aspects of Ottoman rulership. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the mystical notion of rulership was its openness to emulation; anyone could strive for spiritual perfection, as implied by the notion of every man's caliphate cited above. As such, theories of moral purification were at the heart of Ottoman notions of civility; through adopting the worldview, language, and moral conduct advanced in these guides, one could construct oneself as Rūmī, and as a moral and political agent. In the early modern Ottoman world, public political participation took place through competing visions of religious and moral authority.

Recognizing the relationship between piety and political agency is crucial, as it challenges the assumption that a public sphere necessarily relies on the ideal of the equality of all citizens.[42] In the changing political landscape of the seventeenth century, it was mystical theology that was used to legitimate the participation of wider society in local and imperial politics, as well as in forming publics as units of social solidarity. In demonstrating the contribution of mystical theology to this new pluralist culture, the book also presents an important challenge to the recent literature on the caliphate and mysticism, which treats mystical theories of the caliphate as utopian expressions of unity and uniformity. Instead, this book suggests that mystical languages of rulership were sites of contested sovereignties.

The moral premise at the heart of early modern empire wedded spiritual leadership and political agency and generated a flurry of political writing in moral or divinatory idioms. The flurry of political commentary in specifically early modern guises, such as prophecy and divination, was an important channel for public opinion, as Barbara Flemming shows in her study of public opinion under Sultan Süleymān.[43] Despite Flemming's early insight, however, the study of public opinion in the early modern Ottoman era remains rudimentary. There are various reasons for this deficit. In early Ottomanist historiography, Weber's theory of oriental absolutism cast a long shadow over the exploration of associational life, which was simply nonexistent in the East.[44] Even after direct rebuttals of this theory via the argument that Islamic social and economic institutions did in fact facilitate associational life, public political participation in the early modern age remained an unnamed phenomenon until recently. With a few exceptions, the "public sphere" is still considered a Western phenomenon, adopted by non-Western societies—and to a questionable extent—only with the onset of Westernization in the late eighteenth century.[45] More recently, these presumptions of absolute incompatibility between the West and the rest have been discredited by new analytical approaches. In particular, as Ottoman studies has come to be closely engaged with the framework of global early modernity, the parallels between political and societal changes in the Ottoman Empire and European states have received close attention.[46]

Despite this recent shift, however, research continues to focus more on the formation of robust state institutions and practices than on the forms of public political life that these new political formations created. Yet, this preoccupation with centralization and bureaucratization results in the neglect

of the complex processes of negotiation between the state and various levels of society, and of the early modern public sphere that was the result of this negotiation. In the words of Phil Withington, "The story of early modern state formation is as much about the creation of citizens defined by their capacity for public activity as it is about the centralization of functions conventionally associated with modern polities: war, taxation, and bureaucracy."[47] This book contends that the history of early modern state formation is incomplete and misleading when told without consideration of the emergence of new venues and languages of political participation.

Recent research on early modern state formation emphasizes the role of early modern states in forging representative tendencies in society. This literature has challenged the use of such blanket terms as "absolutism" for early modern polities, including states such as France that have long been closely associated with the paradigm of absolutism. A key insight emerging from these challenges is that for effective functioning, the strong absolutist courts of early modern Europe depended on cooperation with the local elites and other powerful social groups, such as nobles, clergy, guildsmen, and venal officeholders. Accounting for moments of cooperation and negotiation has transformed the conception of early modern absolutism in the last twenty-five years. In particular, analysis of the early modern French state, once considered the pinnacle of absolutism under Louis XIV, has changed drastically under this revisionist rewriting. Instead of stressing a modern state crafted by a small elite at a single center, historians emphasize "the many weaknesses and contradictions that led Louis to create a working compromise with the elites, whose subjection owed more to the rewards on offer than it did to a policy of crushing noble power."[48] Although political theory of the time continued to perpetuate the idea of an unrivaled, absolutist state, in practice the early modern state owed its success to social collaboration with the nobility.[49]

French historians' observations regarding the enmeshed nature of early modern institutions and nonofficial networks are paralleled elsewhere. One historian highlights this recent shift in the understanding of state–society relationships as one of the salient changes in recent historiography:

> The early modern state was hardly autonomous from the larger society from which it emerged. Rather, it was a composite of both formal institutions and informal networks of kinship, personal allegiances, clientage ties, and other relationships based on social status and individual influence. . . . The understanding that early modern governing institutions "reflect shifting political force fields, changes in the

classes and groupings that express interests, the variable character of the interests themselves . . . and the various organizational forms that those interests assume," has been one of the most important developments in the history of state formation in recent decades.[50]

To achieve a fuller understanding of the complex structural transformations of the early modern state, it is important to refrain from studying state discourses of power in isolation, and to consider the social negotiation of such discourse. The two pillars of the formation of the modern state, bureaucratic complexity and the local infiltration of central institutions, developed not through the superimposition of rules and institutions on society, but through alliances and networks of patronage forged through the various strata of the semiofficial and nonofficial spheres.[51] This shift opens up important directions for historical analysis. First, patronage networks have begun to receive attention as mechanisms not only for social mobility, but also for the formation of political agencies within these networks. Second, and relatedly, the key roles of a variety of intermediary actors in politics, such as provincial administration, legal institutions, and security, have begun to be emphasized. These intermediaries were allies of the state in different realms of rulership; they helped the state to expand its grip on society, while augmenting their own power. Beyond their contributions to the everyday workings of governance, these intermediaries helped to shape prevalent notions of authority and the limits thereof. Therefore, a focus on varieties of intermediation and political subjecthood has replaced a sole emphasis on the court and bureaucracy, underlining the symbiotic relationship between political institutions and the broader public.[52]

In short, the early modern public sphere described in recent historical research did not develop outside of and against a neatly separated and reified state. On the contrary, early modern publics were enmeshed with state networks and institutions and emerged from regular interactions with them. This framework of the early modern public sphere is highly applicable to the Islamicate empires of the early modern era—namely, the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals. However, although historians have analyzed these three polities in comparable terms, they have refrained from linking these intermediary and partnering associations to the emergence of the public sphere, because of the dominance of the Western-Habermasian model.[53]

It is crucial to underline the rich variety of ways in which publics and states were intertwined to correct the prevalent assumption that they were necessarily opposed to one another. Public and state authority could in fact interact

in a variety of ways: the former could be *apart from, against, in support of, in dialogue with, in partnership with, or beyond* the latter. In all of these relationships, whether in the form of opposition to the state or partnership with it, the political authority was subject to various degrees of accountability.[54] In this book, I underline these different forms of coexistence between the state machinery and political publics, focusing not only on opposition and criticism, but also on cooperation and partnership.[55]

The public sphere of historians has little in common with the public sphere idealized by Jürgen Habermas in his seminal *Structural Transformation*. Habermas describes an eighteenth-century public sphere that positioned itself strictly outside of and against the state, and was the locus of rational, deliberative thinking. This ideal public sphere, according to Habermas, was short-lived yet invaluable in terms of political aspiration. A common criticism of Habermas's portrayal of a rational and democratic eighteenth-century public sphere is that his historical account is overly idealized, intended primarily to provide a foil against which to criticize twentieth-century politics, rather than to describe an actual historical institution.[56]

Historians underline that contrary to Habermas's interpretation, the ideal of a liberated public sphere accessible to all members of society was never actualized in the early modern world (or, arguably, thereafter). Barriers to entering the realm of political action were always present, particularly for women, the lower classes, and the uneducated. In many cases, those excluded from one form of political association formed alternative publics, therefore making it imperative to consider publics as a plural—rather than a singular and all-encompassing—phenomenon at a given time.[57] Furthermore, secular, rational discourse emphasizing the equality of all men was just one possible ideology of civic society.[58] "Carnivalesque publics" in which performance, rather than discursive argumentation, prevailed were one of the important venues for public expression.[59] Even more importantly, in the early modern world, public political grievances and visions were often expressed in religious language. Representing true, uncorrupted moral order was the most potent language of criticism of the political order—hence the ideological basis of a functioning public sphere.[60] In other words, the presence of a program for equal public participation for all was by no means a benchmark of an early modern public sphere; the predominant justification for public political participation remained pietistic and moralistic.

Despite the aforementioned criticism of the original Habermasian model, historians of early modernity retain the terms "public" and "public sphere,"

which denote concepts they regard as key markers of early modernity.[61] The formation of alternative sources for the legitimacy of authority beyond a limited elite, through the channels of state formation explained above, was one of the key characteristics of the politics of early modern regimes. This political shift had significant cultural ramifications, particularly the increasing standardization of the participation of the "masses" in politics. Early modern power struggles were settled in the public eye and often through public participation; an ever-growing portion of society was integrated into political struggles as a result of the conflicts that arose between different components of a bureaucratic structure. In other words, the mobilization of publics to garner support became a key move in factional politics, making public political participation a shared trait of early modernity.[62] Another ramification was cultural, in the form of new cultures of visibility and representation. Increasingly, new groups claimed new venues and forums of visibility, therefore becoming visible in spaces, texts, and images that had previously been reserved for the representation of ideal types. This gradual shift in public visibility reached its apex in the eighteenth century, with the visibility in the cityscape of formerly unseen actors, including women and lower-class city-dwellers.[63] Rather than coming to fruition as a result of a natural progression, however, the new public culture of this period was the product of struggles and debates that had begun at least a century earlier.

This book argues that rather than being a fanatical exception to the otherwise open culture of Ottoman early modernity, the seventeenth century was a crucial period in which alternative visions of the political publics and their relationship with the early modern state formed and competed. In identifying early modern Ottoman political publics, I focus my analysis on the languages and practices of scrutinizing political authority, and on public discussions of the limits of political authority and surveillance. I define the Ottoman public sphere as the totality of discursive, administrative, and economic structures that allowed and sustained political life outside the structures of the court and bureaucracy. In contrast to the prevailing notion of premodern, non-Western politics as the exclusive realm of the royal entourage and bureaucratic officeholders, this book understands early modern political authority as dependent on social negotiation, mobilization, and legitimation.

The early modern public sphere emerged from within the state machinery and exercised its political authority through the mobilization of the multiple frameworks of morality available to its members. Instead of the discourse of

the equality of all men, it was the (potential) caliphate of all men that facilitated and justified political participation. In developing my own analysis, which emphasizes the connection between moral and political agencies, I rely on historiographical discussions of early modern Ottoman publics. These discussions follow two main trajectories: exploration of institutions that invited public participation, and analyses of premodern constitutional thought. First, the institutional approach focuses primarily on the legal and social structures that granted communities legal autonomy. This approach underlines the legal autonomy that Islamic tradition granted to guilds, pious endowments, scholars (ʿulamā), and non-Muslim communities, hence identifying the civic potential embedded in institutional practices. Important articles by Halil İnalcık and Saïd A. Arjomand, among others, use this approach to refute claims that Islamic institutions and legal structures were intrinsically antithetical to the formation of civic cultures. Instead, these articles highlight the structural space provided by economic and legal practices for an autonomously functioning civic culture with considerable rights to self-determination.[64] Despite its conceptual significance, this approach needs to be supported by historical monographs that analyze when, where, and how such civic potential was actualized, if at all.

The institutional approach to this potential involves the study of state practices that aimed to grant the public a platform to reach the ruler, such as that of petitioning the sultan. Every Ottoman subject had the right to address grievances to the imperial council (dīvān-ı hümāyūn), particularly regarding the mismanagement and abuse of office, and addressing these grievances was an important expression of an Ottoman sultan's commitment to justice.[65] Studying these petitions, Suraiya Faroqhi highlights their significance as channels through which the public learned, practiced, and reproduced political discourse.[66] Although the right to petition was available from early on, it was only in the late sixteenth century that petitioning gained momentum—a historical shift that Faroqhi attributes to the economic and social crisis at the turn of the century.[67] Faroqhi casts petitioning as a form of political activity from the bottom up, challenging the Weberian notion of "Oriental despotism."[68] In other words, Ottoman subjects had access to institutions and governmental practices that allowed them to exercise a degree of autonomy in their economic and legal dealings.

A second approach focuses on actualization rather than potential. This approach emphasizes the study of historical events that suggest that these

structural opportunities to exert political agency were in fact used to delimit Ottoman imperial power. The important turning point in this respect came in the late sixteenth century, which saw a transition toward conceptualizing the state as an impersonal entity, increasingly separated from the person of the sultan. This ideological shift was a product of changing political dynamics, whereby the dynasty became just one of multiple actors that determined the empire's political direction.[69] Throughout the seventeenth century, bureaucrats, the military elite, and the grandee households they formed increasingly worked to expand their autonomy, which was based on the delegation of the sultan's power.[70] Scholarly bureaucrats (ʿulamā) had a special role in the empire as powerful agents who capitalized on their legal literacy and their potential to grant religious legitimacy. As such, they played important roles in the numerous public protests of the century, through which Istanbul's public intervened in significant imperial decisions, such as the making and unmaking of kings.[71] Most of these urban rebellions were led by the janissaries. There were six janissary uprisings in the first half of the seventeenth century: in 1031/1622, 1042/1632, 1057–58/1648, 1061/1651, 1066/1655, and 1066–67/1656.[72] Artisans of the capital similarly orchestrated urban protests on at least two occasions, in addition to participating in janissary-led rebellions.[73] Unlike earlier urban rebellions, which had been overwhelmingly military, seventeenth-century protests featured significant civil involvement.[74] Perhaps the most significant outcome of this seventeenth-century political turmoil in the long term was the articulation of the constitutional rights of Ottoman subjects vis-à-vis the ruling class. The violation of these rights provided a legitimate reason to mutiny.

Ottoman historians refer to these articulations as a constitutionalist trend that came to prominence in the seventeenth century. Despite the lack of a written constitution, various groups in the empire were able to claim certain rights vis-à-vis the ruling class. The subject–ruler relationship became shaped not by the language of servitude, but by that of mutual rights and obligations.[75] In emphasizing the increasing prominence of a contractual relationship between the ruler and the ruled in the seventeenth century, historians do not seek to suggest that Ottoman subjects did not have rights before this period. On the contrary, providing justice to subjects had always been the cornerstone of Ottoman legitimacy. However, it was only at the turn of the sixteenth century that Ottoman subjects consistently reiterated their rights to the ruling class as the basis for making concrete demands, and developed a political

culture in which the public scrutiny of the ruling class was routinized. This practice of public scrutiny was a distinct feature of early modernity that the Ottoman Empire experienced alongside their contemporaries to the east and to the west.[76]

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY

Taming the Messiah sets itself the task of understanding Sufi conceptions of authority and sovereignty along with the social worlds those conceptions create. This task requires combining two types of inquiries. First, I closely read manuscript works produced by Ottoman Sufi authors on what they saw as pressing questions of the seventeenth century. In doing this, I avoid the all-too-common artificial separation between religious and historical sources. Until recently, this distinction has guided the study of Ottoman religiosities. An example is the use of hagiographical sources in a limited manner—as a repository of biographies—or the neglect of treatises on seemingly timeless, purely legalistic questions such as music and dance. In this book, I pay close attention to these sources as expressions of visions of community and authority, and as commentaries on the limits of state-religion. By placing these sources in conversation with other types of sources, such as chronicles, I establish their historical relevance and their intended intervention within the larger world of alternative views and projects.

The second task consists of placing these manuscripts within their social world, in order to meaningfully ask the question of what kind of sociopolitical worlds they created. As far as Sufi thought is concerned, there are two ways to approach this question. The first is to study the patronage patterns: What was the social and economic basis of the power of a given Sufi order? Were there specific professional or economic patterns among supporters of a group? The second is to follow the reading and reception histories of the manuscripts in question. Following these paths allows me to argue that the Sufi discourses on authority and community that I discuss were not marginal matters, the relevance of which was limited to the members of a given Sufi community. To the contrary, I portray a world of favorable, even enthusiastic sympathizers, if not followers, of the Persianate Sufi worldview at the heart of this book. Bringing in the military elite and secretarial class in this manner draws the contours of the critical public, and argues for its place at the center of the Ottoman imperial order.

There is a certain irony, however, in establishing a theory of the Ottoman public sphere solely by focusing on patterns of patronage and readership. After all, these practices were predicated upon assets that were accessible only to a limited percentage of the early modern Ottoman society: wealth and literacy.[77] To address this question of scope and reach, I underline throughout the book the importance of nontextual, nondiscursive performances as public-forming social practices. These performances, ranging from political protest to Sufi ritual, embody an array of broadly shared ideals. In focusing on performance, my approach closely follows Azfar Moin's emphasis on the role of embodied, everyday practices as the main venue through which cultural and political ideals were communicated, not only for the illiterate masses, but also for court circles.[78] Unlike most performance studies that focus on social processes without attention to textual traditions, my aim in this book is to underline the interconnection between text and performance. I also add a new dimension to performance studies by investigating the question of how early modern Ottoman authors themselves saw performance. I therefore underline, particularly through discussions of Sufi musical ritual, early modern theories that construe sharing a social habitus on a regular basis as an important venue for, and a viable alternative to, textual learning. By focusing on the communicative, public-making role of performance as a fixture of early modern thought, I caution against exclusively textualist conceptions of morality and civility.

STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT

Chapter 1, "Politics as Spectacle: Changing Norms of Political Participation in the Seventeenth Century," portrays the historical background of the seventeenth-century Ottoman world based on existing scholarship and contemporary chronicles. The chapter underlines the transformations at the turn of the sixteenth century that invited publics into politics. In this period, the dynasty crafted new ceremonial traditions and spectacles for the capital's public, demonstrating the increasing significance of Ottoman subjects to imperial politics. In this new landscape, urban crowds participated more prominently and regularly in political spectacles, whether orchestrated by the state or staged by themselves, as protesters. Chapter 1 also introduces the religious debates of the century, emphasizing the search for orderliness and uniformity at their heart. However, it also shows that this uniformity was

beyond the reach of the Ottoman order, given the regime's dependence on the intermediacy of local and communal leaders.

Chapter 2, "Ottoman Anti-Puritanism: Communal Privacy and Limits to Public Authority," studies conflicting visions of community and religio-political authority through the debates around the Sufi ritual of mystical concerts (samāʿ). In the seventeenth century, the samāʿ debates served as a platform in which Sufi authorities marshaled ethical arguments in favor of communal privacy to challenge the intervention of public authority into sacred space. The pro-samāʿ authors also defended a shared social vision that considered the community, rather than the individual, as the site of virtue. This notion of communal virtue animated urban social and religious space and justified the demands of urban communities for privacy against religio-political surveillance. Through the study of samāʿ debates as expressions of a civic vision that scrutinized the limits of public authority, the chapter underlines the emergence of the urban public sphere via a delimitation of religious surveillance. I argue in this chapter that rather than being a mere repetition of similar debates around musical ritual, seventeenth-century debates contained specific responses to the early modern state's efforts at heavily regulating the domain of religion. Authors who defended samāʿ challenged the increased surveillance of sacred space and the efforts to limit socialization between different confessions. In their treatises criticizing the ban on samāʿ, these anti-puritan authors defended the privacy of their communities and the right to mixed sociabilities. Through a close study of the social vision of pro-samāʿ authors, the chapter also introduces Ottoman anti-puritanism as a distinct strand of early modern thought that began to form in the seventeenth century and remained influential until the mid-eighteenth century.

Thus, chapter 2 introduces the intellectual and cultural foundations of the urban public sphere and its delimitation of state surveillance. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 further investigate this theme by focusing on one anti-puritan Sufi order, the Mevlevī order. In addition, these chapters ask the question of how the anti-puritan Sufi orders established their power to negotiate norms of political surveillance and urban sociability. The chapters respectively argue that the power of Sufi orders was a function of their economic and social resources (particularly as sustained through the endowment system), of the material support of the military class in the seventeenth century, and of the ideological support of the Ottoman secretarial class in the same period. Chapter 3, "Sufi Sovereignties in the Ottoman World: Sufi Orders as Dynasties," introduces

the shifting trajectory of the Mevlevī Sufi order as a case study of changing conceptions of sovereignty in the Ottoman realm in the late sixteenth century. While always respected as the blessed heirs of Rūmī, the Mevlevī order remained outside the purview of Istanbul's ruling elite until the late sixteenth century. This respectful distance was due to the order's conception of sovereignty; the descendants of Rūmī (*çelebi*s) considered their dynasty a partner in the caliphate. In advancing this belief, they relied not only on their genealogical and spiritual descent from Rūmī, but also on their historical role in the establishment of Islamic rule in Anatolia. Therefore, the Mevlevī authorities shared two fundamental tenets of the legitimacy of the House of Osman: a mystical caliphate and the guardianship of Islam in the land of Rūm. Because of their unwillingness to surrender to the center's exclusive claim to caliphate, the Mevlevīs were regarded as less than ideal Sufis in the early stages of Ottoman rule. However, they quickly gained status thereafter, becoming a Sufi order favored by the elite in the seventeenth century, particularly in urban centers.

Chapter 3 argues that the change in the political fate of the Mevlevī order was symptomatic of a larger change in Ottoman political theology and structure. In the rapidly decentralizing Ottoman Empire, there was now greater room for alternative sovereignties such as that of the Mevlevīs, who were reincorporated into imperial ceremony and identity as partners. There was also room for the pluralistic worldview that conformed closely to the experience of Ottoman urbanites who increasingly subscribed to the order. Mevlevī identity was one way of establishing political legitimacy for the Ottoman elite, who built their political legitimacy and identity by patronizing Mevlevī lodges. Therefore, while the Mevlevī experience was exceptional in certain senses, it was in other ways simply a more pronounced articulation of the centrifugal tendencies explored in the first chapter of the book.

Chapter 4, "A New Volume for the Old *Mesnevī*: Reviving the Dual Caliphate in the Age of Decentralization," goes on to explore Ottoman conceptions of plural authorities in both religion and politics, focusing on the role of this worldview in the self-fashioning of Ottomans from various social strata. The chapter explores the story of Book Seven of Rūmī's *Mesnevī*, a new volume that Mevlevī authorities discovered and taught in the early seventeenth century. Mevlevī authorities framed and celebrated this discovery as a divine revelation to the Mevlevī order. The book was regarded as a manifestation of the indispensability of Sufi authority for the continued expansion of Islamic

tradition, in an age otherwise considered to have curbed such esoteric knowl-
edge and Sufi authority. The Mevlevīs considered this esoteric authority
indispensable not only for spirituality, but also for politics; Book Seven con-
tained political advice that contrasted the transcience of individual sultans
with the permanence of an order guarded by a range of advisers. According
to this vision of a plurality of authorities in religious and political realms,
Ottoman rule was a matter of partnership. The language of partnership pro-
vided new modes of self-fashioning for the empire's increasingly powerful
military elite, including the janissaries, thereby forging a new language of
civility. As a result, despite the puritan criticism of Sufi orders, major Sufi
networks such as the Mevlevī order expanded in the seventeenth century, as
manifested in a rapid increase in architectural patronage. The increased inter-
est among the military class in supporting the Mevlevī order was not simply
a pious choice; through association with this order, the Ottoman elite also
sought to partake in discourses and practices of civility and to publicly claim
new forms of political agency.

Chapter 5, "Language and Historical Consciousness: Theories of Progress
in Ottoman Early Modernity," explores Ottoman cultural notions of multiple
religiosities through the evocative imagination of the languages of heaven. In
the age of sharia-based puritan criticism of all innovations in religion, Otto-
man urbanites contested this drive for uniformity by citing a Persianate canon
that was equally authoritative for the legal manifestation of Islam and a core
tenet of belonging in the urban public sphere. The most explicit advocates of
this Persianate version of Islam were Mevlevī authors of the period, whose
worldview considered Rūmī's *Mesnevī* a second Qurān. This Persianate Islam
combated the undiscerning condemnation of innovation and drive for unifor-
mity in the realm of spirituality and culture. This pluralist and pro-innovation
notion of civility found much support among bureaucrats, especially scribes,
and among upwardly mobile Sufis in the empire's higher as well as lower
registers. The pro-innovation arguments of a Persianate-Ottoman Islam
further explicate the growing popularity of the Mevlevī network, emphasizing
the significance of its conception of civility and conduct for the expanding
urban public sphere.

Chapter 6, "Of Coffeehouse Saints: Contesting Surveillance in the Early
Modern City," explores the link between Ottoman Sufism and new forms of
urban civility, moving beyond elite patrons to the urban sphere. The first
Ottoman coffeehouses, established in the middle of the sixteenth century,

were spaces of free association and political dissent. Their susceptibility to disobedience in the eyes of political authorities reached a peak during the turbulent seventeenth century, when a new substance, tobacco, arrived from the New World and quickly became associated with the vices (or pleasures, depending on one's vantage point) of the coffeehouse publics. The debate surrounding smoking and coffeehouse publicity has to date been construed as a discord between secular and religious elements in Ottoman cities, the latter aiming to curb new secular sociabilities.

Chapter 6 explores smoking from a third, heretofore neglected vantage point that unsettles this religious–secular divide: that of Sufi authorities who disputed the state's religiously backed smoking bans. Critics of the state's tobacco bans made two main objections. First, the ban collapsed the distinction between public and private by creating a culture of surveillance wherein smokers were stigmatized even if the act of smoking took place in private. The critics of the ban intended to limit the culture and policy of undiscerning surveillance by restituting the public–private boundary, or by distinguishing between "sin" and "crime." Second, Sufi writings helped to create new meanings through which to "indigenize" tobacco. While antismoking treatises emphasized the foreign, non-Muslim origins of tobacco, another group of Sufis and preachers produced popular and literary works that indiginized tobacco as an agent of pleasure and of spiritual elation and advancement.

The legalization and indiginization of both coffeehouses and tobacco were, this chapter argues, largely brought about by Sufi orders, who quickly adapted to coffeehouse socialization and used this new space to connect with the larger public. In defending tobacco against the encroachment of political authorities and puritan religious criticism, Sufi authors deployed Persianate theories of tradition, primarily a positive affirmation of novelty and change. Debates regarding coffeehouses and tobacco served to broadcast these discussions of change, novelty, and the limits of public and private to the wider public via popular mediums such as poetry and song. More significantly, the sin-crime distinction illuminates the political power and meaning of these discussions: delimitation of sharia-backed surveillance.

The epilogue places the analysis of the book within the long-term trajectory of Ottoman history. In the history of Ottoman early modernity, the seventeenth century has been considered an anomaly, contrasting starkly with the previous century of imperial stability and the following century of effective reforms and Western-inspired modernization projects. Instead of this vision,

this book argues that the seventeenth century was a period when the formulation and dissemination of arguments in favor of a progressive Ottoman tradition were developed and tested. While developments such as decentralized rule, the opening up of urban space to new sociabilities, and the willingness to embrace new technologies and institutions have been associated with the eighteenth century, the analysis in this book suggests that the seeds of these developments were sown in the period under consideration.

Politics as Spectacle

*Changing Norms of Political Participation
in the Seventeenth Century*

On August 8, 1648, Sultan İbrāhim was dethroned and subsequently murdered by a palace clique that claimed he was mentally unstable. The leader of the palace clique was a certain Ṣofu Meḥmed Paşa (d. 1649), a vizier who was also known as Mevlevī Meḥmed Paşa on account of his allegiance to the Yenikapı Mevlevī Lodge, a Sufi lodge favored by Istanbul's janissaries.[1] Sofu Meḥmed Paşa retained his vizierial position after the coup, now offering his services to the seven-year-old sultan, Meḥmed IV. An archival serendipity allows us to see the bundle of imperial affairs that İbrāhim's seven-year-old son Meḥmed inherited on the day of his enthronement. Several grand vizierial communications (*telḫīṣ*) attest to the final discussions between Sultan İbrāhim and his vizier, in which the grand vizier assumes an instructional tone. On one occasion, for instance, the grand vizier explains to the sultan the purpose of the small note papers attached to petitions: they serve to summarize the petitions for the sultan, so that he would not need to read all of them at length. On other occasions, the grand vizier objects to the sultan's wish to send the Crimean khan a third letter in a row, reminding the sultan of the diplomatic inappropriateness of such an act. Yet another vizierial note politely warns the sultan to attend the imperial council's meetings in a timely manner, intimating "the sultan's early arrival would multiply the council's merriment upon seeing the sultan."[2]

Notably, through these communications, the vizier also instructs Sultan İbrāhim—and later, his successor, Meḥmed IV—in the intricacies of staging a political spectacle, a fine art that had become a crucial part of the ruler's

craft. For instance, when the sultan ordered the execution of a certain crimi-
nal in front of the Tower of Justice, the vizier overruled the imperial order.
The said criminal was of low standing (alçaḳ ḥallü)—so lowly in fact that he
remained nameless throughout the correspondence—and his execution thus
deserved only a modest scene. Therefore, the vizier instructed that the
criminal be executed in his neighborhood of residence instead. The vizier's
note goes on to state an important principle of urban space and the decorum
of political spectacle:

> Execution in front of the Tower of Justice must be reserved for major figures. [For
> instance,] it is appropriate to punish the bandit named Bıçakçıoğlu in front of the
> Tower of Justice; he has been arrested in Rūmili and he is about to arrive. The
> likes of that bandit will be handled [in this manner].[3]

The Bıçakçıoğlu in question had been involved in one of the most notori-
ously bloody revolts of the seventeenth century. On February 5, 1623, a group
of ʿulamā gathered at the Fatih Mosque to demand the deposition of Sultan
Muṣṭafā I, whom the ʿulamā—and some soldiers who supported them—
deemed insane and thus unfit to rule. When soldiers supporting Muṣṭafā I's
tenure broke into the mosque, the protest turned into an armed clash. Nine-
teen mosque-goers were killed. Adding insult to injury were the rumors that
of these nineteen Muslims killed at the mosque, nine were madrasa students
and three were sayyids, or descendants of the Prophet.[4] Bıçakçıoğlu was
involved in this scandalous clash on the side of the ʿulamā, and therefore
ranked high in the hierarchy of Ottoman rebels, far above common criminals
whose death penalty merited merely a neighborhood spectacle. In this manner,
the sultan and his vizier worked on various levels of urban spectacle for ban-
dits, rebels, and criminals, sometimes resorting to ignominious parading
(teshīr) before an execution.[5]

Early modern Istanbul was never short of political spectacles. In fact,
according to the ethical-practical wisdom of the day, one of the major signs of
good government was the effective management of "the theater of the city."[6]
Starting in the 1580s, however, the monopoly of the imperial court on staging
spectacles was threatened, and eventually broken, by new political actors, such
as the janissaries, scholars, artisans, and the urban population. In this chapter,
I study the emergence of the politics of the crowd in the late seventeenth
century with special attention to the theater of the city—namely, the urban
public space that became the site of daily politics in the early modern period.[7]

I start with a discussion of Ottoman imperial festivities as early modern ceremonial inventions that facilitated the participation of urban audiences in politics at a gradually increasing level. I then turn to the late sixteenth century, when staging political spectacles ceased to be an imperial prerogative. By focusing on select urban rebellions and contemporary narratives about them, I underline the gradual expansion of the political nation with its conceptual ramifications. In other words, the focus of the chapter is the connection between political events of the century and political thought. Did the regular participation of publics in politics throughout the seventeenth century accompany a change in the Ottoman conception of sovereignty?

The question of the link between political thought and public political action—specifically in the form of protests, rebellions, and violence—has an important place in early modern historiography. For a long time, crowd action and violence were understood not as politics but as a failure or suspension of politics, which was itself understood as effective governance of the populace. E. P. Thompson's 1971 article, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," challenged this notion by underlining that crowd action was made possible by shared notions of legitimacy, in this case the shared belief that a political system was considered just only when it could enable access to affordable food.[8] Thompson's insights were later reinforced by the anthropological turn in history, when crowd action began to be interpreted through the lens of ritual and symbolic action.[9]

The relationship between political action and political thought has been taken up by Ottoman historians in recent decades. In her 2007 article on the social significance of justice, Linda Darling explicitly linked the concept of moral economy with the Near Eastern notion of justice, which established the rights of subjects to safety, justice, and subsistence in return for taxation. Darling's study can be seen as a culmination of Ottoman historians' work on the importance of justice as a political theory informing the contractual relationship between the sultan and his subjects, with implications for government officials at all levels.[10] In the same year as Darling's article, Cemal Kafadar criticized the portrayal of janissaries as "rebels without a cause," underlining instead their possible political motivations and social alliances. Most notably, he underlined that the protests attested to the janissaries' claim to being constitutional parts of the Ottoman regime and integral parts of the imperial decision-making processes.[11] Invoking a tradition of janissary involvement in succession that went back to the deposition of Meḥmed II in 1446, the

janissaries considered their interventions in Ottoman succession processes not as disruptions of politics, but as a political right engrained within the ideal Ottoman order. In these interventions, they also sought and acquired fatwas from the ʿulamā in order to construe their interventions as legitimate, even necessary, political actions. Hüseyin Yılmaz notes the regularity with which fatwas were issued to legitimize dethroning sultans, resulting in the coinage of a specific term for these fatwas: "the deposition fatwā (ḥall fetvāsı)."[12] Read closely, therefore, the political events of the seventeenth century attest to a significant change in political ideas, shifting toward the reconstruction of imperial sovereignty as a partnership among multiple claimants to legitimacy and agency.

In this chapter, I argue that the political events of the century and their interpretations by contemporary Ottoman authors mark an ideological shift away from the discourse of the unity of sovereignty to a notion of multiple sovereignties. Whereas the former political language assumed that all forms of political power stemmed from the House of Osman by way of delegation, the seventeenth-century public conceptualized political power as a partnership among various actors with their own constitutional rights and the capability to delimit the power of the center. The chapter also argues that the public nature of the events was not incidental, but essential to their political agendas. The century saw the rise of new forms of political spectacle and symbolisms that were intended to achieve mass mobilization, an important feature of early modern politics. The increasing significance of mass mobilization through spectacle and religious discourse propelled political negotiations on the question of "good versus bad publics," or the question of who had the right to political agency. The gradual normalization of the political participation of urban publics (cumhūr, şehirli) is an important milestone in the formation of the early modern public sphere. This normalization and justification were largely the product of religious discourse. I therefore end the chapter by arguing that the religious debates of the period were extensions of this larger debate on the right to public political participation, which is to say, on civility (Rūmīlik).

SETTING THE STAGE: THE EARLY MODERN PUBLIC SPHERE AS HETEROTOPIA

A 1538 depiction of early modern Istanbul shows with great detail and clarity the Hippodrome (Atmeydanı), the capital's most significant public square.[13]

FIGURE 1. Maṭrakçı Naṣūḥ's depiction of the Hippodrome. Courtesy of Istanbul University Library.

The miniature, drawn by the historian Matrakçı Naṣūḥ, portrays the square as a collection of memories of imperial glory, clearly centering elements of Byzantine architecture, most notably the three remnants of the Byzantine Hippodrome: the Theodosian Obelisk, the Masonry Obelisk, and the Serpent Column (fig. 1).[14] Much ink has been spilled on the significance of the Hippodrome as the main public square of the Ottoman capital and the chosen stage of the Ottoman elite for ceremonial and everyday encounters with the city's public.[15] Yet, while these imperial aspects of the Hippodrome have often been noted by historians, Maṭrakçı Naṣūḥ's depiction reminds us of a

forgotten monument right at the heart of the Hippodrome. This monument, shown at the right corner of the public square, is a small open-air prayer space (*mescid*) built to commemorate a Sufi saint, the Bayrāmī-Melāmī sheikh İsmāʿil Maʿṣūḳī, executed by the Ottoman order in 1539. This monument served as one of the multiple sites of commemorating the martyr-sheikh, who was widely believed to be the victim of an imperial injustice, across various sections of early modern Istanbul.

How are we to understand the presence of a memorial to an act that to some urbanites symbolized an episode of injustice right by the most significant public square of the early modern Ottoman capital? In this section, I argue that the early modern public square was not the site of unadulterated imperial might, but a space of heterotopia. In other words, it was a space "capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible."[16] In order to understand the Ottoman public square as a space where conflicting, incoherent narratives of the Ottoman order overlapped, I turn to a closer analysis of the monument to the martyr-sheikh. The narrative and architectural lives of this unusual monument, I argue, strongly suggest the heterotopian nature of the early modern public square, which juxtaposed elements of imperial ideology to its discontents. This heterotopian character applies not only to the public square as a spatial entity, but also to the public sphere as a political phenomenon.

Istanbulites kept alive the memory of one martyr-sheikh of Istanbul, the aforementioned Bayrāmī-Melāmī sheikh İsmāʿil Maʿṣūḳī (d. 1539), well into the nineteenth century through multiple narrative traditions and through a number of monuments that were to be erected and renovated during the early modern period. The earliest of such spatial souvenirs to the martyred sheikh was the Üçler Prayer Hall, an open-air prayer space that one follower of the deceased sheikh, the janissary ʿIrāḳīzāde Ḥasan Efendi, dedicated to the memory of Maʿṣūḳī.[17] According to Evliyā Çelebi, the site was believed to be the exact spot where Maʿṣūḳī was murdered along with his disciples.[18] Maʿṣūḳī, also known as Oğlan Şeyh (literally, the "boy sheikh") on account of his young age and beautiful countenance, was one among multiple Bayrāmī-Melāmī sheikhs executed by the state throughout the sixteenth century.

The divergence between the many contemporary sources makes it hard to ascertain the exact circumstances that led to his execution. While the witness testimonies recorded in the court records accuse Maʿṣūḳī of professing radical criticisms of revealed religion, intra-Bayrāmī sources argue that

Maʿṣūkī actively sought martyrdom by scandalizing the public with his preaching. According to the latter, the sheikh's provocative style was inspired by Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj (d. 922), the first martyr of Sufism. Ḥallāj was an itinerant preacher and a controversial Sufi, whom posterity considered to be executed for public pronouncements of *shaṭḥiyyāt*, utterances of mystical ecstasy that were intended to shock the hearer and shake them out of their torpor and indifference. The best-known of all *shaṭḥiyyāt* (mystical utterances) in the history of Sufism—namely, "I am the Truth (*ena'l-ḥaḳḳ*)"—is associated with the name of Ḥallāj al-Manṣūr.[19] For experiential Sufis, Ḥallāj remained an ideal figure who challenged societal conventions on the path of divine love. According to Ottoman authors, the Bayrāmī sheikh İsmāʿil Maʿṣūḳī aspired to the station of Ḥallāj's martyrdom, and hence disregarded the Bayrāmī order's practices of secrecy that entailed keeping the more controversial *shaṭḥiyyāt* limited to a private circle.[20] The content of Maʿṣūḳī's preaching is not known with certainty. It is known, however, that the sheikh gathered influential people around his person, having a particularly noteworthy following among janissaries and *sipāhi*s. It is plausible that this political influence was what brought the sheikh onto the radar of the authorities.[21]

Regardless of the doctrinal and social circumstances surrounding Maʿṣūḳī's execution, the state's handling of the sheikh remained a controversial topic for a long time. The chief mufti of Süleymān I, Ebussuʿūd Efendi (d. 1574), for instance, had to respond to a query about the legal status of "he who claims that the person known as Oğlan Şeyh, who was murdered, was murdered unfairly (*zulmen*)."[22] Even more dramatic stories of the sheikh's unfair treatment circulated in Istanbul well after his death. For instance, a passage by Evliyā Çelebi (d. ca. 1684) attests to the association of Maʿṣūḳī's execution with unfairness in the minds of (some) Istanbulites. According to him, when the sheikh was executed with his disciples, the sultan was at a garden in the Rumelihisarı. At the moment of execution, the sheikh and his disciples appeared on the sea before the sultan, performing the *samāʿ* with their severed heads in their hands. The sea was effervescent that day. The miraculous event showed the sultan that the dervishes were killed unfairly (*nā-ḥaḳḳ yere*).[23]

As Aslı Niyazioğlu emphasizes, supernatural tales about the martyred sheikh's severed head emerging in the Bosporus circulated in Istanbul as part of a lore of injustice.[24] Two memorial sites were persistent, palpable reminders of this history of injustice against the city-dwellers. The first site was initially formed by simply enclosing the location of the sheikh's execution with guardrails. In

1552, this open-air prayer space was converted to a "winter mosque," that is, to a properly built mosque. An endowment that paid the stipends of the mosque employees was created by Murād III. The Üçler Prayer Hall continued its presence at the Hippodrome until 1865, when it was destroyed by a fire.[25] Even after the mosque was destroyed, the sheikh's tomb was renovated and survived for some time after. In 1879/80, a female devotee renovated the tomb (*meşhed*) and reinstated a tombstone that commemorated İsmāʿil Maʿşūķī as a martyr.[26] The second memorial site was in Rumelihisarı, and the location where the sheikh's unburied body was believed to have emerged near Rumelihisarı became the site of yet another memorial. A chief secretary and later chancellor of the imperial council, Şıddıķī Aḥmed Efendi (d. 1662), erected a mosque at this burial location in the seventeenth century.[27] In other words, visible memorials to the martyred sheikh continued to dot Istanbul's landscape from the sixteenth well into the nineteenth century.

The architectural commemoration of Maʿşūķī's martyrdom embodies the heterotopian nature of the early modern Ottoman public square. This heterotopian nature seldom receives attention in historical scholarship, which focuses mainly on the imperial ideology's self-narration through architecture. Despite its many virtues, the historiographical emphasis on imperial ideology has portrayed the Ottoman state of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries almost as a state-without-society.[28] An emergent historiographical trend, however, aims to reintroduce the publics to sixteenth-century political history. For instance, in their recent work on Ottoman Istanbul, Kate Fleet and Ebru Boyar have challenged the prevalent notion that the courtly protocols of imperial seclusion characterized the essential nature of Ottoman rule.[29] Instead, they emphasize that while rituals of seclusion were significant practices, they must be studied in conjunction with the public-forming practices of the Ottoman center rather than in isolation. Through regularly occurring rituals as well as improvised public appearances, the Ottoman elite inserted themselves into the daily fabric of urban life in the capital, projecting visibility and even omnipresence.[30]

Throughout the early modern period, the sultan and the members of his court developed rituals and practices of visibility in the capital. One of these practices was the Friday processions of the sultans and their retinues. On these ceremonial processions to imperial mosques, sultans accepted petitions from subjects in need of the sultan's benevolent justice. This ritual sought to cultivate the image of a ruler who was accessible to his subjects and was committed to dispensing justice.[31] In fact, the practice of being visible every Friday

was so central to the sultan's image as a dispenser of justice and protector of his people that when certain sultans diverged from this practice, they were severely criticized by contemporary observers.[32] Another practice of imperial visibility was "going out in disguise" (*tebdīle çıkma*), where the sultan inspected the city in disguise and punished those who disobeyed his laws. The earliest accounts of imperial disguise in the Ottoman Empire go back to the reign of Selīm I (d. 1520), yet the practice really took off in the seventeenth century, as attested in chronicles as well as lively folk stories about unsuspecting Istanbulites speaking with too much frankness to the sultans in disguise.[33] Despite mentions of these practices, the literature on the public-forming practices of the Ottoman center prior to the seventeenth century remains highly limited.

Imperial festivities remain the most closely studied Ottoman practice that embodied the public performative aspects of political power. Imperial festivities were grandiose urban events staged on the occasions of key events within the dynastic family, such as circumcisions of princes or marriages of princesses. These turning points in the dynastic family's history were construed as events of public significance through festivals, in which the Ottoman palace presented itself as a prosperous and generous benefactor to the city and its population.[34] While Ottoman chroniclers, true to form, insisted on framing imperial festivities as an "ancient custom," these large-scale public celebrations were in fact creations of the early modern age.[35] These lavish festivities were carefully choreographed to reflect the Ottoman center's narrative of power and might through exhibiting the empire's riches. The sultan himself played a central role as the center of gravity. His public appearances were immortalized via pictorial and textual descriptions, which described the sultan and the Ottoman order in the loftiest terms. For instance, the messianic language of Ottoman political writing found a metaphorical parallel in descriptions of the imperial festivities, "through cosmological metaphors, likening the sultan to the sun, the members of his retinue to the constellations of stars, and, by implication, the Ottoman polity itself to a reflection of the heavenly order."[36] Aspects of the sultan's appearance were carefully planned and calculated in order to project the pomp and grandeur worthy of the sun of the universe. For instance, Gülru Necipoğlu notes that the sultan's horse was starved and suspended in the air before public appearances, to ensure glorious gravity.[37]

The extremes to which the imperial center went during the backstage preparations only attest to the significance of the public imperial performance and of the gaze of the audience. The political significance of these festivities

is best understood by casting them as public-forming ceremonies rather than as unilateral projections of state authority. To understand the true force of the public-forming aspects of the rituals, Kaya Şahin suggests reconstructing the sultan as a performer, who "expended considerable time, energy, and resources to please the different audiences he addressed."[38] The urban publics were thus involved as audiences whose divergent expectations were to be met by the staged performances. Furthermore, during festivities, the palace and the elite occasionally shared the stage with the urban public. Emphasizing the significance of the urban aspects of festivities, Derin Terzioğlu focuses on the role of the public not as mere onlookers approving the existing order, but as a subversive presence. Urban participants experienced the suspension of ordinary hierarchies and normative strictures and were transformed into unpredictable agents during these events. These experiences, it is important to note with Terzioğlu, were not accidental; they were facilitated through official policies such as public permission (*izn-i ʿāmm*)—namely, a state of lenience and suspension of moral judgment ordained by the grand vizier.[39] In short, the imperial festivities should be taken as case studies of the public-forming impact of the early modern Ottoman imperial practice.

Yet, despite these public-forming impacts of the early sixteenth-century political practice, visual and textual representations of power remained true to imperial decorum, which demanded centering the sultan and observing a neat hierarchy in the representation of the other performances. This decorum, closely observed throughout most of the sixteenth century, placed a deceptive, even partisan veneer on public festivities. In the 1580s, however, a representational shift, which also reflected a shift in political practice, took place: the streets of the city began to take center stage in textual and pictorial depictions. This representational shift has been closely studied by Çiğdem Kafescioğlu. Kafescioğlu's study on the changing pictorial representations of urban festivities in the early modern era examines the *Book of Imperial Festival (Surnāme)* by a certain İntiẓāmī, an illuminated manuscript dedicated to visualizing the 1582 imperial festival. This late sixteenth-century work differs from earlier productions in that the center stage of the depictions, conventionally reserved for the sultan and his close retinue, was now occupied by "artisans and other urban groups, professionals and performers."[40] The vivacity of the public square as depicted in the 1580s was quite different from the symbolic order of Matrakçı's Istanbul, where "the city as a whole was reduced to a secondary role" by filling the page with imperial monuments and not representing the

streets at all.[41] The change in pictorial representation was reflective of the broader changes taking place in the Ottoman public sphere, where new social groups found visibility in the political stage. The next section turns to the most dramatic examples of this novel culture of public visibility: urban protests and political spectacles.

THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY PUBLIC: REBELLIONS AND SPECTACLES

As the foregoing survey shows, the early modern public square was a space of heterotopia: a space for order and disorder, of imperial might and public festivity, of the embodiment of the ideals of justice and memories of injustice at the same time. This complex understanding of the public square parallels the Ottoman public sphere in the abstract sense. The framework of a porous, ever-shifting state-society boundary explains the dynamic realm of the early modern Ottoman state much more satisfactorily than the exercise of a pre-meditated, unswerving project of the Ottoman imperial power. As of the 1580s, however, Ottoman politics was shaped by new and brave manifestations of broader public participation in politics, most dramatically taking the form of frequent urban rebellions. The Hippodrome, the stage of imperial festivities, came to be known as "the meeting place of rebels" by the end of the century.[42] This transformation was the result of new claimants to political power, who formed coalitions and took to public squares in order to demand changes in officeholders, even sultans, and their official policies particularly in the fiscal realm. In short, as Baki Tezcan phrased it, the seventeenth century was a period of "the expansion of the political nation," a key transformation that would characterize Ottoman politics for the rest of the early modern period.[43]

Much ink has been spilled on the dramatic nature of the political and social changes that took place in this period following the end of Süleymān the Law-giver's reign in 1566. Historians have long debated the nature of this change, and specifically, whether we can apply the term "decline" to that time period—a term that Ottoman observers used generously and vigorously to describe their own era. The now discredited "decline narrative" held sway for a long time, particularly because it perfectly fit grand narratives about the rise of the West and the failure of the East to keep up. However, in the past three decades, the feasibility of a three-century-long decline and the methodological naivete of taking polemical Ottoman treatises at face value have caused the narrative to lose its allure.[44]

Following the periodization formulized by Linda Darling, I consider the period extending from the last quarter of the sixteenth century to the end of the first quarter of the eighteenth century as a period instead of consolidation.[45] Darling underlines that in this period, the political priority shifted from constant expansion to the maintenance of existing borders and to increasing the efficacy of existing administrative institutions and practices. As state institutions continued to develop and expand, they challenged the originally patrimonial nature of the state, in which the dynasty played the leading role. The state came to be conceptualized in a more abstract sense, as a complex structure in which bureaucrats, alongside their household and patronage networks, played an essential role.[46] This extensive network of political authority was the beginning of a transformation in Ottoman political culture toward a model of partnership where the state's main function was to arbitrate between multiple institutional and noninstitutional political actors.[47] In this period, the new political public sphere also experimented with new political languages, both discursive and symbolic. In this chapter, I focus on the emergence of new political languages as a result of the expansion of the political nation.

Nothing captures the changing nature of early modern Ottoman rulership more effectively than the various discussions of the alternatives to the House of Osman that occurred throughout the many public mutinies of the eventful seventeenth century, during which the idea that the ruling dynasty could easily be replaced was aired explicitly and regularly.[48] During various political manifestations, protesters and participants put forward the following as alternatives to the House of Osman: the Chingizid *girāy*s of Crimea, high-ranking military commanders (pashas), the chief mufti then in office, the janissary agha, and even a coalition of the public (*cumhūr cemʿiyyeti*). Each of these propositions was further justified—implicitly or explicitly—by a different logic, therefore attesting to the prevailing discord on what constitutes political legitimacy. The most popular of these, the proposition to replace the House of Osman with that of the Crimean khans, upheld the importance of the latter's Chingizid lineage as a compelling reason for their installation.[49] Similarly, the pashas and aghas who were reported to wish to displace and replace the dynasty had familial connections to the dynasty through marriage with a princess, or in one case, planned to establish such a connection by marrying the queen mother.[50] Recorded in the chronicles of the period, these discussions show that a connection with the Chingizid lineage, either through

the Crimean *girāy*s or through the Ottoman dynasty's members, was still an important component of rulership for some participants in these debates.

Yet, descent alone did not suffice. Other proposed alternatives to the House of Osman were based on merit only. Powerful households were considered as potential replacements by merit of their administrative capability and clout.[51] Another argument was based on spiritual merit; if the caliphate was attained by virtuousness, then no one deserved the title more than the chief mufti. Most interestingly, a mob of janissaries in 1703 proposed the idea of rule by a coalition of the public (*cumhur cemʿiyyeti*).[52] What prepared the ground for this strong, almost republican, political expression was a century of active political participation by the janissaries, who, as argued above, considered themselves a fundamental constituent of the Ottoman order with established rights, rather than mere slaves of the Porte. For instance, during the 1655–56 revolts, when Sultan Mehmed IV addressed janissaries in the traditional Ottoman manner as "my servants (*kullarım*)," they protested, reminding the sultan that only God could have servants; the sultan was a mere agent (*mütevelli*). According to the reports, after demanding their payments, the janissaries continued: "You do what we say or neither you, nor your mother, nor your retinue remains alive."[53]

None of the above projects was realized, or even pursued as a consistent program. Why, then, are these statements important to the historian? As Feridun Emecen remarks, the ease with which these alternatives were proposed in public mutinies, and the consistency with which written sources recorded them, suggest that increasingly during this period, the Ottoman dynasty was coming to be considered a mutable, rather than a core and indispensable, component of Ottoman authority (*dawla* or *devlet*).[54] The marginalization of the sultanate was a major turning point in the formation of the early modern state, defined as a "shift in power away from the person of the sultan and toward newly prominent elites."[55] The changing constellation of political power, whereby new powerholders claimed and exercised heightened political agency, was not limited to the highest echelons of the empire. Subjects, particularly Muslim subjects, of the Ottoman Empire challenged the established hierarchies in Ottoman society by pushing the limits of upward mobility.

Two momentous phenomena of the turn of the sixteenth century attest to these demands by Ottoman subjects for greater upward mobility. These demands were eventually realized. First, as Suraiya Faroqhi and Halil İnalcık convincingly argue, one of the important political motivations beyond the

countryside rebellions of the period, known as the Celālī uprisings, was the desire of the Muslim subjects to turn ʿaskerī, in other words to join the non-tax-paying ruling class.[56] Since Meḥmed II's conquest of Constantinople, functionaries of devşirme origin (converts of non-Muslim origin who held a slave status) had been preferred for the higher offices in the Ottoman governmental apparatus. The preference for the devşirme for high positions was an imperial policy that aimed to replace the Muslim-Turkish aristocracy and had garnered criticism from the latter group from early on.[57] Despite the significance of these early contestations of the limits on upward mobility, it would be mistaken to imagine these criticisms to be widespread political objections throughout the entire duration of Ottoman rule. In fact, Faroqhi carefully notes that the discomfort came to fruition only in the 1570s, alongside a combination of high inflation, population growth, and environmental factors that impeded agricultural production.[58] Through the Celālī rebellions, Muslim subjects of the empire challenged the limitations on their upward mobility by forcing the state to negotiate with them in order to re-ensure their loyalties to the empire.[59]

Contrary to the perturbation caused by the Celāli rebellions, the second momentous change governing social mobility happened quietly. By the latter part of the sixteenth century, janissary registers started to include nonslave soldiers considered as outsiders or infiltrators (ecnebī). By the early seventeenth century, the older practice of devşirme had entirely died out in favor of the recruitment of Muslims.[60] Together with changing recruitment patterns, other strictures governing the janissaries had come to be loosened in this same period. Most notably, janissaries became increasingly enmeshed with the civilian population, particularly the people of the marketplace (eşnāf): artisans and merchants.[61] Like the practices of upward mobility and janissary recruitment, another change that happened without formal announcement was the change in succession rules as of the reign of Aḥmed I (d. 1617). After this period, the former principle giving every prince equal claim to the throne was replaced with the principle of seniority.[62] These seventeenth-century changes in the gravitational center of political authority were never written down as a new code. Hence, historians have had to trace changing principles back from events.

This methodology from the event to the principle has also been at the heart of understanding the changing norms of political participation in the early modern period. Shifts in political mentality have been inferred from events in which the janissaries, ʿulamā, artisans, and urban populations made

political demands of the center and realized their political goals. During the numerous public protests of the seventeenth century, Istanbulites expressed their tacit assumptions about the prevailing social contract between the state and society.[63] In fact, the majority of the statements about alternatives to the House of Osman discussed above were uttered during one or another urban rebellion. Foremost among these urban events were the janissary rebellions. There were six major uprisings in the first half of the seventeenth century: 1622, 1632, 1648, 1651, 1655–56, 1687–88. These uprisings placed direct demands on the Ottoman administration, most often in the form of dismissals of high-ranking officers, including dethronements of the ruling sultans. In 1622, the janissary-led rebellion ended with the first regicide of Ottoman history.[64] Yet another group who took to Istanbul's public squares to press for policy changes were artisans. The guilds of Istanbul were at the forefront of the 1651 rebellion, when they demanded the repeal of a new tax, and of the 1688 rebellion, when they demanded a change in some leading officials.[65]

More often than not, the ʿulamā and other religious officials were involved in these rebellions as an important group that legitimized the demands of the participants. In some cases, the ʿulamā gathered at mosques to make the grievances of their own class publicly heard, and to protest against injustice. One such instance took place in 1633, to protest Murad IV's execution of the provincial judge (ḳāḍı) of İznik without trial. The purported reason was the ḳāḍı's neglect of his public duty, for on his way to Bursa, the sultan had observed that the roads around İznik were not well maintained. Once the news of the execution of a scholar without trial reached the capital, a large crowd led by the scholar-bureaucrats there gathered at the Fatih Mosque to protest the sultan's unlawful execution.[66] This protest attests to the rise of the Fatih Mosque as a political space, one comparable in function to public squares of Istanbul that provided forums for political expression. In addition to defending their own autonomy and rights, the ʿulamā were often invited into conflicts as arbitrators either by rebels who sought out fatwas legitimizing their protests, or by the authorities to help placate the rebels, or both. ʿUlamā networks frequently participated in public political protests not only in the capital, but also in the provinces.[67]

Unlike the rebellions of the sixteenth century, which were military rebellions proper, seventeenth-century janissary urban rebellions were accompanied by significant civil involvement.[68] Istanbul's urban rebellions were not solely insti-gated by officially recognized interest groups such as the ʿulamā, janissaries,

and guilds. To the contrary, these political events garnered significant political participation from the urban public. Different urban interest groups were connected to each other by economic and social interest and therefore acted together. The link between the "people of the market" and the janissaries has been the focus of many studies by André Raymond and Cemal Kafadar.[69] More recently, Eunjeong Yi has suggested that artisans had similarly close ties to other urban elements, such as people of the marketplace or men of religion. As an example of the latter, Yi underlines the participation of Sufi sheikhs in artisan rebellions. Their participation provided a language of legitimacy and drew larger sectors of the public into the fold of urban upheaval.[70] In other words, while the janissaries, the guilds, and the ʿulamā were the most visible elements in urban upheavals, they were often accompanied by larger sectors of society.

The nearly routinized urban rebellions were confrontations between Istanbul's urban population and the ruling elite, including the dynasty and the high-ranking officials, evoking a contractual relationship with the sultan. In the eyes of the rebels, it was the ruler's failure to uphold his end of the prevailing contract that justified these rebellions. The acts of rebellion, therefore, were made possible by an implicit—and occasionally explicit—understanding that the relationship between the subject and the ruler was contractual. This shared understanding of mutual rights and obligations informed the demands made through urban rebellions, as well as the frequent success of these political demands. The recent historiographical focus on early modern Ottoman constitutional thought emphasizes the importance of this contractual framework, despite the lack of a written constitution. In the absence of a written constitutional document, the historian's task is to turn to performance and spectacle as embodiments of implicitly shared political ideals across various strata of society. I turn to a close reading of space and spectacle as embodiments of political ideals in the next section.

STRUGGLE OVER SPECTACLE: STAGING IMPERIAL POLITICS IN THE EARLY MODERN CITY

The culture of public political scrutiny led to a dynastic performance anxiety, where Ottoman rulers had to invent new forms of legitimacy and continuously prove themselves in the public eye. The routinization of political spectacles in the court's daily occupation, as explained at the beginning of this chapter, was one manifestation of the increasing significance of public political statements.

To reclaim the public square, the Ottoman imperial center adopted two changes. First, increasingly, elements of imperial politics were moved outside the palace and ceremonial space to public spaces, involving and inviting urban audiences. Second, new forms of ceremonial on various scales were invented to cement and perform the dynasty's military, religious, and historical claims on a more regular basis.

When contemporary Ottoman authors compared the seventeenth century with earlier periods, they often noted the changing locus of politics as a novelty. Events and affairs that were formerly considered as concerning the palace only—or only the sultan and his *ḳuls* (literally, slaves)—were now considered public affairs. For instance, in his description of the execution of a *sipāhi*-turned-rebel, the court chronicler and personal prayer-leader (*imām*) of Sultan Aḥmed I (r. 1603–1617), İmām Şāfī, underscored the novelty of the public dimension of the event. Şāfī contrasted Aḥmed I's decision to punish the rebel publicly (*ʿalaniyyeten*) to the earlier Ottoman tradition of handling military rebellions as an internal matter of the sultan's household, thereby within the palace. To enhance the public dimension of the event, the rebel was taken around the city before the execution, as an example to ward off potential disobedience. The people of the city of Edirne, where the event took place, were involved as the audience of this political act, which had formerly been considered a private matter of secrecy (*ḫufyeten*):

> The gallow[s] of justice was set at the inner side of the square in front of the palace. After [the sultan] took his seat on the throne, in the most magnificent manner, the aforementioned person [the rebel] was brought [forward]. The verdict of execution was reached by the judge [representing] the noble sharia and by the kingly order and imperial opinion. [Then] he was taken about the city as an example to the people (*ʿibreten li'n-nās*), in that ugly state and unseemly countenance [of his], [after which] his frail life was hung on the hook of annihilation. From the time of the past sultans until then, when the execution of a sipahi or a janissary was dictated by law, they would be handled secretly. They would not be executed publicly.[71]

While privacy was the norm at the times of the former sultans, Şāfī wrote, Aḥmed I departed from this old tradition to execute the *sipāhi* publicly (*āşikāre siyāset*) in order to make an example to the public (*ḫalḳ-ı ʿālem*) and to make them fearful of the sword of justice and *siyāset*. The historian Şāfī therefore observed a novelty of his age, the new public character of political events that had formerly been reserved for the sultan's household.

In addition to moving political drama to the public space, the Ottoman dynasty invented new forms of public performance and ceremonial to claim the stage more frequently and prominently. A striking example of new ceremonial was the dome-closing ceremony held for the Sultan Aḥmed Mosque in June 1617. The dome-closing ceremony was the first—and the last—of its kind. The ceremony (and arguably the monumental mosque itself) was an elaborate and lavish response to the criticisms of the rule of Aḥmed I. The inauguration of the building process in 1609 was publicized as the celebration of Aḥmed's successful repression of the Celālī rebellions, which had swept the countryside for the past quarter century or so. The Celālī challenge, however, had by no means been suppressed; the mosque therefore was more accurately a political statement underlining the dynasty's strength and durability. As a result, to many Istanbulites, the ruler had simply not earned the honor of building an imperial mosque. According to "ancient Ottoman custom," the honor to erect a monumental mosque was reserved for *ghāzī*s, successful military commander-rulers who had conquered new territories. The dome-closing ceremony therefore was a ceremonial response invented to counter the public criticism of Aḥmed's rule, announcing the legitimacy of the sultan as a pious Islamic ruler despite his unimpressive military record.[72]

Under the duress of intense public scrutiny, the dynasty thus invented new ceremonials, performing important aspects of ruler legitimacy for the imperial public. The dome-closing ceremony was one among many public ceremonies that the dynastic center invented to reclaim the theater of politics in the seventeenth century. Another example is the sword-donning ceremony, a ceremonial donning of the sword that was traced to ʿOsmān I's rise to power yet was not recorded until the seventeenth century, which I examine in greater detail in chapter 3.[73] In addition to the majestic imperial ceremonies that emphasized the sultans' military prowess and religious credentials, there were public performances of comparatively smaller scale that aimed to extol aspects of Ottoman rule. An illuminating example is the practice of the public examination of ʿulamā, representing the ruler's patronage of knowledge and learning.

Throughout the sixteenth century, political literature had targeted Ottoman scholarly bureaucracy for corruption, mainly for appointing scholars based on patronage and family connections rather than on merit.[74] The public examination of scholars must be considered a response to this widespread criticism of the ʿulamā.[75] The ʿulamā examinations took place in contexts with varying levels of public access. One such context was the army camp. For

instance, in 1638, Murād IV personally oversaw a scholarly examination in the army camps during the Baghdad campaign. True to Ottoman custom, pre-eminent scholars accompanied the army up to İznik, where the sultan gathered the scholars for an examination before sending them back to the capital. The imperial examination was held to determine the suitable candidate for the judgeship of Edirne. On this occasion, the sultan asked two questions. The first was a theological question: Is faith an accident or essence? The second question fell somewhere between a semantic question and a riddle: If a person swore never to eat meat (*laḥm*, "flesh") again, and then proceeded to eat fish, would this person be considered to have broken his vow?[76] According to Kātib Çelebi, this examination showed how the sultan personally oversaw the affairs of the ʿulamā, and distinguished between the deserving and the nondeserving to restore prestige to knowledge.[77] Another, more openly public space for scholarly examinations was the mosque. Early modern sources often note the examination of Ottoman scholars in mosques, with access open to the general public. These anecdotes attest to the presence of an engaged and keen mosque public during scholarly examinations. An example is an examination between the future chief mufti Ṣunʿullah Efendi (d. 1612) and Kınalızāde Ḥasan Çelebi (d. 1604), the author of a well-received biographical dictionary of poets. According to the biographer Aṭāī, Ṣunʿullah Efendi often complained about the public's support of Ḥasan Çelebi in this examination, blaming the latter for being a populist (ʿāvām-gīr).[78] These anecdotes illustrate the public aspects of scholarly examination, hence contributing to the diversity of early modern spectacles of legitimacy.

Early modern politics was a public spectacle rather than an intra-elite affair. The performance of politics in public spaces—mainly public squares and mosques—was most dramatic at times of rebellion, but was a constant feature of the daily routines of early modern urbanites, with a constantly expanding symbolic vocabulary. Although attention has been paid disproportionately to the imperial ceremonials, other agents of Ottoman politics staged symbolic political events throughout the seventeenth century. In other words, in this period, the dynasty had lost its monopoly over political spectacle. Vivid accounts of public unrest attest to the contestation over urban spectacle between different political groups. These accounts suggest that occupying public squares, parading through commercial districts, and sending town criers around the capital were strategies consciously adopted by urban protest-ers to involve the city's public in their political cause.

The most memorable political spectacle of the seventeenth century was the "Plane Tree Incident" of 1656, a grotesque political spectacle that rebel soldiers created out of the slain bodies of government officials in the Hippodrome. The contemporary account of the event by Eremia Çelebi Kömürciyan (d. 1695) presents the rebellion from the point of view of the city-dwellers in rhapsodical prose.[79] Eremia Çelebi was a polylingual and well-educated Armenian resident of Istanbul, and his writings on the daily life of the imperial capital often start in the middle of the marketplace, where he often spent time as the shopkeeper at his uncle's bakery. This was a perfect spot to feel the pulse of the capricious political life of the city. According to Eremia Çelebi's diaries, the events of 1656 began on Friday, February 22, when the janissaries refused to go to the mosques for congregational prayers and instead convened at the Etmeydanı, the public square near the janissary barracks that had become a regular site of rebellion, alongside the Hippodrome.[80]

The initial reason for the janissaries' protest was the arrears in their pay, which the soldiers considered a thankless response to their efforts and sacrifices for the ongoing Cretan campaign. The protest turned into a full-blown rebellion, however, when Melek Aḥmed Paşa curtly and contemptuously dismissed the janissaries' initial demand for payment.[81] Eremia notes that the "noise" of the upcoming janissary rebellion sent shopkeepers away to their homes in fear for their safety. The janissaries' next move was to demand an audience with the sultan (dīvān), during which they demanded the heads of three high-ranking officials. When these three officials were executed, their bodies were dragged to the Hippodrome, hung on plane trees, and exhibited as a public display. In the following days, the rebels added more names to their list, and eventually nearly thirty dead bodies of officials were added to the plane tree exhibition.[82] When some of the dignitaries on the rebels' blacklist escaped, a manhunt began in the streets of Istanbul. Town criers went about the city, announcing that anyone who turned over the escapees would be rewarded by being registered as janissary or sipāhi. During the following weeks, the janissaries continued to add new bodies to the plane trees in the Hippodrome.[83] Observers note one instance when one fugitive, a janissary agha, took refuge at the palace and was killed through strangulation by the palace guards. Unsatisfied by the bloodless death, the janissaries demanded the dead body and added it to the exhibition.[84] Detailed narratives that repeat similar instances show that the rebels intended the plane trees to be a political statement and spectacle.

In fact, Eremia Çelebi describes the plane trees on which executed dignitaries hung as a spectacle (*temāşā* or *t-amasha*).[85] As Polina Ivanova underlines, the word *temāşā*, of Arabic origin but appearing in most Ottoman languages, including Armenian, was used frequently in seventeenth-century sources to describe a variety of urban spectacles and city-watching.[86] In addition to the visual and aural spectacle, politics had become a public affair through rumor. Murat Dağlı underlines the growing importance of rumor in the public sphere of the seventeenth century, particularly as a leveling mechanism that brought together various social strata, from the sultan to the rebelling *kūl*, on the same platform as participants in politics.[87]

Written in a diary form as events and rumors were unfolding, Eremia Çelebi's account is an exceptionally apt witness to the gradual progression of waves of rumor throughout the city at times of political upheaval.[88] One sensational rumor that spread in the city early on, for instance, was that the rebels demanded the sultan's own mother, Turḫān Sultan (d. 1683), in order to execute her and exhibit her body.[89] While this rumor proved false, the rebels indeed hung a female body on a plane tree, that of Melekī Hatun, the retainer and confidante of Turḫān Sultan. After being manumitted and married off, Melekī had continued to use her privileged position to intercede between petitioners and the palace. Together with her husband, Şaʿban Ḫalīfe, she had been able to amass wealth and prestige by monetizing her close relationship to Turḫān Sultan and the palace. The wealth she amassed had also aroused a critical, even hateful, sentiment among the public.[90] Eremia Çelebi contrasts Melekī with Ṭurḫan Sultan, an "ideal woman," who was known to "occupy herself with reading and not leave the house."[91] In contrast, Melekī was portrayed as given to luxury and pompousness, and having an undue influence at court.[92]

The exhibition of Melekī's poorly covered, deceased body shocked the city. Evliyā Çelebi described the scene vividly: "The lowly *kūl*s killed the poor Melekī Ḥatun and hung her corpse on the plane tree. All of her private parts were in the open. Blood dripped off the tips of her henna-painted fingers."[93] In his description of the events, Evliyā Çelebi, also reflects on the general state of shock and horror that the display of violence created in town.[94] Violence was one important language of the urban political public protesting officials, yet not the only one. Another language of political participation, which also developed its own new symbolic languages, was religion. A new religious symbolism and ritual symbolizing the political participation of "good publics"

emerged in the mid-seventeenth century: that of protesting publics gathering under the Prophet's banner.

The "Prophet's banner" was believed to be the banner that the prophet Muḥammad's armies had carried in early Islamic wars. According to the Ottoman tradition, this banner was brought to Istanbul after Sultan Selīm I's conquest of Egypt (or of Damascus, in an alternative version) and was kept in the palace treasury. Throughout the sixteenth century, the Prophet's banner only left the palace during the pilgrimage season to accompany the pilgrims' procession to the Hijāz and back every year. Starting with the Long War (1593–1606), however, the banner acquired a new ceremonial use: it was now to accompany the Ottoman military campaigns to the west and later to the east. On these occasions, by publicly and ceremonially parading the Prophet's banner (*sancaḳ çıḳarma merāsimi*), the Ottomans cemented their claim to holy war.[95] Yet another usage of the holy banner, this time in urban revolts, emerged with the artisans' revolt of 1651. This new symbolism associated with the banner reveals the dramatic nature of early modern urban political confrontations, as well as the Ottoman center's determination to label the rebels as "enemies of state and religion," both at once.

The urban revolt of 1651 symbolizes an important turning point in the evolution of a moral economy of Ottoman urban rebellions. The 1651 revolt, much like the Plane Tree Incident, which would occur a few years later, was a political crisis caused by the strains placed on the entire economy, but particularly that of the capital, by the prolonged Cretan War of 1645–69. Warfare drained the treasury, which led to a fiscal decision to debase the currency. The decision proved violently unpopular among the people of the city, particularly the artisans, who complained about having to shoulder an unfairly heavy economic burden, first by paying extraordinary taxes for the ongoing war and now through debasement. The rumors that the debasement was engineered by the janissary grandees, particularly by Bektaş Ağa, to take advantage of the fiscal crisis and fill their personal coffers further fueled the flames of disgruntlement. The artisans closed their shops—signaling that life would not return to normal before their demands were met—and marched toward the palace with a crowd that eventually exceeded ten thousand people, according to Naʿīmā.[96] At the palace, the representatives of the crowd demanded a meeting with the sultan, during which they complained about their suffering under military oppression.

Yet, their woes were not only economic. According to the historian Naʿīmā Efendi, they also warned the then-ten-year-old sultan, Meḥmed IV, of the vizier's ill treatment of the public, and the tyranny of the janissary grandees. While this imperial council resulted in the lifting of the extraordinary taxes in question, it also incited further unrest, as the janissary grandees disapproved of the sultan's siding with the protesters against them. Relying on his own palace network, Meḥmed IV was able to defuse the coup that the janissary grandees planned in cooperation with his grandmother, Kösem Sultan (d. 1651), who was executed during this controversy. Yet Meḥmed IV and his advisers knew very well that the execution of Kösem Sultan and her allies could lead to further instability if their supporters in the city—which included the janissaries—were mobilized. As a preemptive strike, the sultan issued a call to the people of the city to gather under the Prophet's banner, which was flaunted in front of the palace gates.[97]

Thus, 1651 marks the beginning of a new mass mobilization strategy: to bring the Prophet's banner to the public square and ask the public to gather under this prophetic banner to help resolve the rebellion. While initially utilized by the Ottoman sultan to mobilize the urban public against the janissaries, the symbolism would be used by the artisans for their own demands in 1687–88, as seen below. The symbolism of the Prophet's banner positioned the crowds that remained loyal to the state under the banner and the crowds that were rebellious outside the shadow of the banner. This symbolism must have been extremely charged for Muslims living in Istanbul, given the religious meaning of the banner. According to the Islamic tradition, on the Day of Judgment, the Prophet would invite Muslims under his banner (*livā-yı ḥamd*) to extend his intercession and protection over them. As a result of this tradition, this powerful symbolism implied an equation between political obedience and otherworldly salvation.

In short, the shifting political culture of post-1580s Ottoman cities witnessed the increasing political agency and social visibility of urban crowds despite the unceasing protest of elite observers. The increasing presence of crowds in urban spectacle, be it political spectacle or the daily hubbub of urban life, was an undeniable fact of early modern Ottoman cities. This tide was far-reaching, ultimately including multiple confessional groups and women. Following Suraiya Faroqhi, Shirine Hamadeh has recently termed this urban "opening-up" *décloisonnement*.[98] This architectural term captures the increased

permeability between social groups and the porous class boundaries in the early modern city. It further conveys the changing *mood* of the urban crowds, marked by "increasing receptiveness to novelty and the remarkable creativity in the interpretation of traditional vocabularies."[99] This early modern creativity disguised under the canopy of traditional forms is the very subject of this book. Before moving on to the intellectual repercussions of the new public culture, however, a word is in order on the concept of "public" itself and how the term was discussed in early modern Ottoman sources.

WHO IS "THE PUBLIC"? NEGOTIATING LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE PARTICIPATION IN URBAN POLITICS

According to a (likely spurious) story, in the 1950s, the then-governor of Istanbul used the following words to complain about the new urban visibility of Istanbul's middle and lower classes at the city's beaches: "The general public has been crowding the beaches, citizens cannot enjoy the sea." This distinction between the general public (*halk*) and the citizens (*vatandaş*) has acquired a proverbial nature in modern Turkish, capturing the hierarchical differentiation between different types of publics from the point of view of governance. Arguably, all political ideologies developed nuanced language for distinguishing between good and bad publics, the value judgment depending on the positionality of the speaker.

   In this section, I argue that while the received political language of the elite Ottoman authors employed derogatory terms for public political participation, the seventeenth century saw the gradual emergence of a neutral vocabulary for urban publics. This gradual shift was the result of the multiplication of modes of political participation, as well as the early modern state's reliance on mass mobilization at crucial junctures. Throughout the many urban rebellions of the century, the Ottoman state also relied on mobilizing crowds to help defeat rebels, in those instances creating two publics: the good and the bad crowds. The imperial court's use of the Prophet's banner to mobilize the public against the janissaries in 1651 is a significant example of this reliance on mass mobilization, as well as on the emergence of "good publics" from the vantage point of the center.

   How did early modern Ottoman political terminology distinguish between good publics and bad publics, which is to say, between legitimate and illegitimate modes of public political participation? The partisan language that elite

authors employed in framing public political participation in negative terms has been studied in detail.[100] Underlining that the elite authors' dismissal of crowd political action as illegitimate was less a statement of early modern politics and more an extension of the administrative elite's political agenda, Cemal Kafadar warns against uncritically reproducing the stance of early modern Ottoman authors on the involvement of the public in politics. Following a similar line of argument, Marinos Sariyannis closely studies public involvement in seventeenth-century rebellions, emphasizing the skewed nature of their representation in contemporary sources, which adopted the viewpoint of "the palace, the government apparatus, the high strata of the ulema."[101] Kafadar and Sariyannis emphasize the deliberate strategies that the elite authors employed to obfuscate the identities and political demands of the crowds as a way of discrediting their agency.

In other words, although political events of the seventeenth century leave no doubt as to the entrenchment of urban public politics as a practice, the majority of these popular political activities were committed to writing by authors whose primary aim was to discredit just such public political participation. Pejorative terms were often juxtaposed to anecdotes discrediting the crowds. For instance, Evliyā Çelebi notes that during the Plane Tree Incident, when the revolt's leaders demanded Melekī Ḫātun, the crowd repeated this demand in chanting, only they were not able to get the name right, yelling mistaken versions, such as Mülkī ḳadı, Milki Efendi. When asked to clarify whom they demanded, Evliyā notes that "the Turks" (etrāk) continued to create a cacophony of incorrect names.[102] The anecdote was intended to mock the crowd for political illiteracy, discrediting their demands by poking fun at their ignorance of the simplest fact.

Yet, while paying attention to the condemnatory language that prevails in the Ottoman chronicles and political treatises of the seventeenth century —as current historiography has done— is significant, these dramatic topoi should not overshadow the gradual development of more neutral, even positive, conceptualizations of the Ottoman public as legitimate and rightful political actors. These latter conceptualizations stemmed from the reality of the involvement of urban masses in politics on all sides, both as rebels and as loyal supporters of Ottoman authority. The urban rebellion of 1687–88 that led to the dethroning of Meḥmed IV exemplifies the existence of early modern Ottoman discourse that construed public political participation as legitimate action. Early modern chronicles called the 1687–88 rebellion "the Banner

Event" (*Sancaḳ Vaḳʿāsı*) in reference to the central role that the Prophet's banner played in the staging of the rebellion.[103] The events were triggered by the Ottoman army's defeat in Hungary and particularly by the loss of Buda in 1686. After the military retreat began, soldiers started to arrive at the capital in large numbers, and, having missed salaries, soon enough they began to mutiny and to plunder the shops in the marketplace. Tensions rose, and reached their peak when the shop of a descendant of the Prophet (*sayyīd*) was looted by the mutineers. The *sayyīd* prepared a makeshift "banner of the Prophet" and marched toward the palace, gathering large crowds behind him. When the crowd reached the palace, they demanded that the actual banner be given to them to start a general mobilization. The crowd was ultimately able to obtain the holy banner from the palace, under the leadership of Atpazārī Seyyid ʿOsmān Efendi (d. 1691), a Celvetī Sufi-preacher whom the artisans and market people considered a suitable figure for intermediation between the palace and themselves.[104]

Following Yi, it is apt to consider the Banner Event "the first full-fledged revolt by Istanbul city-people," in the sense that it was the townspeople who took the initiative in starting the mobilization against the mutiny and guided the state's intervention.[105] The crowd's adoption of the banner symbolism after its initial employment in 1651 further demonstrates the formation of a cumulative political tradition that developed a particular symbolism for legitimate political participation. It was within this context that words such as "city-dweller" (*şehirlü*) or "public" (*cumhūr*) came to be used to distinguish the "good publics" from the bad publics, as seen clearly with the rebellions of 1651 and 1687–88. In describing the latter event, chroniclers opted for the usual derogatory vocabulary for describing disobedient publics to refer to the city-dwellers gathered around janissary leaders. These "bad publics" were marked as "parasites" (*ḥaşerāt*) gathering around the rebels, "the flock," and by various other words that translate to "lowlifes" (*erāzil, ḥazele, rezele*).[106] Contemporary observers who wrote accounts of the event reserved these derogatory terms for the rebels, while referring to their opponents, who helped suppress the rebellion, as "townspeople" or simply "the public" (*şehir ḥalḳı, şehirli, ḥalḳ*).[107]

Upon close examination, then, Ottoman political vocabulary did not lack neutral terms to conceptualize the increasing significance of urban publics in political and social life. Alongside variants of "city-dweller" (*şehirli*) and *ḥalḳ*, another term that may safely be translated as "the public," with a neutral, even positive, connotation, is *cumhūr*. The term is almost ubiquitous in early

modern Ottoman political vocabulary, often within the set phrase *umūr-i cumhūr*," which meant "public affairs." For instance, Kātib Çelebi uses the term to express the following common wisdom: "It has been Divine Custom that anyone who aids and abets the disarrangement of public affairs (*umūr-i cumhūr*) will eventually face punishment."[108] As exemplified in this maxim, *cumhūr* had long been in use as an abstract and governmental concept, referring less to the public as an active agent than to the duty of the administration to act in the best interests of the public. Yet, by the turn of the century, the term came to be used in the sense of the public taking its own affairs in hand. During the uprising of 1703, a janissary leader named Çalık Ahmed suggested the establishment of a *cumhūr cemʿiyyeti*, literally "a public assembly."[109] While the term *cumhūr* was not new to Ottoman political vocabulary, the new sense it acquired, which emphasizes the agency of the public, must be considered the culmination of the political experience of the urban publics of the seventeenth century.

Historiography has emphasized the abundance of derogatory terms describing urban crowds, and rightly underlined the biased nature of this representation. While it is true that quantitatively, the vocabulary used to define publics was predominantly derogatory rather than neutral or even positive, it is important to note the existence of neutral and positive terms and follow their trajectory. Specifically, the trajectory of the terms *şehirli* and *cumhūr* suggests the gradual evolution of these terms over the seventeenth century. The evolution of the term *şehirli* demonstrates the imperial elite's gradual reconciliation with the indispensability of public mobilization for daily politics, given the dependence of the authorities on public support for maintaining order in the capital. The evolution of the term *cumhūr*, on the other hand, suggests a direction from public affairs as an administrative responsibility to a domain where the public had the right to exercise agency.

POLITICS OF PIETY REVISITED: THE LIMITS OF STATE-RELIGION IN THE EARLY MODERN AGE

The foregoing brief sketch of the major political events of the seventeenth century demonstrates a variety of ways through which Ottoman publics sought to occupy the center stage in politics. One of the most prominent of these ways was the use of religious symbolism, as seen in the new symbolism attributed to gathering under the Prophet's banner to impose the public's

demands on the state. These symbolic and charged events were manifestations of broader dynamics between religion and politics. The multiple religious discourses of the seventeenth century played a significant role in negotiating legitimate and illegitimate political participation, which was one of the burning questions of the early modern period. It was a particular combination of piety, politics, and personal conduct that defined who was rightly a "Rūmī," or a political agent. In other words, religious discourses functioned as discourses of civility that negotiated the legitimacy of political participation. Between the 1620s and the 1680s, a series of lengthy confrontations between different discourses on piety and civility took place. Known as "the Kadizadeli debates" after the puritan religious authorities that spearheaded them, these discourses served as a conduit for the expression of conflicting visions of piety and civility.

In this section, I introduce the reader to one of the most important arguments of this book: that the religious debates of the seventeenth century were as intense and prolonged as they were because they were simultaneously about the social and political order. I define two paradigmatic modes of governmentality expressed through competing visions of piety: the centralist and the decentralist.[110] The centralist mode envisioned a uniform, standard sharia code as the basis of political order. In this worldview, the role of administrative and other disciplinary institutions was amplified as they became understood as sites of the correct interpretation of divine law and of its enforcement. A Persianate-Sufi model of authority, on the other hand, emphasized less the enforcement of a neatly codified religiosity and more "belonging to the righteous community" as the marker of good moral standing.[111] In this way, Sufi models of authority granted each Sufi community a certain degree of autonomy and room for innovation. Early modern public cultures flourished based on this model of morality and civility, which prioritized the accommodation of diversity within the community, rather than the imposition of uniform normative standards across the entire public realm. In the following analysis, I show that while the puritan movement of the seventeenth century, the Ḳadızādeli movement, represented a centralist political theology, it faced strong resistance from Persianate-Sufi circles, which espoused, instead, a decentralist political theology.

The Ḳadızādeli movement has attracted much scholarly attention as one of the defining movements of the seventeenth century. On the one hand, the movement belongs to a family of similar traditionalist movements throughout

Ottoman and Islamic history that called for the purification of Islam. This purification implied the eradication of practices that emerged after the early Islamic community, who represented the uncorrupted Islam of the Prophet. Sufi practices and rituals often bore the brunt of these criticisms. On the other hand, the ascendancy of the movement and its persistence for the greater part of the century were unmatched in Ottoman history, hence inviting discussion of the reasons behind the unusual eminence of this wave. Why was it that this traditionalist reform movement found more political support than ever before—or after—in the Ottoman capital?

One of the main reasons was the search for reform in Ottoman political life, which had taken an acute tone with the series of financial and political crises summarized earlier in this chapter. According to this explanation, the movement belonged to a spectrum of proposals for Ottoman societal and political reform. The traditionalist agenda envisioned the restoration of social order through an uncompromising enforcement of sharia rulings.[112] A second reason was the Ottoman center's "performance anxiety," in other words, its perception of losing center ground in everyday politics and the ensuing efforts to regain its former position through the formation of networks of intermediaries. These efforts entailed both harnessing new languages of legitimacy that strongly underlined conformist piety and forming alliances with nonofficials to strengthen direct influence. Throughout the seventeenth century, the Ottoman imperial center oscillated between two predominant modes of governance. On one hand, rulers such as ʿOsmān II and Murād IV strove to claim the figure of a strong, absolutist ruler. These absolutist interludes were often mitigated by their successors as a response to the unpopularity of their authoritarian rule. The reconciliatory efforts were predominantly based on the second mode of governmentality, characterized by a greater emphasis on intermediation and negotiation.[113] The oscillation of the Ottoman center between the two modes of governmentality demonstrates the magnitude of the dynasty's search for the appropriate strategy for achieving stability and for reclaiming the public sphere.

Beginning with Aḥmed I (r. 1603–1617), the double dynastic strategy of forming alliances and emphasizing piety increasingly involved enlisting public preachers for the support of the dynasty.[114] This strategy reached its peak during the reign of Murād IV (r. 1623–1640), who cooperated with the Ḳadızādeli preachers to revive the cult of the strong ruler and to instill obedience among the general public. Ḳadızādeli preachers advocated two main

positions. First, they preached that any doctrine or practice that could not be traced back to the time of the Prophet should be eradicated. This brand of puritan morality condemned and targeted many established practices, such as the Sufi rituals featuring music and devotional dance (samāʿ), and also the novel consumption and socialization practices of the age, such as smoking or frequenting the coffeehouse. Second, the Ḳadızādeli preachers demanded that political authority be closely involved in disciplining the public in line with the prophetic tradition. A sound merger between religious and political discipline was prescribed as the remedy for the ills of the age, portrayed by many puritan preachers as an age of utter disorder and disobedience.

As a response to the changing norms of authority, one possible strategy for reinstating order was a project of social discipline that assigned the state the role of moral guardianship of the Islamic community.[115] This vision of order found its expression in the Ḳadızādeli agenda, which envisioned a uniform public sphere where all Muslims were accountable to the same sets of normative behavior. As I explain in greater detail in the following pages, throughout the seventeenth century, the main Ḳadızādeli model of public participation was in service of the moral surveillance efforts of the state. Within this scheme, the pious individual was encouraged to impose upon themselves preestablished norms, yet did not have any interpretive authority.[116] It is important to understand this centralist and disciplinary political premise of the Ḳadızādeli movement within the early modern context.[117] In this respect, the social and political agenda of the Ḳadızādelis differed from their alleged predecessor, Meḥmed Birgivī, who was a strong critic of the Ottoman establishment and its economic and legal policies. In contrast, as will be seen in the following pages, many early modern Ottomans considered the Ḳadızādeli project one of enhancing the imperial center's political power (salṭanat).[118]

The rising emphasis on moral surveillance and the increasing interference of the state in the social organization of religion are significant aspects of early modern religious politics. Recently, this merger between religious and political authority has been likened to the confessionalization process in early modern Europe.[119] In historiography, confessionalization refers to a cooperation between church and political authorities in order to promote order and obedience, and is considered one of the important paths to the formation of early modern absolutist states at this time.[120] Similarly, the political promise of Ottoman puritanism was to legitimize the absolutist tendencies of the dynasty by involving the state not only in public but also in private and moral

spheres by entangling law enforcement and creed.[121] Based on this comparison, recent literature has argued that seventeenth-century traditionalism represents the culmination of a total transformation of Islam toward an authoritarian and legalistic direction. Some manifestations of this legalistic-authoritarian turn were greater exclusion of non-Muslims from public life and urban space and increased moral surveillance at multiple levels of public life.[122]

Certainly, the disciplinary intentions of certain Ottoman actors were comparable to the confessionalization efforts in Europe. Yet, political intentions cannot be equated with political and social realities. The constitution of governmental and religious authority in the Ottoman Empire differed from contemporary European states in significant ways that impeded the moral-political project of exact identification of religious and political authority. The overall impact and long-term effects of Ottoman religious debates thus followed a different trajectory. The main reason for the incommensurability of the results was that Ottoman political conjecture diverged from the European political trajectory by the late sixteenth century. While the latter was characterized by effective centralization, the former achieved stability through decentralization and delegation. Therefore, the Ottoman state hardly had the capacity to impose all-encompassing moral discipline at the imperial level.[123] Nor did official policy strive to do so in a consistent manner, as seen in the inconsistent Ottoman policies toward the Ḳızılbaş, the toleration of a Shia community in Lebanon, and the existence of nonconformist Sufi orders at the center of power, such as the Bektāşis, who were favored by the janissaries, and the Melāmīs, who were favored by the secretarial class.[124] At a time when, as explained in the introduction, all early modern states functioned by cooperation and collaboration, the increasingly decentralized Ottoman state was highly dependent on the intermediation of nonofficial circles in social and cultural projects. This dependence on intermediaries placed significant limitations on any moral-political project advanced by the center.[125]

More importantly, I argue that the traditionalist project and its vision of a sharia-based discipline and uniformity in the public realm was but one among a variety of early modern religio-political projects, and ultimately not the most successful one. In order to underline this point, in what follows I emphasize contemporary receptions of, and reactions to, the sharia-based surveillance project.[126] There were several reasons for these reactions. Firstly, the policing of an increasing number of aspects of daily social life proved unpopular and generated resistance. Secondly, the program's vision of everyday religiosity

and social life was considered too far away from the social life of Ottoman towns and especially cities, where the new sociabilities represented by, but not limited to, the coffeehouse had transformed the cityscape. The resistance toward the confessional pressures on the Ottoman public has so far remained unrecognized because of a scholarly insistence on the study of Ottoman Islam with exclusive attention to sharia-centered movements. The emphasis that I place on anti-puritanism in the Ottoman Empire aims to challenge this incomplete picture and underline Ottoman discourses of intra-religious diversity that paved the way for the delimitation of the role of the state in the religious realm.

In order to explicate the paradigmatic questions that the Ottoman public discussed throughout the seventeenth century, this book centers on Ottoman criticisms of puritan thought. Particularly, I focus on the Mevlevī order, a Sufi order that made the badge of "anti-Ḳadızādelism" a core part of its identity in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The reader will occasionally find a dichotomous presentation of Ottoman religious debates in the following pages, with the Ḳadızādeli and Mevlevī worldviews on opposing sides. This dichotomous presentation, however, is meant as a heuristic tool that helps to develop an analysis of the terms of the debate. In describing Ḳadızādelis as "puritans," for instance, I refer to their theology that extolled identification with the early Islamic community, but I do not claim that they did indeed develop an innovation-free doctrine that reproduced the early community identically. Similarly, when I follow Derin Terzioğlu to refer to the Ḳadızādelis' sharia-centered moral reformism, I refer to their discourse of unity and uniformity of legal normativity, yet show in the course of the book that such legal and moral uniformity itself was a fiction. The purpose of adopting the dichotomy is to lay out the terms of the debate by focusing on the two ends of the spectrum, while not losing sight of the fact that in reality most historical figures fell somewhere in between. Throughout the book, I take Ḳadızādelis as representative of an authoritative and centralist understanding of tradition, while Mevlevīs represent a decentralist, fragmented political theology that I explain as a Sufi, and specifically a Persianate-Sufi, theology.

A terminological note is in order regarding my use of the term "Sufi theology" as antithetical to a puritan conception of tradition, given the vast diversity of the varieties of Sufism. The term Sufism, while signifying the varieties of inward-oriented and mystical traditions of Islam, is too broad, obfuscating the rich diversity of, and ubiquitous contestations within, Islamic spiritual

traditions. This complexity surrounding the term Sufism has also posed challenges to the study of the Ḳadızādeli debates. While a range of early studies described the Ḳadızādelis as anti-Sufis, studies by Derin Terzioğlu and Katharina Ivanyi have shown the failure of this label in conveying the moral-religious orientation of the Ḳadızādeli strand in Ottoman thought, which was also heavily influenced by Sufism as a system of moral self-formation. Their analyses were supported by the studies of the biographies of Ḳadızāde Meḥmed and the proponents of his worldview. Baki Tezcan's study on the autobiography of Ḳadızāde Meḥmed leaves no doubt as to the preacher's Naḳshbandī affiliation. Furthermore, Dina Le Gall has shown that some Naḳshbandī Sufi preachers supported the puritan agenda of the Ḳadızādelis.[127]

Given the complexity of the early modern religious realm, I adopt the distinction between "juristic Sufism" and "Sufi theologies" throughout this book. The distinction between these terms is significant because these two religiosities were predicated not only on divergent theologies, but also on divergent visions of community. Following Marshall Hodgson, Ivanyi has argued that Birgivī's brand of Sufism can be considered "juristic Sufism," a form of Sufism in which the contours of moral experience are firmly drawn by the law. In Ivanyi's words, Birgivī's Sufism was "an instrument to complement the Law, but nothing more."[128] In other words, the purpose of spiritual training in this line of thinking was to bring the inner self in line with the law, or to achieve a perfect identification of the public and the private. Experiential Sufism, in contrast, foregrounded direct experience, hence emphasizing dimensions of religious experience beyond the public law.[129] The tense and sustained conflict over practices associated with experiential theology, such as the Sufi rhythmic dances (*samāʿ, raḳṣ, devrān*), demonstrates that these varieties of Sufism were not simply divergent, but oppositional in the early modern period.[130] As a result, throughout this book, I will use "juristic Sufism" to distinguish the Sufism of the Birgivī-Ḳadızādeli line from experiential Sufism. Within this experiential world of Sufism, my focus largely stays on the Mevlevīs and their Persianate-Sufi theology, although I also bring other varieties of Sufism—mainly the Ḥalvetī order—into the discussion to underline the richness of religious discourse in this period.

The anti-puritan Sufi theologies that this book studies therefore intellectually distinguished themselves from juristic Sufism and puritanism. The two main tenets of this divergence were a positive propensity toward innovations and theories that accommodated intra-Islamic diversity. In addition, an

important social difference marks the line between Sufis and puritans. The latter, even when they had Sufi affiliations, did not speak from within a network, their version of piety being understood in individual rather than communal terms. The Birgivī-Ḳadızādeli focus remained on the reform of the individual to achieve full alignment with the implications of public law and morality. In contrast, Sufi networks offered not only social and economic institutions, but a mode of piety defined by belonging and allegiance (*biʿat*). Therefore, I use "Sufi networks" in a deliberate manner to distinguish communities where the presence of a sheikh who carried charismatic authority was central to piety and spirituality. While it is true that the Ḳadızādeli strand cannot be labeled "anti-Sufi," it can certainly be understood as an opponent of Sufi theologies and Sufi networks.

With these terminological distinctions in mind, this book reconceptualizes the religious debates of the seventeenth century as debates on the norms of public political participation, or debates on civility. My approach predominantly focuses on the experience of the Muslim male publics of the empire, while women and non-Muslims make only intermittent appearances. Part of the reason for this shortcoming is the current state of scholarship, which studies early modern Ottoman politics with disproportionate attention paid to the Muslim and male experience. Therefore, while this book has not been able to address this historiographical problem, I would like to note some related considerations for future studies.

In her study on Eremyā Çelebi's account of seventeenth-century Istanbul, Polina Ivanova rightly underlines that early modern Ottoman public culture has been incorrectly considered an exclusively Muslim space, to the exclusion of similar developments taking place among the non-Muslim communities of the empire.[131] Ivanova explores the comingling of Muslims and non-Muslims in crowds and spectacles, in both festivals and uprisings. She further lists a number of intra-Christian affairs that spurred public mobilization, including the conflict between the Greek and Armenian communities over the possession of St. James Convent in Jerusalem in 1656.[132] The event became a hotly debated topic in sermons by Armenian preachers, hence involving congregations in significant ways. One significant phenomenon showing the public-forming effects of religious discourse was the cults of neomartyrs, who were Christians under Islamic rule who actively sought martyrdom in order to embody resistance and resilience. In the Ottoman Empire, a rich documentary archive of Ottoman Christians who lost their lives for their faith exists in the

form of vitae of neomartyrs.[133] In her study, Ivanova demonstrates that early modern neomartyrdom narratives involved publics from both the Christian and the Muslim communities, the latter as the audience of the transgression that would ultimately earn the neomartyr his or her execution at the hands of the Muslim authorities. Since "neomartyrs preached in public, and they were executed in public, their bodies exhibited on the city walls," Ivanova argues that religious mobilization played an important role in the creation of public culture among non-Muslims as well as Muslims.[134]

Christian neomartyrs of the early modern age created publics not only in Istanbul, but in other corners of the empire as well. Febe Armanios's study of the Coptic community in Egypt attests to the cults of Coptic neomartyrs in Egypt.[135] Armanios notes how these cults signified a new increase in the role of laity in Coptic religion in the early modern period. As a case study, she writes about festivities around Dimyana, a Coptic neomartyr who was killed at the time of the Roman emperor Diocletian.[136] Although Dimyana herself was a Roman neomartyr, her cult was revived in the seventeenth century with public festivals and newly commissioned hagiographies. Armanios underlines that participation in these festivals was not restricted to Coptic Christians and entailed mixed socialization between Muslims and Christians. More significantly, female participation was an important facet of the festivals. Ultimately, much like the imperial festivities of the capital, these Egyptian festivals centered around Coptic neomartyrs offered participants "loosening of rules that ordinarily governed everyday behavior—between Muslims and Copts, laypeople and clergy, men and women."[137]

Like non-Muslim participation in the Ottoman public sphere, the presence of women in public events remains a sorely underappreciated topic. This neglect is largely the product of the stereotypical notion of the Ottoman woman as confined to the private sphere, having only private roles in the family, such as motherhood and wifehood.[138] The one exception to this assumed confinement of Ottoman women to the private sphere has been in the study of elite women, particularly women of the harem. In the period under consideration, queen mothers reached the apex of their power to such an extent that contemporary Ottoman authors used the term "the sultanate of women," albeit pejoratively.[139] These studies demonstrate the strategies that women of the palace developed to subvert or challenge restrictions on female participation in public life. Yet, the experience of the elite women is exceptional on many levels. Most notably, historians agree that restrictions on the public visibility

of women increased as one moved up the social ladder. Therefore, the women of the palace were the least publicly visible, whereas women from other segments of society could enjoy a variety of public roles, as attested by court records.

Thanks to the efforts of historians who study Ottoman court records, it is now known that women frequently came to the court to seek their rights or to conduct economic affairs, such as commercial ventures or property purchase and sales. In other words, it was not uncommon for Ottoman women to have an investment in the affairs of the market, which is what brought their male counterparts to public squares.[140] Kate Fleet argues that women also joined urban protests on matters such as food shortages and increased prices.[141]

CONCLUSION

This chapter has portrayed the political changes of the consolidation period—namely, ca. 1580 to ca. 1730—which resulted in the routinization of public political participation. The protests, rebellions, and other public political spectacles sketched in this chapter form the background of the following chapters of the book, which take a closer look at the religious and political debates of the century. Even a brief sketch such as that provided here shows that the period was marked by an overwhelming sense of possibility, volatility, and novelty. The most important of such novelties were new political spectacles underlining the political agencies of a host of actors, mainly janissaries, ʿulamā, artisans, and city-dwellers. While the events of the period clearly show the public political participation of a growing civic sphere, what remains to be explored is the cultural-ideological component of this shift. In other words, the question of how these new actors justified their political actions—which often took the form of protest and sometimes even grotesque violence—and construed their own political agency remains to be fully understood. It is to this question that the next chapters turn, through the concepts of civility and piety.

Chapter 2 examines the strategies that early modern religious authorities employed in order to develop conceptions of piety, morality, and civility that served the needs of an increasingly decentralized empire. In order to make this point, the next chapter introduces an alternative conception of piety that hinged not on sharia abidance (takvā) but on belonging to communities of piety (ṣalāḥ). In addition to this community-oriented understanding of piety, I underline the force of a notion of communal privacy, the conceptualization

of a shared private sphere where communities could freely exercise practices that were not necessarily sanctioned in the public sphere. In particular, I argue the importance of privacy not as an evasive practice, but as a critical force that drew boundaries for public normativity. By placing moral authority in these fragmented communities rather than in sharia as public law, Ottoman publics also construed themselves as partners and critics of official imperial politics.

CHAPTER 2

Ottoman Anti-Puritanism

Communal Privacy and Limits to Public Authority

The legal ruling on *samāʿ* ought to be issued by one's heart.
—al-Ghazālī[1]

"One day, when Mülaḳḳab ʿOsmān Çelebi was walking in Aksaray, he saw a mother holding a child. ʿOsmān Çelebi shouted 'You little rascal!' with such rage that the poor thing died right there in his mother's arms. Bewildered, I got off my mule and went up to [ʿOsmān Çelebi] and said: 'Oh çelebi, to take a life is no merit; [rather] to make live is a high merit. . . .' He whispered to my ear: 'Are you married?' I said: 'Yes.' 'They say that no pleasure compares to the pleasure of sexual intercourse, do you agree?' I said: 'Yes.' 'Now, taking a life is [far] more joyful than sexual intercourse.'"[2]

This narrative of an unusual saintly figure of Istanbul might shock contemporary readers, who would not expect instant murder to be a saint's praiseworthy miraculous power. The vita of Mülaḳḳab ʿOsmān Çelebi, however, was included in a collection of biographies of noteworthy Ḥalvetī Sufis. How does ʿOsmān Çelebī's inclusion in a biography of the pious make sense?

Unusual as it is, the vita illustrates an important aspect of early modern religiosity that has not received due attention—namely, the notion of the community, rather than the individual, as the site of virtue, and hence of moral authority. The key notion of communal virtue was discussed in theological literature and found concrete social expression in hagiographies and biographies of the pious. The theological explanation is so well known in Sufi literature that hagiographies only allude to this theoretical underpinning. The author of the passage cited above, the Ḥalvetī biographer Meḥmed Naẓmi

Efendi (d. 1701), explains, for instance, that ʿOsmān Çelebi was eccentric and unpredictable because he was the manifestation of God's Majestic (*jalāl*) names. According to the Islamic tradition, there were ninety-nine names attributed to God, each name falling into one of two categories: "Majestic" (*jalāl*) or "Benevolent" (*jamāl*). Each individual embodied a certain divine name. While some individuals embodied the Benevolent names by being generous, beautiful, or compassionate, others embodied the Majestic names by being vengeful, subjugating, or chastising.[3] According to Ibn ʿArabī, the Perfect Man was he who encompassed all of God's names at once. While, ideally, a mystic would aspire to experiencing and manifesting all the divine names, the station of Perfection was extremely rare for the individual. It was much easier for the community as a whole to manifest the ninety-nine names of God, in other words, to embody moral perfection. Because of the notion of communal virtue, imperfect individuals could be inscribed in social memory as crucial parts of a virtuous whole.

This chapter focuses on the rise of an anti-puritan literature that challenges state-religion, understood as the identification of religious and political surveillance, in the early modern period. In order to underline the main arguments of this anti-puritan literature, I focus on the debates around *samāʿ* — mystical ritual concerts—as a case study demonstrating both the Ottoman state's efforts to impose a uniformized state-religion, and the public sphere's pushback against this religio-political project. These seventeenth-century debates on *samāʿ* demonstrate the intellectual and social repertoire available to the Ottoman public in counteracting the early modern state's efforts at extending its authority into an increasingly broader realm of social life. Foremost among these conceptions was that of communal virtue, which established that civic communities had a right to privacy, understood as immunity from the intervention of public authorities in matters of ritual. Communal privacy thus delimited public authority, while emphasizing heterogeneous sociability as the locus of moral authority. In my discussion of the *samāʿ* debates with attention to the social visions expressed therein, I also trace the formation of a consistent anti-puritan strand in early modern Ottoman thought. Starting in the early seventeenth century, an anti-Ḳadızādeli literature began to form. This literature continued to exert influence well into the eighteenth century, since it provided a coherent vision of Islam marked by a propensity to accommodate innovations and diversity. While the Mevlevī order played a key role in the formation and persistence of the anti-puritan strand in early modern

Ottoman thought, the texts and concepts produced by Mevlevī authors were shared by Ḥalvetī and later on by Mujaddidī authors as well. In addition to describing communal privacy as an important political demand of public authority, therefore, this chapter defines an anti-puritan strand in early modern Ottoman thought. The remaining chapters will focus on an in-depth exposition of this anti-puritan strand by focusing on the Mevlevī order.

In my analysis of the pro-*samāʿ* arguments as they pertain to politics of religion, I underline the significance of communal privacy as an important ethical-political demand. Privacy, understood as a given community's right to develop distinctive practices that diverged from publicly sanctioned normativity, was and remained an important ethical and political demand throughout Ottoman early modernity. The ethical demand for privacy placed important restrictions on the imposition of a uniform and universal public authority justified on a moral and religious basis. While the presence of a communal notion of privacy in early modern Islam has been acknowledged before, privacy has often been treated as an abstract ideal. In contrast, this book underlines the social and historical force of privacy by diverging from established literature at two key points. First, I argue that rather than being an exclusively elitist discourse, Sufi notions of privacy facilitated public-forming practices that brought together various levels of society. These public-forming practices, such as *samāʿ*, were considered viable alternatives to formal learning as paths to pious self-formation, in other words to civility. In other words, practices of privacy were closely linked with an alternative understanding of piety that focused less on a strict adherence to a sharia-defined normative order, and more on membership in a pious community.[4] Second, I argue that rather than being a mode of passive withdrawal, privacy was an active ethical demand that urban publics placed on imperial religious policies. Through thus limiting the interference of public authority in religious practice, nonbureaucratic religious authorities and their publics also developed a language of civility that placed moral authority in the urban public sphere rather than in the official bureaucracy.[5]

PRIVACY AS A POLITICAL DEMAND: THE *SAMĀʿ* BETWEEN LEGAL REGULATION AND PUBLIC RESISTANCE

Based on legal and imperial rulings, current scholarship emphasizes the Ottoman establishment's efforts at purifying public Islam from practices that were not firmly grounded in sharia, such as the Sufi *samāʿ*. Urban narratives studied

in this book, on the other hand, present a different account of religiosity that foregrounds the formation of sociabilities around musical, poetic, and bodily practices of religion. The question poses itself: Should the historian dismiss the urban narratives of everyday religiosity as exceptions to the rule that was the steady ascent of an exclusively legal orthodoxy?[6] Or should these cases be taken seriously to challenge an understanding of everyday politics of religion based solely on prescriptive sources such as fatwas and firmans? As the reader might have already guessed, this book takes the second path. In this chapter, I take a close look at the early modern debates around *samāʿ*. I argue that the debates provide a significant case study about a conflict between a puritan project of reorganizing sacred and social space, on one hand, and a sustained resistance to this restrictive rearrangement, on the other. Through the Sufi responses to objections to *samāʿ*, posed by the Ḳadızādelis and jurists of the period, I underline the importance of urban networks in negotiating the terms of moral authority and civility. The particular focus of the early modern *samāʿ* debates was the privacy of the community—namely, the community's immunity from a uniformized public law in matters of ritual. This notion of communal privacy, I argue, was an important political demand that delimited the reach of public law and granted communities an important degree of autonomy in internal matters.

The persistence of *samāʿ* in early modern sacred space was neither a trivial exception to an otherwise intact legalistic Islam, nor an unintentional remnant of an older world of religiosity. Three important concepts underwrote the endurance and defense of *samāʿ* in public space even during the Ḳadızādeli debates, during which musical and rhythmic practices were heavily targeted. First, the rejection of the equation of the Islamic religion (*dīn, fiḳh*) with sharia challenged the regulation of public space solely along juristic principles. Ghazālī's critique of the professionalization of the ʿulamā, which was not a mere theoretical construct but pervaded biographical and narrative accounts of urban life, enabled the shaping of public Islam by accommodating a more complex configuration of piety grounded in the public sphere (*ṣulaḥā*).[7] This critical discourse on piety and morality posed an important challenge to the puritan project of arranging public Islam solely along the lines of juristic discourse.

Second, defending the right to interpret sharia in divergent ways challenged the official attempts to ban music and rhythmic dance, or to banish them from public mosques and public space.[8] In their treatises on *samāʿ*, Ottoman Sufis and jurists called for allowing each community to exercise interpretive authority on the legitimacy of *samāʿ* within their chosen community, or—as Ghazālī's

statement cited at the beginning of the chapter puts it—to issue a ruling "by their own heart."[9] Yet, while theoretically justifiable, the accommodation of intra-religious diversity was a complicated social and political problem. The third tenet of *samāʿ* debates follows from the need to accommodate diverse interpretations of sharia in a fragmented public sphere. For the Ottoman pro-*samāʿ* authors, this diversity needed to be honored by a kind of negative liberty that demanded the delimitation of interference in religious practice in select matters. This negative liberty is known in the secondary literature as communal privacy. A related argument in the pro-*samāʿ* literature was expressed through the concept of *ṣulḥ*, peaceful accommodation. Through the demand for peaceful accommodation of divergent religiosities (*ṣulḥ*), Ottoman religious authorities demanded a communal privacy understood as a form of negative liberty, an immunity from institutional surveillance in select matters.

These three intellectual and religious conceptual engagements—the distinction between religion and sharia, the interpretive diversity within sharia, and the right to communal privacy—were not merely abstract concepts; they found expression through the performance of nonprescriptive rituals such as *samāʿ*. While I provide a detailed exposition of the first two tenets of Ottoman anti-puritanism in chapters 5 and 6 of this book, in this chapter I focus on the peaceful accommodation of communal privacy as a political demand.

To understand privacy as a political demand, let us begin with a brief overview of Islamicate theories of communal privacy. Analyzing mystical and philosophical discourses of privacy, Shahab Ahmed explains the main function of the delineation of a private sphere in these traditions was to challenge the notion of a single, uniform divine truth that applied to all. Instead, Sufis and philosophers understood the intellectual realm to be composed of multiple truths organized hierarchically. Only the philosopher-king (for philosophers) or the Perfect Man (for the Sufis) had access to the higher levels of divine (or philosophical) truth. The higher forms of truth had to be carefully guarded from the masses, who did not have the spiritual capacity to fathom them. As a result, a strict division between the spiritual elite and the spiritual commoner (*ḫavāṣṣ* versus *ʿāmm*) emerged within Sufi traditions and communities.[10] Ahmed rightly notes the importance of the communal nature of such privacy:

> What I am calling "private discursive space" is very much a *social* space—that is to say, it is a space not of individual secrecy, but rather a restricted collective space in which people gather in private society for discourse (and performance) of Truths not appropriate to unrestricted common and public space and society.[11]

Therefore, the Islamicate conception of privacy implied, unlike modern conceptions of privacy centered on the individual, a socially shared privacy. This privacy is more appropriately translated into contemporary terms as "legal privacy," in the sense of being immune to the imposition of a uniform, sharia-informed order on the moral community of one's choosing.

While Sufi theoretical and discursive traditions on privacy are not unknown, their wider social implications have not been sufficiently recognized. The reason for this failure lies in reading the Sufi discourse of privacy at face value, as an evasive strategy that provided liberty and comfort only to a select elite. In contrast, I underline two important social and political implications of the Sufi notion of privacy. First, the discourse on privacy facilitated the formation of publics with its emphasis on the communication of divine truth through performance and through sharing social space. Second, this notion of a "legal private," which implied the delimitation of public authority in matters that pertained to communal authority, mobilized active political demands throughout early modern history.

Communal Privacy and Civic Culture in the Early Modern Ottoman City

Ottoman social and urban historians have provided mounting evidence that privacy, defined in theoretical texts of law, philosophy, and Sufism, was not an irrelevant abstract ideal, but a significant element of the early modern social order. This section provides an overview of the public-forming aspects of communal privacy as evidenced in historiographical studies based on court records. Historians have argued that in the early modern Ottoman city, communal privacy marked the limits of public authority while simultaneously encouraging the formation of civic solidarities.[12] By emphasizing the importance of this background, I underline the larger context and practical resonance of Sufi notions of privacy.

The prototype of communal privacy in the early modern Ottoman city was the neighborhood. Since Ḥanafi law and Ottoman administrative practice openly acknowledged the privacy of the neighborhood, there is a significant paper trail that allows us to conceptualize the neighborhood as the embodiment of communal privacy.[13] Recent research suggests that compared to its early modern European counterparts, the Ottoman Empire was demonstrably more reluctant to cross the public-private boundary to further its centralized authority. For example, Yaron Ayalon's comparative study on the disaster

responses of the Ottoman Empire, France, and England suggests that the former was reluctant to regulate the sections of cities considered private even under extraordinary circumstances, such as the aftermath of major urban disasters. Ayalon notes that in the aftermath of the Black Death in France and after the Great Fire of 1666 in England, the respective states extensively crossed the public-private boundary in order to impose health measures or to replan the cityscape. Ultimately, such boundary crossings resulted in the states' increased control over urban space. In contrast, the Ottoman state's disaster response, while swift, was strictly limited to the public space. Ayalon rightly suggests that this difference in disaster management is a telling case study of the Ottoman state's abstinence from intruding in urban life beyond the public realm.[14]

In addition to marking the boundaries of state authority, the strong culture of urban communal privacy also created practices of civic solidarity in the early modern city. As Charles Wilkins notes in his study on urban solidarities in seventeenth-century Aleppo, urban neighborhoods were "both a natural occurring formation of civil society and a defined administrative unit," hence sites of negotiating between the residents' demands and those of the state's regulatory efforts.[15] In this sense, the neighborhood community often had to respond to the state's demands and, when necessary, negotiate with the state on behalf of the residents. Communal autonomy within the constraints imposed by the state was not restricted exclusively to the neighborhood community; other corporate bodies in the Ottoman Empire, such as guilds, pious endowments, scholars (*'ulamā*), and non-Muslim communities, operated based on a similar conception of civic solidarity and autonomy.

A significant paradox in studying civic spaces of privacy is that the historical record only covers the moments when these corporate bodies either were forced to or chose to bring their affairs into the purview of public authorities. For instance, as the perfect example of the "communal private," the neighborhood had the right to choose whether to involve the *ḳadı* court in matters pertaining to its privacy.[16] The cases reflected in the court records, therefore, are residual rather than comprehensive; they omit the many instances when the community chose to resort to the practice of amicable settlement (*ṣulḥ*) without recourse to the *ḳadı* court.

Regular recourse to one's immediate community implies the limits not only to public authority itself, but also to the records kept by the public authority—in this case, the court records. In fact, some absences from the

historical record that were caused by the communal private have been so loud that historians often found themselves wondering why certain issues rarely if ever made it to the court records. For instance, in her study of the court registers of Aleppo covering the period between 1507 and 1866, Elyse Semerdjian notes a total of only four cases of same-sex illicit sex brought to the ḳāḍı court.[17] Although her article mainly focuses on a detailed analysis of the one exceptional case, Semerdjian flags the remarkable paucity of same-sex illicit affairs, and asks the question "Why were the shari'a court and Aleppo's neighbourhood residents—the facilitators of prosecution in matters of public morality—generally not interested in prosecution of same-sex intercourse?"[18]

A similarly loud absence is noted by Eunjeong Yi in her study on intercommunal relations in seventeenth-century Istanbul. In her study on the rise of the non-Muslim population of Istanbul in the seventeenth century, Yi aims to bring into the limelight demographic and social reasons behind Istanbul's intercommunal conflicts that have so far been explained in purely religious terms, particularly as a reflection of the "Ḳāḍızādeli impact."[19] Yi elucidates two main factors underlying increased intercommunal conflict. First, ideological reasons motivated the state to strive toward furnishing the capital with an unmistakable Muslim character. Second, the constant influx of non-Muslims into Istanbul caused apprehension among the Muslim community, which feared falling into a minority.[20] One of the most radical manifestations of this apprehension was the proposal to expel all Christians from within the walled city, forwarded by none other than the leader of the third Ḳāḍızādeli wave, Vānī Meḥmed Efendi (d. 1685).[21] Without underestimating the shifting religious climate, however, Yi warns against understanding intercommunal relations solely through expressions of tension. Instead, Yi underlines a dramatic demographic shift that took place as the Ḳāḍızādeli puritanism reached its peak; the non-Muslim population rose to nearly half of the city by the 1690s. This demographic rise, Yi notes, was made possible through the quiet work of urban networks that incorporated the incoming non-Muslims. Despite its significance, this quiet accommodation did not make a dent in the archives in the same way as expressions of intercommunal animosity.[22]

Yi's reflection on the gap in the archive is rare and precious; the coexistence of large-scale immigration and interreligious strife alerts us to the large gaps in the archive regarding the communal relationships where tension did *not* arise.[23] Similar reflections become inevitable in early modern practices of policing morality, a task that was largely left to the initiative of the private

community. While the historical record, by its nature, falls short of fully reflecting the dynamics within such communities of privacy, their roles in urban life—including conflict resolution, moral surveillance, disaster response, and various forms of social solidarity—leave no doubt as to the limited reach, even aspiration, of public authority in the early modern Ottoman city.

Peaceful Accommodation (Ṣulḥ) and the Limits to Public Law

A sound historical understanding of the communal private sphere, therefore, is made challenging, if not ultimately impossible, by what one might term "the paradox of privacy"—namely, that the private domain lent itself to historical record only when it stepped into the realm of the public institution. From the paradox of privacy, it follows that the instances of inviting the public authority into the communal private, while extremely significant, should not be taken to reflect the entirety of urban civic culture. It is important to understand this paradox in order to better appreciate the limits of the early modern state's authority vis-à-vis the urban public sphere. In matters of religious and moral discipline, the extent of the state's authority depended largely on the cooperation of local communities. In other words, practices of privacy suggest that sustainable moral surveillance was possible only if and when local communities chose to fully cooperate.[24] The surveillance potential of the localities was doubtless successfully reaped by the Ottoman state in certain historical instances, most notably the Sunni-Qizilbash clash, which reached its peak during the reigns of Selīm I and Süleymān I.[25] Yet, it would be mistaken to assume that corporate structures entirely surrendered their autonomy to fully cooperate with Ottoman institutions' projects of moral surveillance. To the contrary, this section demonstrates that the history of competing moral projects in the early modern city was often fraught with social tension and active resistance.

In this section, I analyze the persistence of samāʿ in mosques and secular ceremonial contexts as a significant case study that demonstrates the autonomy of urban communities in negotiating with the state about the nature and scope of religious surveillance. The samāʿ debates lucidly illustrate the two important social dimensions of Islamic discourses of privacy that this chapter underlines: their public-forming aspects and the political force of the concept of a communal or legal private. Before turning to the samāʿ debates, however, a note on the terminology and on the social context of samāʿ is in order. Samāʿ is a technical term in Sufism that literally means "audition," meaning an audi-

tion by the heart. The term could apply to the audition of the Qurān, sermons, poetry, music, or any combination of these vocal performances.[26] In the specific case of *samāʿ*, the audition would lead to a state of trance and the movement of bodies rhythmically, either in a state of rehearsed improvisation, or in accordance with an established choreography. In Ottoman parlance, a synonym for *samāʿ* was *devrān*, literally "whirling," referring to the circular bodily movements practiced during the mystical audition. A minor difference of nuance between the two terms, however, exists. The term "whirling" highlights the circular movement of the Sufi rather than the act of audition. The Sufi *devrān* was intended to imitate the rhythmic circular movement of the heavens, thereby effecting a perfect resonance of the macrocosm (the universe) and the microcosm (the human soul).[27] For consistency, the following discussion uses *samāʿ* either without translation or as "mystical concerts," whereas *devrān* is translated as "whirling."[28] A concept related to both is *zikr*, referring to the remembrance of God through silent or vocal repetition of a given litany. In many cases, *zikr* was an added element in *samāʿ* and *devrān*. Accounts of the *samāʿ* ritual appear mainly in Sufi writings and travelogues written by European observers, as the ceremony was a main attraction for foreign visitors during the early modern period. For instance, the Italian musicologist and author Pietro della Valle (d. 1652) visited the Mevlevī lodge of Galata to attend a *samāʿ* ceremony and wrote a pithy yet incisive account of the ritual. In addition to explaining the cosmic imagery embedded in the ritual, della Valle noted that the dervishes chanted the *zikr* "Hū" (meaning "Allah") as they whirled at an extraordinary speed during the ceremonies, a short incantation intended to center the dervish's spiritual focus entirely on God.[29]

Although mystical concerts had a long history going back to the tenth century, their legal permissibility remained a constant source of debate in Islamic societies thereafter. Because of the universality of these juristic debates, the *samāʿ* discussions have been assumed to have an ahistorical, purely jurisprudential character. However, recent research on early modern religiosity provides important insights into the social and political dimensions of the debates around *samāʿ*, particularly during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the tensions around the practice heightened such that in the seventeenth century Sufis often complained about some mosque sermons justifying physical violence against Sufi dancers and physical attacks on Sufi lodges. These reactions eventually culminated in an imperial *samāʿ* ban in the years 1666–84 that invoked the full authority of the sultan in regulating

religious practice, hence forming a perfect example of an early modern merger between religious and political authority. Despite the mounting pressure, the *samāʿ* ritual was defended by Sufi orders who continued to practice it on public occasions, including mosque gatherings, public parades, and court ceremonies.[30] One reason for this persistence, no doubt, was the important role that *samāʿ* played in forming publics of various levels of literacy and commitment. Another important reason was the active resistance to the official efforts to relegate *samāʿ* to the private sphere of the lodge and hence to eradicate ecstatic performance from the public mosque. Both of these aspects of the *samāʿ* debates, which emphasize its relationship to a particular vision of public Islam that was not restricted to a narrow interpretation of the sharia, pervade the Ḥalvetī and Mevlevī accounts of the early modern period.

Making Publics through Performance: Samāʿ and Communal Identities

In early modern Ottoman Sufism, *samāʿ*, music, and similar nondiscursive social practices were valued for their public-forming aspects—namely, their ability to bring various strata of society together as a moral community.[31] Publics formed through performance were intentionally heterogenous; they brought together people from different social groups, with varying degrees of literacy and faith. In fact, as the next section shows, these performances often brought together Muslims and non-Muslims. In this section, I focus on Ḥalvetī narratives regarding the order's continuing practice of *samāʿ* despite the juristic, and later the Ḳadızādeli, criticism. These narratives show, with great clarity, that Sufi communities were explicitly aware of, and in favor of, the social implications of *samāʿ* rituals. Explicit references to the public-forming nature of Sufi ritual find direct statement in the various vitae of ʿAbdülmecīd Sivāsī (d. 1639), an eminent mosque preacher and an opponent of Ḳadızāde Meḥmed Efendi.[32]

Possibly the most renowned sheikh of the Ḥalvetī-Sivāsī branch, Sivāsī was a preacher who served at top-tier imperial mosques of Istanbul, such as the Hagia Sophia Mosque, Şehzāde Mosque, and Sultan Selīm Mosque. He was also the first Friday preacher of the Sultan Aḥmed Mosque, which was built in 1609. As a preacher, he was known not only for his learned sermons, but also for his impressive voice and delivery—in other words, for the performative aspects of his preaching.[33] During his tenure, Sivāsī had to defend the public performance of Sufi *samāʿ* not only against Ḳadızādeli Meḥmed, but also against the chief mufti of the time. Surprisingly, this eminent Ḥalvetī

sheikh known as an advocate of *samāʿ* was against mystical concerts in his early days. According to the Ḥalvetī tradition, ʿAbdülmecīd had a natural disposition toward a strictly juristic outlook in his youth. As a result, he was openly disdainful of the Sufism practiced in the circles of his uncle Şemseddīn Sivāsī (d. 1597), the founder of the Sivāsī branch of Ḥalvetiyye whose order took root in the Sivas-Amasya region of Anatolia.[34] He was particularly averse to the practice of *samāʿ*, which he considered an illicit innovation (*bidʿa*). The young ʿAbdülmecīd often refrained from socializing with the dervishes of his uncle's lodge (*soḥbet ve muʾāneset*), a habit that later in life he acknowledged as a mistake:

> Haughtiness [due to learning] and augmented blackness [of heart] from ink kept me from [their] company and fellowship. [This was] because the Sufis practiced whirling (*devrān*), some of them shrieking with loud cries, others tearing their shirts, falling down unconscious.[35]

Thus turned off by the ecstatic states of the dervishes, the young ʿAbdülmecīd Sivāsī's scholarly and antisocial arrogance continued until the prophet himself came to shake Sivāsī out of his misbehavior, in a dream. The dream involved the Prophet holding the reins of a camel who performed the whirling with a heavy weight on her hump. His uncle and sheikh Şemseddīn Sivāsī interpreted the prophetic dream for the mystically disinclined ʿAbdülmecid: so long as the Sufis (the camel) carried the weight (of the sharia), their whirling was in accordance with the path of the Prophet.[36] The hagiographical narrative is one of intrafaith conversion, presenting Sivāsī as "illuminated by the light of the prophet" to embrace a more lenient attitude toward Sufi practices at his uncle and sheikh's lodge in Sivās.[37] In fact, according to his hagiographers, ʿAbdülmecīd was so profoundly transformed that after the prophetic dream he was more ecstatic in *samāʿ* than all other Sufis combined.[38]

The remarkable significance of this conversion narrative is that ʿAbdülmecid Sivāsī was granted a license to become a sheikh (*icāzetnāme*) serving the neighboring Anatolian towns only after he converted to a conception of Islam that embraced the unlearned and experiential practices of the Ḥalvetī order:

> [Şemseddīn Sivāsī] appointed him as a deputy to the town of Merzifon and the surrounding towns, [including] *the people of tents, namely nomads*. He became so well-respected and popular that he was invited to cities, towns, and tents for his sermons and whirling, inspiring thousands of people into the honor of allegiance [into his order].[39]

Through this narrative, Ḫalvetī authors recognized and underscored the importance of whirling (*devrān*) for communicating with the nomads—and, by implication, other social groups who did not possess religious literacy—as a key virtue of this musical and bodily practice. The vita therefore illustrates the key role of the performative aspects of Sufism in the entrenchment of Sufi authority in early modern society. As Devin DeWeese aptly reminds us, modern scholarly practice often prioritizes legalistic and scripturalist interpretations of Islam at the expense of other equally pervasive and substantial traditions, which might be termed "non-discursive" dimensions of Islam. This neglect of nondiscursive expressions of moral authority results in an incomplete understanding of the social and symbolic worlds of early modern religion.[40] In a similar manner, scriptural approaches to *samāʿ* that reduce the practice to a "legal versus illegal" dichotomy entirely miss the cultural and social dimensions of the practice. In addition, emotive and ecstatic experiences are often considered to be "private," thus not relevant to public religiosity. This assumption is an inaccurate projection of the modern configuration of public and private onto early modern societies. In reality, as far as early modern Sufism is concerned, emotive and ecstatic experiences facilitated the formation of publics, either directly or through the dissemination of the narratives of the experience.

Early modern Sufi authority was not always communicated in the form of highly erudite, philosophical texts. To the contrary, when it came to expressing their teaching, most Sufi sheikhs chose communicable forms of experiential knowledge such as dreams, miracle stories, music, and trance. Epiphanic dreams, such as ʿAbdülmecid Sivāsī's dream about the Prophet condoning whirling, exemplify the significant public-forming implications of personal experience when couched in narrative form. As Jonathan Katz observes,

> The most intimate and private of noetic experience—the dream or vision—could also paradoxically serve a most public role. In the process, dreams and visions extend beyond their customary function as a means of spiritual communication with the unseen to become mundane and highly visible advertisements of the dreamer's *baraka* or charisma.[41]

Katz's observation about the public role of dreams also applies to other experiential aspects of Sufi religiosity, such as ecstasy, trance, and secrecy. When performed publicly, the Sufi's trance built a close-knit social and emotional community around him, as seen in ʿAbdülmecid Sivāsī's account of *devrān*.

The same public dimensions accompany the notion of secrets between God and his friends (*velī*) as found in Sufi theology. These divine secrets were considered not only ineffable by nature, but also detrimental to the commoner, whose superficial and literal interpretation of the secrets might lead him astray. Ecstatic utterances (*shathiyyāt*), a notion discussed in chapter 1, were an extreme example of the concept of divine secrets that needed to be hidden from the general public to avoid misleading them.

Yet, secrets considered dangerous for the commoner were frequently divulged in Sufi poetry and hagiography. Therefore, Sufi theoretical treatments of secrecy should not be taken at face value, as a doctrine endorsing the exclusion of the commoner.[42] A facile reading of Sufi secrets as individual private experience leads to overlooking the regular public expression of transgressive secrets and their roles in forming social bonds. As Azfar Moin notes in his analysis of Mughal Sufism, the transgressive nature of these secrets was precisely what constituted the saint's public authority: "The more 'inviolable' the norm, the greater the spiritual reward existed for breaking it."[43] Notions of privacy and secrecy were an extension of this foundational dilemma of charismatic, saintly authority. As Moin shows with regard to the vita of the Mujaddidī sheikh Aḥmad Sirhindī (d. 1624) of Delhi, the main social function of discourses of secrecy was to invite outsiders. Expressed through cryptic, often poetic language and an esoteric lore, the Sufi emphasis on secrets functioned as "a draw for potential followers to gain access to the inner circle."[44]

It is also, therefore, misleading to take Sufi discourse on secrets as private experiences at face value. While theoretical Sufi literature might suggest that experiential and transcendental truths—that either contradict or simply diverge from legal-normative expressions of religion—were secrets between God and a select spiritual elite, secrecy was in practice a key constituent of Sufi sociabilities. Social expressions of spiritual secrets indeed played a significant communicative role in bringing a heterogeneously literate community together as a unified moral community. The aforementioned intra-Islamic conversion story of ʿAbdülmecid Sivāsī is a significant expression of the social role of emotive performances in reaching to a diverse crowd that included the townspeople and the tent-people alike. The sheikh's "conversion to whirling" was experienced and narrated as a communicable dream with a clear graphic image at its heart of a whirling camel whose reins were held by the Prophet. The whirling itself was valued for its instrumentality in bringing all strata of the public, including the unlettered nomads, into the folds of the Sufi order.

Once ʿAbdülmecid Sivāsī's "conversion to whirling" took place in Merzifon, he remained committed to *samāʿ* even after receiving major preaching posts at the imperial capital, away from the unlettered tent-people of his native town. In his prominent public posts at the capital, Sivāsī insisted on performing *samāʿ* in public spaces rather than relegating it to the privacy of the Sufi lodge. This insistence occasionally brought him into conflict with high-ranking statesmen. For instance, during the reign of Aḥmed I (d. 1617), when the Ḥalvetīs performed the vocal *zikr* during a public parade, they were rebuked by the chief mufti Saʿdeddīnzāde Meḥmed Efendi (d. 1615).[45] The chief mufti's intervention in the public performance of the Ḥalvetī mystical concert infuriated Sivāsī, then preacher of the Sultan Aḥmed Mosque. The ensuing quarrel between the chief mufti and the Ḥalvetī preacher escalated when Sivāsī renounced Saʿdeddīnzāde as an oppressor during one of his public sermons, in response to which Saʿdeddīnzāde asked the sultan to exile the sheikh from the capital, a demand that was not granted, owing to strong Ḥalvetī influence in the capital.[46]

The pressures on Sufi ritual would only mount with the Ḳadızādeli movement, during which *samāʿ* was targeted not only as an illicit innovation (*bidʿa*), but also as a symbol of the taking over of custom (*ʿurf*) in the public sphere. The two orders targeted for their embracing of *samāʿ* and other innovations, the Ḥalvetīs and the Mevlevīs, came under extreme pressure during the seventeenth century. Ḥalvetī preachers, who held the majority of Istanbul's preaching posts in this period, were particularly targeted—not only ideologically, but also physically. For instance, on the day of the passing of one of the most intellectually influential Ḥalvetī sheikhs, ʿAbdüleḥad Nūrī (d. 1651), puritan leaders vandalized the prayer niche (*miḥrāb*) of the Hagia Sophia Mosque, where he had been a preacher. On the same day, they physically assaulted another Ḥalvetī sheikh who used to practice vocal *zikr* at the Sultan Aḥmed Mosque.[47] Nūrī's disciple, Naẓmī Efendi, later wrote that attacks of this kind continued until the beginning of the reign of the grand vizier Köprülü Meḥmed Paşa in 1656. According to Naʿīmā, by this date the puritan preacher Üstüvānī Meḥmed and his followers had escalated their violent methods, calling the public to take up arms to attack Sufis who sang in the mosques, and then to tear down Sufi lodges. Eventually, this group of puritans were exiled to Cyprus, with a fatwa issued by the chief mufti declaring that their acts constituted a disturbance of the public order (*fesād*).[48]

Yet, the respite for the Sufi orders was temporary. A third wave of the Ḳadızādeli movement was led by Vānī Meḥmed Efendi, a preacher and Sultan

Meḥmed IV's adviser-tutor. The period of Vānī Efendi's influence at court was marked by an increased Sunni fervor that resulted in increased tensions with non-Muslims; one of the many examples is the targeting of the Christian presence within the walled city, another the forced conversion of Sabbetai Sevi mentioned above. Sufi orders also received their fair share of the court's aggressive, legalistically oriented Sunnism in this period. Vānī Efendi famously declared that one could either follow the four legitimate legal schools, or follow the school of the sheikhs, implying that belonging to Sufi networks was synonymous with falling outside the legitimate path of sharia.[49]

The main crux of Vānī's criticism of Sufi networks was their propensity for embracing innovations that Vānī associated with most rituals of Sufism, particularly their reverence for sheikhs and rituals such as *samāʿ* and other musical practices.[50] He thus placed the Sufi path against sharia, the former having "innovated" an altogether invented and illicit path. These radical pronouncements were accompanied by actions, both top-down and emulated by the members of the public, that targeted Ḥalvetīs much like at the time of Üstüvānī, albeit with greater success because of Vānī's enormous influence at the court. Under Vānī's influence, a Bektāşī shrine in Edirne was destroyed, and two Ḥalvetī sheikhs, Ḳarabaş Velī (d. 1686) and Niyāzī-i Mıṣrī (d. 1694), were sent to exile outside Istanbul.[51] The verbal criticisms of and physical attacks on the dervish lodges, encouraged by Vānī's religious policies, culminated in an imperial ban on *samāʿ* that started in 1666. This ban would last until 1684, and would be mentioned as "the abominable ban" (*yasağ-ı bed*) in Mevlevī narratives of the subsequent centuries. It represented a unique episode of direct state intervention in Sufi practice indiscriminately in both public and private space.

Throughout the seventeenth century, the Mevlevīs were both direct targets and vocal critics of the Ḳadızādeli-inspired religious policies of the Ottoman center, particularly during the reign of Sultan Meḥmed IV. A glaring example of the prominence of the Mevlevīs in the *samāʿ* debates is the chief mufti Minḳārizāde Yaḥya Efendī's fatwa of 1666, which prepared the legal ground for the imperial ban on *samāʿ*. In his fatwa, Minḳārizāde singled out the Mevlevī ceremony, rather than banning *samāʿ* in a more generic sense. He further enjoined the dervishes of the Mevlevī order to quit music and whirling entirely, to observe the ways (*ādāb*) of sharia, and to "listen to the sayings of the Prophet and other (appropriate) sermons instead."[52] In response, the Mevlevī order crafted an anti-puritan identity that was expressed coherently and consistently, as seen in the biographical dictionary of the Mevlevī order

penned by Şāķıb Dede (d. 1735). Şāķıb Dede's work, entitled *Sefīne-i Nefīse-i Mevlevīyān*, generously praised Mevlevī sheikhs and disciples who resisted the Ķadızādelis in military language, portraying them as warriors and ghazīs against heretics (*münkir*). Much like the Ḥalvetī narratives, the Mevlevīs consistently referred to the Ķadızādeli debates as a period of civil strife (*fitna*).[53] Mevlevī narratives valorized the order's sheikhs as champions in the cause of defeating this social and religious sedition. For instance, the famous Müneccimbaşı Aḥmed Dede el-Mevlevī, historian and chief astrologer to Meḥmed IV, is described as follows:

> Just as İsmail Rusuhi Dede (d. 1631) was the head of the defense in his day, Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede was as if appointed by the saints against that cunning Vānī (*Vānī-i fettān*). He tied the tongue of that reprehensible slanderer and his unwashed followers in their denials [*inkāriyye*, i.e., of sainthood], hence received many praises and prayers from the dervishes.[54]

SAMĀʿ AND THE LIMITS OF STATE-RELIGION

In his account of the Ķadızādeli debates, Kātib Çelebi (d. 1657) argued matter-of-factly that the official fatwas to eradicate Sufi musical rituals from public space were motivated by the desire to reinforce the state's political power.[55] Kātib Çelebi's interpretation of the puritan policies of the Ottoman center as an effort to augment political authority through increased surveillance was widely shared by the Ottoman public. As explained in chapter 1, I refer to this particular religio-political vision as state-religion. The imperial ban on *samāʿ* that began in 1666 is arguably the most succinct encapsulation of the early modern Ottoman conception of state-religion—namely, an officially sanctioned form of Islam that the state policies aimed to impose over other public expressions of Islam.

The deliberate conflation of religious and political authority during the *samāʿ* ban of 1666–84 found unambiguous expression in the fatwa that justified the ban. Issued by the chief mufti Minķārizāde Yaḥyā Efendi (d. 1678), the fatwa invoked the sultan's right and duty to command the right and forbid the wrong in order to protect the purity of religion.[56] While the legitimacy of *samāʿ* had repeatedly been subject to juristic debates before, this was the first time that the effective termination of the ritual was considered a sultanic right and duty. Notably, the mufti who issued this fatwa, Minķārizāde, was reported in Ottoman sources to have a personal disinclination toward Ķadızādeli puritan-

ism. When asked about why he supported Vānī Efendi's agenda despite not being in agreement with his views on Islam, the chief mufti reportedly responded, "[Merely] to instil fear in people's hearts."[57] Whether the anecdote is accurate or not, it shows that contemporary Ottoman observers perceived the dynasty's alliance with the Ḳādızādeli preachers as an instrumental one, where the former deemed the latter useful allies in instilling social discipline.[58]

This particularly harsh extension of imperial authority into the realm of ritual was to be bitterly contested by Ottoman anti-puritan authors.[59] In contrast to the puritan vision, which conjured up the ideal of a unified public sphere under a single religio-political authority, anti-puritan authors sought strategies by which to accommodate a certain degree of diversity and plurality of norms and practice. To entertain this inevitable diversity, anti-puritan discourse argued for the importance of adopting peaceful accommodation, ṣulḥ, as a key socioreligious principle.[60]

In the early modern era, the concept of ṣulḥ had a curious transnational history that extended from the Mughal Empire to the Ottoman Empire. Explaining the significance of the term in the Mughal context, Rajeev Kinra demonstrates that the term ṣulḥ was used to signify a socioreligious vision marked by the easy accommodation of difference. Until recently, historians of the Mughal Empire have interpreted the concept of ṣulḥ as a framework for tolerance in Muslim-Hindu relationships associated with the emperor Akbar I (r. 1556–1605). Kinra argues, in contrast, for the term's *longue-durée* conceptual history as well as its relevance to intra-Islamic accommodation of diverse views. Significantly, Kinra demonstrates the rootedness of ṣulḥ in various areas of classical Islamic thought, such as the legal concept of ṣulḥ discussed earlier in this chapter. While these classical discourses of ṣulḥ were shared between Mughal and Ottoman intellectual cultures, paradoxically enough, it was a critic of the Mughal concept of ṣulḥ who was responsible for the revival of the term in the Ottoman Empire in the early modern era.

While the founder of the Mujaddidī branch of the Naḳshbandī order, Aḥmad Sirhindī (d. 1624), strongly criticized the Mughal principle of ṣulḥ, his first disciple in Istanbul, Meḥmed Emīn Toḳādī (d. 1745), defended peaceful accommodation in matters of ritual, such as the practice of *samāʿ*. This major shift has so far escaped attention as Ottomanist works on Mujaddidism have assumed a full continuity with Sirhindī's sharia-centered project. However, the contrast between the two branches of the same order are noteworthy, and I argue that these differences are a sure indicator of the impact of Ottoman

anti-puritanism in the early modern age.[61] In the early seventeenth-century Mughal context, Sirhindī's conservative revivalism emerged as a criticism of ṣulḥ, which Sirhindī wished to replace with a strict imposition of a sharia-centered Sunnism.[62] Given Sirhindī's emphasis on a sharia-centered uniformity of practice in the Islamic community, Ottoman historians have likened his Mujaddidī order to the Ḳadızādeli movement. While the Sirhindī-Ḳadızāde comparison might be apt, the projection of Sirhindī's ideas onto the Mujaddidī order as a whole is hasty and disregards the varieties within Sirhindī's order from the beginning.[63] More significantly, these comments do not take into account the social-intellectual context of the early Mujaddidīs in the Ottoman Empire, in particular their connections with the scribal class of the empire and with the Mevlevī networks of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is important to understand Ottoman Mujaddidīs within this broader context of a strong anti-puritan, Mevlevī presence rather than to assume that the order had simply been copied identically from the Mughal context.

The ideas of Meḥmed Emīn Ṭoḳādī (d. 1745) and his disciple Müsṭaḳīmzāde Süleymān Saʿdeddīn (d. 1788) illustrate the impact of Istanbul's anti-puritan social milieu on the early Mujaddidī circles. One of the earliest Mujaddidīs of Istanbul, Ṭoḳādī was trained by some of the leading musicians of Istanbul and firmly believed in the legitimacy of samāʿ and music. This position brought him into conflict with some other Naḳshbandī sheikhs of the capital, who argued that samāʿ and other forms of musical performance were categorically contradictory to the tenets of the Naḳshbandī order. The operative term in Ṭoḳādī's response to this uneasy diversity was to emphasize the need to accommodate diversity within the order, and within the Islamic community in general.[64]

As the reader of this book will discover in the following chapters, Ṭoḳādī was not the only Sufi author who advocated for a public order that was accommodating of diverse moral communities. These discussions took both the need to accommodate diversity and the imperative for public order seriously. A key question was: What were the conditions under which the principle of ṣulḥ could be applied? To simultaneously accommodate both the need for public order and the communal autonomy of the multiple groups in the public sphere, Ṭoḳādī wrote about peaceful accommodation as a principle that applied under three conditions. The first two conditions applied to the weighty question of innovation and defended the progressive notion of tradition that embraced novelties. First, Ṭoḳādī argued that in the case of new practices that were not

explicitly condemned in early sources (*zamana tābiʿ olan umūr*) disagreement and diversity were to be allowed.[65] Second, anything that was not openly contradictory to sharia, and that the Muslim community adopted as a custom, became a legitimate part of the tradition.[66] Given the significance of the progressive conception of tradition as justified through these two principles, I will treat it in greater detail in the following chapters.

The third and final principle of *ṣulḥ*, according to Toḳādī, was the following: "Affect is not subject to legal regulation."[67] In making this judgment, Toḳādī surely drew on classical Sufi terminology as found in its earliest exponents, such as al-Ḳushayrī (d. 1072) and al-Ghazālī (d. 1111).[68] The word that Ṭoḳādī used for "experiential," *vicdānī*, was one of a set of conceptual tools that Sufis used to refer to aspects of religion not covered by public law. Ṭoḳādī's statement reflected the consensus among the anti-puritan calls to accommodate these differences of interpretation and practice through the concept of *ṣulḥ*. In making the argument for accommodating affective practices for the sake of allowing emotional communities to practice their diverse interpretations of Islam, Ṭoḳādī was following a key anti-puritan argument in defense of *samāʿ*. The delimitation of public authority in matters pertaining to communal privacy was one of the key tenets of the debate. In its Ottoman reincarnation, this communal privacy was demanded through two interventions that were direct rebuttals to the Ottoman policies of religious surveillance. First, anti-puritan authors criticized the state's progressive encroachment on the regulation of public sacred space, mainly through increased regulation of the mosques. Second, Sufi opponents of Ottoman puritanism challenged the pressure toward greater compartmentalization in the social lives of Muslims and non-Muslims.[69] In both issues, pro-*samāʿ* authors actively pushed against the juristic pressures toward increased separation and advanced a more diverse and heterogeneous understanding of the Islamic tradition.

A flurry of writing that continued well after the end of the *samāʿ* ban aimed to inscribe the Ḳadızādeli period into the Ottoman historical memory as a dark age. Among these anti-puritan writings were hagiographical narratives such as the vitae of ʿAbdülmecid Sivāsī and ʿAbdülehad Nūrī.[70] In addition to narratives in the form of saintly vitae, systematic treatises continued to explicate an anti-puritan stance at least a century after the end of the Ḳadızādeli movement. A prominent example of the symbolic value of the events is a critical treatise by the Damascene Sufi and scholar ʿAbdulghanī al-Nabulusī (d. 1731) entitled *Strings of Pearls in the Way of the Mevlevī Masters*, alongside

its extended translations into Turkish.[71] An initiate of the Naḳshbandī and Ḳādirī orders, Nabulūsī was a public preacher and teacher who established a wide-reaching circle of master-student relationships. In addition, he crafted a public persona through his correspondence, through which he reached a wide network of scholars in the Ottoman Empire, including major figures such as the chief mufti Feyzullah Efendi (d. 1703).[72] As Jonathan Allen has argued, ʿAbdulghanī al-Nabulusī consistently defended an anti-puritan (or, in Allen's words, "de-confessionalizing") vision of Islam that directly challenged the legitimacy of the imperial establishment's efforts to extend its reach increasingly deeper into the realm of religious discourse and practice.[73] This anti-puritan vision manifested itself through the Damascene sheikh's defense of smoking, gazing at young boys (shāhid-bāzī), and the equality of Muslims and non-Muslims who paid poll taxes. In all of these matters, he blamed the jurists of his age for being overly strict and erring on the side of rigidity, whereas the Prophet had ordered his community to err on the side of lenience.[74]

It is important to understand that rather than being accidentally dissident, Nabulusī's thought was shaped in response to the specific climate of Ottoman religious politics. Nabulusī's religio-political vision was a product of his age: not only was he responding to stringency as symbolized by the Ḳadızādelis; he was also responding *together with* other anti-puritans. As this book demonstrates, in symbolically charged issues of the early modern era, such as *samāʿ* or smoking, Nabulusī's arguments were highly consistent with the Ḥalvetī, Mevlevī, and later Mevlevī-Mujaddidī works of Ottoman anti-puritanism.[75] In addition to penning a treatise in defense of the Mevlevīs, Nabulusī read and commented on works by other anti-Ḳadızādeli authors such as the Ḥalvetī preacher ʿAbdüleḥad Nūrī, an important author whose treatises in defense of Akbarian thought and of the *samāʿ* ritual remained widely read throughout the eighteenth century.[76] Nabulusī's *Mevlevī Masters* therefore was a product of an Ottoman anti-puritan alliance that took shape in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The choice of centering the text around the Mevlevīs, with whom he had no social ties except his father's occasional visits to the Damascus Lodge to witness *samāʿ*, should be understood in this context.[77]

Mevlevī Masters, completed in 1683, a year before the end of the *samāʿ* ban, was the last in a series of three treatises that Nabulusī wrote in defense of music and spiritual audition.[78] Two Turkish translations of Nabulusī's *Mevlevī Masters* emerged from the tightly interconnected Mevlevī-Mujaddidī circles of Istanbul.[79] The first translation was penned by ʿĀrifī Aḥmed Dede of Plo-

vdiv (d. 1724). After his initial tenures as sheikh at the Pécs and Plovdiv Mevlevī Lodges, ʿĀrifī Aḥmed Dede was appointed to the Yenikapı Mevlevī Lodge in Istanbul, known as an important center for janissaries during the seventeenth century.[80] According to his own statement, Aḥmed Dede's translation was prompted by the request of the head cook of the Konya Mevlevī Lodge, who suggested that a Turkish translation would benefit Mevlevī adepts (muḥibb) who did not read Arabic. In Mevlevī tradition, the head cooks of lodges acted as the first teachers of adepts, acculturating them to the rules and etiquette of the lodge before they transitioned to full-time resident studentship.[81] The head cook's demand, therefore, represented a more general interest in Nabulusī's work among Mevlevīs of lower ranks. The second translation of *Mevlevī Masters* was produced in the Mujaddidī-Naḳshbandī circles of Istanbul by a prolific secretary and author named Müstaḳīmzāde Süleymān Saʿdeddin (d. 1788). Müstaḳimzāde's translation was completed as late as 1768, a century after the *samāʿ* ban that had prompted Nabulusī to pen *Mevlevī Masters*. Unlike Peçevī Aḥmed Dede's translation, Müstaḳīmzāde's was a considerably extended version of Nabulusī's text.

How do we explain the long-term interest in Nabulusī's *Mevlevī Masters*, a text that was written within the very specific historical context of the *samāʿ* ban of 1666–84? Why was an anti-Ḳādızādeli tract on *samāʿ* of interest to the Ottoman readership a century after its completion, and more importantly in an age where similar direct threats to Sufi practice were no longer a part of the Ottoman reality?[82] Surely, part of the reason is the value of the Ḳādızādeli debates as a major event of Ottoman history, making *Mevlevī Masters* an engaging account in the genre of recent history.[83] However, the enduring relevance of the text to Ottoman debates on tradition, innovation, and the limits of religious surveillance was the main reason behind its long-term success. Translators and commentators considered *Mevlevī Masters* to be much more than a treatise on the practice of *samāʿ*. As Müstaḳīmzāde states with directness and clarity, the work, while seemingly a defense of the Mevlevīs, was in fact inclusive of important discussions pertinent to the Muslims in a more universal sense: "Even though the esteemed sheikh wrote this treatise in the name of the Mevlevīs, it will be obvious to the readers that it is an essential [reading] to all Muslims in a comprehensive sense."[84]

In other words, according to its Ottoman readers, *Mevlevī Masters* was a comprehensive treatment of issues pertinent to key debates on Islam, going beyond the specific question of Mevlevīs and *samāʿ*. Through many additions

and expansions, Nabulusī's commentators used *Mevlevī Masters* to remind the Ottoman reading public of the eighteenth century of the detrimental impacts of the Ḳadızādeli movement, and by extension of the puritan vision of Islam as typified in the movement. Most importantly, Müstaḳīmzāde's discussion placed the debates surrounding the *samāʿ* ban squarely within the specific reportoire of practices that the Ottoman center aimed to implement in the early seventeenth century, hence taking a critical stance toward the Ottoman center's alliance with the Ḳadızādeli agenda.

To understand the Ottoman context of the *samāʿ* debate and the significance of the intervention that *Mevlevī Masters* made, we must turn to Ottoman policies of religious surveillance, which sought to establish a clear hierarchy between official Islam and unofficial, unsanctioned religious practice. This quest for hierarchization is clearly visible in the Ottoman state's arrangement of religious space. As studied in detail by Çiğdem Kafescioğlu, starting as early as the reign of Meḥmed II (d. 1481), Ottoman sultans adopted a range of policies that differentiated practices that belonged to the mosque from those that belonged to the dervish lodge. The spatial-symbolic differentiation aimed to distinguish between official, sharia-based and unofficial, Sufi Islams.[85] This early modern separation between the mosque and the lodge was a purposeful departure from the prototypical early Ottoman sacred space, the *ʿimāret*, which combined Sufi and non-Sufi as well as sacred and nonsacred functions.[86] Ottoman state policies further aimed to shape the "official" space of the mosque as a center of community surveillance. For this purpose, imperial decrees declared attendance at mosques for the five daily prayers obligatory. Furthermore, state-appointed prayer inspectors (*namazcı*) were instructed to report neighborhood residents who failed to regularly attend the mosque. If a resident regularly failed to attend his neighborhood mosque for prayers, other residents of the neighborhood could potentially report him to the court, and have him designated as a wrongdoer (*sāʾī bi'l-fesād*). These mechanisms served to instrumentalize religious rituals for the inculcation of social discipline and surveillance.[87]

In theory, therefore, the early modern lodge and mosque were to be strictly and hierarchically separated in favor of the latter. The mosque was to be purified from all other activities that had been customarily carried out on its premises: singing, chanting, and whirling at mosque rituals; recitation of Persian poetry such as the *Mesnevī*; and nonreligious uses such as the conducting of business, copying manuscripts, and even healing practices, for which women and children often frequented mosques. Despite all of these objections,

however, the Ottoman mosque continued to be used as a multifunctional social space that the public visited not only for the prescribed prayers, but for a rich variety of social and cultural activities. In other words, despite the state's efforts at regulation, the Ottoman mosque by and large continued to be a place that, in Marshall Hodgson's words, "answered more nearly to the agora than to the Greek temple."[88]

Mevlevī Masters and its Turkish translations responded to the Ottoman policies aimed at regulating sacred space. As Evren Sünnetçioğlu's analysis of early modern legal discourse demonstrates, Ottoman jurists strove to develop policies of mosque attendance whereby residents of a neighborhood were allowed—even encouraged—to report residents who failed to attend the daily prayers at mosques. This juristic design was an example par excellence of the mobilization of the socially tight neighborhood networks for moral and social surveillance.[89] Yet, the cluster of texts around *Mevlevī Masters* objected to the neat separation between a mosque congregation and a lodge congregation, the latter offering not only ritual prayers but also additional rituals such as *samā'*. This understanding challenged the legal validity of the requirement to pray with the mosque community, arguing that any form of congregation, including a Sufi congregation in or outside the mosque, constituted a valid community for prayer.[90] The texts then continued to argue that the Mevlevī gatherings (*Mevlevī meclisi*), regardless of the space in which they were located, formed a legitimate community for daily prayers. So long as prayer and Qurʾān recitation was part of the Mevlevī gatherings, their practices and rituals could not be blamed and criticized (*ṭaʿn*).[91] The valorization of Mevlevī gatherings went hand in hand with the Ghazalian theme of the corrupt morality of the salaried religious officials, and the inferiority of their actions compared to the esoteric wisdom of the Mevlevīs (*ʿilm al-bāṭın*).[92]

The equation of the lodge congregation with the mosque congregation that the Mevlevīs and other anti-puritans defended was an important objection to the official efforts at religious surveillance, as well as a defense of the privacy of the community—in this case the Sufi community. In addition to the rigid surveillance of daily prayer attendance at the mosque, anti-puritan authors also objected to the idea of the exclusion of nonritual gatherings from the mosque by way of a strict separation between the mosque and the lodge. A noteworthy example of this objection appears in the vita of a Ḫalvetī sheikh, Ḥasan Ünsī (d. 1741).[93] Ḥasan Ünsī's initial public appearance as a Sufi preacher coincided with the third wave of the Ḳādızādeli movement. In his

vita, his disciple describes Ḥasan Ünsī's early years as a period in which the Mevlevīs were habitually ridiculed, and some deniers of religion (*ehl-i inkār*) "wished to erase the *dhikr* of God from the mosques and thus desolate mosques."[94] Ünsī's vita attests both to the pressures that Sufi orders faced in this period and to the Sufi resistance to official demands.

Ḥasan Ünsī was the disciple of Ḳarabaş Velī (d. 1686), one of the two Ḥalvetī sheikhs who were exiled from Istanbul during the tenure of Vānī Efendi. Before this exile, Ḳarabaş Velī and Ḥasan Ünsī were no marginal figures in the capital. To the contrary, Meḥmed IV was extremely fond of Ḳarabaş Velī; the sultan preferred to perform his Friday prayers at the ʿAtīḳ Vālide Mosque, where the sheikh was a preacher, and was often moved to tears during the sermons. According to the Ḥalvetī tradition, the sultan's devotion to Ḳarabaş Velī was one of the main causes of the exile of the sheikh, who became the victim of Vānī's jealousy. During these early years, the sultan also requested Ḳarabaş Velī to send one of his disciples to perform Sufi mystical concerts at the palace. In response, the Ḥalvetī sheikh sent Ḥasan Ünsī to the palace. For the next two years, Ünsī regularly visited the palace to perform *samāʿ* and deliver sermons.[95]

Ḥasan Ünsī Ḥalvetī was known as "a whirling sheikh" (*bir devrānī şeyḫ*), who continued to practice *samāʿ* and *dhikr* at the mosque despite the pressures to refrain from such ecstatic practices in public spaces.[96] In addition to his gig at the palace, Ḥasan Ünsī performed mystical concerts at the ʿAcem Aġa Mosque, where he was a public preacher. According to his hagiography, Ünsī gathered a large number of followers among the ʿulamā, who were fond of his lessons in exegesis and the *Mesnevī* of Rūmī.[97] Soon enough, the pressures to purify the mosques of anything but prescribed prayer caught up with the Ḥalvetī sheikh. The vizier Ḳaraḥasanoğlu Muṣṭafa Paşa, who was close to the Ḳadızādeli camp, repeatedly sent deputies to the sheikh to request that he move to a lodge if he wished to continue practicing whirling. The vizier even allocated a specific lodge to the sheikh, presumably to put a generous twist on his request. However, Ḥasan Ünsī's response demonstrates that the Ḥalvetī sheikh was aware of the implications of this demand to move away from the mosque to the lodge and disagreed with the principle: "We have been performing the *ẕikr* in this mosque for twenty years. At the moment, this place, too, is a lodge."[98] The sheikh's pronouncement was a denunciation of the intended demarcation between official and nonofficial versions of Islam through spatial rearrangement.

In addition to the strict differentiation between mosque and lodge, which aimed to subsume all forms of nonnormative religiosity under the authority

of a state-religion, another trend in Ottoman Sunnitization was to harden boundaries between religious communities of the Ottoman Empire.[99] According to this argument, Muslim religious authorities diverged significantly from the practices of mixed socialization prevalent in the first two centuries of the empire, when a relaxed attitude toward interconfessional boundaries carried the day. In line with this argument, one might indeed observe that one of the chief criticisms of Sufi *samāʿ* was the confessional promiscuity of the ritual: it brought together believers and unbelievers. To underscore this confessional promiscuity, Ottoman critics of *samāʿ* and other musical practices argued that these practices were not pious ritual proper, but plain entertainment. Critics carefully avoided the proper Sufi terms *samāʿ* and *devrān*, and instead used the word *raḳs*, "dance," with the strong implication that the Sufi rituals were fundamentally worldly and pleasure-oriented.[100] Puritan and juristic objections considered the Sufi *samāʿ* ceremony as a foil for secular entertainment gatherings where believer and nonbeliever came together.

In this sense, the early modern objections to *samāʿ* were an extension of the wish to clearly demarcate the official Islamic space and community from non-Muslims, as well as from nonprescriptive interpretations of Islam. Against this neatly stratified social vision, pro-*samāʿ* authors defended the virtues of the mixed socialization facilitated by performances that brought together different groups regardless of their religious literacy, level of devotion, or even religious affiliation. This explicit defense of heterogeneous socialization is clearly stated in Ottoman anti-puritan literature. For example, in his expanded translation of Nabulusī's *Mevlevī Masters*, Peçevī Aḥmed Dede describes the Mevlevī gathering as a space for heterogeneous socialization:

> The Mevlevī gatherings are renowned for bringing together the commoner and the elite, the scholar and the illiterate, the old and the young, men and women, pious and vicious, Jews and Christians and other nations.[101]

Himself a Mevlevī sheikh, Peçevī Aḥmed Dede thus took pride in the heterogeneous nature of the *samāʿ* gatherings. These rituals were meaningful social occasions across class, gender, and religious dividing lines. As seen in the case of Ḥalvetī hagiographies as well, this heterogeneity was one of the main reasons for the indispensability of performance for Sufi sociabilities. It was also one of the main reasons why early modern puritanism criticized *samāʿ* harshly, as this confessional promiscuity contradicted puritans' ideal of a sharia-oriented order in the public sphere.

The explicit defense of mixed socialization was an important tenet of Ottoman anti-puritanism starting with its earliest proponents. Treatises by the Mevlevī sheikh İsmāʾil Anḳaravī (d. 1631) and the Ḥalvetī sheikhs of the Sivāsī line that refuted the puritan call to increased social compartmentalization became influential and continued to inform anti-puritan works well into the eighteenth century. Writing during the first wave of the Ḳadızādeli movement, Anḳaravī considered mixed socialization a part of Rūmī's tradition and legacy:

> Oh dervish, beware that whoever came before that Sultan [of Rūm, i.e., Rūmī], be they believer or nonbeliever, be they governors or peasants, they would be accepted as disciples. Nobody would be rejected. One day, they asked [Rūmī]: "My Sultan, you never reject anyone who wants to serve you. What is this situation? The city is full of sinners gone astray (*fāsıḳ ve fācir*) who are associated with [Rūmī]!" That Sultan of the gnostics responded: "If a person is a believer (*ṣāliḥ*) already, what use does he have of you and me? The true sheikh is he who guides the debauched and the libertine (*ḫarābatī*)."[102]

The Mevlevī notion of the *samāʿ* as a performance that brought together "believer and unbeliever, governor and peasant" is similar to the Ḥalvetī understanding, which saw *samāʿ* as a language that spoke to the urbanite and the nomad alike. *Samāʿ* was thus a social performance that crossed the lines of social class and literacy. It also crossed interconfessional lines: in addition to the foreign travelers to Istanbul mentioned above, Christians of the Ottoman Empire visited Mevlevī lodges on the days of *samāʿ* performance. In fact, the attendance of non-Muslims at Mevlevī lodges for the sake of musical audition or, in some cases, musical training was not unusual in early modern Ottoman society.[103] For instance, Eremyā Çelebi Kömürciyān reports attending a Mevlevī ceremony together with some priests in 1665. The Armenian author describes the Mevlevī dervishes as "humble, friendly to the Christians, . . . and poets who are fond of learning."[104] The amicable relationships between the Armenians and the Mevlevīs could partly be a heritage of the age of Rūmī. As shown in the next chapter of this book, narratives of Rūmī's companionship with the Armenians of Konya were still alive among Armenians of the region in the early modern period. In addition, Eremyā Çelebi's treatment of the Mevlevīs implies a sense of rapprochement brought about by a shared enemy, Vānī Meḥmed Efendi, during this period. Eremyā notes Vānī's role in effecting the *samāʿ* ban and his open animosity to the Christians of Istanbul in the same breath, right before ending the section with the

sure judgment that right after his death in Bursa, Vānī must have begun suffering in hell.[105]

Early modern Ottoman Sufis defended the *samā*ʿ ritual as a heterogeneous space that brought believer and unbeliever (and, presumably, semibeliever) together for the formation of a moral community. Treatises in defense of *samā*ʿ openly acknowledged that not everyone attended mystical concerts for religious reasons. Yet, the argument continued, even if attendees were present in *samā*ʿ for nonreligious reasons, their presence nevertheless socially bonded them with the pious. According to the proponents of *samā*ʿ, this connectedness granted the *samā*ʿ a legitimate, even necessary, socioreligious role, since without these performances, most people would not bother to attend mosques, lodges, and other religious spaces where they would have an opportunity to hear and explore important religious and moral texts. Peçevī Aḥmed Dede explains this practical function of *samā*ʿ with a food analogy:

> Without promotion with [at least] something minor, the common people would not attend [ceremonies] and would be deprived of their worldly and otherworldly benefits. For instance, don't you see that when it is announced that there will be a *mevlīd* recitation at a certain mosque, . . . people gather together [only] to have sherbet and candies?[106]

In religious gatherings, the argument continued, music elevated the occasion, if anything. Because without music, people would have gathered solely for food, like "cattle or birds."[107] In other words, music was considered to play a significant role in introducing civility to otherwise ordinary social gatherings. The reason music elevated social gatherings was not only aesthetic, although the aesthetic dimensions of morality should not be overlooked.[108] An important part of civility was affect, which was learned through socialization and imitation (*taḳlīd*). Through attending *samā*ʿ, therefore, the general public learned to appreciate and emulate a refined affectation. The pro-*samā*ʿ literature conveyed a clear sense that these musical and bodily performances were not conceived as a performance by a professionalized religious group (such as a Sufi order) to a passive audience. To the contrary, the performances were intended as occasions for training attendees in the correct affectation by emulation of exemplary behavior.

In other words, *samā*ʿ defenses propagated a socially oriented understanding of morality and civility acquired through presence and socialization. This communally oriented understanding of morality and virtue was broadly shared in

Ottoman social and cultural life, notably in religious and literary discourse. *Samāʿ* defenses invoked both discourses to argue for the notion of communal virtue as the organizational principle of society. First, they foregrounded the socially oriented notion of piety that the first section of this chapter has explored in depth. A shared affective language was key to the formation of these communities. Thus, pro-*samāʿ* authors summoned a prophetic tradition that had been used to support affective practices such as *samāʿ* since the time of al-Ḳushayrī (d. 1092). According to the tradition, the prophet advised his followers to "pretend to cry even if you cannot cry," which is to say, to act with the socially and morally correct affect even when such action was not genuine. In these cases, the correct spiritual orientation would follow the action: feeling sensitive and emotional would follow feigning to cry. For instance, al-Qushayrī cites the prophetic saying in defense of *tawājud*, of pretending to have experienced God directly (*wajd*), since ultimately this pretense would bring about the true experience:

> Some [Sufis] said that ecstatic behaviour is inappropriate for the one who seeks to bring it about, because it involves a deliberate effort and thus distances him from true realization. Others say that it is appropriate for the poor who have divested themselves of everything and who are watching out for such things to happen. Their argument rests on the report from the Messenger of God—may God bless and greet him—that says: "Cry, and if you do not cry, then [at least] pretend that you are crying!"[109]

In addition to the prophetic and Sufi notions, pro-*samāʿ* authors invoked the Ottoman literary tradition to foreground the importance of the private community in acquiring civility. Much like the Prophet's admonishment to adopt the correct emotional reaction, by imitation if necessary, Ottoman poetic tradition instructed readers "to strive to be a lover, even if you are not."[110] Since being a good lover was the epitome of civility in the Ottoman literary tradition, being a gentleman required the successful embodiment and performance of love scripts.[111] These two traditions, one prophetic and one literary, were brought together in *samāʿ* defenses to argue that social gatherings of mixed nature were valid venues for self-formation along norms of civility; and viable alternatives to traditional normative-cathechistic modes of self-discipline (*taʿlīm*).[112] Puritan criticisms of *samāʿ* contrasted music with proper learning of religion (*taʿlīm*), by which the critics plausibly meant the norm-oriented, cathechistic learning that modern historiography considers the principal path of moral instruction.[113]

Therefore, anti-puritan discourse insisted that even those incapable of intellectually grasping the tenets of piety would still benefit from being present in a gathering led by the pious of the community. In this sense, the Mevlevīs and Ḥalvetīs considered music, chanting, and ritual itself to be a form of religious instruction and community formation at the same time, and more significantly, these two considerations could not be divorced from each other. Despite its critics, therefore, the belongingness-oriented approach to piety loomed large in the early modern world of religion. The defense of *samāʿ* in the face of continuous criticism was also a defense of this diverse, pluralist conception of piety (*ṣalāḥ*) against a uniformizing and standardizing sharia-oriented moralism (*taḳvā*). In their defenses of the musical rituals, the anti-puritan authors also objected to the official and semiofficial pressures to transform religious socialization through stricter surveillance of sacred space and through increased compartmentalization of the social lives of different confessions.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has investigated the ethical foundations of the Ottoman public sphere and its potential to circumscribe the actions of state institutions.[114] The previous chapter analyzed two motives for public political action that contributed to the formation of an early modern political culture. The first motive was group interest by the various social and political groups who considered themselves constitutive elements of the Ottoman order. The second motive was dynamics of the moral economy, or holding authorities accountable for failing to meet legitimate demands concerning the subjects' security and livelihood. This chapter adds a third motive for public political participation that was of an ethical-political nature. The chapter shows that the right to communal privacy and autonomy was an important political demand that pushed against the early modern state's efforts to expand the purview of religio-political surveillance. While expressed through a pious—often Sufi—language, these ethical-political demands were voiced strongly owing to the changing nature of early modern Ottoman politics, which allowed for the constant scrutiny of and negotiation with the Ottoman center.

The chapter has studied the discussions around *samāʿ* as a demonstration of the ethical demand for the community's privacy to impose boundaries on the application of a uniform, universally applicable public law. I have argued that the early modern *samāʿ* discussions entailed specimens of broader questions

about religion, community, and political authority that were ignited by early modern Ottoman religious policies. Emphasis has been placed on the degree to which pro-*samā'* authors responded to the specific pressures of early modern state-religion, mainly the increasing surveillance of public sacred space and the stigmatization of heterogeneous sociabilities. Through exploring the reaction to these early modern religious policies, the chapter has also introduced a key argument of the book: the presence of a strong anti-puritan strand in early modern Ottoman thought that began to take shape in the early seventeenth century. This anti-puritan strand became one of the main constituents of the Ottoman public sphere through its sustained criticism of the intended enmeshment of political and religious authority. The next question to ask is, What were the sources of authority that supported this anti-puritan strand? The next three chapters respond to this question by focusing on only one of the three Sufi orders mentioned in this chapter, the Mevlevīs. The chapters respectively argue that the Mevlevī order's power was a function of the Ḳonya *çelebi*s' economic, social, and ideological capital; of the material support of the military class in the seventeenth century; and of the ideological support of the Ottoman secretarial class in the same period.

Sufi Sovereignties in the Ottoman World

Sufi Orders as Dynasties

In 1638, the Ottoman sultan Murād IV set out on a military campaign to the east. His goal was not only to conquer Baghdad, but also to bring the title *ghāzī* back to the House of Osman, since the Ottoman sultans had long been criticized for not upholding the glorious military reputation of their forefathers. The stakes were high. For moral support, Murād IV asked the famed preacher of the Hagia Sophia Mosque, Ḳadızāde Meḥmed, to accompany him on the campaign. When the duo arrived at the Konya Mevlevī Lodge, a disagreement arose. It had long been an imperial custom for Ottoman sultans to pay homage to the Ṣūfī master Rūmī's tomb on military campaigns to the east. In order to bless the Ottoman sultan and the army, the dervishes of the lodge would hold a *samāʿ* ceremony during these visits. Attending the Mevlevī ritual at the Konya Lodge on the way to (and from) eastern campaigns had long been a part of Ottoman imperial tradition (see fig. 2).[1] Sultan Murād's chosen preacher, however, had established a reputation for his fierce opposition to the practice of *samāʿ*: he saw this ritual as an illicit innovation, a despicable corruption of the prophetic tradition and legacy. After years of denouncing the whirling dervishes as enemies of pure religion, Ḳadızāde Meḥmed was now being asked to participate in a *samāʾ* ceremony to honor the Ottoman imperial tradition. The preacher did not oblige.

Later sources agree that Ḳadızāde Meḥmed refused to join the sultan in attending the Mevlevī ceremony at Rūmī's mausoleum. There are many versions, however, of the details of what transpired at the lodge. According to one version, Ḳadızāde Meḥmed not only refused to attend the ceremony, but also reprimanded others who did wish to attend. Furious at the preacher's

FIGURE 2. Lala Mustafa Paşa (d. 1580) attending the Mevlevī ceremony in Konya during the Ottoman campaign in Safavid Iran. Courtesy of Topkapı Palace Library.

irreconcilability, Murād IV sent a messenger to order him to attend the performance of Mevlevī music (*nāy u ḳudüm*). Otherwise, the sultan said, "I will either break his leg or make him a cook at this lodge!"[2] In an effort to pass on the full force of the command to Ḳadızāde Meḥmed, the sultan's messenger hit the preacher so hard that he was injured and had to go back to İstanbul. According to another version, Ḳadızāde Meḥmed was smitten immediately after objecting to the *samāʿ*, contracting epilepsy. The epileptic preacher had to be sent back to İstanbul and died soon after.[3] According to yet another version, it was not only the preacher but also the sultan who insulted the Mevlevīs of the lodge. Incited by Ḳādızāde, Murād IV performed a number of provocative acts, from refusing to take off his boots upon entering the tomb to insisting on entering the underground grave of Rūmī rather than praying at the tomb on the surface.[4]

All of the aforementioned stories emerged out of the need to explain one historical reality: the rift between the Konya *çelebi*s and the sultan, which was not the first moment of tension between the Konya Lodge and the Ottoman center.[5] The conflicts between the Mevlevī leadership and the Ottoman court have so far escaped attention, however, because of the ahistorical assumption that the Mevlevī order had always been a favorite of the Ottoman court. Yet, as this chapter shows, the Mevlevī relationship to the center was often tenuous, and during Murād IV's reign outright tense. The reason for this tension was not a doctrinal dispute provoked by any one preacher. To the contrary, the sultan respected Mevlevīs in matters of faith and divination, in one instance shifting his military plans in line with the predictions of a Mevlevī Sūfī.[6] As contemporaneous historians underlined, the sultan's hostility to the *çelebi*s was rather a result of the ways in which the Mevlevīs used their financial wealth and flaunted their political power (*istilā*).[7] As the close study of the relationship between the sultans and the *çelebi*s in this chapter will demonstrate, the scrutiny and surveillance that some Sufi orders suffered in the first three quarters of the seventeenth century cannot be explained solely on the basis of doctrine. Instead of disembodied religious figures, Sufi orders must be understood with a full consideration of their economic wealth, local influence, and ideological significance. The combination of wealth and social influence contributed to the power of Sufi orders as local magnates.

This chapter shows that Sufi orders functioned as far-reaching networks, and in certain cases even dynasties, that held significant financial, social, and political power in addition to their spiritual authority. Even long after the messianic uprisings of early Ottoman rule were over, powerful Sufi networks were considered potential challenges to the sole and complete sovereignty of the state. This old imperial fear clearly haunted Ottoman authorities in the aftermath of the Celālī rebellions, which shook Anatolia and the Balkans in the second half of the sixteenth century, causing large-scale migration, displacement, and disorder.[8] In this volatile political climate, Sufi orders were considered susceptible to lending their support to the multiple contestants to Ottoman power. Therefore, their financial resources and social clout were under closer scrutiny than ever. However, while suspicious of the political potential of the Sufi orders, the Ottoman center needed their cooperation in order to reestablish its authority and legitimacy. It was this dilemma, explained further in this chapter, that led to complicated relationships between Ottoman authorities and Sufi orders. Eventually, however, the period saw increased

social and political support for Sufi orders, which established their authority as concurrent with, rather than subordinate to, the Ottoman center.

This chapter argues that the expanding public sphere of the seventeenth century tolerated, even facilitated, alternative sovereignties of households other than the House of Osman. The growing power of military households has been studied as a sign of this changing notion of sovereignty toward partnership.[9] To this list of powerful household and dynasties, this chapter adds major Sufi dynasties and argues that while Sufi dynasties remained local powerholders until the late sixteenth century, the new, fragmented sovereignty of the seventeenth century allowed them to exert greater influence on the center. In other words, it was the changing nature of the Ottoman social contract in this period that opened new space for powerful Sufi orders such as the Mevlevīs to act as partners of the state. Through the case study of the Mevlevīs, I argue that their changing trajectory amid a general suspicion of Sufi networks is a case study in new forms of political sovereignty and agency. This period's new political idiom presumed a multiplicity of authorities, thereby justifying the political plurality of the age in cosmic terms. This new idiom challenged the uncompromisingly absolutist political idiom of the earlier century, with its emphasis on one and only one caliph.

A key term in understanding these alternative sovereignties is "dynasty" (hānedān), defined as "a family in power," or a form of hereditary power that was transferable within the family and was based on a sound economic and political foundation.[10] The Ottoman Empire is often cited as an exception in Islamic history for being ruled by the same dynasty, the House of Osman (Āl-i ʿOsmān), for six centuries. Such a lengthy tenure is truly unique. However, the rule of the Ottoman dynasty, while uninterrupted and long lived, was not without challenges and negotiation with partners. Even before the rise of provincial powerholders (ʿayān) as local dynasties in the eighteenth century, the Ottoman realm was home to multiple forms of dynasties.[11] Of these alternative dynasties, the Crimean khans (girāys) were the most prominent by virtue of representing the Chingizid lineage. As seen in chapter 1, at times of crisis at the capital, Ottoman authors resorted to speculations that the girāys would take over the Ottoman throne. In addition to the girāys, the Ottoman order had expanded to create other military dynasties, such as the Şoḳulluzādeler (also known as İbrahimhanzadeler), Civankapıcıbaşızadeler, and Köprülüzadeler. These dynasties, like the girāys, were considered viable alternatives to the House of Osman.[12] In addition to military households and

ʿulamā households, another important expression of hereditary power holding was embedded in Sufi institutions.

In this chapter, I show that the Mevlevī order functioned like an alternative dynasty within the Ottoman order owing to a combination of economic power, social clout, and political claims established through historical and spiritual legitimacy. The first section of the chapter focuses on the complex relationship between the Ottoman center and the socially powerful Sufi networks at the turn of the century. I underline that while the Ottoman center wished to incorporate these Sufi orders as allies and power brokers, there was serious concern that their power could turn threatening. Seeing engagement with Sufi networks as a double-edged sword, Ottoman sultans adopted inconsistent policies toward Sufi orders.

Section 2 turns to the specific conditions of the Mevlevī order. While sharing some features with powerful Sufi networks, such as financial autonomy and social authority, the Mevlevīs also had a legitimizing genealogy and historical myth that took credit for the Islamization of Anatolia and deputyship of the Seljuks alongside the House of Osman. Despite these resources, Mevlevī *çelebi*s acted as provincial magnates far from the center until the late sixteenth century, the time of Murād III (d. 1595).[13] The chapter argues that this cordial distance was caused by the Mevlevī order's self-representation as a sovereign dynasty. The gap between the sultans and *çelebi*s was closed by the end of the century, when a rapprochement between the two dynasties was finally achieved. This rapprochement, however, was only reached after several episodes of friction and mutual suspicion that contemporary sources took pains to explain away by invoking the external, sporadic influence of Ḳadızāde Meḥmed.

The tale of the fluctuating relationship between the Ottoman dynasty and powerful Sufi networks, of which the Mevlevīs were but one example, sheds light on the shifting notions of imperial authority and sovereignty. The contradictory dynastic policies toward powerful Sufi networks were a product of the Ottoman center's experimentation with two imperial projects: one to discard all alternative sovereignties, and the other to integrate powerholders of different scopes as partners of the order. By the end of the century, it had become clear that only the second strategy was going to be viable.

Despite occasional backlash from the state, the Mevlevī leadership played an active role in politics, particularly during and after the age of Murād IV. In addition to their role in the Abaza Paşa (d. 1634) revolt, the *çelebi*s

continued to participate in imperial politics throughout the rest of the century. The *çelebi*s were involved in the deposition of Sultan Ibrāhim I in 1648, and the enthronement of the then-seven-year-old Meḥmed IV.[14] Despite being the direct target of puritan criticism under Meḥmed IV, the Mevlevīs continued to have a strong presence at the court of this sultan. The reign of Meḥmed IV saw the first and only imperial ban on *samāʿ*, issued in 1666 and lifted only in 1684. Yet, the Mevlevī influence continued even through this period. When the sultan lifted the ban in 1684, he made it official by attending the *samāʿ* ceremony at the Beşiktaş Mevlevihāne.[15]

"HISTORY BOOKS ARE FULL OF SUFIS TURNED SULTANS": THE SUFI CHALLENGE IN THE POST-CELĀLĪ OTTOMAN EMPIRE

At a time when the dynasty's hold over imperial politics was weakened both at the capital and in the provinces, the Ottoman order had to renegotiate with the political potential of the Sufi orders, and with their claims, whether actual or potential, to sovereignty. It is important to understand these political anxieties of the time so as not to reduce the seventeenth-century debates solely to doctrinal tensions. In the highly fragile political atmosphere of the seventeenth century, Ottoman sultans sought new ways of reasserting dynastic authority. One important strategy was to create favorites to counterbalance the influence of potential opposition at the court. Beginning with Aḥmed I (r. 1603–1617), the strategy also involved enlisting public preachers for the support of the dynasty.[16] In other words, one dynastic policy was to augment authority through incorporating political partners. This newfound accessibility of the royal authority created a new language of kingship that saw the ruler's power as delimited.[17] An alternative imperial policy was to resist this centrifugal pull. Murād IV's reign in particular was a period in which the dynasty strove to reestablish its absolutist authority, and this political goal was supported by a wide variety of people who considered an authoritarian ruler to be the pillar of order and stability.[18]

Instead of looking for a unified "Ottoman political thought" or "ideal Ottoman kingship," therefore, one needs to make space for inconsistent or shifting policies in order to truly understand the dilemmas and negotiations of the age. Even in the age of Murād IV, an exemplar of personal and authoritarian rule, it is possible to see not one, but two conflicting imperial strategies for

dealing with alternative sovereignties. In order to underline these two strate-gies, I turn to Murād IV's treatment of powerful Sufi sheiks in Anatolia as a case study of two shifting policies: cooperation and suppression. Murād dealt with religious authorities with an unusual harshness, rooted in a sense of the instability of central authority. This instability was caused not only by the recent history of imperial depositions and regicide, but by the chaotic state of the provinces.

Murād IV's Baghdad campaign is an important illustration of the Ottoman center's strong suspicion of Sufi leaders and communities as potential politi-cal challenges. Contemporary and near-contemporary chroniclers note Murād's ruthless treatment of local Sufi sheikhs, particularly those known to have a large following. The historian Naimā, writing at the end of the century, when the events were over but their memories still fresh, expressed the shared political anxiety of the age in a striking manner. In interpreting Murād's execution of three Sufi sheikhs, Naʿīmā remarked:

> [In the past], a sheikh called Tumart [Ibn Tumart, founder of the Almohad dynasty] rose to power in the West, and it is well known that Iranian Shahs were originally Sufi sheikhs. Many [more] stories about sheikhs-turned-rulers are writ-ten in history books.[19]

The historian's words evoke the political power of Sufism as exemplified by two striking examples of the Ottoman past. Of these, especially the Safavid shahs and their Sufi origins remained a cautionary tale for the Ottomans for centuries to come. A lengthy story jotted down in an anonymous manu-script from around the same time suggests that the connection between powerful Sufi sheikhs and the Safavid challenge was part of popular conscious-ness.[20] Entitled *Epistle Concerning the Stories of Şeyh Bedreddīn Simavi, Şeyh İsmāʿil, and Şeyh İbrahim*, the lengthy popular story compares two iconic heterodox Sufi sheikhs of the Ottoman context with Şeyh İsmāʿil Ṣafevī, the eponymous founder of the Safavid state. The preamble of the story likens these figures to Deccāl, the Antichrist, a misleading yet charismatic figure, a being who, as evil as he was, was nevertheless capable of effecting miracles.[21] Using his skills of deception, Deccāl would first claim to be the Prophet, then to be God himself, and would be followed by huge masses. In other words, the three sheikhs were Antichrist-like in combining mystical charisma that lured large crowds, had a God complex, and aimed to rule the world.

Of these figures, Sheikh Bedreddīn received the lengthiest treatment and was considered to be the closest analogy to both the Antichrist and Şeyh İsmāʿil Ṣafevī. He had a gigantic ego (*çok enāniyetli*), and his dreams betrayed the depth of his political ambitions. While in one dream he met with Jesus—in other words, the Messiah—in another "he was sitting on a throne and ruling people. The people consisted of the living, as well as the dead."[22] To the writer of the story, Bedreddīn's tale is not a historical one. He notes that Bedreddīn's followers still frequently visited the sheikh's tomb and performed ecstasy out of the love of their sheikh. This tomb in Eğriboz was still considered to be a place of spiritual blessing and physical healing at the time of writing in the late seventeenth century.[23]

The story, while anonymous, lays bare some of the shared connotations of Sufi movements in the Ottoman Empire: the utilization of messianic language, a large number of devout and obedient followers, and the potential for political sedition. Remembering past Sufi movements, one of which led to the birth of the Safavid state, evoked the fragility of the Ottoman social order against potential messianic-Sufi movements. While the Rūm of the seventeenth century was not as disheveled as post-Timurid Anatolia, the land was nevertheless in disarray after the Celālī uprisings. The post-Celālī climate was characterized by a weakening of central authority and large-scale crisis in agricultural production, and therefore also by economic grievances. The many Ottoman experiences with messianic movements, of which the three sheikhs were but a part, left no doubt that this environment was favorable to similar movements. While none of these movements had reached a large-enough scale to threaten Istanbul directly, they were regionally powerful and thus still potentially threatening.

The first messianic movement in post-Celālī Rūm brewed around the Eskişehir-Sakarya region. An incident known as the "Rebellion of the Sheikh of Sakarya" exemplifies both the messianic overtones of Sufi leadership in the time of the Celāli rebellions and the Ottoman state's dependency on local intermediaries for containing challenges to the center's power. According to contemporary records, around the year 1638, in the town of Ilgın on the banks of the river Sakarya, Turcomans were gathering around a Sufi sheikh known simply as the "Sheikh of Sakarya." Local authorities, such as the Eskişehir judge, saw the movement through a "city-countryside" dichotomy and complained that the nomadic Turcomans were threatening the city-folk.[24] Historians and political advisers of Murād IV, however, saw the event as a

fully-fledged rebellion against the sultan (ḫurūc).[25] This political interpretation was the result of the sheikh's resort to messianic language in order to express the economic grievances of the Turcomans underlying the movement. The messianic movement found such broad appeal that the Ottoman army had to be involved in 1638. The army was only able to quell the rebel messiah's (mehdi-i ḫāricī) uprising by seeking the mediation of a certain Çiftelerli Osman Agha, who was himself "a local and a follower-muḥibb of the sheikh."[26]

When the sheikh was captured and brought to Murād's tent in Konya, the sultan asked the sheikh about his messianic claims, to which the sheikh responded that he meant that he was awaiting Jesus the Messiah, which meant that he was not referring to himself, but to Jesus, as the messiah. In Islamic eschatology, the coming of Jesus the Messiah was the first signal of the end of time. In other words, whether it was the Sheikh of Sakarya or Jesus, the Turcomans of the region were expecting an imminent end of time. The movement and its revolutionary-rebellious tone was alarming to the authorities, particularly given that Ottoman history was replete with similar messianic-Turcoman uprisings. Therefore, Murād IV treated the sheikh as a political challenge to be quelled in the harshest manner. He ordered the execution of the sheikh and the exhibition of his mutilated body, for he had heard that the sheikh's followers believed his body to be inviolable. The Sheikh of Sakarya was subject to great torture. Yet, even as the torturers slit his fingers "knuckle by knuckle," the historian Naʿīmā wrote decades later, he did not sigh once or curse his torturers, to the amazement of the onlookers.[27] In other words, the spectacle of torture and dismemberment of the sheikh might have produced sympathy in at least some of the audience, and not disillusionment, as had been the imperial intention.

According to contemporary chronicles, the sultan's advisers fanned Murād's political anxieties by linking the Sufi movements in Anatolia with messianic political opposition of historic scale. Thus, Kātib Çelebi notes that the incident surrounding the Sheikh of Sakarya was considered sound proof that sheikhs carried within themselves "desire for rulership and armed rebellion" (ḫubb-i riyāset ve ḫurūc).[28] The sultan's advisers therefore saw not only the Sheikh of Sakarya, but also other powerful Sufi orders with large followings in the same light as potential usurpers. For this reason, the Naḳshbandī sheikh Maḥmūd Urmevī (d. 1638) of the Diyarbakır region was considered a potential contender for central authority and executed soon after the Sheikh of Sakarya. A holy saint "for generations," Urmevī was a prominent notable of Kürdistān,

whose adherents included governors and commanders, as well as wealthy merchants from the Safavid-Ottoman borderland.[29] During his Baghdad campaign, Murād initially had consulted the sheikh as a reliable informant about the region. However, over the course of their companionship, the sultan had also observed how wide the sheikh's sphere of influence was. The entirety of Kürdistān, including both Kurds and Iranians, were adherents of (*bende*) Urmevī and his dynasty (*ḫānedān*), "all the way from Tebrīz and Revān to Erzurum, Musul, Ruha."[30] People of the region also generously donated to the sheikh's lodge, which, together with the sheikh's commercial investments, formed the basis of the Urmevī dynasty's wealth.[31] It was in realizing the extent of the sheikh's economic and political power that the sultan decided to execute the sheikh, to nip a political challenge in the bud.

The sheikh's execution became the subject of much public rumor and talk in the following decades. The event polarized public opinion on whether the political motives behind the sultan's actions were sufficient to justify his execution of a well-respected Sufi sheikh. According to the historian Peçevī, for instance, Murād spilled much blood of the innocent while trying to discipline rebels (*zorba*), and Sheikh Maḥmūd Urmevī was one of the many murdered unjustly.[32]

Since the story of Urmevī was a speculative and titillating one, many different versions of the details came to circulate. One widely circulated story, for instance, was that Urmevī had been a well-meaning sheikh corrupted by the haughty daughter of the Ma'noğlu family of Lebanon. This daughter, whose unruliness was apparent, since she disguised herself as a man, had used the sheikh to obtain a large sum of money from the sultan, which she promised to convert to gold, using alchemy.[33] Upon acquiring the money, she used it to party with the young male musicians of Diyarbekir. When imperial sergeants suspected her actions, she used the money to bribe them and send them to the brothel. When the sultan finally returned to Diyarbekir, he learnt about the woman's doings. He ordered the woman killed, together with her two baby daughters. The sultan was furious at the sheikh for bringing the disaster upon them because of his cunningness.[34]

The coupling of Urmevī's name with that of Ma'noğlu family in the playful story recounted by Na'īmā was not mere coincidence; the Ma'noğlu name connoted the permeability between the categories of local dynasty and rebel. The family was of the most well-known clans that had initially been rebels

and later became Ottoman administrators. Maʿnoğlu Faḫreddīn (or Fakhr al-Dīn al-Maʿani) was the leader of the Druze Maʿānī clan of the Mount Lebanon area, who held the imperial position of regional ruler (*amīr*). In 1605, Faḫreddīn joined a wide-scale rebellion against the Ottoman government alongside Canbuladoğlu ʿAli Pasha of Aleppo. After the suppression of this rebellion in 1607, Faḫreddīn restored his amicable relations with the administration for a few more years, restoring his clan's appointment as governors of the Beirut-Sidon region. Even after he was pardoned and granted an official position as governor, however, Faḫreddīn Maʿnoğlu sought out opportunities to expand his autonomy, seeking allies as powerful as the Duke of Toscana and even the papacy. Soon, he staged another full-fledged rebellion against the Ottoman state in 1613. Eventually, he died in a military confrontation with the Ottomans in 1635. His clan, however, continued to rule in the region for the rest of the century.[35] Maʿnoğlu and Canbuladoğlu were two of the stereotypical rebel-administrators of the Ottoman provinces of this age, whose characteristic was the agility with which they passed from one category to the other.[36]

Through the narrative embellishments of the story of Urmevī, contemporary authors expressed that it was the dynastic nature of his power that jolted Sultan Murād IV. In a political landscape marked by fragmentation, powerholders of his combination of economic, social, and spiritual power could sever ties with the central authority and establish their autonomy. This was a possibility for, say, Sheikh Urmevī of Kürdistān, who possessed not only charisma and a respected lineage, but financial and manpower resources. Alternatively, these orders could lend their resources to the military rebels in the provinces, who were carving out a sphere of autonomy.[37] In other words, the political power of the Ottoman Empire in the provinces of Anatolia and Syria was quite fragile well until the middle of the seventeenth century. The emergence of new challenges and powerholders was a distinct possibility at any given time. This political fragility cast influential Sufi sheikhs and dynasties in a suspicious light in the eyes of the central authority. The Mevlevī *çelebi*s were one of these Sufi dynasties, whose mystical lineage and charisma were firmly substantiated with a large network of lodges and adherents, which gave them social and political power. In the next section, I turn to the dynastic character of the Mevlevīs in order to better place them within the Ottoman order.

THE MEVLEVĪ ORDER: A SUFI DYNASTY ON PAR WITH THE OTTOMAN DYNASTY?

Despite the increasing weight of the Mevlevī order in imperial politics, their ascendancy in the seventeenth century has received little scholarly attention. This is due to two historiographical trends. Firstly, the predominant perspective on the seventeenth century characterizes the period as the age of sharia-minded, strict orthodoxy. The criticisms of Sufi orders by a group of preachers throughout the Ḳadızādeli movement, which received occasional imperial support, colored the period as the dark age of Ottoman Sufism.[38] Interestingly, this narrative of the seventeenth century as the dark age of Sufism was reinforced by Sufi narratives written after the period. For instance, all of the narratives chalking the Mevlevī conflict with Murād IV up to Ḳadızāde Meḥmed's incitement were written after the 1670s. The emergence of these narratives of the seventeenth century was partly the result of the Sufi orders' valorization of their own efforts in combating the puritan movement.

This development partly explains the second reason why the Mevlevī revival of the seventeenth century escaped historical attention: modern scholarship often ascribes an unchanging, conformist character to the Mevlevī order. The prevailing assumption is that the Mevlevī order had always been a "sedate and status-quo order" of dervishes, and their traction among the Ottoman elite was a function of this essential docility.[39] This approach glosses over the shifting political alliances and doctrinal positions within the Mevlevī order, which this chapter lays out.[40] Another factor is the conflation of the Ottoman elite's veneration of Rūmī and his historical memory with their attitudes toward the Mevlevī order. It is true that the Ottoman sultans revered the mystical and historical person of Celāleddīn Rūmī, and showed this reverence in quite concrete forms, such as architectural patronage and other donations to the Konya Mevlevī Lodge. Yet, this reverence for the order's founder did not always translate to amicable relationships with the contemporary leaders of the order. An example is Murād III (r. 1574–1595), who made generous donations to the Konya Lodge, who was also the first Ottoman sultan to depose a Mevlevī *çelebi*; it was also during his time that the Mevlevīs lost their most important center in Istanbul, the İskender Pasha Lodge, to the Ḥalvetīs.[41] Political relationships with the Mevlevī order, in short, were not solely informed by the wide-scale and unchanging Ottoman reverence for Rūmī.[42]

By paying attention to the complexity of Mevlevī political involvement, this chapter argues that Mevlevī authority cannot be adequately understood without appreciating that the Mevlevī *çelebi*s were the heads of an established dynasty, with a wide network of clients and connections across the empire.[43] The Mevlevī network was but one Sufi network that spread out of a dynastic core; therefore, their history serves as a case study of a larger phenomenon. In her study on the Sufi families of the Ottoman Empire, Suraiya Faroqhi analyzes three dynastically run orders: Bektāshīs, Mevlevīs, and Bayrāmīs.[44] Through her analysis of the financial and administrative practices of Sufi familial networks, Faroqhi emphasizes the need to see influential Sufi orders in their entirety, as a conglomeration of large networks, to understand the nature and extent of their power.

In what follows, I study the Mevlevīs as a dynasty in the sense of having well-regulated traditions of succession and wealth accumulation, safely secured financial and social resources, and, finally, founding and legitimating myths that granted the family sovereignty. The genealogical descendants of Celāleddīn Rūmī were one such Sufi dynasty in Ottoman Anatolia. These descendants carried the distinctive title *çelebi*, which differentiated them from the rest of the Mevlevī sheikhs. A Turkic word that derived from *çalab* (God), therefore literally meaning "Godly," the title *çelebi* signified spiritual authority in the late medieval period. The relationship between this spiritual authority and political authority was so close in the late medieval period that soon enough the rulers of Anatolian principalities started appropriating the title *çelebi* for themselves.[45] Princes and sultans of the Ottoman dynasty continued to appropriate the title, as in the cases of Meḥmed I (d. 1421) and Bayezid I (d. 1403). Although the Ottoman dynasty's flirtation with *çelebi* was short lived, the title's appeal demonstrates its power claims in the Ottoman parlance of the fifteenth century.[46]

Furthermore, in its Mevlevī incarnation *çelebi* evoked not only divine blessing and the earthly power resulting therefrom, but a host of other genealogical associations. In addition to Bakrī descent, juristic credentials, and mystical gnosis, the early history of Rūmī's family also flaunted political nobility. These claims were expressed in the biographies of Rūmī, which conjured multiple genealogical claims at once. First of all, Rūmī's father was credited with *sayyid* status, meaning descent from the Prophet, and with descent from the first rightly guided caliph, Abu Bakr. In his analysis of the early sources, Franklin Lewis shows that this genealogical claim was unlikely to be true.

Instead, it was a later attribution based on a "willful confusion over his pater-nal great grandmother, who was the daughter of Abu Bakr of Sarakhs, a noted jurist (d. 1090)."[47] In fact, by the fourteenth century both of these Abu Bakrs had been integrated into Rūmī's genealogy. The appearance of Sarakhsī in his genealogy had bolstered the already existing image of Rūmī as an epitome of legal learning. According to the Mevlevī tradition, Rūmī's father, Baha al-Dīn, was dubbed *sultānu'l-ʿulamā* (the king of scholars).[48] After their arrival in Asia Minor, Baha al-Dīn's first ask from the local governor of Lārende—who ruled in the name of the Seljuk sultan—had been the construction of a madrasa where he could teach.[49]

In short, a long tradition of legal learning was reflected in this genealogy through Abu Bakr Sarakhsī, and additional Sunni credentials were added by the presence of the caliph Abu Bakr. Unlike many popular Sufi figures of the medieval age, who argued that they were "unlettered" (*ümmī*), the Mevlevī tradition valued a strong connection with the juristic tradition from early on.[50] Throughout the early modern period, the Ottoman administration sustained administrative practices that honored the Mevlevī order's juristic authority. For instance, the *çelebi*s had a salaried teaching post reserved exclusively for the descendants of Rūmī (a *gedik*) at the Karatay madrasa of Konya, where Rūmī had taught during his lifetime.[51] In an imperial setting characterized by the increasing centralization of the *ʿulamā* bureaucracy, the Mevlevīs retained their hold on these madrasas until their rights to appoint professors were explicitly challenged as late as the eighteenth century.[52]

While Rūmī's familial genealogy went back to Abu Bakr, his spiritual lineage was traced to ʿAli. The key role that ʿAli played in the Mevlevī tradition as a source of mystical wisdom merits emphasis. Both Mevlevī and non-Mevlevī sources of Rūmī's hagiography followed his short family credentials with a genealogy of *tevḥīd*, a chain by which Rūmī internalized the gnostic science of the unification of God. This spiritual genealogy went back to the Prophet by way of the third caliph, ʿAli. As the next chapter shows, the *Mesnevī* itself was considered a manifestation of secrets that the Prophet had shared with ʿAli, and ʿAli alone. This prophetic wisdom on the esoteric meaning of the Oneness of God was passed down to Baha al-Dīn and his son Rūmī via such towering figures as Junayd, Shibli Nuʿmānī, and Ahmad Ghazāli (d. 1126), younger brother of the more famous Abu Hamīd Ghazāli.[53] Bahā al-Dīn's mother, the hagiographies believed, was a princess of the Khwārazmshāh dynasty.[54] The hagiographies also depicted the family as being

sought by the rulers of the time. The reason the family moved from Lārende to Konya, for instance, was the invitation of the Seljuk prince ʿAlā al-Dīn Kayḳubād (r. 1219–1237), who sought Rūmī's father as his spiritual leader.[55] This move to Konya marked the beginning of Rūmī's engagement in the spiritual and political life of the Seljuk capital.[56]

Mevlevī genealogy, combining mystical, scholarly, genealogical, and political credentials, ascribed high importance to the family's close engagement with Seljuk rulers as yet another aspect of their political legitimacy. The story of Seljuk-Mevlevī relations was penned in one of the first hagiographies of Rūmī, entitled *Manāḳib al-ʿĀrifīn* (*Feats of the Knowers of God*), by Eflākī (d. 1360). Eflākī was the close companion of Rūmī's grandson, Ulu ʿĀrif Çelebi (d. 1320), who was credited with the institutionalization of the Mevlevī order. It was during Ulu ʿĀrif Çelebi's time that the first hagiographies of the family were penned. Starting with these earliest sources, Mevlevī hagiography depicted the family as powerful companions of the Seljuks.[57] Association with the Seljuks was important not only as a path to locating the dynasty within narratives of universal Islamic history.[58] This historical connection also evoked the histories of the Islamization of Rūm, in which both dynasties claimed a salient role. Spreading Islam through military expansion, in other words, *ghazā*, was an essential component of Ottoman identity and legitimation.[59] Early Sufi orders, such as the Bektāshīs, also portrayed themselves as partners of the sultans in these holy wars.[60]

The Mevlevī tradition also perceived the order as one of the most important agents of the Islamization of what was a confessionally diverse and fluid Western Islamic world before the eleventh century. In fact, narratives of Rūmī's life grant the question of conversion a special place. According to Eflākī and his translator, Kemāl Aḥmed Dede (d. ca. 1615), Rūmī's father, Baha al-Dīn, came from a noble line of pious men who had succeeded in the conversion of the Khorasan region:

> That this Khorasan became a land of Islam
> That the bird of religion and state are captured here
> These are all the works of [Baha al-Dīn's] ancestors
> This is a gift given by those kings[61]

According to Mevlevī tradition, the family's long history of Islamization of new territory thus began in Khorasan and continued in Konya. In the Anatolian context, according to Mevlevī sources, the conversion of Mongols and

the conversion of non-Muslims were epic deeds and spiritual miracles performed by Rūmī and his family. As John Dechant remarks, Eflākī's *Feats* gave Rūmī and his circle credit for Islamizing "thousands, including Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and even sea creatures and a river monster."[62] First and foremost, the order took credit for the conversion of the Mongols to Islam. Admittedly, not all of these early anecdotes in Mevlevī hagiography involved full conversion. While some anecdotes do indeed involve Mongol commanders converting to the discipleship of Islamic saints, others are merely general statements of their natural inclination toward monotheism. Still, the close relationship between Rūmī and the Mongols was well known in sources both inside and outside the Mevlevī tradition, and continued to be an important and curious aspect of Rūmī's legacy long after. While historians remain interested in the political implications of this connection, Mevlevī hagiography represented the connection as a pious act, where Rūmī guided the Mongols toward the right creed.[63]

In addition to their intriguing and complex relationship with the Mongol overlords, Rūmī and his heirs also portrayed themselves as an important part of the conversion of Greek and Armenian Christians in Asia Minor.[64] Like many medieval Sufis of Anatolia, Rūmī's circle was known to have close relationships with non-Muslims, including shared space and sanctuaries and shared linguistic mediums.[65] The earliest sources for Rūmī's life portray him as having close relationships with the Christians of the Konya region.[66] He was close companions in particular with a monk and a certain Gorji Khatun. Eflākī proudly records these friendships and declares that the greatest miracle of Rūmī was that "in complete agreement all the nations and rulers of states love Mevlānā and are honored hearing his explanation of secrets and overflow with enthusiasm."[67]

This early history of shared spaces and ceremonies was surely transformed in the early modern period, yet continued to live in a new form, which emphasized the Mevlevī order's conversion of non-Muslims even more emphatically. An important case study are the early modern oral stories circulating around Rūmī's friendship with an Armenian bishop, Epsepi. According to the testimony of the French traveler Paul Lucas (d. 1737), who visited Konya, the story was well known among the Armenians of the region. Lucas notes that he himself heard the story from an Armenian bishop of the region named Hebien.[68] In Hebien's version, Rūmī was close friends with Epsepi, a most intelligent, knowledgeable, honest, and loyal soul. Their friendship had been

targeted by Rūmī's family and circle, who were jealous of the bishop's place in Rūmī's life. As a result of a series of intrigues, Rūmī ended up ordering the beheading of his friend, an act that he later bitterly regretted. An important tale to the Armenian communities of Konya, it perhaps lamented a lost history of coexistence. The narrator of the tale, Hebien, also noted his Muslim neighbors' unwillingness to remember this well-known story of friendship.

Even if Hebien's neighbors were reluctant to remember Rūmī's relations with non-Muslims, histories of close relationship with various religions remained a significant part of the written heritage of Rūmī's legacy, including not only hagiographies such as Eflākī's, but also the text of the *Mesnevī*. Commentaries on the *Mesnevī*, such as the one by the famed Ḫalvetī preacher ʿAbddülmecīd Sivāsī (d. 1638), discussed the question of why Rūmī mingled with the impious and wrote about them in his poetry. The Ḫalvetī sheikh's response was that Rūmī's sole aim was to facilitate their conversion.[69] Similarly, İsmāʿil Anḳaravī underlined that Rūmī never declined any potential disciples, whether they were "unbelievers or pious or [ordinary] subjects," since he wanted to facilitate their familiarity with, and perhaps eventual conversion to, Islam.[70] In other words, the by-now inappropriately eclectic life of Rūmī was justified on the grounds of the pious cause of conversion. In this reinterpreted version, one of the most important legitimating narratives of the Mevlevī order remained their significant role in the Islamization of Anatolia.

"THERE ARE TWO SOVEREIGNS IN THIS LAND": MEVLEVĪ SELF-REPRESENTATION IN THE OTTOMAN PERIOD

Based on a rare conjunction of three forms of authority—historical, juristic, and mystical—Mevlevī sources declared Rūmī the descendant of the "kings of the temporal and spiritual worlds," an appellation reserved for the sultan in Ottoman political writing.[71] The *çelebi*s considered themselves kingmakers and partners in the Ottoman order. Their brand of duality, however, was not compatible with the political climate of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which was characterized by a movement toward imperial consolidation. As of the late sixteenth century, Mevlevī *çelebi*s began to work toward the circulation beyond Mevlevī circles of their self-representation as partners in the Ottoman order. This important shift demonstrates the repercussions of the political shifts of the seventeenth century for the role of Sufi orders in mediating a political language of partnership and multiple sovereignties.

In this new era of Mevlevī political engagement, artistic and literary production points to the Mevlevī leadership's search for new audiences and new patrons. Mevlevī efforts at self-representation were not only Persianate literary and religious works, which will be explained in the next chapter, but also illuminated manuscripts. In the sixteenth century, the Konya Lodge became the center of a distinct miniature school catering to nondynastic patrons. This Mevlevī school produced lavish *Mesnevī*s and Shāhnāmehs for the art market. In addition, the first illuminated hagiography of Rūmī, entitled *The Shining Stars of History* (*Sevāḳib al-Manāḳib*), was produced by the Konya school. The text of this work was the Ottoman Turkish translation of an abridged version of Eflākī's *Feats of the Knowers.* The translation was completed by Maḥmūd Dede at the Konya Lodge, and one copy was presented to Sultan Murād III.[72]

According to Filiz Çağman, the production of miniatures at Mevlevī lodges—particularly Konya and Baghdad—was of a different nature than courtly artistic patronage. Thematically, these manuscripts heavily featured depictions of the Karbalā tragedy and other ʿAlid themes, which were excluded from courtly production.[73] In addition, unlike Ottoman courtly works, which focused on the deeds of sultans, viziers, commanders, and official histories, Mevlevī miniature production focused on biographies of the Prophet, the life of Rūmī, and copies of the *Mesnevī*.[74] More significantly, miniature production at the lodges in Konya and Baghdad developed coevally with the overall increasing visibility of Mevlevīs in miniatures depicting urban scenes.[75] The flourishing of artistic production—an expensive, elite engagement—on and by the Mevlevīs was brought about by new patrons from among the urban and military elite. Not only miniatures, but textual narratives on the history of the order reached wider reading publics in this period of expanded audience and patronage. The eighty surviving copies of Maḥmūd Dede's *Shining Stars*, for instance, attest to the success of the book. Other literary narratives of Mevlevī history were also produced by the associates of the *çelebi*s. For instance, Kemāl Aḥmed Dede, a disciple of first Ferrūḫ and later Bosṭan Çelebis, wrote a brief and versified summary of Eflākī's hagiography of Rūmī during the early 1600s. The work's simple language and brevity suggest an effort to reach larger audiences.[76]

How did the Mevlevīs represent themselves in these written and illuminated works? One of the important points of emphasis was Mevlevī proximity to the Seljuk rulers. Maḥmūd Dede's work was based on Eflākī's *Feats of the Knowers of God*, which portrayed Baha al-Dīn and Rūmī as kingmakers. These king-

makers could also end dynasties if rulers failed to follow their advice. Thus, Eflākī considered the end of the Seljuk dynasty to have simply been a punishment for the sultan Rukn al-Dīn, who had offended Rūmī by preferring another sheikh over him.[77] When illuminated histories of Rūmī's family were produced in the 1590s, this event was considered significant enough to be one of the twenty-nine scenes illustrated. In this illustration, the sultan is portrayed suffering at the hands of an executioner strangling him with a rope. The sultan's face is turned toward the inside of Rūmī's madrasa, where lie his hopes of being saved. The text corroborates this visual orientation by underlining that the sultan cried "Mevlānā! Mevlānā!" in his last breath. Meanwhile, Rūmī continued his *samāʿ* uninterrupted, visibly blocking his ears, and reciting a poem: "I told you not to go there / I am your friend and master (*walī*)."[78]

The Mevlevī emphasis on the order's significance in the Seljuk political order was not mere nostalgia; this historical narrative impinged upon early modern Ottoman political thought more broadly. By underlining their role in the Seljuk order, the Mevlevīs carved a key space for themselves in the historical narratives of the emergence of the Ottoman state. As of the fifteenth century, Ottoman historiography took pains to assert that the Seljuk rulers, who had acted as deputies of the Abbasid caliph, had officially appointed the Ottomans as their own deputies.[79] It was through this chain of transmission that the Ottomans could lay claim to the caliphate.[80] A spurious letter from the Seljuk sultan ʿAla al-Dīn to ʿOsmān I, in which the former appointed the latter as his deputy, became a treasured cultural text as of the early fifteenth century. Despite being a later fabrication, this letter continued to be circulated throughout the sixteenth century, featuring in letter collections compiled by Ottoman bureaucrats and historians like Hoca Saʿdeddīn Efendi (d. 1537).[81] One of the cornerstones of Ottoman historical legitimacy was this unbroken chain of transmission of political authority as sovereigns of Rūm, in which the Ottomans were the successors of the Seljuks.

The Mevlevīs shared the Ottoman dynasty's self-representation as partners of Seljuk rule. Furthermore, Mevlevī narratives that emerged in the early modern period claimed that it was Rūmī who eventually transmitted power from the Seljuks to the Ottomans. According to these later narratives, after falling out with Rukn al-Dīn, Rūmī encountered ʿOsmān I, who treated the sheikh with great respect. Impressed, Rūmī girded ʿOsmān with a sword, declaring: "We have taken away rulership from the Seljuks, and given it to you and your lineage."[82] Other versions of this story had come to circulate by

the eighteenth century, when the Mevlevīs had succeeded in establishing themselves in imperial favor. One version claimed that after Rukn al-Dīn's death, Rūmī ruled in Konya for eighteen days and then transferred rulership to ʿOsmān. Another version presented Rūmī's son, Veled Çelebi, as the person who girded ʿOsmān with his sword. While the emergence of these versions cannot be precisely dated, they were certainly a product of the Mevlevī argument against the Bektāshīs, who similarly claimed to have armed ʿOsmān.[83]

The stories that attributed to the Mevlevīs a key role in the origination of Ottoman sovereignty were in circulation during the reign of Meḥmed IV and the Köprülü vizierate, when Paul Rycaut wrote his observations on the Ottoman state.[84] Noting that the Mevlevī order was the foremost "for fame amongst the Turks," Rycaut describes this foundation myth as follows:

> The Mevelevee, otherwise and most commonly named Dervise, which word signifies Poor and Renouncers of the World, have their chief and superior foundation in Iconium, which consists of at least four hundred Dervises, and governs all the other convents of that Order within the Turkish Empire, by virtue of a Charter given them by Ottoman first of the Mahometan Kings, who out of devotion to their Religion once placed their Prior or Superiour in his Royal Throne, because having been his Tutour, and he who girted on his Sword (which is the principal Ceremony of Coronation) he granted him and his Successors ample Authority and Rule over all others of the same Profession.[85]

Rycaut's description suggests that the narrative that Rūmī, as the founder of the Mevlevī order, had girded ʿOsmān with his sword was in circulation in the seventeenth century as an origin story that was embodied in public ceremony. These sword-donning ceremonies began in 1603, with the accession of Aḥmed I.[86] The honor of donning the sword was bestowed upon different personalities throughout the century: the chief mufti, the Ḥalvetī sheikh Hüdāī, the *naḳību'l-eşrāf.* The honor remained a contested privilege, particularly between the Bektāshīs and Mevlevīs, who both claimed that the founders of their orders (Hacı Bektaş and Rūmī, respectively) had girded ʿOsmān with his sword.[87] Rycaut's description of the Mevlevīs shows that the order's version of their role in the establishment of the Ottoman state was widely circulated in the 1660s.

In other words, the Mevlevī self-description evolved over the seventeenth century to describe the order as the patron saints not only of the Seljuks, but also of the Ottomans. This new emphasis on their identity as the patrons and partners of Ottoman rule permeates Ottoman Turkish translations of Rūmī's hagiography. For instance, the illuminated hagiography *Shining Stars* depicts

the siege of Konya that took place during the battle between Süleymān's two sons, Selim and Bayezid, over the throne. The miniature links Selim II's victory to the clouds of salt that emanated from Rūmī's tomb. It was this otherworldly intervention that brought about the defeat of Bayezid, as well as the prayers of the Mevlevī dervishes that are depicted on the same page.[88] In another example, Kemāl Aḥmed Dede's verse history of Rūmī is replete with the notion that rulership was always subject to saintly approval. After narrating Baha al-Dīn's relationship with the Seljuk sultan ʿAla al-Dīn, Kemāl Aḥmed Dede's (d. ca. 1615) narrator voice comments: "Since the sheikh is the one who decides on the ruler, [the ruler] treats the sheikh favorably in gratitude for that favor."[89] While these statements as to a patron saint–ruler relationship were common topoi in any hagiographical text, Ottoman translations of Rūmī's hagiography considered the Mevlevīs to be partners in sovereignty. For instance, Maḥmūd Dede wrote: "There are only two ṭaʾīfe who hold the title sovereign [hüdāvendigār] in the land of Rūm: the Mevlevīs and the House of Osman."[90]

As seen in the changing self-representation of the Mevlevīs, a new relationship with the Ottoman establishment was in the making in the seventeenth century. This new balance of power, however, was not established without tension and oscillation. Murād III, Murād IV, and Meḥmed IV all showed reverence to the order and simultaneously engaged in efforts to restrain the power of its leadership. The reasons for the tensions are shrouded in mystery and narrative, yet it is plausible that the Mevlevī self-representation as kingmakers and king breakers played an important role. This less-than-humble vision of political authority where the Mevlevīs considered themselves partners in sovereignty contradicted Ottoman political decorum, which represented the contractual relationship between the ruler and the ruled.[91] In addition, the financial and social networks of the Mevlevīs backed their historical and religious legitimacy, rendering the dynasty a potential challenge at a time when the Ottoman dynasty was skeptical of power magnates of this sort. The next section turns to these anxieties in order to close the circle that this chapter opened with, that is, the question of sultan-çelebi relationships.

WAQFS AND THE FINANCIAL BASIS OF MEVLEVĪ INFLUENCE

The negotiation of a new relationship with the center, which involved greater proximity as partners of the Ottoman order, generated an unstable relationship

between the *çelebi*s and the sultans, oscillating between patronage and banishment. According to Mevlevī biographical sources, these imperial tensions were due either to the incitements of some vicious outsiders, as exemplified by the Kadızāde anecdotes cited at the beginning of this chapter, or, more commonly, to disputes over waqf property. The rich waqf holdings of the Mevlevīs were the basis of their power across Ottoman provinces, primarily in Konya but also elsewhere in the empire.[92] The waqf system tied the lodges to the surrounding towns and villages economically and positioned the *çelebi*s as the representatives of these villages vis-à-vis local authorities. The wealth and social ties acquired in this manner made the *çelebi*s local power magnates, or, to borrow Metin Kunt's terminology "proto-ʿayān."[93]

The descendants of Rūmī (*çelebi*s) were heirs to a waqf system that recognized public endowments in Konya as a financial source to be administered by the family. These Mevlevī endowments were a combination of charitable and family (*dhurrī*) endowments.[94] In other words, while a certain part of the income-generating revenues was dedicated to public charity, another part was dedicated to maintaining the livelihood of the descendants of Rūmī.[95] The charitable functions of a Mevlevī lodge included feeding the poor and providing religious services—namely, teaching the *Mesnevī*, performing *samāʿ* and music, and reciting the Qurʾān. With these services, the Mevlānā Lodge was a beacon to its environs, quite literally, as the lodge spent an important amount of its income on candles to maintain an illuminated façade.[96] Any income after the deduction of the cost of public services and the maintenance of lodges was allocated to the descendants of Rūmī.[97] Accounting records show that in addition to their familial share from the revenues, the *çelebi*s also received salaries as endowment overseers. The appointment of sheikhs as overseers (*mütevelli*) was an exceptional privilege, since habitually the overseer would be an outsider, for accountability reasons.[98]

In other words, the endowment system sustained the power and influence of *çelebi*s both directly, by augmenting their family and personal wealth, and indirectly, through placing them in posts that came with salaries and social influence. The income for these familial and charitable functions was allocated from several revenue sources, primarily the poll taxes of nearby non-Muslim villages and the agricultural taxes of denoted towns.[99] Adding to the financial power of the *çelebi*s were the generous contributions of the Ottoman state, in the form of large sums of cash or tax relief. Even in periods when the Sufi order was not particularly close to the Ottoman administration, they received gener-

ous and sustained donations in recognition of the heritage of Rūmī that they embodied. State donations in the form of tax relief also augmented the social standing of the family, as well as the popularity of their endowments. To many villagers and townsmen, this financial relief added to the allure of association with the Mevlevī lodge. A striking example is the popularity of the immediate neighborhood within which the *çelebi* lodge was located. Named the Celāliyye neighborhood after Celāleddin Rūmī, its residents were exempt from taxes in honor of Rūmī's legacy. As a result, the neighborhood was one of the most densely populated neighborhoods of the city in the early modern period.[100]

In addition to the Mevlevīs' official holdings, the Konya Lodge used its prestige to obtain the usufruct of land that did not, on paper, belong to the lodge. In other words, the account books that the Mevlevī lodge presented to the inspectors upon request only partially represented the lodge's total wealth. Orchards and gardens granted to the lodge in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, for instance, never appeared in the official registers, despite being at the disposal of the lodge.[101] The urban garden (*bostān*) adjacent to the imperial mosque built by Selim II was one such case. Although not a part of the endowment deeds, these gardens were used by the cooks (*aşçıdede*) for supplying the kitchen of the Mevlevī lodge by custom. These privileges were sometimes contested by local authorities, such as preachers and judges, yet often these authorities were unable to strip the Mevlevīs of financial privilege, given the family's influence in the area.[102] In other words, the Konya *çelebi*s controlled greater urban and agricultural resources than presented to the state for audit.[103] The lodge's extensive claims to urban resources arose as a source of tension between the *çelebi*s and other local authorities from time to time.[104]

Contemporary sources from the seventeenth century perceived the *çelebi*s of Konya as local ʿayān whose de facto power matched, even challenged or exceeded, that of local government agents such as judges. According to one chronicler, "neither governors nor judges could govern without consulting Ebubekir Çelebi," the then-*çelebi* of Konya.[105] Similarly, Evliyā Çelebi depicts the lodge as a gathering place for the notables of the city:

> There being a Mevlevī ceremony (*âyîn-i Mevlânâ*) . . . times a week, more than three-hundred *mullah*s, begs, pashas—each one rising from a [different] garden, leaving behind world[ly affairs] came to enjoy the *samāʿ* at the threshold of Mawlānā. There are so many Aristotle-minded souls [here] who are learned [*musannif ü müʾellif*, literally "authors"] yet they brag (*tefahhur*) with nothing but their humbleness.[106]

In other towns and cities where the Mevlevīs had sizable lodges, followers of the Mevlevī path were similarly heavily represented among local authorities. The large and prosperous town of Karaman, not far away from Konya, is a case in point. Karaman was the first home of the family of Rūmī upon their arrival in Anatolia. Although Rūmī later moved to Konya, the Seljuk capital, his successors honored this historically meaningful town by establishing a large Mevlevī lodge built around the tomb of Rūmī's mother. One of the most important centers for the Mevlevī authorities, the prominence of the *çelebi*s in the political and social life of Karaman was recognized by Ottoman authorities from early on. During and in the aftermath of the Celālī rebellions of the late sixteenth century, for instance, the Ottoman center resorted to the *çelebi*s at the Karaman Lodge as allies who would help facilitate the restoration of order.[107]

When the travel writer Evliyā Çelebi visited Karaman in the seventeenth century, he marked the notables of Karaman, a wealthy commercial city, first and foremost for the ostentatious garments of the elite (*ʿaskerī*). They displayed their wealth by wearing expensive cloths, such as furs and the famous *sof*, a luxurious cloth. It was not only wealth that the elite of Karaman flaunted with their attire, however. They also flaunted their attachment to the Mevlevī path by wearing Mevlevī hats; Evliyā noted that most notables of Karaman wore these hats.[108] At the top of the hierarchy of local notables of the town, furthermore, were none other than the *çelebi*s of Karaman. In short, the Mevlevī *çelebi*s acted as provincial power magnates in Konya and Karaman. Therefore, they should be considered within the framework of local notables, and not simply as religious or spiritual authorities.[109]

There is reason to believe that association with the Mevlevī lodges was economically advantageous not only for the hereditary *çelebi*s, but for anyone who was affiliated with one of the lodges of the order. Firstly, these financially solvent institutions developed credit relationships with the surrounding population. For instance, the Mevlevī lodge in Yenişehir-i Fenar (Larissa, an important commercial hub in the early modern period) functioned as a cash waqf—in other words, as a financial institution that loaned money at interest.[110] Secondly, the agricultural areas around prestigious lodges were first to receive aid and support in times of hardship. The Celālī agricultural crisis that led to a sharp decline in crops and resulted in the large-scale immigration of agricultural labor to towns is a case in point. The Mevlevī endowment revenues sharply declined in the first half of the seventeenth century because of a general

agricultural decline. Owing to the shrinking of their revenues, the Konya Lodge had to economize on charitable and ceremonial services. The number of musicians, for instance, decreased from six to three.[111] The need to economize on the order's emblematic ceremony, musical *samāʿ*, attested to the severity of the economic crisis that the endowment faced. The crisis, however, was not long lived. Around the middle of the seventeenth century, the Mevlevī network gained a new vitality stimulated by a new abundance of patrons and donors.

Mevlevī wealth and social prestige, which materialized at the waqf, often arose as a cause for dispute between the *çelebi*s or sheikhs, on one hand, and political authorities on the other, as mentioned above. The earliest example of such conflict was at the Edirne Lodge, which was the first Mevlevī lodge that was ever patronized by an Ottoman sultan. According to later reports, the governor of Edirne (*vāli*) decided that the extensive wealth of the lodge was a threat to his own power in the city, and therefore attempted to confiscate the property of the endowment. When the sheikh of the lodge, Yusuf Sineçāk (d. 1546), strongly resisted his efforts, the governor planted a murdered body in the Mevlevī lodge, blaming the dervishes for the act of killing. The governor's scheme must have worked, given that the Mevlevīs had to evacuate the original lodge, which was then converted to a mosque. At a later and unknown date, a new Mevlevī lodge was established adjacent to the mosque and continued its functions. However, at some point this lodge, too, fell out of use. Hence, when Sultan Aḥmed I visited Edirne in 1612, this lodge was defunct and had to be reopened for the sultan.[112] In other words, despite early histories of imperial support for the Mevlevī order in the form of endowments, such imperial support was sporadic and discontinuous prior to the seventeenth century. One of the main reasons for this unstable relationship was the tension between the Mevlevī leadership and the authorities—whether local or imperial—in which Mevlevī wealth played a significant role.

According to Mevlevī biographical sources, when sultans and *çelebi*s had a disagreement, it was also due to disputes about waqf property and management. Such was the Mevlevī explanation for the incident during the reign of Murād III, when a sultan interfered in Mevlevī affairs for the first time. Murād III deposed the Konya *çelebi*, Ferrūḫ Çelebi, and started a period of Mevlevī interregnum when no *çelebi*s were seated in Konya for eighteen years. The events leading up to Sultan Murād's dismissal of Ferrūḫ Çelebi are unclear in the sources of the period, yet attributed to unspecified waqf disputes.[113] A similar sultan-*çelebi* disagreement arose during the reign of Murād IV,

resulting in the deposition of the Konya *çelebi*, Ebubekir Çelebi. The sultan also contemplated executing the *çelebi*, only to be dissuaded by the chief mufti, Zekeriyyāzāde Yaḥyā Efendi (d. 1644).[114] As a result, Ebubekir Çelebi was sent to exile in Istanbul. The sultan's interference in Mevlevī affairs did not end here. He further appointed ʿArif Çelebi, a descendant from the maternal side, as the next overseer of the Konya Lodge. According to established Mevlevī tradition, only paternal *çelebi*s (*zükūr*) were qualified to rule as Konya *çelebi*s, whereas maternal *çelebi*s (*inās*) could only hold lesser posts, such as the Afyon Karahisar Lodge, where Arif Çelebi was stationed before Murād IV summoned him to Konya. This latter *çelebi* remains as the only maternal *çelebi* that ever held the position of the Konya *çelebi*. Mevlevī biographers wrote about this disruption in a disapproving tone.[115] The sultan's interference was disruptive of established Mevlevī tradition in multiple regards.

What motivated Murād IV to challenge the *çelebi*s of Konya? As the introduction of this chapter has shown, later tradition blamed Kadızāde Meḥmed for the incident, yet these narratives were presumably spurious. Naʿīmā's observation that the reason was the political powers of the *çelebi*s (*istilā*) deserves attention, since his observations are based on the sultan's dealings with Mevlevī financial resources.[116] On the way to Baghdad in 1634, the sultan was generous to the Mevlevī lodge of Konya, where Ebubekir Çelebi welcomed the sultan and his retinue with a rich banquet. To reciprocate the goodwill, Murād IV donated the income from the poll taxes of the nearby Suğla (*hass*) to the lodge with the stated purpose that the revenue be spent for the preparation and distribution of food and charity.[117] On his way back from Baghdad, Murād IV rescinded his donations on account of serious accusations against the *çelebi*s. According to these accusations, instead of feeding the poor, the *çelebi* had used the funds for the augmentation of his own wealth. Even worse, the tax-paying residents of Konya had asked the *çelebi* to intercede for tax reduction prior to the arrival of the sultan. This type of intercession for alleviation of financial burdens was expected of Sufi sheikhs who oversaw agricultural waqfs. Yet, the *çelebi* shirked this duty, which infuriated the sultan, according to reports. In short, the sultan's near execution of the *çelebi* was based on his stockpiling and usurping the food of the resident dervishes.[118]

It was recognition of the power and influence of the *çelebi*s, explained above in detail, that must have caused Ebubekir Çelebi his seat. The involvement of the *çelebi*s in the recent Abaza Paşa (d. 1634) revolt must have signaled that the *çelebi*s could use their political power in support of dissenting movements.

The rumors that the pasha was backed by the *çelebi*s, who had dressed the pasha in the Mevlevī hat (ʿ*araḳıyye*, the shorter hat reserved for novices) as a sign of their support, had reached Istanbul and remained the talk of the town for a long time. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the suppression of the revolt, the rebels took refuge at the Konya Mevlevī Lodge. According to a colorful anecdote, the inspector sent by the Ottoman government to Konya considered the Mevlevī dervishes prime suspects in the rebellion. The inspector, İsmāʿil Pasha, rounded up eight men dressed in Mevlevī garments. Asked to "perform" their Mevlevī-ness, one of these men recited the *Mesnevī*, another played the ney, and two performed *samāʿ*. The remaining four were unable to demonstrate any Mevlevī skills, which convinced the inspector that they were of Abaza's retinue disguised as dervishes.[119]

Yet at the same time, it was the same power and influence that saved him from execution. In addition to the overall social and political disorder, explained in the first part of this chapter, which rendered large Sufi networks suspicious, Murād's interference with the Konya Mevlevī endowments must have been shaped by the fiscal anxieties of his age. The waqf system granted endowments a good degree of fiscal autonomy. Therefore, a long-term pattern in Ottoman history was interference with waqf autonomy during periods when the central authority wanted to strengthen its hold.[120] In line with this long-term pattern, political authors of the early seventeenth century targeted large waqf holdings as one of the factors that contributed to the central treasury's weakness, and thus to an overall Ottoman decline. According to this criticism, endowments carelessly given away as *temlik*s (lifetime holdings with rights of inheritance) seemed good acts, but in fact harmed the state by robbing the treasury. In other words, the reformist thought of the period sought to change the balance between endowments and the central treasury in favor of the latter. This fiscal austerity mentality must have played a role in the rigid treatment of large waqf holdings.[121]

To summarize, the similarity between the Urmevī affair and the fate of Ebubekir Çelebi of Konya bears emphasizing. In both cases, an influential Sufi sheikh was treated with generosity and as an ally on the way to Baghdad, and discarded on the way back, when the sultan had earned the title *ghāzī* and thus was less wary of public criticism. In both cases, while the sheikhs were initially co-opted as allies, their powerful political influence eventually raised anxieties. In this respect, the Mevlevīs paralleled experiences of other Sufi networks, particularly those that had accumulated wealth and connections

over a long period because of dynastic or tribal formations. The affairs demonstrate that Sufi networks must be seen with reference to their complicated social, financial, and political entanglements rather than as disembodied spiritual and intellectual traditions. The strongest reason to do so is that Ottoman society saw them as a function of these various entanglements.

CONCLUSION

Mevlevī authorities are an example of a dynastically structured Sufi order with extended networks of financial and political influence. In addition, they were a part of Ottoman historical identity and shared with the House of Osman important tenets of imperial legitimacy, such as a Seljuk legacy and the Islamization of Anatolia. As a result, the Mevlevīs conceptualized their order as a dynasty with an important degree of authority. These traits rendered the Mevlevīs potential allies and potential challengers to imperial sovereignty at one and the same time. Therefore, from the time of Murād III to that of Meḥmed IV, the relationship between the Konya çelebis and Istanbul sultans was changeable and occasionally fraught. On one hand, the Konya Mevlevīs experienced exile and threats of execution (siyāset), intensifying during the reign of Murād IV as the Ottoman dynasty's anxiety over control reached a peak in the aftermath of the Celālī revolts and the recurring depositions of sultans. On the other hand, the Mevlevīs found a new visibility in the imperial order, as attested by ceremonials of sword donning in which the Mevlevī order was represented as patron saints of the Ottoman dynasty. While Ottoman historiography has focused on the pressure that the Sufi orders faced from the puritan critics of the age, the much more complex relationship between Sufi networks and the broader Ottoman order has not received due attention.

If there is one lesson to be drawn from the checkered relationship between the sultans and the çelebis, it is the significant negotiating power of the latter vis-à-vis the former in the seventeenth century. As a result, the period saw the increasing prominence, rather than the suppression or erasure from public life, of major Sufi networks. This chapter has underlined Mevlevī identity and their articulation of sovereignty, and how the dynasty responded to their claims of sovereignty. The next chapter continues the theme of the Mevlevī revival of the seventeenth century, with attention to the Ottoman elite who supported the Mevlevīs. Through association with the Mevlevī order, I argue, the increasingly powerful Ottoman elite adopted not only a mode of piety,

but also one of political self-fashioning. In other words, the Mevlevīs crafted a complete language of civility. In search of new modes of self-fashioning to legitimate their augmented political power, the new elite turned to Mevlevī association as a mode of partaking in a spiritually and historically justified claim to partnership of rule. Their patronage of new lodges in both Istanbul and the provinces on an unprecedented scale must be seen in this light of political self-fashioning. The Mevlevī order, in turn, produced political and mystical literature that legitimized the plurality of authorities.

A New Volume for the Old *Mesnevī*

Reviving the Dual Caliphate in the Age of Decentralization

A little more than three centuries after the death of Rūmī, in 1012/1603–1604, the news of a new volume of his magnum opus, the *Mesnevī*, began to spread in the land of Rūm.[1] The news, while ridiculous to many, stirred the interest of the then-head of the Mevlevī order, Bostan Çelebi I. Bostan Çelebi immediately sent his dervishes to Damascus where the new volume was reported to have been seen, and had the copy in question acquired. Upon his examination of the work, Bostan Çelebi was convinced of the authenticity of the volume, declaring it to be the long-lost Book Seven of the *Mesnevī*. He would soon pass the manuscript on to İsmāʿil Anḳaravī (d. 1631), known as one of the most adept commentators on the *Mesnevī* in the Ottoman Empire. Enthused by the discovery of Book Seven, Anḳaravī interrupted his commentary project in the middle of the fifth volume to closely study Book Seven. The earliest manuscript of the book that Anḳaravī saw, studied, and took as part of the *Mesnevī* was copied at the quite late date of 1411.[2] Based on this manuscript, he wrote what was and what still remains the only commentary on Book Seven.[3] When the Mevlevīs of Konya and Galata decided that this newfound volume was authentic and therefore to be considered part of the *Mesnevī*, their greatest argument in favor of the book's authenticity was the continuity of divine revelation to the hearts of the friends of God (*vaḥy-i dīl*). Book Seven was therefore seen as a concrete manifestation of the Mevlevī principle of the continuing evolution of revelation and tradition, and the indispensability of saintly authority as a receptacle for new forms of spiritual and moral knowledge.

As seen in the previous chapter, the moral and social authority of Sufi orders was under scrutiny by the ruling elite in the early seventeenth century. In addition, the ambivalence of the political authority toward Sufi orders was soon coupled with puritan religious criticism—the Ḳadızādeli movement—targeting all but sharia-based sources of authority.[4] Against this background, the discovery of a new volume of the *Mesnevī* was a bold if unusual reassertion of Sufi authority. Book Seven argued for the indispensability of Sufi authority in accessing the ever-changing forms of religious meaning in a dynamically conceived Islamic tradition (*sunna*). According to many seventeenth-century readers (and listeners), revelation from the unseen world (*ghayb*) continued to flourish after the Qurān, first with Persianate classics, the *Mesnevī* being one of them, and now with Book Seven. In other words, the book was a miracle first of Rūmī, then of the Mevlevī establishment; it attested to their spiritual authority and their unique and direct access to the divine.[5]

In addition to a bold assertion of Sufi authority through its divine provenance, Book Seven offered a new language that legitimized political changes taking place in the Ottoman public sphere. The main narrative of Book Seven was a book of advice (*nasihatnāme*) combining moral and political guidance. Unlike most ethico-political advice, which idealized a powerful sultan and his disciplining power over institutions, administrators, and the general populace, however, Book Seven's main story considered ideal rulership to be a partnership between various forms and magnitudes of authority. In this sense, the message conceptualized ideal rule as a partnership and followed the ideals of Persianate political theories, which emphasized notions of multiplicity of authorities and of a social contract between the ruler and the ruled.[6] This vision of partnership was a product of Sufi notions of sovereignty detailed in the previous chapter. Furthermore, governance as partnership was a shared political vision between Sufi dynasties and a range of other early modern political actors; it met the needs of the new contestants to legitimate their political agency and power in the seventeenth century.

In this chapter, I argue that the increasing prevalence of the Mevlevī order in the empire's capital, as well as in other Ottoman urban settings, was a product of the order's conception of dual authority that resonated deeply with the rise of new, multiple political agencies in Ottoman governance. In the moral realm, the Mevlevīs considered Rūmī and his descendants the epitomes of both juristic and saintly authority. In Sufi terms, the order boasted of combining formal (exoteric) and spiritual (esoteric) authority. This duality of

moral authority was also reflected in the order's early modern organization, where hereditary authority (the *çelebis*) and spiritual authority (the sheikhs) existed side by side. When criticized for this structure of authority, Mevlevīs responded that duality was in the nature of caliphate, since the caliphate was of two types: formal and spiritual, cosmologically corresponding to the exoteric-esoteric divide.

In their conception of moral and political authority, therefore, Mevlevī thought revived the dual notion of caliphate. This bipartite understanding was shunned by mainstream Ottoman political writing in the sixteenth century, which insisted on the unification of both forms of power in the person of the sultan.[7] Mainstream Ottoman political advice penned in this climate prioritized absolutist notions of authority.[8] In contrast, the Mevlevī tradition of writing on the caliphate underlined the cooperation and harmonization of different forms of authority as ideal governance. The previously examined Mevlevī conception of sovereignty, which considered the descendants of Rūmī an alternative dynasty, surely played a significant role in furthering this dualistic notion. While signaling a departure from the political writing that was typical of Ottoman advice literature of the earlier century, the new idiom appealed to the expanded political nation of which not only janissaries and military elite, but also the *'ulamā*, preachers, and Sufis, were a significant part. The appeal of this new idiom and its various expositions of a plurality of authorities in the public sphere was one of the main reasons why the Mevlevī network became highly popular among the military elite in the early seventeenth century.

This chapter particularly emphasizes the role of the military patrons of the order in contributing to the Mevlevī revival of the seventeenth century. The symbolic authority of the Mevlevīs legitimized the claims of new military elites to augmented political power, as seen most prominently with the Ṣoḳulluzādes, an important dynasty that sprang from the lineage of the powerful Ṣoḳullu Meḥmed Paşa (d. 1579). The alliance between this dynasty and the Mevlevī Sufi order shows that the Mevlevī revival of the seventeenth century was a result of the order's role in the new, decentralized political realm, which consisted of negotiating the legitimacy of new powerholders.

Through association with the Mevlevī order, I argue, the increasingly powerful Ottoman elite adopted not only a mode of piety, but one of political self-fashioning. In other words, the Mevlevīs crafted a complete language of

civility: a set of cultural practices and idioms by which one could construct oneself as an *homme politique*. In search of new modes of self-fashioning to legitimate their augmented political power, the new elite turned to Mevlevī association as a mode of partaking in a spiritually and historically justified claim to partnership of rule. Their patronage of new lodges in both Istanbul and the provinces on an unprecedented scale must be seen in this light of political self-fashioning. The Mevlevī order, in turn, produced political and mystical literature that legitimized the plurality of authorities. The chapter closes by reflecting on the key roles that Sufi networks played in articulating civility and political self-fashioning.

This chapter begins by describing the expansion of the Mevlevī network under the patronage of the military elite throughout the seventeenth century. As the previous chapter demonstrated, the Ottoman dynasty's response to the Mevlevī center's efforts at expansion had been inconsistent, occasionally ending in exile of and threats of execution against the descendants of Rūmī. Ultimately, the period saw the increasing prominence of the Mevlevī network, rather than its suppression or erasure from public life. This ultimate revival was due not only to the significant negotiating power of the Mevlevīs, but also to the support of the military elite, who found in the order's glorious past and notions of multiple political authorities new ways of self-fashioning as political agents. The chapter then continues with a discussion of Book Seven and its relationship to Mevlevī authority. In taking a close look at Sufi authority in a Persianate vein, the chapter underlines the wide resonance of the notion of a dynamic Islamic tradition embodied in Sufi interpretive tradition. The chapter then continues to study the political advice articulated within Book Seven and its appeal to the Ottoman elite of the period.

Before turning to these topics, I shall introduce the Mevlevī author whose writings shed light on Mevlevī teachings of the seventeenth century. İsmāʿil Rusūḫi Anḳaravī (d. 1041/1631) was a prolific Mevlevī sheikh whose magnum opus was his commentary on the *Mesnevī*, which earned him the title "the Commentator" (*hazret-i şāriḥ*).[9] For subsequent centuries, many Ottoman *Mesnevī*-reciters (*Mesnevī-ḫāns*) studied his reading and interpretation of the *Mesnevī* and highlighted this aspect of their training in certificates.[10] His commentary was not only authoritative, but also sensational, as seen in his integration of the spurious Book Seven. Alongside his works on the various aspects of the *Mesnevī*, of which his commentary was only one, he wrote the

first systematic guide to the doctrine and practice of the Mevlevī order, entitled *Minhācu'l-Fuḳarā* (*Way of the Dervishes*). Another noteworthy aspect of his work was producing Turkish translations of subjects considered scholarly, hence better suited to be discussed in Arabic. He wrote the first Turkish translation of Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī's *Temples of Light*, a key work of Islamic philosophy that will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. In addition, he translated the standard madrasa textbook on Arabic rhetoric and a prose (*inşā*) manual in Persian, combining them and adding examples from Ottoman letters. The result was the first handbook of rhetoric in and for Ottoman Turkish, entitled *Key to Eloquence* (*Miftāḥu'l-Balāgha*).[11] His oeuvre attested to his erudition in a variety of scholarly disciplines, which established him as an esteemed textual authority in his time. In many ways, Anḳaravī is representative of how Sufi authority was transformed in the early modern age: esoteric, intuitional knowledge had to be coupled with sound scholarly learning in this world.[12]

Modern scholarship has often studied the various aspects of Anḳaravī's versatile intellectual production as distinct from each other, and independently of his historical context. However, despite the impression of an aloof intellectual one might get from such portrayals, his contemporaries described Anḳaravī as closely engaged with the popular discussions of his age.[13] In particular, he was considered one of the main opponents of Kadızāde Meḥmed Efendi and his traditionalist vision of Islam. In addition to his contemporaries such as Kātib Çelebi, later Mevlevī tradition, too, remembered Anḳaravī for his "militancy on the battleground with the weapons [of] sciences and knowledge," the battleground in question being the Kadızādeli debates.[14] According to the Mevlevī biographer Şāḳıb Dede (d. 1735–1736), Anḳaravī had quit writing altogether after his archnemesis Kadızāde Meḥmed Efendi died in 1635. Despite the anachronism of this statement—Anḳaravī died before Ḳadızāde Meḥmed—it stands as witness to the importance of his anti-puritan works for the subsequent Mevlevī tradition.[15] As seen in chapter 2, the long-lasting impact of his anti-Ḳadızādeli writings went beyond his own order, finding readers among other eighteenth-century figures, such as the Mujaddidīs. This chapter thus takes a detailed look at the world of this Mevlevī sheikh and investigates the question of just what aspect of his worldview made him one of the most original and esteemed thinkers in the Mevlevī tradition and a spokesperson for those in the Ottoman public sphere who were opposed to the rise of puritan movements.

THE MEVLEVĪ REVIVAL OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

Although the early relationship between the Konya *çelebi*s and Ottoman sultans was not particularly close, and was indeed occasionally volatile, the early seventeenth century saw the revival of Mevlevī influence among the Ottoman imperial elite. The concrete manifestation of this revival was the rapidly increasing number of new or renovated Mevlevī lodges across the empire, often patronized by the military elite and favored by bureaucrats. For the imperial elite of various ranks, associating with the Mevlevīs was not only a matter of piety, but also a way of political self-fashioning. The Mevlevīs acted as powerbrokers, lending political legitimacy to claims to upward mobility and political agency. Throughout the century, viziers, janissaries, and at one point even a rebellious pasha—Abaza Meḥmed Pasha (d. 1659)—flaunted their Mevlevī connection as a means of self-fashioning as legitimate political actors.

Despite the general assumption, quoted earlier, that the Mevlevīs were close to the Ottoman center from early on, the order did not have a major presence in Istanbul until the late sixteenth century.[16] While there were instances of Ottoman sultans patronizing Mevlevī lodges in the fifteenth century, these episodes hardly had a lasting impact or effected a sustained rapprochement between the *çelebi*s and the sultans. The first such imperial patronage of a Mevlevī lodge was in Edirne, the complicated history of which has been summarized in the previous chapter. Despite being an early Mevlevī lodge donated by Murād II (d. 1451), the Edirne Mevlevī Lodge became the target of local authorities and possibly fell out of Mevlevī use. A few decades later, after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Meḥmed II patronized the first Mevlevī lodge in Istanbul. The lodge was simply converted from the monks' cells adjacent to a Byzantine church, itself converted to a mosque known as the Ḳalenderḫāne Mosque.[17] The first sheikh of the lodge was ʿĀbid Çelebi (d. 1497), a descendant of Rūmī who had later subscribed additionally to the Naḳshbandiyya. The lodge hosted the ceremonies of both orders: Mevlevī ritual on Thursdays and Naḳshbandī ritual on Fridays. There is scant information on the fate of this lodge after the death of its first sheikh. The absence of any mention of the lodge in contemporary or later Mevlevī sources suggests that it hardly achieved any substantial Mevlevī presence in the new imperial capital.[18]

In the early seventeenth century Mevlevīs revived their network of lodges in Istanbul and the provinces. Four new lodges were established in the first

two decades of the century in Istanbul alone, where there had previously been only two. Across Anatolia and the Balkans, Mevlevīs established or reestablished lodges in urban centers where their presence had become negligible, as explained below. The order had further become a favorite of the urban elite, primarily janissaries, pashas, and litterateurs. Despite all this concrete evidence of expansion, however, the Mevlevī revival of the seventeenth century has escaped attention as a result of the continued prevalence of the assumption that the Mevlevīs had always enjoyed close ties with the Ottoman court. The exceptions to this negligence are the studies of Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Cemal Kafadar, and Hüseyin Yılmaz.[19] The latter two historians, while noting the increased prominence of the order in urban centers and imperial politics, explain this phenomenon by appeal to doctrinal reasons. According to this explanation, because of the rising influence of sharia-minded movements in the Ottoman Empire, the Mevlevīs were preferred as the more Sunnitized alternative to the ʿAlid Bektāshīs. The main reason that the Mevlevīs have been considered Sunnitized was their genealogy, which was traced to Abu Bakr rather than to ʿAli, which was the more common Sufi genealogical practice.

While the Bakrī genealogy of the Mevlevī order is significant, there are two reasons why it should not be overemphasized as the sole explanatory factor in the changing fate of the Mevlevīs. Firstly, as Dina Le Gall's study on Ottoman Naḳshbandiyya has shown, Bakrī and ʿAlid genealogies could easily coexist in the early modern period. In other words, Bakrī genealogies were not necessarily considered anti-Shiite elements. To illustrate this point, Le Gall provides the example of Lāmiʿi Çelebi (d. 1532), a Naḳshbandī writer who was active during the reign of Süleymān the Magnificient. Even at this time of great Ottoman-Safavid tension, Le Gall observes, Lāmiʿi Çelebi "did not find it necessary to refrain from reciting publicly in front of the city's packed Greater Mosque his euology for the İmām Ḥusayn."[20] In other words, the Bakrī versus ʿAlid dichotomy allowed for a great degree of permeance. Secondly, the Mevlevī brand was characterized less by an exclusive emphasis on Abu Bakr than by a state of confessional ambiguity valorizing both Abu Bakr and ʿAli at the same time. As noted earlier, while Rūmī's familial genealogy was traced back to Abu Bakr, his spiritual lineage was traced back to ʿAli. As a result, the Mevlevī cults and rituals were still performed with a strong element of ʿAlid veneration. In fact, the Istanbul-Konya Mevlevīs were considered to have a predominantly ʿAlid outlook in the seventeenth century. When

İsmāʿil Anḳaravī wrote his works in 1620s, he cited an ʿAlid genealogy rather than a Bakrī one.[21] Furthermore, he was still responding to the widespread criticisms toward the Mevlevī order that the Mevlevīs revered ʿAli more than Abu Bakr. Some of these criticisms targeted the venerations of ʿAli found in the *Mesnevī*, occasionally invoking concepts like *imām* or *mahdī* for saints.[22] In short, the Mevlevīs combined the Bakrī and ʿAlid genealogies, rather than choosing the former over the other. It would be more appropriate to consider the Mevlevīs as "Alid Sunnis," in Ayfer Karakaya-Stump's terms, rather than as exclusively Bakrīs.[23]

While the Mevlevī order's Bakrī allegiance is not insignificant, this element was combined with a strong ʿAlid cult, and therefore did not render the Mevlevīs a strong candidate for the role of an anti-Shiite order. Therefore, explaining the Mevlevī revival by appeal to their Bakrī genealogy falls short of understanding the sociopolitical background of this shift. In searching elsewhere for the answer, Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı and Ahmet Yaşar Ocak suggest that the Mevlevī revival was a product of the changing political climate of the age, marked by increased decentralization. Gölpınarlı underlines that prior to the seventeenth century, the sultans were indifferent to the Mevlevī order because they "did not see [Mevlevīs] as a force supportive of their own rule."[24] However, he notes that this pattern changed in the seventeenth century when viziers and other military elites rose as patrons of Mevlevī lodges at an unprecedented scale. Gölpınarlı considers the new urban and elite popularity of the Mevlevīs a sign of moral corruption, blaming the Mevlevīs for turning away from their rural roots and becoming "a state institution."[25] Leaving aside Gölpınarlı's moral frustration, his observations regarding the changing character and the urban expansion of Mevlevīs merit serious consideration. His long-term analysis sheds light on the significance of the seventeenth century as a turning point, both from a largely rural to an urban order, and from political and social obscurity to prominence.

Noting the same transition, Ahmet Yaşar Ocak briefly offers a comparable explanation. Ocak underlines that particularly in the seventeenth century, the Mevlevī leadership tended to use their authority to achieve greater autonomy, enabled by the weakness of the Ottoman center. He further draws parallels between the ongoing decentralization and emergence of local power magnates and the increased political activity of the Mevlevīs.[26] In line with Ocak's insight, this chapter contends that the reason for the Mevlevī revival was the new, fragmented political atmosphere of the century, which provided a fertile

ground in which the Mevlevī order, which had a strong sense of sovereignty, could thrive.

Mevlevī efforts to establish themselves in the imperial center initially incited discord and friction, as seen in Murād III's dismissal of the Konya *çelebi* and the Mevlevīs briefly losing their major center in Istanbul, the İskender Pasha Lodge, to the Ḥalvetī order in the same period.[27] However, the fate of the *çelebi*s was about to turn. Ferrūḫ Çelebi's son and successor, Bostan Çelebi I (d. 1630), began a new age of Mevlevī efflorescence combining spiritual charisma and connectivity. Accompanying his father to Istanbul during his exile, Bostan Çelebi came of age in the imperial capital.[28] Unlike the remote Konya *çelebi*s of earlier, Bostan Çelebi cultivated close relationships with the imperial elite of Istanbul. He was also known to be a *çelebi* with exceptional spiritual charisma and unrivaled powers of predicting the future, as seen below. Bostan Çelebi ended what may be termed the Mevlevī "interregnum," the eighteen-year period of the vacancy of the Konya *çelebi* post, by reclaiming the post in 1601 with the approval of Aḥmed I.

Among the key Istanbul connections Bostan Çelebi forged was none other than Sultan Aḥmed I. Later Mevlevī sources underline that Bostan Çelebi was coronated at the same time as Aḥmed I, signaling an auspicious concurrence. As yet another sign of the improving relationship between the sultan and the *çelebi*, Aḥmed I visited not only the Konya Lodge, but also the tombs of Mevlevī figures such as Baha al-Dīn, Shams, Ḥüsām Çelebi, and other *çelebi*s (*ḥażerāt-ı çelebiyān*).[29] To be sure, Aḥmed I's interest in and generosity toward Sufis was not exclusively reserved for the Mevlevīs, yet his reign marks the beginning of an exceptional period for imperial patronage of the Mevlevīs.

The favorable relationship between the *çelebi* and the sultan found concrete form in the Bursa Mevlevī Lodge. The main Mevlevī lodge of Bursa in the early modern period, known as the "Pınarbaşı *tekke*," was established in 1615 by Cünūnī Aḥmed Dede (d. 1620), an esteemed Mevlevī author who spent most of his career as the sheikh of the Baghdād Mevlevī Lodge. This lodge received a generous donation in endowment resources from Aḥmed I.[30] According to the endowment deed of the lodge, it was Ebubekir Çelebi of Konya who asked Cünūnī Dede to establish a new lodge in Bursa, where the older Mevlevī lodge had fallen into disuse.[31] When the *dede* seemed hesitant

on account of his old age, Ebubekir Çelebi asked rhetorically: "Is it acceptable that there are no Mevlevī lodges in a city known as the stronghold of the friends of God (*burc-i evliyā*)?"[32] The narrative captures both the dissatisfaction of the Mevlevī leadership with the reach of their network, and their determination to expand that reach.

At the time of the establishment of the Bursa Lodge in 1615, the endowment deed mentions only the following lodges as part of the Mevlevī network: Konya, Istanbul (i.e., Galata), Edirne, Salonica, Cairo, Aleppo, Damascus, and Baghdad. Yet the deed of the Bursa lodge, unusually, also expresses a vision about intended Mevlevī expansion over a broader geography. According to the document, the establishment of the Bursa Lodge was intended to realize the final hope that

> all imperial provinces and lands of Islam be filled with that exalted *ṭāife*, the Mevleviyye, and in every city and town there be a Mevlevīhāne, a nest for the disciples (*fuḳarā*) and the dervishes, where the Mevlevī ceremony be held and where *samāʿ* be performed.[33]

The endowment deed emphatically stated the Konya *çelebi*s' investment in the realization of this vision. In addition to underlining Ebubekir Çelebi's initiative, the deed declared that the secrets of Rūmī were guarded, and would eventually be revealed, by Rūmī's honored and blessed lineage (*ḥazret-i müşārun-ileyhin evlād-ı emcād-saʿādet-nejādları*).[34]

In short, in the early seventeenth century the Mevlevī network began to expand considerably on the initiative of the *çelebi*s and with the support of the political elite. This expansion continued throughout the century, despite the puritan pressure with which the order had to struggle in the capital. Bostan Çelebi initiated the establishment of new lodges through the delegation of his disciples to places like Damascus and Gelibolu.[35] Istanbul's own network, too, was growing rapidly around this time with the addition of the Yenikapı Mevlevihāne in 1597 and Beşiktaş Mevlevihāne in 1622. The latter lodge was a short boat-trip away and therefore in close connection with the Gelibolu Lodge, itself a new addition.[36] In the provinces, too, the Mevlevī network was revived in this period. Lodges built by Ottoman viziers included the Selānik Mevlevihāne (Ekmekçizade Hasan Paşa, d. 1617), Peçuy Mevlevihāne (1665, Gazi Hasan Paşa), and the Kayseri Mevlevihāne (1675, Bayram Paşa).[37] Another common pattern of the seventeenth century was the revival of old Mevlevī lodges that had fallen into disuse or impoverishment. Lodges built

in the heyday of the Mevlevīs in the late medieval period, by either Seljuk patrons or the *beg*s of the post-Seljuk principalities, had been reduced to oblivion and disuse. These defunct lodges were revived in the seventeenth century by the new patrons of the order. For instance, when Eflākī wrote his *Feats of the Knowers of God*, the Tokat Lodge was known to be an important Mevlevī center run by a Mevlevī woman named ʿArife-i Hoşlikā. The lodge and its neighborhood had, however, been crushed by the Ottoman army in 1471, when the Ottomans conquered the Karamanid principality, possibly on account of a Mevlevī-Karamanid association. This important center was not revived until 1638, by Sülün Muşlu Paşa, a vizier of Aḥmed I.[38]

Not only viziers but also janissaries emerged as patrons of Mevlevī lodges and clients of Mevlevī civility in the seventeenth century. A janissary scribe named Malkoç Efendi established the Yenikapı Mevlevī Lodge of Istanbul in 1598.[39] Another janissary, named Kara Mezāk, established a Mevlevī lodge in Istanbul's Eyüb district.[40] The founder of the Gelibolu lodge, Ağazāde Meḥmed Dede (d. 1653), was from a janissary family. A certain Haşan Ağa had a fountain built inside the Galata Lodge in 1649. The fountain was accompanied by a lengthy inscription describing how ʿAdem Dede, the then-sheikh of the Galata Lodge, sought out and found a charitable patron to meet the needs of his dervishes.[41] These patronage relationships were not merely charitable acts, but represented an ideological rapprochement. As Cemal Kafadar observes, in the early seventeenth century, the Mevlevīs began to appear in the founding myths of the janissary order. Historically, the janissaries had been aligned with the Bektāşī order and traced their spiritual traditions to Ḥacı Bektāş. However, in *The Code of Janissaries* (*Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan*), penned by a janissary scribe during the reign of Aḥmed I (d. 1617), janissary traditions were traced back not only to Ḥacı Bektāş but also to Rūmī. Thus, for instance, janissary attire was the joint invention of Timurtaş Dede, from the lineage of Hacı Bektāş, and Emir Şah Efendi, from the lineage of Rūmī.[42] Similarly, the military successes of the janissaries were considered blessings from Hacı Bektāş Velī and Rūmī.

In addition to Istanbul's distinguished elite, such as pashas and viziers, the local elite of the provinces contributed significantly to the growth of the Mevlevī network. The rejuvenation of economic life at the Manisa Mevlevī Lodge in western Anatolia, which was to emerge as the second most important Mevlevī lodge by the end of the century, was the work of one such local patron. The waqf's agricultural income sources, which had been depleted like agricul-

tural resources elsewhere, had been replenished by the interference of a local notable, Maḥmūd Agha (*fahrü'l-ʿāyān Saruhan livāsı kaymakamı Ali oğlu Mahmud Ağa*). Mahmud Ağa dedicated part of his income to reviving rice cultivation in the region: one quarter of the income from agricultural production was endowed to the Grand Mosque, and the remaining three quarters to the Manisa Mevlevī Lodge.[43] Similarly, the Kilis Lodge was reestablished in 1676 by a local Ali Ağa.[44]

It must be noted that not all of these lodges were tied to the Konya Lodge in the same way; there were Mevlevī lodges that were entirely or partly independent of the Konya-centered system. For instance, the Kasımpaşa Lodge established in the 1620s was outside the purview of the *çelebi*s. The founder-sheikh of this lodge, ʿAbdi Çelebi, had started the Kasımpaşa Lodge after he was removed from his seat at the Galata Lodge by the Konya *çelebi*s.[45] Another interesting example is the ʿAyntab Mevlevī Lodge, established by Mustafa Ağa b. Yusuf (d. 1640–1646). Mustafa Ağa, the son of a prominent Turcoman family, was granted the title of local governor (*sancakbeyi*). Using his wealth and prestige to establish a Mevlevī lodge in the city, he stipulated in the endowment deed that only his brother, the Mevlevī sheikh Şaʿban Dede, and his lineage could become sheikhs and overseers of the lodge. However, while preemptively preventing the interference of the Konya *çelebi*s, even this immunity was justified by the approval of the Konya *çelebi*s.[46] In short, although the centralization of the Mevlevī network was not as complete as it would be in the eighteenth century, in this age of Mevlevī revival the *çelebi*s still established their authority over the majority of the network, the growth of which was their considered and sustained project.

While the motivations of the Konya *çelebi*s in expanding the Mevlevī network might be more obvious, the reciprocation of this project by financial and political support needs closer scrutiny. For the military class, associating with the Mevlevī tradition was more than a pious choice, it was a matter of political choice to reclaim symbols of sovereignty. The military elite acknowledged this connection between Mevlevī identity and political self-fashioning—in other words, civility—through the production of illuminated books. Producing illuminated books was itself a marker of political distinction. Initially the terrain of the court, artistic patronage of illuminated books gradually became the domain of the imperial elites who wished to represent themselves as powerful political actors.[47] In the seventeenth century, one of the many ways in which the military elite appropriated imperial strategies of

self-fashioning was to commission self-depictions while visiting the Konya Mevlevī Lodge.[48]

One such individual was Şoķolluzāde Hasan Paşa (d. 1602), son of the famous grand vizier Şoķollu Meḥmed Paşa (d. 1579). The Şoķollu family was not simply an elite family; they were a powerful dynasty rumored to be positioned to replace the House of Osman in case of the demise of the latter.[49] Şoķolluzade Hasan Paşa embraced his royalty fully—even though it was a vision rather than reality. Contemporary chroniclers underlined that his conduct in Baghdad, where he was stationed as the governor, was imbued with "sultanic habit and manner."[50] Ceremonial pomp and pompous display of material wealth, such his commission of an ornamental silver throne, evinced a royal ambition that was not lost on his contemporaries. One of these royal acts was the patronage of a silver door for the Mevlevī lodge in Konya. Architectural representation at the Konya Mevlevī Lodge had long been the priority of Ottoman sultans, now emulated by other eminent statesmen.[51] The connection between Mevlevī identity and civility is even clearer in a universal history commissioned by Şoķolluzade Ḥasan Paşa, a work that heavily featured the Abbasids and aimed to establish Hasan Paşa as the last in a chain of glorious rulers of Baghdad. Two miniatures in this universal history were dedicated to the depiction of the Mevlevī lodge in Konya as part of the glorious Islamic past. Patron of many other illuminated paintings from Baghdad, Ḥasan Paşa intently made himself visible in these illuminations by inserting himself into the frame, even when the event shown was much earlier. For instance, a miniature in the illuminated history of the Mevlevī order featured Ḥasan Paşa in a scene depicting Rūmī and his dervishes in a madrasa setting.[52]

The connection between the Konya Mevlevī Lodge and the Ottoman imperial tradition is even clearer in the self-fashioning of another vizier, Çerkes (Hadım) Yusuf Paşa (d. 1614). Rising from the ranks of chief eunuch, this vizier held important positions such as the governorship of Baghdad, and had a large household retinue of three hundred.[53] Commissioning an unusual book, which Melis Taner summarizes as "illuminated travelogue," Çerkes Paşa described his travel from Istanbulto Baghdad, where he would assume the post of governor. In this travelogue, seven scenes were singled out as worthy of depiction by painting. Two of these scenes portrayed the governor's visit to the Konya Lodge. Moreover, Çerkes Paşa's travelogue presented Konya as a meaningful city that connoted not only the legacy of Rūmī, but also the past glory of the Seljuks.[54] In other words, for Ottoman elite in search of languages

of political self-fashioning, the Konya Lodge represented much more than piety; it was also replete with historical and political associations, as well as a network of connections.

INCESSANT REVELATION: A NEW VOLUME FOR THE *MESNEVĪ*

A new volume of the *Mesnevī* appeared at the beginning of the seventeenth century, coterminously with the expansion of the Mevlevī network and its rising political clout. What is the connection between these two historical phenomena? The few studies that have mentioned Book Seven have so far treated the episode as an odd event in Mevlevī history. In contrast, I argue in this chapter that the provenance and the content of Book Seven had broader implications for the moral and political debates in Ottoman society at this time. First, the provenance story of Book Seven was a manifestation of two interrelated tenets of Rūmī Islam: the authority of the Sufi network, and the valorization of a Persianate canon as revelation, or as a "second Qurān." By arguing that revelation was a continuous process, the Mevlevīs announced a dynamic theory of tradition and the importance of the Sufi sheikh in the continuous interpretation and reinterpretation of this dynamic tradition. Second, the dual notion of caliphate that the Mevlevī tradition defended offered a suitable language of civility to the expanding political nation of the Ottoman Empire. At the heart of Book Seven was a book of advice (*nasiḥatnāme*) envisioning this new political order, which was defined as independent of the person of the sultan, and actualized through the sustained knowledge of a broad range of actors, or "advisers."

The Mevlevī narratives of the seventeenth century, which emphasize the harsh criticisms toward Book Seven, are partly responsible for the volume's dismissal as an irrelevant oddity. According to Anḳaravī's own statements, his commentary on Book Seven was met with nothing but protest. Sheikhs, whose names Anḳaravī did not disclose, sent messengers to his lodge in Galata telling him to correct his grave mistake immediately, and denounce this forgery of a book, "or else he would be sorry."[55] By his own admission, Anḳaravī was quite intimidated by his implacable opponents, who demanded his exile, and even made attempts on his life.[56] The sheikh initially tried to stand up to his unnamed detractors by pointing out that they were committing the grave mistake of depriving students of beneficial knowledge. Book Seven, he told

critics, was "a fine book containing hundreds of Qurānic verses and prophetic sayings, and not a single couplet that would contradict the teachings and doctrines of the pillars of religion."[57] When his defense failed to convince his detractors, Anḳaravī and his disciple-scribe, Derviş Ganem, decided to teach the book only clandestinely.[58]

Despite İsmāʾil Anḳaravī's dramatic narration of his involuntary submission to the oppressive critics of Book Seven, the new volume was widely and publicly circulated in the early seventeenth century, and in fact continued to be copied and read well into the twentieth.[59] A casual look at the number of surviving manuscript copies of Book Seven makes it difficult to suggest that the attempted censorship of the volume was successful.[60] More importantly, among the early copies of Book Seven one finds several copies by İsmāʿil Anḳaravī's disciples, who also acted as his scribes.[61] In other words, to the contrary of the sheikh's statements, his circles actively copied and promoted Book Seven against the tides of censorship. Furthermore, the sheikh rewrote earlier volumes of his highly regarded commentary after completing Book Seven, sprinkling these widely read early volumes with plenty of references to Book Seven. Even his manual of rhetoric, *Key to Eloquence* (*Miftāḫuʾl-Belāġha*), cited couplets from Book Seven to illustrate the use of rhetorical devices.[62] In other words, it was impossible to read Anḳaravī's *Mesnevī* commentary, or any other work by the sheikh, and not be aware of Book Seven and the sheikh's commitment to its authenticity.

One such reader who asked to read Anḳaravī's commentary on Book One and was thus introduced to the sheikh's commitment to Book Seven was Sultan Murād IV. According to a marginal comment in one of the copies of Anḳaravī's *Mesnevī* commentary, having heard the reputation of the sheikh's masterful commentary, Murād IV sent a messenger to the Galata Mevlevī Lodge to request a fine copy of the sheikh's work.[63] The sheikh immediately acted to fulfill the sultan's request, finding a reliable and speedy scribe who penned a copy "different than former copies" (*evvelki nüsḫālara muġāyir*) specifically for the sultan.[64] One might suspect that these changes could include omitting references to the controversial Book Seven. However, the sheikh retained references to Book Seven, hence comfortably flaunting his most original contribution to the literature on the *Mesnevī*.[65] As this chapter demonstrates, it was no coincidence that Book Seven was communicated to the sultan, since the content of the volume followed the "advice to the kings" genre, bringing together stories from earlier volumes of the *Mesnevī* with snippets

from Firdevsī's *Book of Kings*. Indeed, Aṇḳaravī summarized the central story of Book Seven in a short, versified, and memorable advice form, which circulated separately. Thereby, Book Seven and its central message were advertised by the sheikh's very own circle in a variety of genres, speaking to diverse audiences.

Furthermore, scholars of Aṇḳaravī's time were willing to entertain the authenticity of Book Seven as a plausible claim. For instance, Kātib Çelebi mentions Book Seven in his bibliographical work quite favorably, lamenting the unfairness of the criticisms directed at its commentator, Aṇḳaravī. Kātib Çelebi's short treatment shows that he had read İsmāʿil Aṇḳaravī's preface to Book Seven, where the sheikh classified the objections against the authenticity of the volume into four main groups and responded to each objection. Kātib Çelebi judged Aṇḳaravī's argumentation to be "profound and satisfactory."[66] The whole campaign against Aṇḳaravī's Book Seven was, according to Kātib Çelebi, launched by the sheikh of the Yenikapı Mevlevī Lodge, who was simply jealous of Aṇḳaravī. In other words, intra-Mevlevī competition was to blame for the controversy around Book Seven. Kātib Çelebi continued to assert that those in the know agreed that Aṇḳaravī's argument was reasonable (*maʿḳūl*), whereas his opponents exhibited mere ignorance and foolery. In the end, Kātib Çelebi concluded that Aṇḳaravī was an author unmatched in the entire Mevlevī order.[67] Another contemporary scholar, Nevʿizāde ʿAtāī, singled out Book Seven among Aṇḳaravī's "thirty-six volumes of books" in his respectful treatment of the Mevlevī sheikh's life and works, noting that Book Seven "became widely known thanks to his grace."[68] While other contemporaries of the sheikh did not discuss the "Incident of the Book Seven" in similar detail, their opinion of Aṇḳaravī as a *Mesnevī* commentator was similarly high, and not negatively influenced by the incident. For instance, Evliyā Çelebi noted that Aṇḳaravī's commentary was highly regarded among Persian readers.[69]

Even readers who ultimately found Aṇḳaravī's attribution of Book Seven to Rūmī unconvincing were still intrigued by the interesting history and content of the new volume. In other words, authentic or not, Book Seven was part of the literature on the *Mesnevī*, and serious readers felt obliged to express an opinion on the volume. An anonymous reader, for instance, studied all 435 folios of an early manuscript copy of Book Seven. The reader's marginal comments, varying from short statements of disagreement to full refutations, leave no doubt that he was not convinced of the authenticity of Book Seven.[70] However, despite his disbelief in the volume's authenticity, the reader

continued to study the entire book, leaving further marginal comments, some approving Anḳaravī's remarks on specific subjects.[71] Thus, even for readers who found the book's authenticity unconvincing, the book was an interesting, or even sensational, piece of reading. The sensationalism appears to have contributed to the book's popularity rather than its censorship.

A striking example of a reader who took Book Seven seriously despite not attributing it to Rūmī was İsmāʿil Ḥaḳḳı Bursevī (d. 1725), a Celvetī Sufi well known for his commentaries on the Qurān and *Mesnevī*, among other substantial works.[72] A Sufi sheikh who lived nearly a century after Anḳaravī, Bursevī wrote detailed and well-received commentaries on a variety of religious and Sufi texts, including the *Mesnevī*. While Bursevī did not discuss Anḳaravī's Book Seven explicitly, he was one of the many Ottoman intellectuals who found at least one argument of this commentary convincing: the argument that since the *Mesnevī* is comparable to the Qurʿān, which consists of seven recensions, it must consist of seven books. Bursevī argued on the basis of this analogy that the first eighteen couplets of the *Mesnevī* must be considered a separate book, just to be able to bring the number of *Mesnevī* volumes to the complete seven.[73] Similarly, when the discussion of Book Seven was rekindled in the nineteenth century around the question of whether the seventh volume should be included in printed versions or not, some Ottoman authors argued that even if Book Seven was not to be published, the sixth volume should be printed in two parts just to hit the magical number seven.[74] In other words, the commentary on Book Seven was influential even among those who were reluctant to accept its attribution to Rūmī. Ultimately, the commentary was far more successful in introducing new ways of reading Rūmī's magnum opus than one might surmise from Anḳaravī's narratives of victimhood-cum-martyrdom.

What were the shared intellectual assumptions of the seventeenth century that allowed an oddity such as Book Seven to be considered forgivable, even plausible? The early modern success of Book Seven has heretofore escaped the attention of modern researchers, who have limited their inquiry on the subject to the question of whether the volume was indeed authored by Rūmī. From a historical perspective, the more important and productive issue is to understand the favorable reception of the volume in the early modern Ottoman Empire. I contend that Book Seven became a part of Ottoman Persianate literature owing to two dynamics of textual authority.[75] First, the *Mesnevī* itself had long been read as a "second Qurān." While some readers and writers

understood "second Qurān" in a modest sense, as an act of the divine text's translation for the benefit of people who did not read Arabic, other readers and writers identified the *Mesnevī* and the Qurān much more closely. As the next section of this chapter shows, to many early modern Rūmīs, the *Mesnevī* was itself a divine communication emanating from the same eternal source as did the Qurān and the knowledge of the Prophet. This esoteric understanding of revelation made it easy to conceptualize it as an incessant, ongoing process, rather than a onetime finite event. In short, Book Seven could, like the *Mesnevī*, be conceptualized as a divinely revealed (*ghaybī*) book.

The second dynamic of early modern textual authority at play was the backing of the claim to revealed knowledge by the authority of the Mevlevī institutions. The presence of a concept of ongoing divine (*ghaybī*) revelation did not mean that early modern readers would accept any text as divinely revealed text. Beyond the theology of the text, more familiar forms of authority such as Sufi genealogies and textual scholarship contributed to the expansive understanding of the textual canon as emblematized in the case of Book Seven. As the previous chapter explained, Mevlevīs understood authority to be materialized in formal and spiritual forms, the former invested in the çelebis and the latter in the sheikhs. Both forms of authority vouched for the authenticity of Book Seven and its divine nature at once. These forms of authority had the right to "distinguish Rūmī's voice from others"—in other words to avow or disavow whether a word, a couplet, or an entire book was authored by the Sufi sheikh. This esoteric authority trumped any and all exoteric evidence to the contrary.[76]

The plausibility of a continued divine revelation, and its approval by the Mevlevī leadership, were forces strong enough to rule out all objections to the authenticity of Book Seven. In responding to these objections in the preface to his commentary on Book Seven, İsmāʿil Anḳaravī ruled them out as exoteric (*ẓāhirī*) evidence, which would roughly translate into "historical-critical" objections in modern parlance. The first set of objections focus on the historical references to the *Mesnevī* as a six-volume book. Not only did Rūmī himself refer to the *Mesnevī* as six volumes, but so did the earliest sources on Rūmī's life, such as his hagiographers Sipehsālār (d. 1312) and Eflākī (d. 1360), whom the reader met in the previous chapter. Thus, no early source mentioned a lost Book Seven. Furthermore, Anḳaravī's detractors argued, the volume's narrative content and linguistic style were incompatible with the rest of the *Mesnevī*. These objections elaborated that the word choices and imag-

ery were vulgar, the volume was repetitive and rambling, and most of its content was simply lifted from Book Six. Furthermore, had Rūmī wished to continue writing the *Mesnevī*, why had he not first completed the incomplete final story of Book Six? Why would he begin a new tale when that final tale awaited completion?[77]

İsmāʿil Anḳaravī's preface to his commentary on Book Seven provides responses to each of these objections. Yet the weight of his defense is not the individual responses to these exoteric objections, all of which are trivial for one who understands the spirit of the *Mesnevī*. For those who are familiar with the inner meaning of Rūmī's magnum opus, the volume's authenticity is simply self-evident:

> Those who are not familiar with the voice of Mevlānā [Rūmī] and with his secrets, they demand external evidence that this [book] is Mevlānā's own words. On the other hand, gnostics (ʿārif) who know Mevlānā's voice and secrets recognize this book as one recognizes the voice of a loved or familiar one in the darkest night, they confirm that this is the voice of that beloved and familiar one [Mevlānā].[78]

Believing or not believing in Book Seven was not a matter of knowledge, but of belief and intuition. By defending Book Seven with reference to their own esoteric authority, Mevlevī thought advanced a theory of Islamic tradition as progressive and plural, guarded by figures of authority trusted with maintaining its expansion, which allowed this intuition. The next two sections turn to a detailed analysis of these cultural phenomena.

MESNEVĪ AS REVELATION: SACRED HISTORY AND THEORIES OF RENEWAL IN EARLY MODERN SUFISM

The plausibility of a new volume of the *Mesnevī* was based on a particular early modern conceptualization of time and revelation as dynamic and expansive. Despite its ubiquity in early modern scholarly and Sufi literature, this dynamic notion of sacred—and by extension, historical—time has largely escaped modern scholarly attention,as it was assumed that the "puritan" or declinist conception of time was the default of religious imagination.[79] In a profound article on the sacred and historical notions of time in postclassical Islam, Samuela Pagani defines a scholarly conception of tradition as a cumulative body of knowledge and interpretations, summarized in the well-known maxim "Who comes before learns from who comes after."[80] This conception presumed

that although the personal life of the Prophet and the text of the revelation, the two sources of Islamic normativity, were final; later generations could actualize new and original interpretations of the tradition by accessing the *archetypes* of prophethood and revelation.[81] As Pagani emphasizes, this progressive conception of revelation and tradition was not an exclusively accepted in Sufi thought; it was also shared among scholarly circles. For both groups, the conceptualization of new interpretations of the tradition (*sunna*) as crucial, rather than superfluous, reinforced their authority in postclassical societies.

Under the pervasive influence of this conception of a progressive tradition, early modern Persianate reading cultures highly revered the *Mesnevī* and dubbed it the "second Qurān."[82] This interpretation was inspired by Rūmī himself, who often referred to himself as the prophet of his time and to the *Mesnevī* as the "second Qurān," or as revelation (*vaḥy*).[83] In considering Rūmī as equivalent to the prophet of his age, and treating his poetry like revelation, *Mesnevī* readers were not straying far from scholarly understandings of the Qurān and of revelation. From early on, scholarly traditions understood the Qurān not as the entirety of revelation, verbatim, but as part of a larger revelation, which was conceptualized as "the Mother of Books." The Qurān was an Arabic expression of divine revelation, but not "the" revelation; the latter was infinite and ever revealing itself in new forms.[84] Esoteric interpretations of Islam, including Sufism, had internalized this understanding of a dynamic revelation, which continued to manifest itself in ever-newer forms in different human languages.[85] Hence, to many early modern reading communities, the phrase "second Qurān" evoked a profound affinity between the *Mesnevī* and similar works of vernacular spirituality and the revelation to the prophet.

In order to understand the pervasiveness of this conception of a progressive tradition, one needs to appreciate the social lives of Persian and vernacular spiritual poetry in early modern societies. As an example, let us consider the performance of the *Mesnevī* in everyday settings.[86] *Mesnevī*-reciters (*Mesnevī-ḫān*) recited and taught the *Mesnevī* not only in Sufi lodges, but also in mosques. The *Mesnevī* was part of the daily life of teaching and preaching in many mosques, including prestigious imperial mosques such as the Fatih Mosque, the Süleymāniye, and the Great Mosque of Madina. Reciters of the *Mesnevī* preached to the public on morality at the pulpits of these mosques, while also teaching them Persian based on Rūmī's poetry.[87] To the Ottoman reading (and listening) publics gathering at lodges and mosques, the *Mesnevī*

was part of an incessant revelation that continued to manifest itself in new forms, and of a progressive concept of tradition.

Like other literary and mystical classics of Persian, such as Jāmī's *Yūsūf u Zulayḫā*, Rūmī's *Mesnevī* was considered an exposition of the inner meaning of the Qurān, only in a different medium.[88] This broadly shared conception, that the *Mesnevī* was the "inner meaning of the Quran" (*maǧz-ı Ḳurʿān*), was a cornerstone of the teachings of the Mevlevī Sufi order, headed by the bloodline descendants of Rūmī.[89] Anḳaravī's rich oeuvre was largely dedicated to proving the affinity between the Qurān and the *Mesnevī*. Most remarkably, Anḳaravī wrote *Gatherer of Verses* (*Cāmiʿu'l-Āyāt*), a compendium of all references to the Qurʿān found in the six volumes of the *Mesnevī*. Some were direct quotes from the Qurān, while others were allusions to the meanings intended in the Qurānic verse, despite having no common wording.[90] One of the most important roles of Sufis was to receive this divine revelation (*vaḥy*) and to express it in a way communicable to their community. Therefore, Anḳaravī wrote in his *Way of the Dervishes*, revelation was of two kinds. The first kind was like the Qurān, divine revelation to the prophets through the intermediacy of angels. Revelation to the heart (*vaḥy-i dīl*), on the other hand, was nonmediated and was not limited to prophets; in fact, it was often experienced by saints and pious Muslims. Revelation to the heart, while inferior to the revelation to the Prophet, was superior to the learning of the mind, hence a legitimate source of divine knowledge.[91] It was because Sufis continued to receive divine revelation, Anḳaravī explained, that Rūmī described the *Mesnevī* by saying "this [book] is neither astrology nor divination / This book is God's revelation." This conception of the *Mesnevī* as part of an incessant revelation was widely shared by the book's readers; Ottoman readers often copied this couplet on the flyleaves of their books as a blurb.[92]

It was not only Mevlevī circles that identified the *Mesnevī* with the spirit of revelation. Many early modern authors and readers voiced this belief. A case in point is Ḳaraḳaşzāde of Bursa, a widely read Naḳshbandī Sufi author of the period.[93] Ḳaraḳaşzāde wrote two works on Sufism and left behind one *mecmuʿā* that summarized the teachings of Ibn ʿArabī.[94] Overall, his goal was to produce comprehensive yet accessible guides to the realm of Sufi thought and Sufi orders in the composite Ottoman Turkish language that had come to be a sign of Rūmi civility in the early seventeenth century. In his *Light of God for the Converted [to Islam]* (*Nūru'l-Ḥudā li-man Ihtadā*), Ḳaraḳaşzāde presented a compendium of the various dervish groups of Rūm, ranking them

from the least to the most acceptable. Ḳaraḳaşzāde's favored order was the Naḳshbandīs, an order that had a large following in urban Bursa at the time of his writing.[95] The Mevlevīs appeared as a generally admirable group with but one flaw: they argued that being a Mevlevī was enough to be considered pious. In other words, putting it in the terms of the discussion in chapter 2, their piety was socially oriented (*salāḥ*) rather than sharia-centered (*taḳvā*). Despite this flaw, however, the Mevlevīs were highly regarded as the successors to Rūmī.

Ḳaraḳaşzāde's work reiterates some striking elements of the *Mesnevī*'s early modern interpretation as a form of revelation, showing the appeal of these interpretive strategies beyond the Mevlevī order. The author reproduces the *Mesnevī*'s parallels between the Prophet and Rūmī by describing the latter as the Prophet's equivalent, only in a different time period.[96] Reproducing a well-known story about the origins of the *Mesnevī*, Ḳaraḳaşzāde eloquently underlines that Rūmī's inspiration was the unexpressed secrets that God had communicated to the Prophet during the latter's ascension to heaven (*miʿrāj*).[97] When the Prophet arrived in heaven and saw God (*ru'yetullah*), God told him seventy thousand secrets, all "without letters and without words" (*bī-ḥarf ve bī-sadā*). Upon his return to the world, the Prophet entrusted one of these secrets to ʿAli. In a manner reminiscent of the story of Midas, ʿAli then told the secret to a pond, where a reed grew. When a youth took one of these reeds and made it into a flute, and started playing the flute, the Prophet overheard the youth and turned to ʿAli, saying: "Oh ʿAli, have I not told you not to tell anyone?" Therefore, Ḳaraḳaşzāde explained, when Rūmī invited readers (and listeners) of the *Mesnevī* to listen to the reed in his opening couplets, he meant: "Listen to Muḥammad, peace be upon him; what the *ney* tells is that story abundant with mercy and that tale of separation from the realm of unity that the prophet told ʿAli. In this, the *ney* is the [mute translator] of that story (*tercümānı ve bī-zebānı*)."[98] In other words, the *Mesnevī* sprang from the same source as the Qurān in that it was a representation of the revelation to the heart of Muḥammad. Rūmī's book, therefore, embodied the notion of "revelation after revelation."

These notions of a continued prophethood and continued revelation reverberated widely in the reading communities of the *Mesnevī* in the Ottoman period. Therefore, Anḳaravī's defense of Book Seven fell on fertile ground where the analogy between the *Mesnevī* and the Qurān was a shared cultural assumption. Many Ottoman readers, among and beyond the Mevlevī order,

considered the *Mesnevī* the embodiment of the spirit of revelation: an exposition of a nonlinguistic, ongoing communication between the divine and the human. Against this background, İsmāʿil Anḳaravī argued that the inspiration of Book Seven from the unseen world to Rūmī and his spiritual heirs was an event analogous to the revelation of the Qurān. Anḳaravī therefore began his preface with a lengthy exposition of the significance of the number seven in Islamic eschatology. He noted that the number seven was frequently mentioned in the Qurān, placing a particularly strong emphasis on the seven recensions of the Qurān (*sabʿa maʿānī*).[99] Explaining the allure of the idea, Anḳaravī wrote that even before he found Book Seven, he was troubled that a divine book such as the *Mesnevī* was in six volumes, six being a rather trivial number in Islamic eschatology and science of letters. Despite seeking consolation in the verse "[God] created the earth and the heavens in six days," the sheikh had not found solace. Specifically, he wondered why the *Mesnevī* had not been inspired in seven volumes, given that "God created the universe from seven things, and inspired the Qurān to the prophet in seven recensions, as the prophet said in the prophetic saying 'The Qurʿān has been sent down in seven letters [readings]'."[100] The central place of seven in Qurānic exegesis alone could (and, as seen above, indeed did) persuade readers that a Book Seven was simply a necessity, since the *Mesnevī* had to parallel the Qurān in every respect.

Anḳaravī's lengthy introduction to Book Seven is replete with similar parallels between the Qurān and the *Mesnevī*. The analogy extended to comparing the deniers of Book Seven to the deniers of the Qurān; those who refused to believe in the authenticity of Book Seven were analogous to the unbelievers who refused to believe that the Qurān was God's revelation. Some of his critics, Anḳaravī wrote, simply dismissed Book Seven, since it largely repeated other stories from the *Mesnevī*, particularly from the sixth volume. Furthermore, they underlined that the new volume had contained vulgar and vernacular wording, which was below Rūmī's poetic style as it appeared in other volumes. These critics, Anḳaravī declared, resembled the non-Muslims who simply dismissed the Qurān for similar reasons. These unbelievers had simply dismissed the Qurān as "tales of the ancients"; these deniers of the Qurān and the Prophet had disbelieved on account of the parallels between the Qurān and the Old Testament.[101] The unbelievers had further denounced the Qurān for containing vulgar words, such as ʿankebūt (spider), the title of a Qurānic chapter. Their empty and absurd words do not change the fact that Qurān was God's

speech, in the same way as the criticisms of Book Seven do not change the fact that it was Rūmī's speech.[102] In other words, just as the *Mesnevī*—including Book Seven—was analogous to the Qurān, the Mevlevīs were analogous to the Prophet. Their detractors, then, stood in for nonbelievers.

INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY IN PERSIANATE SUFISM

The case of Book Seven demonstrates the extraordinary interpretive authority that Ottoman Sufis exercised even in the face of rampant criticism. While adding an entire new volume to the *Mesnevī* was a rather extreme manifestation of this interpretive authority, the foregoing analysis has underlined that the arguments in favor of the authenticity of Book Seven were firmly rooted in interpretive traditions that considered the Islamic canon to be an ever-evolving, dynamic body of texts. The possibilities of such interpretive freedom pose questions for the historian. What were the limits to such interpretive authority? While the answer changes for every time and place, the answer remains that interpretive authority was a social paradigm granted by a mixture of assets. As a case in point, İsmāʿil Anḳaravī's authority relied on two forms of socially acknowledged power. First, he had established his intellectual authority by his works in multiple scholarly disciplines, which had been received favorably. In other words, by the time he wrote the commentary on Book Seven, the sheikh had come to demonstrate strong scholarly credentials and excellence in textual scholarship. Second, his connection with a highly esteemed descendant of Rūmī, Bostan Çelebi, who approved his interpretation of Book Seven, granted him both genealogical and spiritual authority.

İsmāʿil Anḳaravī's intellectual production impressed many of his contemporaries, as explained above. His works included commentaries and annotated editions of the *Mesnevī*. He wrote vernacular guides on scholarly subjects such as rhetoric and logic, subjects central to the art of textual interpretation. Anḳaravī had also done the research to locate and study the earliest credible copy of the *Mesnevī*, which had at the time been preserved in Cairo.[103] His frequent protestations against other scholars who carried out merely exoteric studies of texts should not be taken at face value. By these protests, the sheikh did not mean to dispense with the scholarly methods of textual study; his own intellectual authority was largely based on his scholarly standing.

Using his intellectual credentials, Anḳaravī presented the discovery of Book Seven as a sign of the intellectual progress that the Ottomans had made

since the time of Rūmī. This narrative of progress, as the next chapter shows, would appeal to the urban Istanbulites who formed his main audience.[104] In explaining the long hiatus between the lifetime of Rūmī and his own time, during which no soul had seen or heard of Book Seven, Anḳaravī presents a historical narrative:

> This humble one has heard that Our Master Mevlānā had twenty-five volumes of work in total. When Tīmūr Ḫān arrived at Konya, he gathered [Mevlānā's] books wherever he found them. Then, saying "There is no one in the land of Rūm who can appreciate these refined and pure words," he took all of them to the Persian lands (ʿacem diyārı). However, because the six volumes of the *Mesnevī* had already been widely known in many lands, he did not take those [six volumes].[105]

The narrative evokes what Anḳaravī's fellow Ottomans remembered as the complete devastation of Anatolia by Tīmūr's invasion in 1402, followed by a total chaos culminating in a period of political interregnum. This period was remembered as a cultural dark age by the early modern residents of Rūm. The Tīmūr narrative also evokes an important cultural assertion for Anḳaravī's Persianate readers: the rivalry between ʿacem and *rūm*, between Persianate cultural production in geographical Iran, on one hand, and the Balkans and Anatolia, on the other.[106] In Mevlevī sources of the early modern period, Mevlevīs often presented themselves as representatives of distinguished and classical Persianate learning in the land of Rūm. Anḳaravī's origin story, cited above, gave himself and his order a central place in discovering a missing part of the *Mesnevī*, Book Seven, and its return to a land that was considered incapable of appreciating Persianate culture at the time of Tīmūr. This Persianate intellectual identity accounts for the increasing appeal of the Mevlevī order in the early seventeenth century. By producing a masterful commentary on the *Mesnevī*, Anḳaravī was reinforcing not only his own intellectual authority, but also the image of his order as the institutional home of distinct Persianate learning.

Therefore, Anḳaravī's intellectual credentials and standing among his contemporaries were of utmost importance in granting him some autonomy in deciding the contours of the canon. By his own statements, however, he offered his readers more than his distinguished learning. Book Seven was a symbol of his authority that encompassed more than formal learning, which was a rather accessible asset compared to his other credentials: spiritual authority, and association with the descendants of Rūmī. Anḳāravī empha-

sized, time and again, that many a scholar could bring together intellect and learning (ʿaḳl ve ʿilm), yet they would still get lost in the valley of esoteric meanings (maʿnā). By referring to these other scholars of the *Mesnevī*, oftentimes by name, Anḳaravī repeatedly emphasized how his reading was distinguished from that of other scholars by virtue of his esoteric (ghaybī) insight.[107]

In other words, it was his deep knowledge of the inner meaning (ḥaḳīḳat) of the *Mesnevī* that warranted the authenticity of the new volume. This deep knowledge was predicated upon scholarly study of the *Mesnevī* but was different and further from it. Unlike scholars whose interpretations of the *Mesnevī* were merely textual, distinguished Sufis like Anḳaravī were able to venture beyond the exact wording of the text at hand.[108] It is for this reason that when explaining that Book Seven was divinely inspired (ghaybī), he clarifies that the volume was divinely inspired not only to him, but also to the heart of Rūmī and to Bostan Çelebi, who had given Anḳaravī the book in the first place. Book Seven was sent from the unseen world (ghaybī) in two senses. First, the volume descended upon the heart of Rūmī in one instance. This divine meaning (maʿnā) was then put into words and verses by Rūmī. Second, the volume was recovered from ʿālam-i ghayb, the world of the unseen, by Bostan Çelebi and Anḳaravī.[109] In this sense, the book was a miracle first of Rūmī, then of Anḳaravī and his patron-çelebi; it attested to their spirituality and direct access the divine.[110] These assets granted the Mevlevī sheikh an authority that led even those who did not consider Book Seven part of the *Mesnevī* to read and partially subscribe to his interpretation, or to continue to regard Anḳaravī's commentary as a reliable and distinguished work even after the mini-scandal following his adoption of Book Seven. It is important to recognize the role of this complex regime of authority that gave some individuals extraordinary interpretive authority, and its socially constructed nature, and to pay these socially constructed forms of interpretive authority as close attention as legal authority.

Let us begin with Bostan Çelebi as a receptacle of ghaybī, or otherworldly knowledge. As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, the seat of çelebi-hood was an administrative (formal, suwarī) position that did not necessarily require spiritual perfection. Nevertheless, çelebis did live in a pious manner, and they were capable of miraculous powers by virtue of a distinguished genealogy connecting them back to Rūmī. While Mevlevī historical sources remembered some çelebis solely as estate managers—and even bad ones at that—others were portrayed as holy figures just short of prophets. Bostan Çelebi certainly

belonged to this latter category. He had an established reputation for strong talismanic and occult powers. He carefully established a pious image by acting in a generous and humble manner. For instance, he refused to reside in the wealthier *çelebi* mansions and chose to dwell in a hut in the yard of the Konya Lodge instead. He gave generous alms to the poor who visited the lodge. These images must have served to dispel the image of the wealthy and greedy *çelebi* that was mentioned in the previous chapter. As a result, Bostan Çelebi was able to reestablish the prestige of the descendants of Rūmī, as reflected in his popularity among the elite of the empire, including at the court of Aḥmed I. His every move or word was considered to hold cosmic power. If he hunted an animal, it meant that a successful military campaign was upcoming; if he fiddled with arms, a battle would break; if he changed his garments, the heads of the state would change.[111] The discovery of Book Seven was just one in such a string of miraculous powers of Bostan Çelebi, whose reputation doubtless contributed to the persuasive force of Anḳāravī's commentary on this new-found volume.

To sum up, Book Seven is an important illustration of the dynamic and expansive nature of the Islamic canon with which this chapter opened. The rift between the modern literature on the strange case of Book Seven and its early modern reception reflects the sharp differences between early modern views of the Islamic tradition and modern understandings of religious traditions. To early modern Ottomans, the revelation of an entirely new book from the unseen world (*ghayb*) was a possibility that could be entertained, even if in the final event it would be rejected or only partially accepted. It was one of the important roles of early modern Sufi authorities to manage and mediate such vast interpretive possibility. This authority to mediate the boundaries and possibilities of an expansive tradition was attained by a combination of distinguished learning, social standing, piety, spiritual training, and genealogical connection to a canonical figure. It was by way of this form of spiritual authority that Anḳaravī and his patron-*çelebi*, Bostan Çelebi, were well placed to decide that Book Seven was consistent with the inner meaning of Rūmī's *Mesnevī*, despite all appearances pointing to the contrary. They were, in Anḳaravī's words, the recipients of a *ghaybī* (otherworldly) revelation in the form of Book Seven. In other words, the *çelebi* and the sheikh were seeking freshness and novelty; their authority did not stem from following a giving tradition verbatim, but from the spiritual and intellectual capacity to establish novel teachings, and even altogether novel books.[112]

Finally, Book Seven can be construed as a Mevlevī attempt to distinguish the order from other reading communities of the book. By the seventeenth century, the *Mesnevī* had been a widely read book and an indispensable part of the Rūmī canon. This popularity meant the proliferation of reading communities and commentators. By reasserting their esoteric connection with Rūmī's legacy, Mevlevī authorities also aimed to claim their uniqueness and superiority as guardians of the *Mesnevī*'s real meaning. The central role attributed to Bostan Çelebi in arguing for the authenticity of Book Seven exemplifies this unique link between Rūmī's legacy and the Mevlevī order. Further supporting the same argument is the close relationship between the Mevlevī musical ritual, studied in detail chapter 2, and the structure of the *Mesnevī*. Although the musical ritual (*samāʿ*) had been part of the Mevlevī tradition since Rūmī's lifetime, the ritual had not been given its familiar structure until the turn of the sixteenth century.[113] During this gradual reorganization of the ceremony, a seventh *selām* was added to the ritual. Müstaḳimzāde Süleymān Saʿdeddīn establishes a parallel between this new *selām* and Book Seven, noting that both were latecomers to the Mevlevī tradition and were still disputed at the time of his writing in the mid-eighteenth century.[114] In other words, Book Seven might be seen as an attempt to introduce a harmonious cosmic order that tightly linked the Qurān, Book Seven, and Mevlevī institutions and ceremonial.

A DIVINE *NASIḤATNĀME*

What was the content of this divinely inspired (*ghaybī*) Book Seven that Istanbulites discussed in the seventeenth century? Since Anḳaravī's commentary on Book Seven was quite lengthy, at around four hundred folios, the sheikh wrote a vernacular summary of the main story to make sure that the volume's message would not be lost. The *nasihatname* was entitled *Genesis and Ending (Mebdeʿ ve Meʿād)*.[115] Anḳaravī stayed partially true to the genre of *mabdaʿ ve maʿād* by framing the main story as advice on how to lead a virtuous life on earth. Addressed to Murād IV, in a simple, versified Turkish, *Genesis* summarized the contents of Book Seven.[116] The preface emphasized that the advice provided in this short treatise was Rūmī's own advice, since it was based on a story that Rūmī told, at length, in his Book Seven.

The main story of the seventh volume was in the genre of advice that worked at both personal and political levels, and guided much of Anḳaravī's

commentary, as well as being summarized in his *Genesis*.[117] The parable was very simple: a merchant sent a young boy out on an open-sea journey, and told him that if he earned good things before he returned home, then the boy would be rewarded with infinite gifts. This was clearly an allegory for God sending man into the world and promising him eternal gifts if he behaved well. Then, the boy landed in a country where the people met him at the coast and crowned him immediately, declaring him to be the sultan (*padişah* and *halīfe*, used interchangeably). Being smart, the boy pondered the fact that "the crowning was not his own achievement; he had been enthroned with no doing of his own."[118] The boy, not understanding the reason why he was crowned, asked the vizier. The vizier responded: "My sultan, this land of ours has a strange custom. We change sultans every year. This is because we are all the servants of that greatest and loftiest of all sultans, who is beyond our land and is the true lord of this land. That sultan built two cities in his own domain. One of them is such a majestic city that there is no equal to it, it is pleasant, noble, beautiful. The other city is the exact opposite of the first city: ugly, painful, excruciating. When a sultan's year [of ruling] ends, the sultan of the beyond sends an envoy, so that the envoy brings him to the sultan of the beyond as he was sent: naked, without any property or even clothes. They wrap the [one-year sultan] in one piece of cloth only, and send him. If this sultan of ours has ruled with oppression . . . he is sent to the ugly and painful city, and if he has ruled with justice, he is sent to the first city of beauty." In versified form, *Genesis* then continues to underline the transience of sultans and the brevity of their power:

> For us, oh young one, every year a new ruler becomes decree-giver
> whenever that year ends, that ruler is forever cut off from rulership
> we dethrone him and start looking for a new ruler right away
> you will be dethroned like them, you will become deceased like those sultans.[119]

Despite the genre and the allegory, which served to speak to man's personal salvation, the author explicitly stated that he also meant the work as political advice.[120] Throughout the story, the relationship between the young boy and the old and wise vizier represented the ideal relationship between the sultan and his advisers, or the notables of the state. The advice considered the notables (*erkān ve aʿyān*) of the state to be God's deputies on earth.[121] The sultan's religious duty was to follow the guidance of these advisers, particularly the dervishes, who were the most precious companions of sultans.[122] The mark of a good sultan was his openness to consulting with advisers (*meşveret*). In

addressing his advisers, *Genesis* advised the sultan-boy to say: "Oh you, who has been my guide and my mentor (*delīl u pīr*), and I have been subject to you, you are my commander (*amīr*) in every respect, I obey you in every respect, show me the right way."[123]

The work is noteworthy in diverging remarkably from the usual works of advice addressed to Ottoman sultans in this period. Works of advice written in this period, especially political advice by preachers, emphasized the importance of projecting a powerful, omnipotent sultanic authority. Whether popular forms of advice by preachers, or more administratively focused manuals such as Koçi Bey's, a common feature of advice writing under Murād IV was the emphasis on the authority of the sultan in enforcing effective discipline and order on society. Even if the sultan was to take advice, Sufi preachers advised such consultation to take part exclusively in private, since any public advice to or admonishment of the sultan would harm his all-powerful aura. According to this latter tradition, the duty of the preacher was to "make the people lenient and favorable and obedient and subject to the sultans."[124] Not only was the preacher to refrain from public criticism of the sultan, but he was also to dispute and discard anyone who publicly criticized the sultan's actions.[125]

Overall, the political advice works of this period continued to project the ideal of a centralized polity through the persona of a powerful sultan, despite the changing political realities of the age.[126] In other words, the lag between political realities and political thought was one of the features of popular political writing in the early modern period. The Mevlevī *naṣiḥatnāme* penned by Anḳaravī, and presented as the wisdom of Rūmī channeled through the Mevlevī leadership, was an exception to this discrepancy between real and ideal rulership. In *Genesis*, the Mevlevī sheikh presented the sultan as accidental to the continuity of just rule; justice and stability were now the function of the "partners" of Ottoman rule. The short, versified *Genesis* dedicated to the sultan thus summarized the gist of its advice as cooperation with advisers and other statesmen.

While *Genesis* is written in a simple, vernacular language, its message was clearly connected to Persianate notions of dual power as seen in the lengthier expositions in Book Seven. Book Seven, on the one hand, emphasized that the story of the lost boy-king was the main story of the volume and, on the other hand, expanded in greater detail on the political import of the work.[127] In his commentary on the "divinely inspired" book, Anḳaravī explicitly stated that the story was full of advice for viziers and other administrators—in other words,

it was a direct admonishment to the rulers of the world.[128] Furthermore, in his commentary on Book Seven, Anḳaravī wedded the main story of *Genesis* to stories about pre-Islamic, Iranian rulers. He interwove the main story of Book Seven with allusions to Iranian kings (ʿacem padişahları), or with paraphrases of stories from Firdevsī's *Book of Kings*.[129] In the Ottoman world as in the rest of the Persianate world, Firdevsī's epic, *Book of Kings,* was widely read as a commentary on just and powerful rulership. The book's characters and stories were often integrated into other works, such as the *Bostān* and *Gülistān* of Saʿdi, one of the most widely read poets of early modern Ottoman culture.[130] Book Seven's choice of "Iranian kings" is significant, since Islamicate political writing with reference to the pre-Islamic Iranian rulers conveyed a distinct view of the relationship between "the king's two bodies," or in Islamic terms his formal and spiritual authority. Some pre-Islamic kings were "irreligious" in this literature, but still deserved to enter God's paradise by virtue of their just governance.[131] In making this argument, Persianate political writing sought not to conceive of secular kingship, but to differentiate between governance and moral authority. In the end, the successful functioning of the political order was dependent not on the unification of these authorities in the person of the sultan, but on the smooth cooperation between different authorities.[132]

This Persianate conception of two authorities was one of the themes of the commentary on Book Seven, most directly when Anḳaravī noted the Ottoman maxim "The world can withstand unbelief, but cannot withstand injustice."[133] The maxim was a reminder that the primary goal of political authorities was to address the dispensation of justice, more than issues of faith. To recall the division of labor in this manner was to remind the ruler of the need to cooperate with those holding spiritual authority. The ensuing notion of plurality of authorities resonated with the military elite of the empire, whose realities of sharing authority with the court did not find a suitable mode of legitimation in the predominantly absolutist idioms and assumptions of Ottoman political writing. It was this vision of partnership with, rather than servitude to, the central authority that appealed to the Ottoman elite, who were in search of new modes of political self-fashioning.

CONCLUSION

Mevlevī thought revived the dual notion of caliphate that was shunned by mainstream Ottoman political writing in the sixteenth century. In doing so,

the Sufi order's own bifurcated structure served as a model. Mevlevīs were governed by the descendants of Rūmī (*çelebis*), who did not necessarily have to—though frequently did—possess spiritual charisma or intellectual authority. The latter characteristics were covered by Mevlevī sheikhs, who did not have the proper genealogical credentials but whose teaching and preaching, which took place within the Mevlevī network, formed the basis of the order's sustained moral and spiritual authority. This two-tiered structure formed the basis of a Mevlevī tradition of writing on the caliphate that underlined the cooperation and harmonization of different forms of authority, rather than the domination of one, as the basis of just rule. While signaling a departure from the political writing that was typical of Ottoman advice literature of the earlier century, the new idiom appealed to the expanded political nation of which not only janissaries and military elite, but also the *ʿulamā*, preachers, and Sufis, were a significant part. The appeal of this new idiom and its various expositions of a plurality of the public sphere—explained in greater detail in the next chapter—was one of the main reasons why the Mevlevī network became highly popular among the military elite of this period.

Language and Historical Consciousness

Theories of Progress in Ottoman Early Modernity

Glory be to God who graced us with learning Arabic and Persian and to our master Muḥammad who said, "The languages of heaven are Arabic and courtly Persian," and to the companions who spoke with the most eloquent of languages.[1]

A running joke in the Ottoman secretarial habitus was the sacrilegiousness of the Persian language, the mastery of which was closely associated with the profession's cultural identity. Secretaries teased each other by invoking different versions of the Turkish proverb "Whoever recites Persian / loses half his religion."[2] The biography of Ḥoca Neşʾet Efendi (d. 1807) contains some of the finest examples of this irreverent motif of Ottoman humor. Born the son of a secretary who was employed at the imperial court, Hoca Neşʾet himself became a member of the secretarial corps (ḫācegān).[3] Following his father's lead not only in his profession but also in his Sufi affiliation, Neşʾet Efendi was initated into the Mevlevī path at the age of fifteen. Later, he also became affiliated with the Naḳshbandī order through the circles of his patron, the chief scribe (reisülkküttāb) and later grand vizier Rāġıb Paşa (d. 1763).[4] Although he held a fief (zeʿāmet) that came with certain official responsibilities, not least of which was to serve in the Ottoman-Russian war of 1768–74, Ḥoca Neşʾet Efendi made his living and fame primarily through private teaching at his home. He offered regular lessons on Persian and the *Mesnevī* to such a large number of pupils that one of his colleagues described his home as "the envy of many a madrasa."[5] These lessons on Persian and the *Mesnevī* served to train personnel for grandee households, where Persian, poetry, rhetoric, and prose composition were considered key skills in the cultural formation of a bureaucrat and members of his retinue.[6] Through them, potential secretaries and

litterateurs acquired the necessary training in languages, literature, and the social habitus of the secretarial class and were introduced into the relevant social and intellectual networks.

At Ḥoca Neşʿet's private-home-turned-public-academy, or salon, guests bonded over the host's witty anecdotes and stories that irreverently played with the many religiously contentious issues that are familiar to this book's reader.[7] In issues ranging from the *shathiyyāt* of Ḥallāj to smoking tobacco—to which he was heavily addicted—Neşʿet Efendi made defiant remarks that became the talk of his circles. Reportedly, when one attendee mocked his fondness of Persian literature by citing the famous saying that Persian was the language of hell, Neşʿet Efendi replied: "If it is so, it were as well to learn it; one can never tell where one may go, and suppose one would have to visit hell, not to be able to speak the language would be but a torment the more."[8]

The colorful biography of Ḥoca Neşʿet Efendi combines three important developments of Ottoman early modernity that contributed to the formation of the public sphere. The first and cardinal development was the rise and expansion of the civilian bureaucracy—and concomitantly, increasing opportunities for upward social mobility. This newfound social mobility had significant cultural ramifications, most notably in the form of increased sponsorship of a Persianate conception of civility. The second important development was the extension of this Persianate conception of civility into the larger urban culture. As seen in Ḥoca Neşʿet's profile, these themes were also closely linked to a third theme that this book explores: the connection between Persianate learning, the scribal milieu, and Sufi circles—particularly the Mevlevī order. In fact, one of the main channels through which Persianate civility became an urban phenomenon was the dissemination of its cultural capital through Sufi orders.

In this chapter, I argue that in the early modern Ottoman context, Persianate civility entailed a progressive perception of the Islamic tradition that developed an accommodating, even positive, view of innovations. Another important corollary of this progressive conception of tradition was its justification of plurality in the public sphere. Specifically, one of the important arguments of early modern Ottoman Islam was the existence of a Persianate Islam that was as legitimate, if not more so, than a sharia-oriented Islam. In addition to developing a progressive conception of tradition, the argument for Persianate Islam thus challenged the monopoly of state-religion, and thereby developed an Islamic language to demarcate between personal and private

aspects of religion.[9] This Persianate conception of worldview resonated with anti-puritanism more broadly—with both Sufi and juristic variations of anti-puritan thought.

Before moving on to my argument about the seventeenth-century roots of the crystallization of a distinct Persianate civility, some background on the social aspects of Persian learning in the Ottoman context is in order. Of urban character, Persian learning in the Ottoman context was one of the important keys to upward mobility. Hence, in the seventeenth century, civil officialdom played a salient role in sustaining this form of learning.[10] The previous chapter showed that the rise of new forms of political power increased interest among the upwardly mobile Muslims of the empire, particularly the military elite, in patronizing Sufi orders. For the military elite, Sufi orders acted as arbiters of Rūmī civility and social distinction. Similarly, the rise of civilian officials was also accompanied by a form of cultural capital that was partly provided and popularized by Sufi orders. By civilian officials, I refer to the scribal profession (ḳalemiye) whose ranks rapidly swelled in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The civilianization of bureaucracy by the increased presence and predominance of the scribal offices was an important feature of Ottoman early modernity. This shift was made possible by the changing composition of the Ottoman elite in the seventeenth century. As seen in chapter 1, the importance of recruits in the military slavery system (devşirme) plummeted, and Muslim-born Ottomans began to dominate official posts at all levels. The civilian bureaucracy not only expanded in numbers, but also enjoyed heightened prospects for promotion. Most notably, the office of the grand vizier, formerly open only to the military elite, was opened up to high-ranking civil officials by the second half of the seventeenth century (reisülküttāb). The novel availability of this new form of mobility resulted in the increased representation of individuals from commoner backgrounds in bureaucratic offices.[11]

As the political power of civil bureaucrats grew, they also developed a group identity that emphasized sharper differentiation from other officials—namely, from the military class and the ʿulamā.[12] The differentiation took place in training and cultural outlook. In terms of training, after the sixteenth century madrasa training lost its significance for securing civil bureaucratic posts. Instead, training for secretarial positions took place mainly through apprenticeship to and affiliation (intisāb) with grandee households. In the Ottoman Empire, households, referring to the retinues (ḳapı ḫalḳı) of powerholders, had

always been a crucial element of political organization at every level of society, from the sultan to provincial governors. In the mid-seventeenth century, with the rise of the office of grand vizier as the highest executive authority in Ottoman politics, households attached to military—and, later, civilian—personnel grew in significance. In addition to providing training, the households were social units for forming and enhancing communal cultural identities around an official function.[13]

The household system contributed to the early modern public sphere in two key ways. First, households offered early modern city-dwellers sustained, learned salons through the promise of upward mobility. While training and upward mobility were significant structural draws, households became full-blown cultural institutions in their own right. As seen in the example of Ḥoca Neşʿet, some litterateurs connected to great households had their own "micro-retinues" for training personnel for civil offices.[14] Albeit in nominally private spaces—namely, homes and mansions—these salons played important public roles, including the training, networking, and promotion of public personnel. More significantly, they played an important role in the dissemination of authoritative knowledge beyond the elite.[15] The dissemination of the literary culture of the salon took place through connection with Sufi orders, who regularly provided learned personnel to these circles as trainees or teachers. As a result, a tight pattern of affiliations emerged between civil officials of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the Mevlevī order.[16] These public connections facilitated the formation of a distinct cultural sphere that centered around the bureaucratic households and expanded toward the urban public. Although the existence of a distinct habitus associated with the secretarial bureaucracy has been established, the urban and public dimensions of this cultural formation are less acknowledged.[17] By examining this Persianate civility from the vantage point of Sufism, I show the significant impact of this cultural capital on the early modern public sphere.

In this chapter, I present an analysis of the cultural meanings of "the Persianate" in the early modern Ottoman Empire and its significance for the Ottoman public sphere engrossed in questions of innovations and diversity. I begin with an in-depth analysis of the connection between Persian and a progressive conception of tradition as found in the works of the Mevlevī sheikh İsmāʿil Anḳaravī. Yet, I do not consider Anḳaravī's views to be exceptional or unique. Throughout the chapter, I point out the broader reading communities within which the Mevlevī notion of a Persianate Islam was situated: the

reading (and listening) communities of the *Mesnevī*, the readers of Illumina-tionist philosophy (*işrāḳilik*), other anti-puritan Sufis such as those belonging to the Naḳshbandī order, and finally the civilian bureaucracy and their house-holds. By underlining these larger contexts, I suggest that the Persianate configurations of the Islamic tradition merit close study for an informed appreciation of the self-expression of the early modern Ottoman public sphere in its entirety. In addition, by underlining the social and intellectual connec-tion between grandee households and Sufi orders, I show the significance of this Persianate civility for upward mobility.

Before I move on to my analysis, a few words on my approach are in order. First, following my Ottoman interlocutors, I use the term Persianate to refer to a broader cultural landscape that, while not always using the Persian tongue as the linguistic medium, was associated with the legacy of the Persian clas-sical canon. In other words, the historical-theological arguments regarding Persian were considered relevant to other non-Arabic Islamic vernaculars, such as Turkish. It is in this expansive sense that I translate Persian as a lan-guage of heaven into "Persianate." Second, my usage of "Persianate" differs from its more prominent conceptual use in scholarship as a zone of connectiv-ity "from Balkans to Bengal" or, alternatively, "from Britain to China."[18] Instead, this chapter focuses on the cultural and intellectual signification of "Persian" in a specific historical context. The question is not where the Persian-ate was geographically located, but what it meant and how it constituted a distinct discursive space.[19]

Third, it bears emphasizing that this chapter suggests that Persian was more than a linguistic medium; it was shorthand for the hermeneutics associ-ated with the early modern mystical-philosophical canon. Therefore, when the puritans of the seventeenth century declared Persian the language of hell, it was not the entirety of the language that they had in mind. After all, Persian literacy was and remained an important component of learned Ottoman identity, hence a key resource for upward mobility in the Ottoman Empire throughout the early modern period.[20] Therefore, at least since the renowned chief mufti Kemalpaşazāde (d. 1534), it was customary to opine that the lan-guages of heaven were two: Arabic and Persian.[21] These two languages sat at the top of a linguistic hierarchy too lofty for the empire's other languages to even approach. For instance, Evliyā Çelebi noted a well-known maxim: "Ara-bic is eloquence, Persian is wittiness, Turkish is abomination, and the rest [mere] filth."[22] In the sixteenth century, Persian was particularly associated

with upward mobility, as noted in a famous couplet by Leʿālī Çelebi (d. 1563): "Each and every Persian who comes to Ottoman domains / Expects a provincial lordship or viziership for his pains."[23] Given the key role of Persian literacy in acquiring status, Ottoman scholars of any standing were familiar with the Persian canon. For instance, an otherwise ardent critique of the Mevlevī way and practice, Ḳadızāde Meḥmed himself was a reader of the *Mesnevī*, as well as poetry by Saʿdī (d. 1291) and ʿAṭṭār (d. 1221), quoting couplets in two recently discovered autobiographical treatises.[24] Therefore, debating "Persian" was not literally a debate on the linguistic medium. The debate was a conflict between different reading communities of Persian mystical-ethical poetry. Ḳadızāde Meḥmed and the Mevlevīs represented two different reading communities; while the former consumed Persian poetry as literature, the latter theorized it as sacred text. This chapter shows that while the literary value attributed to Persian remained unquestioned, the sacred value attributed to Persian poetry was contested by different reading communities.[25]

Through arguing about the language(s) of the afterlife, Ottoman authors parsed competing theories on the place of diverse discursive traditions within Islam. It has generally been assumed that such issues as diversity, or differentiating between different discursive traditions within Islam, are merely modern concerns that have been superimposed on the past; that these terms have rarely been explicit concerns of premodern societies.[26] This assumption has persisted despite recent scholarship that has vigorously argued that prior to the onset of Western modernity, Islamic societies tolerated a great degree of "contradiction" or "ambiguity" rather than searching for a strict orthodoxy. According to the recent groundbreaking studies by Shahab Ahmed and Thomas Bauer, the equation of Islam with a sharia-based orthodoxy is a modern creation. Through their analyses of knowledge and hermeneutics in Islam, both authors have underlined that the backward projection of this sharia-centered religiosity has created great distortions in the study of historical Islam.[27] In fact, Islamic hermeneutics valorized toleration of plurality, and coexistence of multiple forms of authoritative knowledge.

However, in setting up this "contradictory" or "ambiguous" Islam as the mirror opposite of modernist Islam, the two authors risk romanticizing medieval and early modern Muslims by understating the amount of contention between different conceptions of tradition.[28] The conceptual framework provided by these studies, therefore, should be placed in conversation with historical studies on the power dynamics in Islamic polities. More specifically,

a historical approach should take into account the power dynamics of the early
modern state, characterized by the entanglement of state legitimacy and
authority with Islamic legal institutions and their interpretations of Islam.[29]
A full appraisal of early modern Islam must take into account not only these
religiously framed disciplinary projects, but also the resistance and criticism
toward them.[30] This chapter paves the way for a well-informed appreciation
of the resistance toward the sharia-based conception of Islam favored by early
modern puritan-reformist movements, such as the Ḳadızādeli movement. By
focusing on one such moment of resistance, I explore and carve out the here-
tofore unstudied conceptual tool kit that early modern Muslims developed to
defend the diversity of discursive traditions within Islam. The present case
study shows that the imperative to respond to intensified criticisms of Persian-
ate Islam resulted in discussions on the nature and limits of sharia in excep-
tionally explicit terms.

   This chapter contributes to the larger debate on the nature of discursive
authority in Islam from a historical point of view, by illuminating how the
Ottomans negotiated this diversity in their own terms. Since the terms of the
Ottoman debate on diverse discursive traditions in Islam are very different
from modern terms, these debates have escaped attention. Foremost among
these Ottoman idioms was the reference to a Persian[ate] canon as the symbol
of a diverse and expansive, in contrast to a normatively and legally imposed,
form of Islam.

ISMĀʿIL ANḲARAVĪ AND *FORTY PROPHETIC SAYINGS*: A MEVLEVĪ DEFENSE AGAINST TRADITIONALISM

A prolific author and Mevlevī sheikh, Anḳaravī wrote multiple tracts in which
he defended the Mevlevī order against puritan criticism. As seen in chapter
4, Anḳaravī was one of two Mevlevī authors—alongside Müneccimbaşı
Aḥmed Dede—that the later Mevlevī tradition valorized for their contribu-
tions to anti-Ḳadızādeli discourse. According to Kātib Çelebi, Anḳaravī often
went so far as to accuse Kadızāde Meḥmed of heresy for "rejecting sainthood
and the Sufi [path]."[31] While sharia-based heresy accusations toward Sufis
have been widely studied, the worldview by which a puritan preacher like
Ḳadızāde Meḥmed would be labeled as a heretic remains unexplored. The
reason for this gap, which exists despite the scholarly attention that the
Ḳadızādeli movement has received, is the predominance of a legalistic frame

of analysis in scholarship.[32] Yet, as this chapter underlines, early modern thinkers offered multiple modes of conceptualizing Islam that could not be reduced to a binary between conformity and nonconformity to sharia.

By moving the intellectual framework outlined by İsmāʿil Anḳaravī to the center, this chapter offers a new understanding of early modern Islam that goes beyond an exclusive emphasis on sharia compliance.[33] I show that early modern Ottoman thought recognized nonlegal discourses as integral and constitutive parts of the Islamic tradition (*sunna*) by adopting the imagery of a bilingual heaven, specifically through the recognition of the sacred status of Persian alongside Arabic. In other words, two distinct configurations of the divine—legal and mystical-philosophical—coexisted in a bilingual heaven. Following Anḳaravī and the Mevlevī tradition, I define a distinct Persianate Islam, which had two main characteristics. The first was the recognition of the diversity of authoritative Islamic discourses: the second was a positive propensity for innovations.

While the notion of a distinct Persianate Islam that goes beyond a narrow emphasis on sharia compliance pervades Anḳaravī's oeuvre, the most direct expression of this worldview appears in his *Commentary on Forty Prophetic Sayings*.[34] Anḳaravī's *Forty Sayings*, at first look, appears to be just another collection of prophetic sayings, the likes of which are too numerous to count in Ottoman collections.[35] However, the author's preface states, in a straightforward way, that the collection was intended as a focused rebuttal of the two chief criticisms of the Mevlevī version of Islam: a propensity for adopting and tolerating innovations, and a heavy emphasis on Persian in ritual and in learning.

> This humble Mevlevī, eş-Seyḫ İsmāil el-Anḳaravī . . . selected forty reliably transmitted prophetic sayings that support our chosen path and reinforce our way [then]; I explained them and provided a commentary on them in Turkish. . . . First of all, I [wrote] many correct responses and sound discourses against those who, after relaying a prophetic saying about Arabic, declare: "The Persian tongue is the language of the people of [hell]fire."[36]

This justification for the compilation clearly states that İsmāʿil Anḳaravī's collection is coherent and has a pointed goal: to defend the Mevlevī order by refuting the critiques. The work defends several specific Mevlevī practices against puritan criticisms, including the distinctive hats and habits of the Mevlevīs, the disputed practice of shaving one's head, celibacy, the chants and their lyrics, the use of poetry in rituals, and finally *samāʿ*, a debate studied in

chapter 2. While these specific issues merit attention, more noteworthy is Anḳaravī's framing of the overarching question. In his presentation, the Mevlevīs were targeted, first and foremost, for attributing sacral authority to Persian and for having a positive attitude toward innovations (*bidʿa*).[37] In what follows, I explore Anḳaravī's conceptual analysis (*taḥḳīḳ*), by which the twin questions of Persian and innovation were construed as interconnected, and the kernel of the early modern Ottoman debates on the nature of Islamic tradition.[38]

The very first topic Anḳaravī addresses is the question of language, more specifically whether "Persian is the language of the people of [hell]fire."[39] To be sure, the sacred status of Persian in Islamic tradition (*sunna*) had been a topic of contention in Islamic history before.[40] In combating the condemnation of Persian to hell, Anḳaravī partly relied on this traditional repertoire. Hence, *Forty Sayings* reproduced standard arguments in favor of the status of Persian as a truly Islamic language, such as a compilation of narratives about the Prophet speaking Persian—either with his companion Salmān-ı Fārisī or with his grandsons Ḥasan and Ḥusayn.[41] The second and more intricately developed legacy that the Mevlevī sheikh utilized were the juristic debates on the permissibility of praying in Persian, which were related to the question of the sacred status of non-Arabic languages.

In *Forty Sayings*, Anḳaravī began his treatment of Persian by evoking Ḥanafī juristic literature, which had formed a strong precedent in discussing the religious status of Persian.[42] Since, historically, the Ḥanafī school of law developed in Transoxiana among Persian speakers, the school adopted a uniquely lenient attitude toward including non-Arabic speakers in ritual. Despite early Ḥanafī inclusiveness toward potential converts, and therefore the use of Persian, being Persian- or Arabic-speaking was still accompanied by an anxiety of hierarchy.[43] Therefore, to maintain the linguistic hierarchy between Arabic and other Islamic languages, most jurists had allowed non-Arabic recital only temporarily, until the convert learned to recite the Qurʾānic chapters.[44] Following this precedent, many Ottoman jurists allowed converts to recite their prayers in Turkish with the same qualification. For instance, the catechism of a famed mufti and preacher, Münīrī Belgrādī (d. 1620), allowed praying in Turkish but only temporarily, until one had memorized a minimum number of Qurʾānic verses.[45] The question about the permissibility of prayer in Persian remained an important discussion in Ottoman legal thought, appearing in legal treatises as well as scholarly examinations in the early modern period.[46]

Ankaravī's reworking of this juristic legacy, however, gave it a new direction. His discussion shows that Ankaravī was more interested in these debates for their implications regarding the hierarchy of languages, than for their actual implications for daily prayers. In other words, his treatise focused on the spirit of the Hanafī law, rather than merely its letter. Therefore, completely omitting the literature on juristic qualification, İsmāʿil Ankaravī's adaptation selected the inclusive aspects of the Ḥanafī legacy. He therefore emphatically underlined that had it not been for the many translations of the Qurān into other languages, Islam would simply not have spread as widely as it did. Therefore, knowledge of non-Arabic (ʿacem) languages was as necessary as knowledge of Arabic so that one could spread the message of the Qurān by way of translation. Therefore, knowledge of "Persian, Turkish, Indic, Coptic, Bulgarian and others" was as crucial an asset as knowledge of Arabic.[47] In this brief excursus, the Mevlevī sheikh suggested that the debate at hand was relevant to other Islamic languages that, like Persian, were latecomers to the Islamic tradition. Ankaravī's rendition of the language of prayer debate, therefore, served to reject that Persian—or, for that matter, any language in which the message of the Qurān spread—could be the language of hell.[48]

A PERSIAN QURĀN OR SHARIA-VIOLATING POETRY: PLACING THE *MESNEVĪ* IN HEAVEN OR HELL

Throughout his treatise, Ankaravī refrained from naming his opponents. Yet, he provided a useful, if indirect, summary of the views of these opponents who revived the motto "Persian is the language of hellfire." Without naming names, Ankaravī suggested that his opponents aimed at restricting the Islamic canon to the text of the Qurān and the prophetic sayings, by saying:

> Preferable speech is [restricted to] God's [Holy] Book, and preferable guidance and agreeable conduct . . . is the Path of Muḥammed and the Conduct of Aḥmed. Disagreeable and objectionable are any affairs that are [novel and recent]; any novelty is an illicit innovation (*bidʿa*), any innovation is to stray from the Right Path.[49]

All else, therefore, was to be excluded from Islamic learning and ritual. In other words, the disagreement concerned the contours of the authoritative canon. What texts could be used to justify an act or ritual as Islamic? Mevlevī ritual was based on Rūmī's *Mesnevī*, music, and dance. The authoritative Mevlevī

canon therefore included Persian poetry and Islamic philosophical ethics, which respectively justified these practices. Their critics, as seen in the passage above, considered neither of these traditions authoritative.[50] Moreover, Persian ethical-mystical poetry such as the *Mesnevī* was known for explicit criticism of the textualist formalism defended by puritan movements.[51] The emphasis on excluding anything but the Qurān from litanies and religious gatherings, which Anḳaravi alluded to, prevailed in the catechism of Ḳadızāde Meḥmed Efendi, whom Ottoman authors portrayed as Anḳaravī's opponent. Throughout his catechism, Ḳadızāde enjoined Muslims to follow nothing but the exact, verbatim wording (*söz*) of the Book, a term that refers only to the Qurān.[52] Other Ḳadızādeli-leaning preachers from the seventeenth century followed his lead and propagated for strict restriction of religious ritual to the Qurān. For instance, one such preacher targeted the use of poetry in religious ritual:

> [Question:] What is necessary by sharia to those who recite couplets and poems during ritual gatherings? [Answer:] They must renew their avowals of faith and of marriage, since it is blasphemous to mix the mention of God with other utterance.[53]

Similar condemnations of city-folk who were fond of nothing but Persian poetry abound in the puritan literature of the early modern period.[54] The puritan author Fażlızāde ʿAlī, writing at the time of Dāmād İbrāhim Paşa (d. 1730), heavily criticized Sufis who memorized the *Mesnevī*, taking its verses for mystical wisdom (*ʿirfān*). "Mystical wisdom is obedience to God (*ʿirfān iṭāʿatdur*), not learning poems and verses and conversing about *taṣavvuf*," he retorted.[55] Elsewhere, Fażlızāde wrote that the divergence of Istanbul's people from sharia began in the year 1000, when "books written in the language of the Qizilbāsh" became widespread in the Ottoman Empire.[56] Fażlızāde's description of Persian as the language of the Qizilbāsh was rhetorical libel that was commonly employed in similar disagreements over the Persianate canon. For instance, the Naḳshbandī sheikh Meḥmed Murād-ı Naḳşibendī (d. 1848) was criticized by a preacher—whom Buḥārī considered a fanatic puritan (*ḳaba ṣofu*)—for teaching "Qizilbāsh books." Murād Buḥārī was a sheikh and a mosque preacher who later established the Dārülmesnevī (a "House" for teaching the *Mesnevī*) and became its first sheikh. In both posts, he taught Persian language and Persian poetry through Rūmī's *Mesnevī* and ʿAṭṭār's *Pendnāme*, as well as more contemporary poets such as Sāʾib-i Tebrīzī (d. 1676).[57]

The puritan condemnation of Persianate poetry contradicted the realities of Ottoman religious practice in the early modern period. Classics of Persian mystical-ethical poetry stood at the heart of everyday religiosity in Ottoman cities. Hence, defending the Persian canon and its thorny relationship with sharia was not merely a Mevlevī priority. According to Anḳaravī, it was Rūmī's *Mesnevī*, first and foremost, that made Persian a language of heaven: "That the Noble *Mesnevī* was written in [Persian] gave this language an additional [badge of] honor, and carried the rank of poetry to an exalted status."[58] The declaration of Persian as the language of heaven was commonly found in the works of *Mesnevī* commentators, regardless of the Sufi order they belonged to. In addition to Murād-ı Naḳshbandī, whose statement about the sacred status of Persian opened this chapter, the Celvetī-Ḥalvetī sheikh İsmāʿil Ḥaḳḳı Bursevī considered Arabic and courtly Persian to be equals as languages of heaven.[59]

Yet, according to Anḳaravī, the sacred status of Persian was contested. He noted that his unnamed opponents argued that Persian was the language of hell because the canon associated with it, particularly the *Mesnevī*, openly contradicted sharia. Anḳaravī alluded to "lowlifes disguised as preachers and jurists" who preached that the *Mesnevī* was replete with words and couplets that contradicted the sharia.[60] Manuscripts from the period reinforce Anḳaravī's claim that the Ḳadızādeli-leaning preachers targeted themes and passages from the *Mesnevī* in their sermons. An anonymous preacher who compiled a personal miscellany (*mecmūʿā*) of opinions and fatwas against the Sufi practice of *samāʿ*, for instance, noted the following fatwa: "It is not permissible for those dancers to liken themselves to the angels circumnavigating the heavens. It is not permissible for them to liken themselves to the pilgrims circumnavigating the Kaʿba."[61] While the reference may be vague for the uninitiated, to contemporary Sufis the fatwa clearly singled out a well-known passage of the *Mesnevī*: "Make a circuit round me seven times and reckon this (to be) better than the circumambulation (of the Kaʿba) in the pilgrimage."[62]

While unacceptable from a puritan point of view, the couplets occupied a central place in Mevlevī culture. In his *The Way of the Dervishes*, which was a systematic description of Mevlevī doctrine and practices, Anḳaravī quoted this exact passage to explain his order's take on pilgrimage.[63] There were two types of pilgrimage. The first was formal pilgrimage, the physical visitation of Kaʿba, which was one of the five pillars of Islam. The second was spiritual pilgrimage, which entailed submitting one's will to a friend of God. In other

words, one could perform an esoteric pilgrimage, going beyond the prescription of the sharia. In equating submission to a sheikh with pilgrimage, Anḳaravī's handbook cited the rest of the *Mesnevī* story in question, where a sheikh is heard saying: "When thou hast seen me, thou hast seen God. . . . To serve me is to obey and glorify God: Beware thou think not God is separate from me."[64] It was passages like this one, revered as central tenets of the *Mesnevī*'s morality, which had made Persianate Sufism the target of puritan critiques.

The clear divergence of Persianate mysticism from the wording of the Qurān or sharia was not lost on early modern readers and commentators. Throughout his well-regarded commentary, Anḳaravī frequently acknowledged without compunction that the *Mesnevī*'s expositions on God and the Prophet went beyond, even contradicted, the text of the Qurān.[65] In *Forty Sayings*, he directly expressed his conviction that while the *Mesnevī* did go beyond sharia, this did not make the book un-Islamic or blasphemous. Remarkable in Anḳaravī's response to this legally based criticism was his countercriticism of the puritans, scrutinizing their narrow and rigid interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence (*fıḳh*). Considering sharia narrowly as procedural jurisprudence (*fıḳh-i ıṣṭılāḥī*), the puritans failed to understand that *fıḳh* meant much more than simply the science of issuing fatwas; it meant the science of the afterlife (*ʿilm-i āḫiret*). If *fıḳh* was taken in this broader sense, the *Mesnevī* was not only not contradictory to God's law, but deserved to be the true and the clear path (lit. *sharʿ*) to understanding (lit. *fıḳh*) God.[66] As the critics of the Mevlevīs cited the prophetic hadith declaring jurisprudence to be the main pillar of Islam, the Mevlevī response retaliated by criticizing the narrow-sightedness of reducing Islam to sharia, defined as the science of fatwas.

Anḳaravī's *Forty Sayings* therefore is an important expression of early modern conceptions of Islam and its distinction between political and personal aspects of religion.[67] The Ghazālian distinction between religion-writ-large and religion-as-jurisprudence appears to counteract the puritan criticism toward practices that were not directly rooted in legal literature. According to Anḳaravī, critics of the Mevlevī order cited the prophetic saying "*Fıḳh* is the pillar of religion" in order to discredit all but sharia-based interpretive traditions. Critics denounced many rituals of the Mevlevīs, including the recitation of the *Mesnevī*.[68] However, to Anḳaravī and his circles, the argument that sharia was the ultimate benchmark did not hold up because sharia was a mere fraction of Islam, writ large as "the science of the afterlife." Seemingly simple, this conceptualization of religion was deliberately expansive; it

conceptualized Islamic tradition as cumulative and composite. Multiple expressions of inspired knowledge and the philosophical tradition (ḥikma) were as legitimate and fundamental expressions of religion as sharia, despite the relatively later recent provenance of these discourses. The *Mesnevī* of Rūmī was to be measured by the standards of ḥikma and inspiration (*ilhām, vaḥy-i dīl*) rather than by sharia.[69] This expansive, progressive conception of Islamic tradition that the Mevlevī tradition championed was shared among other intellectual and cultural circles in the early modern Ottoman Empire. The next section turns to this progressive conception of Islam and its proponents.

THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS IN OTTOMAN ANTI-PURITANISM

The *Mesnevī*, and with it Persian and Turkish mystical poetry, were widely recognized expressions of an expansive, progressive tradition that continuously grew after the time of the Prophet and the companions (*salaf*). These popular conceptions were maintained by a variety of intellectual discourses that underpinned the Persianate conception of progress. Anḳaravī's oeuvre, particularly his *Forty Sayings,* combines these intellectual sources of a progressive conception of tradition. The first of these sources is the literature on the continuity of revelation through exegesis and mystical inspiration, which was explained in detail in chapter 4. In this section, I show two additional sources of Anḳaravī's conception of tradition and innovation: Illuminationist philosophy and jurisprudential discussions on innovations.

As the author of the first Turkish commentary on *Temples of Light,* the magnum opus of Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (d. 1234)'s Illuminationist philosophy, Anḳaravī's thought provides important insights into the link between Illuminationist philosophy and Sufism, which were considered to be tightly connected in the early modern period.[70] The Mevlevī sheikh's commentary on the philosopher Suhrawardī's *Temples of Light* shows the importance of Illuminationist epistemology for the justification of Sufi authority, since both forms of authoritative knowledge emphasized direct experience as the only reliable source of knowledge.[71] In other words, the most important aspect of Ottoman Illuminationism for the purposes of the Mevlevī-Ḳadızādeli debate is Suhrawardī's theory on the prelinguistic nature of divine knowledge. Surely, Suhrawardī was not the only mystical philosopher to theorize the relationship

between language and divine knowledge. In fact, Liana Saif rightly argues that the emphasis on prelinguistic knowledge is a shared characteristic among various forms of Islamic esotericism.[72] Yet, early modern Ottoman readers strongly associated Illuminationism with the foregrounding of prelinguistic knowledge. A simple, vernacular guide to philosophy written in sixteenth-century Belgrade, for instance, characterizes Illuminationism as without words, whether in speech or in writing:

> All philosophers [fall into one of] two categories. One is the Peripatetics (*meşşāʾiyyūn*), the other Illuminationists (*işrākiyyūn*). The Peripatetics are those who read books and discourse with the teacher, [thus] benefit from the words of the teacher. The Illuminationists are those who do not speak with the teacher; they absorb the inner meaning of *ḥikma* in the presence of the teacher. They do not speak a single word with the teacher, the teacher does not speak to them. They sit in front of the teacher for a while and then leave. Their learning is the purification of the heart. [Then,] whatever meanings (*maʿānī*) are present in the teacher's heart manifest themselves at the heart [of the student]. Yet another reason they are called Illuminationists is that their teachers sit with their backs to the sun, and the students sit towards the sun.[73]

Illuminationist philosophy's theorization of prelinguistic, nonverbal knowledge justified new interpretations of the Islamic tradition, which did not have to be restricted to the exact wording of the revelation.[74] Therefore, while Illuminationist philosophy provided the theoretical framework within which Islamic tradition (*sunna*) could be conceptualized in a progressive, expansive manner, Persian poetry represented the same idea in more accessible terms. It was widely agreed that while the *Mesnevī* was in an entirely different tongue, it could be conceptualized as divine revelation, as it originated in the same prelinguistic realm as the Qurān.

In Anḳaravī's work, the strongest argument in favor of Persian as a sacred language was the connection between Persian, poetry, and *ḥikma* (philosophical wisdom, more specifically Illuminationist philosophy).[75] In *Forty Sayings*, the second prophetic saying Anḳaravī cited was "Some of poetry is *ḥikma*."[76] In his explanation of this (likely spurious) prophetic saying, Anḳaravī explained that poetry emanated from imaginative propositions (*muḳaddemāt-i muḫayyile*) and connected its reader with Being (*vücūd*), which is the source of all pure and philosophically valuable (*ḥikemī*) knowledge. In short, *ḥikma* was a legitimate system of Islamic knowledge even when such knowledge was incompatible with the letter of the sharia.

Anḳaravī was not the only author who considered ḥikma and sharia as equally legitimate sources of Islamic knowledge that could be contradictory as well as complementary. Another self-declared Illuminationist, Kātib Çelebi, held the same position in his treatise on the Ḳadızādeli debates, entitled *The Balance of Truth*.[77] In his discussion of the legitimacy of music and singing, Kātib Çelebi acknowledged that music was not permissible by sharia, yet this did not justify shunning music. Philosophers, and following their method, Sufis, had made music a method of spiritual training. Instead of trying to settle this contradiction between sharia and ḥikma, Kātib Çelebi concluded, one had to simply accept that there would always be two distinct and contradictory interpretations of the same practice, one a jurisprudential and one a philosophical interpretation.[78] For both Anḳaravī and Kātib Çelebi, therefore, there was no urgency to reach an ultimate orthodoxy through sharia; philosophical and mystical interpretations were not inherently inferior to legal ones.

The Illuminationist notion of a progressive tradition, therefore, was both philosophically defended and performed in more accessible forms—such as poetry and music—by the Persianate-Sufi circles of the early modern empire. This conception of tradition had important ramifications within the context of the puritan movement of the seventeenth century. Most significantly, Anḳaravī used the same framework to argue against the puritan condemnation of innovations as illicit (*bidʿa*).[79] Much like Kātib Çelebi, he found the puritan arguments declaring all innovations illicit narrow-minded, developing nuanced analyses of innovations that considered them integral parts of Islamic tradition. In his *Gatherer of Verses*, Anḳaravī expressed this vision frequently and casually. For instance, in his discussion of the companions of the Prophet (*ṣaḥabe-yi güzīn*), Anḳaravī noted that these early Muslims were pious adherents of the Qurān, but did not engage in literary sciences.[80] These were sciences developed later in Islamic history. More pointedly, in his *Forty Sayings*, Anḳaravī explicitly stated that many Islamic institutions and practices emerged long after the time of the Prophet, and therefore it was untenable to argue that divergence from the practices of the Prophet was, by definition, illicit.

In making the argument, Anḳaravī cited a five-partite classification of innovations that was grounded in Islamic law and had become widely cited in early modern Ottoman anti-puritan circles. This well-known tradition classified innovations in five categories: necessary, commendable, neutral and permissible, reprehensible, forbidden.[81] The examples that Anḳaravī cited for each category had become fundamental practices and discourses by the

seventeenth century, and thus readily debunked the discourse that innovations were illicit. These examples included theology, a science that was not practiced by the Prophet yet was necessary as a duty against heresy, or building madrasas and lodges, institutions that the Prophet did not establish but were essential to the furthering of religion. These examples alone showed the integral role of innovations in Islamic tradition. In addition, there were practices that were not commendable on moral grounds, but did not merit being forbidden. Consumption of luxurious goods or producing gilded copies of the Qurʾān were innovations in these latter categories.

The five-partite legal categorization of innovations was favored by other anti-puritan authors of the age. ʿAbdulghanī Nabulusī, who made an appearance in chapter 2 with his anti-puritan tract *Mevlevī Masters*, similarly used the same legal framework to argue against the blanket condemnation of innovations. What is striking about Nabulusī's treatment of the subject is his effort to connect this lenient view of innovations with Meḥmed Birgivī (d. 1573), the esteemed moralist considered to be one of the main inspirations of the Ḳadızādeli movement.[82] As Jonathan Allen shows in his study of Nabulusī's commentary on Birgivī's *Al-Tarīḳa al-Muḥammadiyya*, the purpose of this commentary was to "rhetorically defuse particular elements of Birgivī's text, so as to wrest it away from his puritan-minded opponents."[83] In other words, Nabulusī's purpose was to creatively reread Birgivī in ways that saved the latter from his puritan followers. One of the key points of divergence was the conception of history; Nabulusī contested Birgivī's declinist understanding of time as an indefinite movement toward corruption, following the golden age of the time of the Prophet.[84] Instead, Nabulusī adapted a more neutral understanding of history where the present was not inferior to the past by definition; the novelties that differentiated the present from the past could be—and often were—good innovations, akin to *sunna*.[85] Like Ankaravī, he employed the five-partite legal classification of innovations to create space for legitimizing innovations in customs. In his work, these good innovations were extended to even more contemporary customs of his own day—namely, coffee and tobacco. Nabulusī's treatment of innovations shows the immediate relevance of the topic to early modern discussions, particularly those around urban sociabilities. Similarly, Meḥmed Emīn Toḳādī, whose call for peaceful accommodation in religion (ṣulḥ) was examined in chapter 2, referred to the five-partite classification of traditions in his defense of *samāʿ* and music as permissible innovations. Toḳādī's refusal to categorize all innovations as illicit was

in fact one of the main arguments behind his argument for accommodation (*ṣulḥ*); he argued that in deciding the legal status of practices of recent provenance, leniency was recommended.[86] Therefore, a shared conception of a progressive notion of history and tradition—whether in the Persianate form in which Mevlevīs expressed it or in the more legalistic language that Toḳādī and Nabulusī preferred—emerged as an accommodationist answer to problems of early modern sociability. In other words, the increasing appeal of conceptions of a progressive tradition in this period—whether in its Persianate, Illuminationist, or legal garb—was due to the relevance of this world system to the contemporary questions that the Ottomans were preoccupied with, such as the burning question of innovations.

Last but not least, mention must be made of the favorable reception of this anti-puritan worldview among the scribal corps. Meḥmed Emin Tokādī and his prolific disciple, Müstaḳīmzāde Süleymān Saʿdeddin Efendi, whose anti-puritan views on the limits of state-religion were studied in chapter 2, exemplify this affinity between Sufi anti-puritanism and the scribal habitus.[87] Müstaḳīmzāde's biographical collection of calligraphers, entitled *Tuḥfe-i Ḥaṭṭāṭīn*, is punctuated by an underlying theme of competition between the secretarial class (*ṭarīḳ-i ḫācegān*) and the scholarly bureaucrats (*ṭarīḳ-i ʿulamā*).[88] Müstaḳīmzāde's sheikh, Toḳādī, belonged to the secretarial profession before becoming a resident sheikh at a lodge late in his life. Toḳādī's familial genealogy was unusual: he was a descendant of Maḥmūd Urmevī, the Naḳshbandī sheikh that Sultan Murād IV preemptively executed in 1639 for perceived potential rebellion.[89] Toḳādī's early career in Istanbul took shape in the Persianate-scribal circles, where he held posts in the civil bureaucracy. Toḳādī's patron, Kesedār ʿAli Efendi, a prominent member of the secretarial bureaucracy, allotted him a house in which Toḳādī convened lessons about Persian and the poetry of Ḥāfiz. In addition to this house, Toḳādī taught Persian poetry at the Şehzadebaşı Mosque to the general public. During these lessons at his private home and the public mosque, he met important cultural and intellectual figures of his day. Among these figures were prominent musicians of Istanbul, most notably the great Ottoman composer Buḥūrīzāde ʿIṭrī Efendi (d. 1711), with whom Toḳādī ended up studying music.[90]

Meḥmed Emīn Toḳādī, like Hoca Neşʿet Efendi, with whom this chapter opened, fulfilled a key sociocultural role in the dissemination of Persianate learning among the secretarial class and the urban public sphere. Since the cultural and intellectual production of these circles took place in informal

settings—such as houses, lodges, and mosques—the Sufi-scribal milieu of early modern Persianate learning has not received due attention. However, it is important to recognize the informally arranged yet routinized and continuous practices of this milieu to appreciate the public dimensions and intellectual content of Persianate civility in the Ottoman Empire. Starting with İsmāʿil Anḳaravī in the early seventeenth century, Persian teaching at households and mosques remained centered around similar texts and social types well into the nineteenth century. This was a combination of the classical poetry of Rūmī, Saʿdi, and ʿAṭṭār taught by Sufi sheikhs and their bureaucratic patronage networks, a pattern that continued in the modernized educational institutions of the nineteenth century. For instance, the Mujaddidī sheikh Murād-ı Naḳşibendī (d. 1848), earlier mentioned as the first *Mesnevī* teacher at Dārülmesnevī, began his career by offering public *Mesnevī* lessons at the Çarşamba Naḳshbandī Lodge. When these lessons became popular, the sheikh began to gather *Mesnevī* circles at the Fatih Mosque for a broader audience.[91] The handbook of Persian grammar that he wrote for these lessons was printed as a textbook and taught at the military academy established by Sultan Maḥmūd II in 1835.[92] As Carter Findley shows, the Persianate learning of these informal settings was carried to modernized institutions of the period, where both Muslim and non-Muslim aspirants to civil officialdom were expected to possess the same Persianate cultural capital.[93]

İsmāʿil Anḳaravī's exposition of the cultural meanings of the Persianate as a progressive and diverse conception of Islamic tradition sheds light on the worldview of this Sufi-scribal habitus. The cultural production and consumption of the Persianate milieu composed of secretaries and ascribing trainees, Sufis, and urbanites demonstrate a noteworthy intellectual coherence. This cultural production is preserved in *mecmuʿā*s, manuscript anthologies that early modern Ottoman readers kept in order to reflect their reading tastes and preferences. These manuscript anthologies were often considered publications, in the sense that they circulated among readers belonging to the same milieu with shared tastes and reading examples. A noteworthy example is the manuscript anthology of the secretary-turned-grand-vizier Rāgıb Paşa, entitled *Sefīne-i Rāgıb*, which survives in multiple manuscript copies and a print edition.[94] Similar anthologies owned and used by multiple readers from the secretarial profession shed light on the cultural identity of this group. The public dimension of these anthologies becomes even clearer in the eighteenth century, when leading members of the civil officialdom established public

libraries, which were praised as *mecmuʿā*s.[95] In other words, the scribal class curated a particular Persianate taste at different scales: at the manuscript scale for members of their habitus and at the architectural scale for the urban public.

The civil officialdom is often associated with patronizing *ādāb*, belletristic knowledge that includes literature, history, and biographies, which distinguished this profession from the ʿ*ulamā*'s heavier emphasis on exegetical and jurisprudential sciences.[96] In order to reflect this distinction, *ādāb* is often translated as "secular knowledge." However, the conceptualization of *ādāb* as secular is misleading for a number of reasons. First, it disregards the significant overlap between the two fields and particularly the continued significance of religious learning to the training of an Ottoman gentleman.[97] Second and more importantly, it disregards the mutually constitutive nature of the secular and the religious, *ādāb* and religious knowledge (ʿ*ilm*).[98] As this chapter has shown, Persianate civility was not secular if the term is understood to imply autonomy from religious knowledge production; to the contrary, this form of cultural capital was a direct commentary on the nature of religious tradition as a criticism toward sharia discourse.

Manuscript evidence preserved in anthologies suggests the favorable reception of seventeenth-century anti-puritan literature among secretarial corps. Copies of Anḳaravī's *Forty Sayings*, which contains the most straightforward expressions of the Mevlevī brand of anti-puritanism as summarized in the symbolic idea of Persian as a language of heaven, were circulated in manuscript miscellanies owned by scribes and shared among the members of the profession.[99] These textual connections parallel social connections between the scribal profession and Sufi orders, particularly the Mevlevīs and, later on, Mujaddidī-Naḳshbandīs. Preeminent secretarial officials, such as Cevrī Çelebi (d. 1654), Ṣarı ʿAbdullah Efendi (d. 1660), Neşāṭī Dede (d. 1674), Fāsiḥ Aḥmed Dede (d. 1699), and Naḥifī (d. 1738), were connected to these Sufi circles throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, The secretary-turned-viziers of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Rāmī Meḥmed Paşa and Rāġıb Paşa, similarly had Mevlevī presence in their households.[100] The Mevlevī and Naḳshbandī orders contributed to the teaching of Persian not only in these grandee households, but also among the urban populations more broadly. In fact, speaking or reciting Persian was consistently associated with being or posing as urbane (*şehrī olmak*).[101] In his famous *Seyahatnāme*, Evliyā Çelebi links the prevalence of Persianate urbanity in certain cities with

the activities of Mevlevī lodges. For example, in his description of the city of Peçūy, he writes that "all residents of this city are Persian-reciters."[102] His description identifies the city's Mevlevī lodge and the adjacent Hasan Paşa Mosque as centers of listening to and learning Persian poetry.[103]

CONCLUSION

In the early modern period, sharia-minded puritan movements targeted Persianate literature, claiming that reading these works diverted the Ottoman public from normative texts of Islam. Vernacular versions of moral and religious works such as *Şirʿatuʾl-İslām* as well as sermons targeted a distinct, "Persianate" Islam as the sign of the community's diversion from the letter of Islamic revelation and from sharia. This chapter has studied what Persianate Islam meant to one of its most vocal advocates, the Mevlevī sheikh İsmāʿil Anḳaravī, who wrote a rebuttal to puritan condemnations of Persianate literature. Anḳaravī's perspective offers a novel understanding of early modern Islam that theorized and legitimized the diversity of discursive traditions within Islam through the imagery of a bilingual heaven. This imagery of a bilingual heaven served to pose an explicit challenge to a rival early modern conception of Islam as primarily—and even exclusively—based on sharia.

Through an exposition of the notion of a Persianate Islam, this chapter has sought to challenge the negligence of nonlegalistic traditions as formative and authoritative discourses of Ottoman Islamic practice and doctrine. According to the Mevlevī tradition that this chapter has focused on, the sacred status of Persian formed the kernel of early modern debates on Ottoman Islam. This unusual framing of the religious polemics of the period allows us to understand Ottoman theories on the nature of Islamic tradition (*sunna*) in a more nuanced light and to decenter the prevailing legalistic approaches to the study of early modern Islam. This chapter has argued that the imagery of a bilingual heaven signified a distinct conceptualization of Islam as a diverse, as well as expansive, tradition that evolved through an accumulation of innovations. The Mevlevī tradition considered the expansion of the Islamic tradition through the addition of the Persian mystical-ethical canon as the epitome of good innovations, hence signifying a dynamic conception of tradition. The conception of a diverse and expansive tradition was justified and expressed in a variety of mediums, mainly the philosophical framework provided by Illuminationism and the more popular practices of readings and recitations of the *Mesnevī*. Further-

more, as chapters 2 and 6 demonstrate, the same worldview of a delimited authority and a lenient attitude toward innovations was available in some varieties of the juristic discourse. This consideration drives home the broad appeal of Persianate Islam beyond Sufi and Persian literary reading circles. Moreover, the congruence between Sufi and juristic discourse in issues of progress and the limits of public authority serves as an important reminder that the dual opposition between Persianate Islam and sharia found in early modern sources must be considered as a heuristic device that served to differentiate between varieties of Sunni Islam.

This chapter has also emphasized the social contexts of the distinct Persianate civility imagined through the debates around a bilingual heaven. Persian and the cultural capital associated with this language were taught at three main social spaces: the grandee household (the salon), the Sufi lodge, and the public mosque. These three spaces were often interrelated through Sufi teachers who provided instruction to the attendees. The scribal class contributed to these circles as instructors or sponsors of instructors, as well as by offering attendees opportunities for joining the networks of the rapidly growing ranks of civil officials. The potential of upward mobility contributed to the spread of a Persianate civility with a distinct cultural formation and a shared worldview in the Ottoman public sphere. This cultural formation was meaningful within and beyond the grandee household, in the latter case for negotiating an urban identity. The Persianate emphasis on embracing novelties suited the needs of the early modern Ottoman city-dwellers, who experimented with new forms of visibility, expression, and consumption. The next chapter turns to one of these novelties: tobacco consumption. The early modern debates around smoking provide a case study of the practical deployment of the urban and Persianate ideals analyzed in this chapter—namely, defending novelty and plurality.

Of Coffeehouse Saints

Contesting Surveillance in the Early Modern City

It is sometime during the reign of Murād IV (1612–1640). A group of Mevlevī dervishes are seated at a coffeehouse in Konya. Among them is the head of the Mevlevī lodge in Konya and a descendant of Rūmī, Mevlānāzāde Bostan Çelebi. A mysterious man, an "outsider" to the town, approaches the Mevlevī crowd to win them over, which he accomplishes rather easily by ordering a round of coffee for everyone present in the coffeehouse. The man soon reveals his heart's desire to Bostan Çelebi: he wants to become a Mevlevī. The *çelebi* responds: "Why, this is God's path, [we do not] turn anyone away." The *çelebi* gives the man two options for becoming a Mevlevī. He can either do it the express way, by meeting the dervishes at the coffeehouse the next day and inviting them to a round of morning coffee (*caba*), subsequently donning the Mevlevī hat. Or, he can choose the usual path, by preparing a banquet for the Mevlevī dervishes at the Merām gardens, Konya's main recreational destination.

The story, set at the time of the highly regarded Bostan Çelebi, whom the reader will remember from chapters 3 and 4, suggests that as early as the first half of the seventeenth century, the coffeehouse played a central role in the daily life of the Mevlevī Sufis. Alongside the Merām gardens, the Mevlevī coffeehouse had now become one of the two spaces in which initiation into the order took place. Ordering a round of coffee for coffeehouse-goers had become a viable, and considerably less expensive, alternative to throwing a banquet at the Merām gardens. Moreover, the author of the story suggests that Bostan Çelebi and his dervishes hung out at the coffeehouse habitually; if one were looking for them, they would know to find them at their designated coffeehouse.[1]

There is something remarkable in imagining a dervish order as the regulars of a coffeehouse. After all, contemporary accounts of the emergence of the coffeehouse, a truly novel social space, tended to portray this new space as a rival to religious spaces of socialization, especially the mosque; writers of moral and political advice lamented the crowds emptying the mosques and madrasas to fill the coffeehouses.[2] While the initial wave of criticism against coffeehouses had abated by the second half of the sixteenth century, the tension was reignited with the arrival of a new drug at the turn of the century: tobacco. In the sermons and treatises of Istanbul's preachers, tobacco consumption quickly became established as a grave sin. This moral condemnation was paired with political criminalization, since in the eyes of the political authorities, tobacco was associated with two unruly urban elements: coffeehouse-goers and janissaries. In a battle in which the puritan Ḳadızādeli preachers played a leading role, smoking was announced to be a violation of the holy sharia and sultanic authority at one and the same time. Through this religio-political discourse, moralist preachers of the time not only legitimized the state's harsh treatment of smokers, which included executions, but also instigated a general mobilization among the Muslim community, whose moral duty it was to forbid this double moral and religious wrong. In other words, with the cooperation of political and religious authorities, a mobilization for sharia-backed moral surveillance was created around tobacco, and around the new culture of pleasurable sociability that smoking symbolized. Given the surveillance capacity of the early modern state, imposing social discipline would only be possible through such large-scale, morally motivated mobilization.[3]

How did Ottoman coffeehouse and smoking culture not only survive, but also thrive despite this double stigmatization and mass mobilization? Because of a teleological bias, this question is hardly even posed. It is assumed, implicitly, that these new habits of sociability and consumption were destined to catch on from the beginning. Accompanying this teleological bias, sometimes the physical effects of the new drugs are considered the reason for their tenacity. More often, in the Ottoman case, the rise of new, nonreligious urban groups with an interest in coffeehouse sociabilities has been considered the reason for the triumph of new urban sociabilities, although there is no specific information on these secular groups or their points of view.[4] In this chapter, I take a close look at Ottoman criticisms of the state's tobacco bans, written by Sufis, preachers, and scholars. The study of these religiously backed anti-ban arguments complicates the religion-secularity, mosque-coffeehouse

dichotomy that permeates the study of Ottoman public life. More significantly, the study of these anti-ban voices suggests that the tobacco debates impinged upon crucial discussions in Ottoman social and political life at this time, regarding chiefly the limits of moral and legal surveillance.

In this chapter, I argue that the prime aim of anti-ban authors was to resist the aggressive policies of moral surveillance that the Ottoman order forwarded in the early seventeenth century. This challenge took aim at the state's attempt to monopolize moral authority; in other words, it targeted the institution of a state-religion as introduced in earlier chapters. Instead of identifying religious and political authority, anti-ban authors distinguished between adjudication and the execution of the law, and reserved only the latter for the state. The power to adjudicate on the moral permissibility of an action, in contrast, rested with religious authorities, including Sufis.[5] The anti-ban authors who wrote treatises and preached their opinions in sermons held a variety of views on the religious judgment on tobacco. Some of them condoned smoking in Sufi terms, as a conduit to spiritual awakening. Others made their personal dislike for tobacco clear, yet still explicitly challenged the prevailing moral-political discourse that construed smoking as a sin and a crime at the same time. In this chapter, I show that despite their internal differences, ultimately the anti-ban authors debated the same phenomena: the intentional conflation of the political and the moral, on one hand, and the public and the private, on the other. In delineating the anti-ban authors' arguments for the delimitation of political and social surveillance, I would like to underline the negotiating power of Ottoman publics vis-à-vis imperial policies.

The prime aim of the anti-ban authors was to delimit the culture and policy of undiscerning surveillance through restitution of the public-private boundary, or by distinguishing between sin and crime. While the state still had the authority to ban smoking in public spaces, the ban was to be acknowledged as a sultanic ban and not a sin (*nehy* versus *ḥarām*). This important distinction allowed individuals and communities to hold different views on tobacco, without being forced to subscribe to the official religious interpretation forwarded by muftis, preachers, and imperial decrees. Second, Sufi writings helped to create new meanings through which to "indigenize" tobacco. Instead of the anti-smoking treatises that emphasized the foreign, non-Muslim origins of tobacco, a group of Sufis and preachers produced popular and literary works that indigenized tobacco as an agent of pleasure and spiritual elation and advancement. This Persianate discourse portrayed

tobacco as a sign of urbanity, and of a positive dispensation toward innovations that was deemed praiseworthy in the new urban culture.

In defending tobacco against the encroachment of political authorities and puritan religious criticism, Sufi authors deployed Persianate theories of tradition, primarily of a positive affirmation of novelty and change. The parallels between the religious debates portrayed in the earlier chapters of this book and the debate around tobacco, in terms of shared agents and shared arguments, are remarkable. The anti-puritan authors whose defenses of *samāʿ* and of Persianate civility have been introduced penned similar treatises to discredit the tobacco bans. In these treatises, they deployed arguments developed within the much older debates around issues of ritual to defend the smokers of the early modern cities. In addition to the positive view of innovations, these arguments included the notion of a delimitation of public authority and an ethical demand for the privacy of urban communities.

Debates on the coffeehouse and tobacco served to broadcast the anti-puritan arguments on change, novelty, and the limits of public and private to the wider public via popular mediums, such as poetry and song. By describing the tobacco debates with attention to not only the pro-ban, but also the anti-ban authors, this chapter aims to underline the relevance of this book's discussions of multiple sovereignties and competing interpretations of Islam to the public debates and practices of the era. While some of the foregoing debates on history, rulership, or even the language of afterlife might seem to be conversations that took place within relatively smaller and often elite circles, the close scrutiny of tobacco debates shows that the implications of this intellectual opposition reached further. Throughout the debates on smoking, Sufi authorities employed their vision of a pluralist, pro-innovation Islam in order to rebut a uniformizing and disciplining religio-political project. It was in the nondisciplinary space this rebuttal opened up that the coffeehouse publics of Ottoman early modernity eventually flourished.

TOBACCO AND ITS SOCIAL ASSOCIATIONS

Around the year 1600, residents of Ottoman Istanbul began speculating about a discovery from the New World called tobacco.[6] Like their contemporaries elsewhere, including Europe, the Americas, and Iran, they would spend the next few decades trying to figure out the value of this strange leaf, not only financially but also morally.[7] In what follows, I provide a brief summary of the

moral arguments against smoking, and the close connection between smoking and coffeehouse publicity that loomed in the background of these debates.

The moral verdict on smoking depended on its medical effects. On the one hand were medical and popular authors who considered tobacco a medicine, therefore debating the ban. On the other hand were moralist authors who supported the ban on tobacco, arguing that smokers knowingly harmed their own bodies. Given its recent provenance, medical authors had scarce experience with the plant, making it difficult to reach a consensus on its medical effect. Many Ottoman authors resorted to the simple yet authoritative logic of Galenic humors, which dictated that tobacco, being a hot and dry substance, could only be beneficial to balance cold and humid humors. For people of other natural complexions, tobacco was only harmful, disturbing their humoral balance and leading to a range of malfunctions from infertility to pestilence.[8] Yet, to the curious mind, this generic verdict was not enough. Ottoman authors also read Arabic translations of tobacco treatises written in Europe, particularly the medical treatise by the Spanish physician and botanist Nicolas Monardes (d. 1588), who wrote a well-received treatise on the botanical and medical culture of New World. According to his herbal, tobacco was a great ointment for wounds, a cure for diseases of the head and the eye, and a disinfectant for scars and openings in the skin. Perhaps rather shockingly, Monardes also suggested that tobacco was a good cure for diseases of the chest. These medical views on the benefits of tobacco were quite widespread in the early modern world, including in the Ottoman Empire.[9]

Many anti-ban authors emphasized the medically favorable view of tobacco in their tracts. However, for their opponents, even if these reported health benefits were true, they did not justify the continuous smoking for pleasure. "If it is a medicine, why is it used for pleasure?" many retorted.[10] Furthermore, tobacco's addictive quality was noted from early on. Many opponents of smoking opined that even if tobacco had limited medical benefits, these would be offset in the long term by the corruptive effects of addiction.[11] A western Anatolian preacher whose works came to be known widely across the empire, Aḥmed Rūmī Aḳḥiṣārī, argued that the harms of tobacco outweighed any medical benefits:

> In the beginning, it produces strength in the body and sharpness in the vision, ardour in the limbs and [good] digestion during a meal. When one comes to use it permanently, however, it causes weakness in the body and heaviness in the limbs, covering in the vision and constipation in the digestive faculty. And this [is] because

it is, as stated by the physicians, desiccating with a kind of heat. In the beginning, it thus does what they mentioned first, and in the end, what they mentioned last.[12]

Anonymous sermons similarly disparaged the medical benefits of tobacco, arguing that whatever these benefits were, they would be canceled out in the long term. One such sermon claimed, for instance, that even though people commonly believed that smoking improved one's eyesight, the improvement was only temporary. "You will see, those people will all die in less than five years," the sermon informed the congregation firmly. Further on in the same sermon, one finds another mathematical certainty: a smoker's remaining lifetime would be reduced by one-third.[13] In short, while the debate on the medical effects of tobacco was unsettled, firm judgments assuming its harmful nature widely circulated.

Next to the question of the effects of tobacco on the body was that of its effects on the mind. Was tobacco a mood-altering substance (*muskirāt*)? And, if it was, what was its effect on the mind? After all, jurists made an important distinction between substances that inspired relaxation and those that inspired sobriety, the latter being acceptable, even commendable.[14] In fact, when the debates on the legitimacy of coffee were finally settled in its favor, one of the strong arguments that convinced many jurists was its sobering effect.[15] Even the origin story of coffee was tied to its effects of rejuvenation and wakefulness. According to many Ottoman authors, it was Sufis who were responsible for discovering the coffee plant in the Yemen in the first place. Observing that goats that ate this plant became notably perky, the Sufis decided to use the same plant to stay awake at night for pious deeds and rituals.[16] Similarly, whether tobacco induced relaxation or watchfulness was an important aspect of its moral worth and permissibility.

Many Ottoman authors argued that even if tobacco had a mind-altering effect, it was a positive one that could be put to pious use. On the authority of Nicolas Monardes, for instance, Ibn Cānī praised the favorable mental effects of tobacco, which induced "intense watchfulness and an attentive state of mind," such that one could use tobacco to stay awake during night vigils.[17] While the argument from wakefulness was common, so was the counterargument that tobacco must be compared not to coffee, but to wine, since it created a loose and idle state of being. The question of intoxication remained unsettled, yet moralist anti-tobacco authors continued to forward the latter opinion on the analogy of tobacco and wine throughout the debates.

Despite the rudimentary, and often contradictory, state of the knowledge on the physical impact of smoking, many popular stories, sermons, and poems associated it with the corruption of the body and the mind. Adding to this perception of a "corrupting" substance were tobacco's foreign origins. Origin stories tracing tobacco back to the New World (*Hind-i Cedīd*) or the island of Tobago were widely circulated.[18] Yet, in popular discussions, it was much more common to dub tobacco "the British leaf" (*Ingilis yaprağı*), since it was the British merchants who brought the leaf to Ottoman markets. Many moralistic authors, citing the Islamic injunction not to imitate unbelievers, capitalized on tobacco's foreign origins to declare smoking a sin, some even further speculating that the British tobacco trade conspired to corrupt the empire by spreading tobacco.[19] Anti-ban authors, on the other hand, rejected this line of argument from the plant's foreign origins. They responded to this argument by claiming that "following non-Muslims on issues external to religion without the intention of imitating them is not absolutely prohibited and, in fact, can be obligatory (*wājib*) in cases of necessity."[20] Yet another moralist argument for the association between tobacco and impurity was its being an innovation, unknown to (therefore not sanctioned by) the Prophet or the early community. In the puritan religious discourse that gained traction in the Ottoman public sphere in this period, any innovation was illicit innovation.[21]

Despite the anti-ban responses to their arguments, which will be detailed below, the puritan-moralist discourse continued to firmly associate tobacco with myriad forms of corruption: corruption of a healthy body, corruption of the will to fast, corruption even of the open air, since tobacco's smell permeated houses, mosques, and streets.[22] The plant's unpleasant smell, many argued, was an offense to one's social peers. Quoting the legal opinion that forbade entering mosques after eating onions and leeks, these people argued that smokers, who similarly upset their peers with bad smells, ought to be banned from congregations.[23] The smoker threatened, therefore, not only the purity of their own body, but also that of the sacred congregations at the mosques. This impurity of the smoker made it necessary to expel them from within the congregation.

Throughout the tobacco debates, therefore, there was a clear connection between the corruption of the human body and that of the social body. Despite the juristic and medical literature's technical attention to detail regarding the "intoxicating," or "sobering," properties of tobacco, popular literature often simply grouped it together with other impure substances, such as coffee, hash-

ish, and opium. All of these substances were considered to lead to corruption and sedition (*fitne* and *fesād*), corruption of the human body and sedition of society. The terms, both often translated as "sedition," referred to a violation of the divine law that led to the destruction of the Islamic community. In the moralistic discourse against tobacco, tobacco was a *fitne*, a political sedition, which could destroy the community.[24] Popular sermons and catechisms categorized narcotics by their social impacts:

> [Coffee] exerts a general fascination and its calamity (*fitne*) is so widespread that it has become the cause of various sorts of acts of disobedience and various types of forbidden behaviour. Using it necessarily forces one to observe these forbidden behaviours during gatherings, to mingle with the fools and the vile, to receive it from the hands of beardless youths, to touch their hands, and to commit acts of disobedience.[25]

In other words, while medical and juristic arguments on the physical effects of tobacco were widely read and circulated, the preoccupation of the public discourse remained with the effects of smoking on the social body. This sensibility rarely considered tobacco in a vacuum. Sermons on, stories about, and chronicles of tobacco consistently associated it with social spaces that were themselves associated with disorder and disobedience (*fitne*). These settings were the army, the dervish orders, and lastly, but most strongly, the coffeehouse. It was the unruliness of these spaces that the moralistic authors of the age wished to purify, joining forces to that end with political authorities. The next section turns to the social associations of smoking in the early modern Ottoman world.

POLITICAL CONCERNS: THE CORRUPTION OF THE BODY POLITIC

Tobacco arrived on the scene just when the coffeehouse had safely and irrevocably established its place in Ottoman public life. From the opening of the first coffeehouses in Istanbul in the 1550s, the new sociability associated with the coffeehouse was the subject of much debate. Initially, critics called for a ban on coffeehouses, seen as places of idle, unproductive socialization and, even worse, of political dissent. Yet, despite this initial opposition, objections to the coffeehouse soon abated. By the early seventeenth century, a single district of Istanbul (the Eyüp district) housed 120 coffeehouses. The sheer

number of coffeehouses in a single district attests to the popularity of the Ottoman coffeehouse, within half a century of its arrival.

What were the reasons for the quick and avid adoption of this new social institution? In answering this question, it has been common to point to the global popularity of coffeehouses, hence assuming that the eventual success of this new sociability was inherent in its features. To be sure, the parallels between the social and political impacts of coffeehouses across different early modern cities are not insignificant.[26] The cross-regional similarities were partly due to the rapid circulation of information. Tracts on the medical effects of coffee (and later, tobacco) were quickly translated between languages, for instance, and integrated into the respective discussions on coffeehouse socialization.[27] These striking parallels often limit the historian's ability to see difference, and hence prompt them to attribute their similarities to the space or to the drink alone. Thus, studies that attribute the electrifying social impact of coffee solely to the drink's chemical effect are not rare.[28]

Underlining the many parallels between coffeehouses in different early modern cities should not, however, overshadow the specificities of individual social and political contexts. Depending on the political and economic conditions of the host city, coffeehouses could take on different roles and forms. The coffeehouses of Safavid Isfahan are a striking example of an early coffeehouse culture, one markedly different from that of Istanbul, Cairo, or London.[29] Seventeenth-century Safavid coffeehouses neither mushroomed at the same speed, nor manifested unruly associations to the same extent, as their Ottoman counterparts. Furthermore, particularly in Isfahan, coffeehouses were primarily linked with the elite and the courtly classes. Isfahan's first coffeehouses were established by the state as ornaments of the newly built capital. Shah Abbas (d. 1629) used the coffeehouse in a formal capacity, as a space in which to appear to the city's publics, even to receive foreign ambassadors. Other coffeehouses of Isfahan were concentrated in the elite quarters of the city, hardly making an impact in the poorer neighborhoods. To be sure, the potential of these new public spaces was cause for concern among Safavid statesmen. Overall, however, the coffeehouses of Isfahan remained closely connected to the Safavid court, such that they went into a sharp decline with the fall of the Safavid dynasty in 1722, completely disappearing by the early nineteenth century. The Ottoman-Safavid comparison illustrates the flexibility of the coffeehouse as a social space, and the significance of the host society's dynamics in giving this amorphous space its final form.

In the Ottoman case, the impact of coffeehouses on Ottoman political life was immense precisely because they were established on fertile ground. Underlining the significance of the social and political context, Cemal Kafadar notes:

> In thinking of this complex social formation [coffeehouse], one should also take into consideration the extraordinary political dynamism—a creative as well as destructive energy of the time—as expressed and embodied in a plethora of subversive acts, including rebellions, the so-called Janissary-revolts, and other kinds of turbulence, which found coffeehouses most congenial for mobilizing public opinion and political action.[30]

In other words, the social and political use of coffeehouses depended on the broader historical context. Therefore, despite the quick naturalization of coffee as a drink, and the resulting deescalation of the coffeehouse debates in the second half of the sixteenth century, the increasingly contentious urban politics at the turn of the century prompted renewed efforts toward urban surveillance. Tobacco's arrival at the turn of the century provided a new legitimization for the state's interference in coffeehouses. Smoking was associated not only with the coffeehouse, but also with janissaries; therefore, controlling tobacco consumption aimed at curbing two unruly urban elements at once.

Contemporary and near-contemporary chroniclers saw tobacco bans simply as excuses to shut down centers of dissent. For instance, the historian Peçevī's account portrayed, and praised, Murād's struggle against the coffeehouses and smoking as facets of one and the same fight:

> By the year 1045 (1635/6), [tobacco] was so widespread that one cannot possibly describe [its popularity]. May God multiply (many a time) the lifetime and the reigning time, the justice and the mercy of our sultan. . . . He abolished the coffeehouses around the whole empire, and replaced them with acceptable shops and ordered, in certain terms, that the enemy of life that is tobacco shall not be smoked. Thereby, [the sultan] bestowed upon the many rich and poor such a great gift [of] extreme compassion that had they thanked [God] for [this gift] until the Day of Judgment, it would still not have been enough.[31]

As seen in the historian's account, in the early seventeenth century, imperial bans on coffeehouses and tobacco were interlinked. Imperial decrees, such as Aḥmed I's 1611 decree banning Istanbul's coffeehouses and later bans by Murād IV, rhetorically linked the coffeehouse and smoking.[32] After the Great Fire

of 1633, for instance, Murād IV issued one of the harshest bans on Istanbul coffeehouses, which resulted in the closing of 120 coffeehouses in the Eyüb district alone. The ban cited smoking in the coffeehouses as the greatest cause of urban fires.[33]

In addition to coffeehouses, smoking was closely associated with soldiers and janissaries. As a result, the Ottomans, like their early modern contemporaries, associated smoking with the army and the navy. For instance, according to a Safavid narrative, tobacco was introduced to Safavid Iran after the war with the Ottomans in 1609. The shah's soldiers learned smoking from the Ottoman army, and quickly became so addicted that they began to spend most of their allowance on tobacco. Enraged by this wastefulness, Shah Abbas banned smoking in the army.[34] Similar associations peppered Ottoman cultures of storytelling in this period, in which sailors and soldiers were also stereotyped as smokers; urban fires were frequently associated with sailors smoking carelessly at the coffeehouse. Additionally, the janissaries figured prominently in not only the consumption, but also the production of tobacco.[35] Tobacco helped with the soldiers' and sailors' lengthy, sleepless nights, and with the fear and anxiety of being under fire, as well as curing homesickness. Because of this perceived occupational use, even detractors of smoking, such as the historian Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, made an exception for sailors. Peçevi expressed dislike for the smell of tobacco, which permeated the smoker's headgear and clothing, entire houses, and even entire neighborhoods. As if the unbearable stench was not enough, smokers also shirked their work. Yet, Peçevi conceded, tobacco was beneficial under limited circumstances, specifically for "watchkeepers and guardians of galleys by defying sleepiness."[36]

Because smoking was so closely linked with the sultan's often disobedient janissaries, many executions of smokers also took place within the army. During his famous Baghdad campaign, Murād IV was known to keep the army under strict control by instilling in the soldiers a fear of imminent decapitation. These executions were narrated by the sultan's chroniclers, who used the sultan's ruthlessness to nurture the myth of his might.[37] The chroniclers often mentioned sultanic discipline together with smoking. A campaign log kept on the sultan's march to Revān between March 28 and December 27, 1635, for instance, frequently records Murād IV doing one or more of the following at each station: hunting multiple game birds at a time; beating up his statesmen for poor performance, such as setting the imperial tent in a wrong spot; executing former bandits; decapitating soldiers for lack of discipline; and

executing soldiers for smoking. The anecdotes, carefully noted by the sultan's personal scribe, aimed to further nourish the sultan's preferred public image as a mighty, ruthless warrior.[38]

In sum, narrative sources show that smokers were associated with two social groups suspected for their unruliness and dissent: coffeehouse-goers, and janissaries and other members of the urban mob.[39] Smoking bans, therefore, targeted these unruly groups and the spaces of dissent associated with them. This disciplinary aspect of Ottoman imperial policy was supported by many preachers, who found in the strict bans an occasion for purging the community of innovation and vice and thus instilling social discipline. Contemporary observers noted this disciplinary motive as the prime purpose of imperial strictures surrounding smoking, considering the moral objections of puritan preachers, mainly the Kadızādelis, as secondary concerns at best, and as thinly veiled excuses at worst. For instance, the historian Ṣolaḳzāde Meḥmed Hemdemī (d. 1658) was skeptical of the moral discourse surrounding the tobacco bans:

> The late Sultan Murād (may he rest in heaven) forbade using tobacco, which appeared in their blessed time and attended to the erasure [of tobacco] by force and even execution, [the Kadızadelis] associated themselves with [the sultan] by the sermons they gave. Becoming [ever more] arrogant with the credit and respect they were given . . . they [clamored] with all kinds of sophistries. [In response] to those who disagreed with them [on smoking] by reciting: "What is your profit from forbidding people, oh preacher! Will smoking bring the end of the world?" they . . . issued a *fetvā* that [those] who disobey the ruling sultan by disregarding the ban shall be executed. In this way, they made their way into the sultan's proximity and attained fame and renown.[40]

Ṣolaḳzāde's interpretation attributed political motives to the religious discourse surrounding the ban; the Kadızādeli preachers, according to him, provided a religious sanction to the sultan's policy only to find imperial favor. The *fetvā* in question had in fact made smoking a litmus test of political obedience. Reflecting on Murād's tobacco policies at the end of the same century, the historian Naʿīmā unequivocally states that the aim of the tobacco bans was to discipline the public (*halkı zabt ve teʾdîb*):

> Kadızade Efendi was the most famous preacher at the time when Sultan Murād Han, with the aim of disciplining people, had coffeehouses demolished and issued a firm ban to stop the use of tobacco and to [even] completely erase [tobacco] [from the face of the earth].[41]

Beyond their aim of projecting the image of a harsh, disciplinary sultan, the sermons in support of tobacco bans also framed the ruler as the guardian of God's law and Islamic morality. Many pamphlets and sermons of the period argued that legal rigidity was in fact a sign of imperial compassion ("tough love") and of the sultan's religious fervor. An anonymous preacher, for instance, summarized this sentiment by reminding the congregation to pray for the sultan's soul in gratitude for his protecting "you from yourselves" by banning tobacco.[42] In other words, by banning tobacco, the sultan was to prevent his subjects from committing sins, albeit against their own will.

SIN AND CRIME, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

Disciplining the unruly elements of the Ottoman urban fabric was an important imperial project in the seventeenth century. However, this discipline would not be achieved solely by bans and closures, which proved too short-lived. As the above-quoted remarks by contemporary observers suggested, an important corollary to the Ottoman center's disciplinary policies was the support of religious authorities, who not only granted Islamic legitimacy to the bans, but also mobilized the rest of the society against smokers. In other words, beyond the bans and closures, the truly substantial anti-coffeehouse policy was the mobilization of crowds. Against the coffeehouse publics, authorities wished to mobilize urban crowds to achieve effective surveillance.

The politics of moral surveillance at play in the debates on smoking functioned by collapsing the distinction between religion and politics, on one hand, and public and private, on the other. In other words, the tobacco bans forwarded a discourse of state-religion that considered political and religious authority as one and the same; offenses to one of them were thus both crimes and sins. Sermons were rife with provocative statements contending that to smoke or not to smoke was a double question of public order and piety. Smokers were, therefore, not only committing immoral indulgences; they were to be considered political rebels.[43] By hurling a host of historically loaded terms—such as *bughā* (political rebellion), *kaṭ ʿ-i ṭarīk* (brigandage), and *fesād* (political provocation)—at smoking, puritan authors evoked a long tradition of intertwining political and moral obedience.

Collapsing morality and sharia together in favor of extending the authority of the ruler had a well-worn pedigree. In the thought of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), considered one of the inspirations of Ottoman puritan movements,

the realms of morality and politics were one and the same. The Taymiyyan move was in fact a universally comprehensive system of mores and criticized Islamic law's self-delimitation as found in juristic literature. As historians of Islamic law have demonstrated, a widespread juristic position had long refused to equate the realm of sharia and the realm of the sultan, and in fact saw sharia as one of the important checks on political power. The conceptual foundations of this juristic autonomy are studied closely in Khaled Abou El Fadl's *Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law,* which challenges the conception that Islamic jurists did not impose any meaningful checks on the arbitrary actions of public authorities.[44] Abou El Fadl demonstrates that even in the highly politically charged topic of rebellion, jurists were keen to define and defend the rights of rebels, whether by way of distinguishing various types of criminal activity (common criminality, brigandage, and *bugha,* rebellion proper) or by way of protecting the rights of the incriminated.[45] In understanding the jurists' assertion of autonomy, Abou El Fadl carefully underlines that this assertion took place despite the historical experience of political absolutism, with which jurists developed a complicated relationship through what he calls a creative and negotiative act. The jurists refused to completely withdraw support from the state, which, in turn, legitimated and supported their institutional roles as judges and teachers. However, their main loyalty was to the legal order, the preservation of which was their raison d'être. Therefore, Muslim jurists argued that rebellion could be the result of a plausible interpretation or cause, but an interpretation that was considered as a matter of law to be in error. This argument played the dual function of preserving the appearance of impartiality of the legal order, and hence its legitimacy, and acting to temper the legitimacy of the political order against its foes.[46]

According to the juristic vision of political authority, the preservation of boundaries between the two forms of power—religious and political—served to avoid the potential delegitimation of sharia's power, and the compromise of the power of its guardians, the jurists.[47] The Taymiyyan project's vision of a merger between politics and sharia was an unusual departure from this tendency. All government offices, Ibn Taymiyya pithily declared, were also religious offices; and the maintenance of public order and morality was to be prioritized over and above the technical workings of juristic procedure.[48] In its radicalness, this vision had a lot to offer in perceived situations of states of emergency, such as the public order crisis of the Ottoman Empire of the early seventeenth century.[49]

To many preachers of the period, the spheres of imperial authority and sharia discourse were easily blended: it was because the sultan had banned smoking that it was forbidden by sharia, and vice versa.[50] One of the most publicly circulated *fetvā*s against smoking, attributed to Meḥmed IV's *imām* and confidant Vānī Efendi (d. 1685), directly associated smoking with rebelling against the ruler, the leader of the Islamic community:

> The four [schools of law] have agreed that as long as the order of the sultan is compatible with sharia, obedience to [that sultanic order] is incumbent. Hence, to those who hesitate about the illegitimacy of smoking after a firm imperial ban has been issued, this verse applies: *they are like cattle—in fact more astray* [Q 7:179]. The following verse is a clear proof to the matter of [obeying] authorities: *Oh Believers! Obey God and obey the prophets and [obey] those who hold authority [over you].* As well as the following prophetic saying: *Whoever obeys me obeys God, whoever defies me defies God. and whoever obeys laws* [emr] *and whoever defies orders surely defies me.* And those who deem [tobacco] permissible and insist on smoking it, they inflict harm on themselves and they rebel.[51]

Even before Vānī's *fetvā* began to circulate, its main premise, which equated sin and crime, was well in place. Preachers writing political tracts addressing Murād IV advocated for the sultan's use of his political authority to implement the application of sharia, whether they belonged to the Kadızādeli lot or not. A Naḳshbandī preacher known by the pen name Nuṣḥi Naṣīḥī, for instance, characterized smoking as one of the greatest ills of his age in a tract he addressed to Murād IV. Informing the sultan of the state of his subjects, Naṣīḥī wrote: "Most of your people are addicted to the pursuit of pleasure. Some are dogs of the coffeehouse; some are dogs of the wine tavern. . . . They follow the English infidels in smoking, they do not follow the orders of God or the words of the prophet."[52] In frequenting the coffeehouse and wine tavern, these subjects were disregarding not only God's commands, but also the sultan's orders. Moreover, the failure of the repeated bans, this preacher warned, undermined the sultan's authoritativeness. "My sultan, in provinces people talk. They say: our sultan could not even eliminate a [mere] tobacco, how is he to retaliate his enemies? They speak poorly of you."[53]

Naṣīḥī's merger between the sultan's authority and that of God was widely shared in tracts addressed to Murād IV from around the empire. An otherwise unknown advice-writer from Crimea known as Ḳādirī, for instance, blamed tobacco and coffeehouses for the political troubles of the age. He reported to the sultan that the people of Istanbul were turning a deaf ear to the invitations

to mosques, yet they would not leave the coffeehouse even if they knew they would be decapitated. They much preferred to stay in coffeehouses, which were filled with beautiful boys, and smoke the infidel's invention that is tobacco. In the end, the Crimean moralist wrote, it was not the Cossacks or the Russ in the Black Sea region that were destroying the empire, as much as "our [the subjects'] moral degeneration."[54]

Echoing the erasure of the distinction between the realm of the political and that of the religious was the collapsing of the distinction between public and private through the tobacco debates. The limits of sharia enforcement were established not only through technical juristic debates, but also through the much more accessible discussions on public and private. Islamic discourses on the consumption of intoxicants had always differentiated between private and public intoxication, the former being a sin and the latter a crime, subject to punishment by public authorities. The paradigmatic example provided by Ghazālī served as a blueprint for subsequent generations of discussions on the limits of public authority in intervening in the private realm. According to Ghazālī, if a person was suspected of carrying a wine bottle on his person, even if he showed clear signs of wine consumption—such as intoxication—he could not be searched. However, if the outline of the bottle could be seen from the outside—for instance, under the man's cloak—then he would have to be searched and punished accordingly. While the potential of public seduction in the latter case made carrying wine a crime, the absence of any such public implication rendered the first case a sin, but not a crime.[55]

The long tradition that distinguished between public and private vice informed many subsequent ethical and legal discussions, including sixteenth-century debates on the legality of coffee. Making conceptual divisions between private and public consumption of this new intoxicant, Muslim (and non-Muslim) religious opinion declared personal consumption of coffee a private, even potentially healthy habit. However, even Ottoman religious authorities who condoned drinking coffee discouraged doing so publicly, at the coffeehouse.[56] Yet, the boundary between public and private behavior was not always easy to pinpoint. Not only was the public-private boundary an ever-shifting one, but also public authorities often wished to expand the realm of "public" to their own advantage. Yaron Klein's study of the medieval surveillance of music performance demonstrates the eternal contestation of the public-private boundary. Klein notes that even if music was to be considered a vice, performing and enjoying it within the enclosed walls of one's home was still permitted

in recognition of privacy. If, however, the musicians at a house party were inside the house, yet the music was audible to the neighborhood, was this considered a private party? Most jurists objected to the categorization of these gatherings as private, arguing that the audible sound threatened to seduce the hearers into moral corruption, thereby demanding the interference of authorities.[57]

The fumes of tobacco oozed into the public realm almost as easily as the sound of music, even when consumed privately. The contemporary discourse on the stank of smokers, who corrupted every public place to which they went, was not simply a subjective, physical reaction to the smell. This discourse aimed to construe smoking as an act subject to social and legal punishment, even when committed in private. The anti-smoking discourse thus aimed to extend moral surveillance and policing not only to the public, but also to the private sphere. An important theme was that smoking was not to be considered a "private act," for its terrible stink corrupted more than the body of the smoker; it corrupted the air that everyone breathed. This stink was such a putrid substance of corruption that it could singlehandedly destroy the morality and the fate of someone who, hypothetically, was perfect in every other sense. Popular sermons were replete with moral parables that challenged the notion that smoking was a private act. A popular story attributed to the preacher Cerrāḥ Şeyḫi of Istanbul, known to be one of the fiercest critics of smoking, provides a striking example of how the notion of corruption was applied to smokers.

İbrāhim Bolevī (d. 1633), known as Cerrāḥ Şeyḫi because he found Istanbul-wide fame while a preacher at the Cerrahpaşa Mosque, was one of the celebrities of Istanbul's urban scene in the seventeenth century. He was well known not only because he was well connected to the dynastic and vizierial circles, but also because of his oratorial skills. In historical scholarship, he is known to have accompanied ʿOsmān II on his ill-fated Hotin campaign. When ʿOsmān II was murdered by the janissaries in a rebellion after his return from Hotin and replaced by the mentally unstable Muṣṭafa I (d. 1639), it was again Cerrāḥ Şeyḫi who delivered influential sermons to legitimate the tenure of the new ruler, whom the preacher presented as a saint to provide a sacred justification for the sultan's erratic behavior.[58] In addition to being close to the dynasty, Cerrāḥ Şeyḫi was famous because of his eloquent storytelling, and his fiery discussions with other famous religious figures of the day, including Ḳāḍīzāde Meḥmed and İsmāʿil Anḳaravī.[59] The conflict between

Anḳaravī and Cerrāḥ Şeyḥi centered on two questions: the legitimacy of *samā*ʿ and the question of smoking.

Cerrāḥ Şeyḥi, well known for the soundness of his juristic knowledge and his talent in storytelling, dedicated his skills to the cause of eradicating smoking. He wrote a tract against tobacco. In case the tract did not deter enough people, he also wrote shorter *fetvā*s against smoking and hung them inside his mosque for the public to notice. Finally, he delivered eloquent and fierce sermons against smoking, which continued to be remembered with his name over a century after his death.[60] Cerrāḥ Şeyḥi's sermons against smoking were animated with colorful and rather frightening parables about smokers. Moreover, the preacher claims to have personally witnessed the supernatural signs condemning smokers, or to have spoken to people who witnessed such supernatural signs. One of his parables is set against the background of a famine-struck Rumili. In a desperate quest to ward off the ill omens that brought about the famine, the community decided that the unexplained famine must be due to witches haunting the region (*cāzū*). Since in the Ottoman context witches were not considered to be living persons, but spirits haunting graves, the people began opening graves in search of a witch.[61] When they arrived at the grave of a pious person, some people objected to opening the grave, seeing as the witch could not have harmed this person, whose piety was sure to protect him from evil spirits. Another group of people, who did not smoke, said:

> True, he is a pious (*sāliḥ*) person, but he smoke[d], maybe tobacco caused him to die an unbeliever." [Upon opening the grave . . .] they saw that the inside of the grave was full of smoke, it was impossible to approach the body because of the stench. They waited until some of the smoke [diffused]. Lo and behold, they saw that [the deceased] had hair that grew [posthumously], eyes as big as an apple which protruded, and nails grown as long as fingers. A witch (*cāzū*) was sitting inside the grave, his head and [lower body] leaning over, sucking [the deceased's] penis like a clay pipe, smoking out of the fire burnt on the belly [of the deceased].[62]

The community was shocked at observing a person they knew to have been an indubitably pious person at the mercy of a witch, who was treating him as a smoking pipe. Bent on getting to the bottom of this mystery, the gravedigger, who was also an old and pious person, went to visit the wife of the deceased. The wife informed the gravedigger that her husband lived a moral and righteous life, always observing his prayers, fasting, never shirking his duty to pay alms (*sadaka* and *zekat*). This righteous person's only vice was to smoke when he came home tired.

The moral surveillance discourse surrounding tobacco bans, therefore, left little room for privacy. Instead, it created an atmosphere of moral surveillance that instigated scrutiny of smokers, even if the act of smoking took place exclusively in the private sphere.

ANTI-BAN PAMPHLETS

The question of why and how smoking was finally legalized in 1688, before which the tobacco bans had already eased to a considerable extent, has so far received scant attention.[63] Some historians explain the eventual naturalization of tobacco with the state's motivation to collect taxes from the import and consumption of tobacco; since coffee and tobacco, important and profitable trade goods, would bring a handsome addition to the state's tax base, the argument goes, the state was finally tempted by the promise of fiscal gains.[64] While there is no arguing that tax revenue was an important aspect of the equation, the question remains as to why Ottoman authorities delayed legalizing tobacco until 1688. The financially strained reigns of Aḥmed I, ʿOsmān II, and Murād IV could have benefited from taxation just as much, if not more, than did the government of the Köprülü era. Another explanation offered for the triumph of tobacco is the power of the drug qua drug. This argument, again, reduces the agency of the users and does not take into consideration the many Ottoman authors who were simultaneously against both tobacco and its banning.

"I do not doubt [tobacco's] repugnance and I do not give in to those who go on in praise of it, yet I do not concede its being sinful (ḥarām)."[65] This is how the Mevlevī sheikh İsmāʿil Anḳaravī described his position on tobacco, distancing himself both from the drug and from the legal and ethical stigmatization of it. In this section, I study this third position to argue that the eventual normalization of smoking cannot be explained via financial or physical factors solely. Instead, there was a conscious pushback against the climate of moral surveillance surrounding tobacco. In paying attention to these criticisms of the tobacco ban, I trace the tools available for contesting moral authority in the Ottoman public sphere.

In contesting the moralist-absolutist discourse of their age, Ottoman anti-ban authors turned to two established concepts that established boundaries for legal and political authority. The first is that of the private sphere as the limit to public authority. The second is the designation of a "legally neutral"

(*mubāḥ*) sphere, a range of issues on which sharia was to pass neither an affirmative nor a negative judgment. These two arguments were ultimately employed to curb the call for public mobilization against moral corruption.

Privacy, Legal Neutrality, and the Limits to Public Authority

Arguments against the tobacco ban evoked the established Islamic discourse on the immunity of the private sphere from punitive intervention. As explained in chapter 2, Ottoman conceptions of privacy, particularly in the legal sense, were different from modern, Western conceptions, which ascribe privacy to the strictly personal or to the domestic sphere. In contrast, in the Ottoman world the communal could very well be private; the boundary of the private and public was determined by the prevailing social contract, rather than by abstract rules. Therefore, one is able to speak about privacy of neighborhoods or of open-air gatherings, or of private coffeehouses, all shared by civic groups.[66] While these classical conceptions of privacy were utilized in the early modern debates, behavioral norms associated with the private sphere were gradually carried to the public sphere in this period, reaching full fruition by the eighteenth century. The defense of the private communal sphere as exempt from public legal imposition played an important role in the early modern transition to new forms of public expression.[67]

In debating the boundaries of the public and the private, Ottoman authors did not use distinct terms for "public" or "private." Following a well-established legal-ethical tradition going back to Ghazālī, they used "street" and "home" as prototypes of publicity and privacy.[68] In his criticism of the state's ruthless persecution of smokers, for instance, Kātib Çelebi invoked the established practice of allowing private consumption of intoxicants at home, while acknowledging the authorities' right to impose a ban in the public sphere. According to his analysis, people who were fond of pleasurable substances should avoid using them "in the streets," out of respect for authorities. On the other hand, the authorities' "prying into homes"—in other words, interfering in the private sphere—would not be legitimate.[69] In a similar line of argument, İsmāʿil Anḳaravī's treatise on tobacco submitted the right of the state to impose a ban "on the streets and in the coffeehouses." He argued that even though public authorities could ban smoking in public places, they could only do so as a public imperial ruling (*nehy-i sulṭānī*) and not as a sin (*ḥarām*).[70]

While in appearance supporting the state's tobacco bans, Anḳaravī's insistence on conceptually differentiating between crime and sin was in fact

in defiance of the public authorities' desire to augment the state's authority by conflating religious and political rulings. He wanted to clearly establish the tobacco bans as a political act, which would then render them effective only in the public sphere and thus irrelevant in the private sphere. This distinction would allow individuals or communities to have differing opinions on the moral appropriateness of smoking. Anḳaravī's treatise, for instance, considered smoking to be legally neutral and contradicted the official *fetvā*s by Ottoman chief muftis, whose verdicts declared smoking to be forbidden (*ḥarām*).[71] While supporting the state's tobacco bans in the public realm, the Mevlevī sheikh Anḳaravī's position simultaneously sought to circumscribe this public authority. Like other anti-ban authors, he aimed to disentangle moral and political authority and place the former in the Islamic civic sphere rather than the state.

The number of early modern jurists and Sufis who wished to establish the neutrality of smoking from the perspective of all four schools of law was not negligible.[72] In thus disputing the politicization of this practice, they resorted to the legal category of *mubāḥ*, which can be translated as "legally neutral" or "legally indifferent." To put it in Kevin Reinhart's terms, the category of "legally neutral" was a juristic concept by which sharia recognized the limits of its own jurisdiction.[73] Why would jurists and scholars, whose livelihood and identity depended on their knowledge and application of sharia, argue for a delimited notion of sharia? Following Khaled Abou El Fadl's argument summarized above, one important explanatory factor was the loyalty of legal scholars to the primacy of law above political loyalty. As discussed above, maintaining this juristic loyalty helped not only to legitimize the realm of law, but also to negotiate the power of jurists in the political system, who wished to avoid being reduced to mere servants of the political power.[74]

Therefore, similarly, Sherman Jackson has argued in a recent article that contrary to modern claims about the comprehensiveness of sharia, many premodern authorities conceptualized sharia as an important part of Islam as a religion, but not as its entirety. Outside the boundaries of sharia lay "an Islamic secular," a realm left neutral by choice. This Islamic secular was not an imposition from the outside, but an internal analytical tool that acknowledged the limits of juristic knowledge.[75] In a similar vein, when anti-ban Ottoman scholars and Sufis applied the category of *mubāḥ* to smoking, they aimed to argue for a delimited notion of sharia. Smoking, while not exempt from moral and Islamic reflection, was to be exempt from legal regulation.

This legal neutrality was a reaction to the prevalent discourse of moral surveillance, characterized above as a Taymiyyan response, which prioritized public order and morality above technical restrictions of jurisdiction. In short, the debate on tobacco was one on the limits and nature of sharia. Against the general spirit of morality policing and indefinite extension of sharia into every aspect of daily life, anti-ban pamphlets argued that a sharia decision on tobacco was to be suspended.

The insistence of anti-ban authors on declaring tobacco legally neutral was accompanied by a concern over the socially divisive effects of the moralistic debates surrounding smoking. For instance, the Aleppan mufti Abu'l-Wafa al-ʿUrdhī (d. 1660) joined the rank of anti-ban authors who considered tobacco legally neutral (*mubāḥ*), arguing that its prohibition was, therefore, simply unfounded. ʿUrdhī was a jurist with Sufi leanings from an established ʿulamā family in the greater Syrian region, who was known to be a regular at the Aslan Dede coffeehouse of Aleppo. According to his autobiography, ʿUrdhī led a scholarly life of teaching calligraphy, theology, Qurān, and Turkish. He held several prestigious posts, including endowment management, a *fetvā* office he held as the Shafii judge, and a Friday preaching post at the Omayyad Mosque.[76]

Urdhī intervened in the tobacco debates by reminding his readers that not long ago, in the age of Sultan Süleymān, some muftis had ruled against drinking coffee. Less than a century after these anti-coffee rulings, however, coffee and coffeehouses had become an indispensable part of daily life. "Is it possible to blame either the past jurists who banned coffee, or the present jurists who allow coffee for their judgments?" ʿUrdhī asked, underlining the contingency of juristic knowledge, particularly in matters of recent pedigree. Like other anti-ban authors, therefore, ʿUrdhī concluded that juristic uncertainty was inevitable in matters that postdated the Prophet. In many cases, this uncertainty needed to be left as it was, in silence.[77] This argument about abstaining from legal judgment on innovations was employed by anti-puritan authors in other issues, most directly by Meḥmed Emīn Toḳādī in defending *samāʿ* in particular and propagating peaceful accommodation in religion (*ṣulḥ*) in general.[78]

Other authors similarly instrumentalized the lessons learned from the coffee debate during the tobacco debate. For Kātib Çelebi, for instance, the important takeaway from the coffee debate was the impracticality of simply issuing an official order to eliminate substances as popular as coffee and tobacco. He reminded the reader of the extreme measures the authorities took to prevent the consumption of coffee after the drink became known to Istanbulites in 1543.

These measures included the chief mufti Ebussuud Efendi's destruction of ships trading coffee, pouring their contents into the sea. Finally, Murād IV's most recent coffeehouse ban in 1633 may seem to have succeeded, but Kātib Çelebi remarked that the ban was only effective in Istanbul, and even then "these matters do not yield to permanent bans."[79] Kātib Çelebi further argued that the tobacco bans had, if anything, only fanned popular fondness for tobacco. Targeting Murād IV's capital execution of smokers during his Baghdad campaign, Kātib Çelebi argued that the violence was not only gratuitous, but also simply futile:

> At the station Üçpınar, fourteen men, who disobeyed the imperial order that prohibits smoking tobacco, were captured and executed. . . . In Ruha, too, fourteen men, two of whom were janissaries, were killed. In Cülb, twenty-one men were executed. At the Hacegöz station, six men were killed. Some of these men were killed in front of the [imperial] tent, some in the army after their arms and legs were broken. Some were decapitated, some were chopped into four pieces. [Even] after such [violence], [people] smoked through short pipes out of staunch spite, in line with the maxim: *People covet that which is forbidden / The forbidden fruit tastes the sweetest.* This situation is clear proof that people will not adopt right behavior by sheer force.[80]

Focusing on the negative social impacts of the bans, anti-ban authors warned against the societal tension created by the politicization of the tobacco debates. The atmosphere created by the bans was one of pervasive hostility—in other words, the opposite of the social vision of peaceful accommodation (ṣulḥ). Concerns over societal polarization were raised in and beyond Istanbul. For instance, in Aleppo, Abu'l-Wafa al-ʿUrdhī accused anti-smokers of belittling and antagonizing their fellow Muslims.[81] These prudes, he claimed, implied that they alone were the pure and righteous Muslims. Some went as far as denouncing smokers altogether, claiming that since smokers were not really Muslims, they could not be witnesses at the sharia courts. The adoption of this principle would mean that courts would become vehicles for extending moral surveillance regarding consumption of tobacco, encouraging Muslims to pry into each other's private habits. The mufti ʿUrdhī found such partisan talk unconscionable:

> If one were to triple divorce his wife in front of a group of smokers, and if the judge were to follow the opinion of these prudes and not accept the witnesshood [of the smokers], how will the prude answer before God about [his role in] perpetuating a marriage that had been terminated?[82]

Even authors who recognized the rights of political authorities to control smoking in public spaces—such as Anḳaravī—strongly criticized the social effects of such mobilization. Anḳaravī underlined that public interventions in personal conduct, encouraged by reminding Muslims of their duty to "command the right and forbid the wrong," led to nothing but antagonism across the community (tanāfur al-ḳulūb).[83] Given his notion of a delimited sharia and the urgency to avoid social tension, it would perhaps not be surprising that the Mevlevī sheikh argued against moral interference across his works. In Forty Sayings, Anḳaravī explicitly argued that only the spiritually perfected had the right to guide the general public (irşād-ı enām), limiting the duty of moral surveillance to a limited cadre of Sufis.[84] Another anti-puritan, anti-ban author, Nabulusī, was similarly critical of the notion that every Muslim had the right to intervene in the moral conduct of his society. In Nabulusī's view, this duty was the exclusive right of the ʿulamā.[85]

By contesting the idea that it was every Muslim's duty to impose moral conformity in his community, anti-puritan authors sought to counteract the public mobilization that violated the privacy of civic communities and created unwelcome societal tension. Furthermore, they considered this violation of the public and private boundary as unjustified by sharia. Like other innovations that emerged late, smoking was the realm of legal neutrality (mubāḥ) and lenience. Despite their different Sufi affiliations and geographic locations, authors of anti-puritan pamphlets thus deployed a shared language against the identification of sin and crime as perpetrated in the tobacco bans.

Indigenization of Tobacco

As early as the 1620s, Sufis were considered stereotypical smokers alongside janissaries, long-distance merchants, and coffeehouse-goers.[86] The stereotype of the smoking dervish would not shock the reader of this chapter, who has already seen the Sufi interest in the tobacco debates. In addition to the legal objections to the tobacco bans, Sufi authors wrote on tobacco in a variety of idioms that turned this foreign substance ("the British leaf") into an essential part of an Ottoman vocabulary of bodily and spiritual care, imbued with a Sufi or Persianate sensibility. This new discourse granted tobacco a whole array of Islamic and spiritual meanings, constructing a discourse of urbane and gentlemanly smoking through a Persianate-Sufi imagination, rather than through a sharia discourse.

Idioms granting pleasurable substances Islamic meanings, thereby provid-
ing alternatives to legal restrictions and condemnations, were widely known
in the Islamic world.[87] One of these non-sharia discourses on pleasurable
substances (*mükeyyifāt*) focused on the connection between one's choice of
drugs or drinks and their social status and role, thereby establishing intoxi-
cants as vehicles of self-fashioning. A sixteenth-century Ottoman literary
treatment of pleasurable substances, for instance, marked every drug for a
different social class. While opium was reserved for scholars (*ʿulamā*), madrasa
students only deserved cannabis (*esrār*) consumed as dried leaves. Elaborate
and expensive drugs, on the other hand, were to be reserved for urban folk
(*şehr oğlanı*). This was the case for electuaries prepared with a mixture of
opium, honey, and mixed spices (known as *berş*), which symbolized both
sophistication and a cosmopolitan connectedness, given the faraway origins
of the fine spices used in the concoction.[88] One's choice of substance, therefore,
signaled one's social standing. Conversely, consuming a certain drug was a
mode of self-fashioning, each drug signaling a different social place. In addi-
tion to class, intoxicants had another cultural connotation: virtue, or social
role. An anecdote attributed to Sultan Selīm I drives this point home. When
asked whether he fancied *berş*, the sultan refused and asked for wine, explain-
ing that he preferred to be chivalric (*levendāne*) rather than scholarly
(*ʿālimāne*).[89] In attributing chivalric virtue to wine, the anecdote about Selīm
alluded to a long-standing tradition well known in Ottoman cultural life that
associated wine drinking with virility and physical invincibility.[90]

In the early modern Ottoman context, therefore, modes of intoxication
were markers of social place and role. In the seventeenth century, consuming
tobacco was likewise construed as a marker of being urban, in the sense of
being up-to-date with novelties and inhabiting urban social spaces. These
non-sharia cultural meanings served to reframe smoking in a Rūmī garb. One
of the important interventions of anti-ban writing in this respect was to por-
tray tobacco as a good innovation, and thereby argue against the puritan
argument that all innovations, including coffee and tobacco, were illicit. In his
treatise on smoking, for instance, the Mevlevī sheikh İsmāʿil Anḳaravī clas-
sified smoking as a "good innovation."[91] He did not detail his views on the
specific properties of tobacco that made it a "good innovation"; rather, he
simply argued that any innovation in the category of "legally neutral" was a
good innovation. It is possible, however, to speculate that Anḳaravī's aware-
ness of the literature on the positive medical effects of tobacco, cited earlier

in the chapter, played a role in his consideration of tobacco as a good innovation.[92] Others shared his disdain for the unsophisticated argument that any innovation was to be condemned simply for being of recent origin. A preacher in Cairo, Meḥmed Altıparmaḳ, advocated that tobacco was a good innovation in his sermons. These sermons, like Altıparmaḳ's other work, came to be known well in the rest of Rūm.

Meḥmed Altıparmaḳ (d. 1624) of Skopje was a Bayrāmī Sufi and scholar whose career of teaching and preaching began in Istanbul and continued in Cairo. He died in the latter city, where he endowed a mosque known with his name. A prolific scholar, he was known mostly for his translations into Turkish of Persian literary works, primarily of *Meʿāricu'l-Nübüvvet*, a well-regarded work on the life and character of the Prophet.[93] His sermons on tobacco were known in Istanbul, either through written transmission or through oral transmission, via travelers between Istanbul and Cairo. In fact, these sermons had so enraged some opponents of smoking that they were moved to pen rebuttals. It is thanks to one of these rebuttals that historians have access to the pro-tobacco sermons of Altıparmak.[94] Written by an unknown Şeyḫ Sinān, a versified rebuttal to Altıparmaḳ Efendi's sermons, demonstrates that the latter preacher endorsed tobacco on two grounds: that smoking was a positive innovation, and that it was conducive to spiritual pleasure and advancement (*zevḳ*).[95]

In refuting that tobacco was an illicit innovation, Altıparmaḳ Efendi's sermons referred to the medicinal uses of tobacco.[96] In addition to its physical benefits, the preacher's sermons praised tobacco for its positive impact on spiritual refinement. The smoker, Altıparmaḳ Efendi preached, evoked God every time he exhaled, because the exhaling sound, *hū*, was the sound Sufis made in their litanies. Altıparmaḳ Efendi clearly tried to produce a Sufi-spiritual myth around smoking. He was not alone in this effort. In fact, other Sufi authors had argued that smoking kept one awake at night, thereby helping with one's night vigils.[97] The Cairo-based preacher's spiritual rebranding of tobacco by alluding to the Sufi notion of spiritual tasting (*zevḳ*) was similarly widespread. According to the historian Peçevi, this discourse—which he though made little sense—was widely used by coffeehouse-goers, who justified their indulgence by claiming that tobacco induced a spiritual refinement.[98]

In short, the legal and moral debate on tobacco was accompanied by a search for a favorable cultural meaning around smoking. Authors from different social ranks, including muftis, preachers, and Sufis, partook in this search

FIGURE 3. Jean Baptiste van Mour's depiction of a gathering of Mevlevī dervishes, ca. 1720–1737. The painter introduces a visual playfulness between the forms of the flute (*ney*) and the long tobacco pipe. Courtesy of Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.

through a variety of oral and written literature. The cultural meanings around tobacco evolved to include associations with refinement and urbanity. Unlike İsmāʿil Anḳaravī's rather cautious argument against the ban, many Mevlevīs composed praises to smoking in which they played with the semblance between a dervish playing the reed flute (*ney*) and a person smoking out of a long pipe (fig. 3). An illustrative example of this trend was a short treatise entitled *Ode to Hookah* (*Tenbakūnāme*) by the Mevlevī author Fāṣiḥ Aḥmed Dede (d. 1699).

Fāṣiḥ Aḥmed Dede was a poet, prose writer, musician, calligrapher, and painter.[99] His *Ode to Hookah* is a comparison between the mental and spiritual effects of wine and tobacco, ultimately declaring tobacco's victory over wine.[100] While wine poetry is a well-established motif in Islamic literature across literary traditions, Fāṣiḥ Aḥmed Dede noted that, in his day, similar praises of tobacco were becoming part of the Persianate literary tradition. Poets no

less than the highly esteemed Sāʾib-i Tabrīzī (d. 1676), whose Persian poetry was inspirational across the Persianate world, including India, Central Asia, and Iran, were now composing praises to the hookah.[101] In other words, Fāṣiḥ Aḥmed Dede's treatise attested to the domestication of tobacco by attaching to it new spiritual meanings recognized not only in the Ottoman world, but also in the Persianate world more broadly. *Ode to Hookah* elevated tobacco from a mundane addiction to a mark of a refined gentleman. He likened the long pipe to the *ney*, the flute that had been one of the symbols of Mevlevī music and of Rumi's poetry, mentioned in the opening couplet of Rūmī's *Mesnevī*. Beyond this specific connection with the *Mesnevī* and the flute, Fāṣiḥ Dede considered tobacco to be conducive to art and inspiration; the long pipe was the best confidant for the musician, as well as the writer and the poet, who would benefit more from the wakefulness induced by tobacco than the sleep induced by wine.

Fāṣiḥ Dede's treatise showed that by the second half of the century, tobacco was rehabilitated into an Ottoman conception of urbanity. In addition to the literary and discursive devices, this rehabilitation was brought about by adjustments in literary culture, particularly through the taming of its infamous stink via refined spices and herbs.[102] While many anti-tobacco writers, as seen above, considered tobacco appalling for its terrible smell, Fāṣiḥ Dede's praise likened the smell of tobacco to that of hyacinths. "The boiling of the hookah is so overflowing that it bursts a thousand hyacinths in a moment," he wrote enthusiastically. These contradictory accounts cannot be pinned on merely subjective difference. The hookah, Fāṣiḥ Dede's preferred tool for smoking, allowed one to mix tobacco with fragrant herbs, so that the fine gentleman oozed floral scents rather than the stench of tobacco. In other words, there were multiple cultures of smoking. While soldiers were often associated with smoking out of short clay pipes (*lüle*), gentlemen could afford the spices that would offset the odor of tobacco, as well as the free and idle time to sit while enjoying smoking. In other words, there were ways of smoking this foreign plant, which, far from making one an *ingilis*, gave the smoker the air of a true Ottoman gentleman, a fine Sufi.

CONCLUSION

"Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar," Sigmund Freud once famously remarked. Nothing could be further from the mood of the Ottoman public in the early

seventeenth century upon their first encounter with tobacco. This chapter has explored the moral, political, and cultural meanings attached to tobacco in the early modern Ottoman Empire. Instead of perpetuating a dichotomy between coffeehouse and the society, on one hand, and religion and the state, on the other, this chapter shows that the legalization and indigenization of both coffeehouses and tobacco were largely brought about by religious authorities and particularly Sufi orders. Quickly adapting to coffeehouse socialization, many Sufi authors used this new space to connect with the larger public. Furthermore, they provided elaborate criticisms of the state's efforts to extend surveillance in the urban sphere through the instrumentalization of tobacco bans.

Rather than explaining the eventual triumph of tobacco and coffeehouses solely through either the chemical effects of these new drugs, or the tax revenue they brought, it is important to pay attention to the agency of the various Ottoman actors who defended tobacco in a variety of idioms, from the medical and the legal to the literary. In their arguments, anti-ban authors shared a common reaction to the mobilization efforts of religious and political authorities. Expressing discomfort at the social tension brought about by the new discourse of moral surveillance, these authors called for certain limitations to public authority's intervention into the newly emerged cultures of pleasurable socialization. While some authors employed complex legal arguments for this purpose, others strove to develop alternative discourses that portrayed tobacco as a sign of urbanity, of a positive attitude toward innovations. These anti-ban discourses show that large segments of the Ottoman public, religious and nonreligious alike, actively resisted the attempts at more comprehensive surveillance forwarded by the political-moral project that materialized in the Ḳadızādeli movement. It was owing to this active resistance that the new sociabilities of the seventeenth century eventually prevailed.

While this chapter has mainly focused on the points of view of Muslim male authors, it has also hinted at the existence of similar debates among the Christian and Jewish populations of the empire, and at the exchange of information between these denominational communities. Whether these similar ethical debates carried the same political subtexts is an important question that awaits further inquiry.

EPILOGUE

Despite the great interest in institutional aspects of Ottoman early modernity, studies on political thought and tradition in the period commonly paint a picture of a state without a society. In other words, the main paradigmatic explanation of state-society relationship remains subjecthood. The commoner appears in political thought as the subject of imperial authority and imperial justice or injustice. Surely, the paradigm of subjecthood allows Ottoman society a degree of agency, as the latter could and did place demands on the sultan to provide justice, safety, and sustenance. However, the study of the early modern public sphere rarely, if ever, ventures beyond this transactional paradigm. We are left with the assumption that the waves of nineteenth-century Westernization had to wash over the crowds before they rose as political subjects capable of negotiating the limits of public authority and contesting the legitimacy of the actions of the state.

Contrary to the implications of this gloomy picture, early modern Ottoman publics were neither disempowered in nor apathetic about politics. In fact, I argue that the formation of a vigorous public sphere was a crucial aspect of early modern state formation. Although Ottomanists have produced important scholarship on state formation, the focus has been on institution building.[1] The transformation of the broader societal and cultural dynamics through the direct and indirect effects of state formation, however, remains to be understood in its full complexity. A key insight for understanding this complex relationship is that the growth of the early modern state took place not at the expense of, but through cooperation with, the public sphere. The Ottoman center's need to secure the cooperation of new groups in order to deepen its reach into society had substantial consequences. The result was the entry of an ever-greater number of citizens into the realm of politics as intermediaries of power, demanding rights on behalf of civic or corporate bodies, and as debating the limits of public authority as well as the legitimacy of the social agendas of their fellow citizens. The most important question that underlay this new political culture had to do with

the very limits of public authority. Opinions varied from a centrist emphasis on the augmentation of sultanic authority as the only definition of a successful polity to various calls for the delimitation of public authority. This latter host of views rose to prominence with unprecedented force in the seventeenth century and gave rise to a civic culture.

The early modern Ottoman public sphere was at once like and unlike other early modern publics. The common thread running through the early modern public spheres, globally, was the bilateral relationship between the development of the realm of the state and the politicization of the public sphere. Across the board, the expansion of the state machinery spurred the integration of new publics into the realm of power. This new constellation of power had important cultural and intellectual ramifications such as the development of new practices and cultures of urbanity, the flourishing of vernacular literatures, and the expansion of the reading public. Despite these shared traits, however, Ottoman political culture diverged from European early modernity in one key aspect. While the sixteenth to eighteenth century saw increased centralization in Europe, the same period was marked by decentralization and the heyday of centrifugal powers in the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman decentralization took place as a series of seismic shocks rather than soft, invisible shifts. By now, the reader is well aware of the rich scholarship on the historical events that signaled the emergence of new political agencies. One of the main arguments of this book has been that the shifts in the de facto distribution of power were accompanied by important intellectual shifts that envisioned an effective yet restricted central authority.

The intellectual shifts of the seventeenth century informed not only "the expansion of the political nation," but also major social and cultural shifts such as the formation of a dynamic urban culture, new sociabilities marked by heterogeneity across class and confessional lines, increasing social visibility of the nonelite, and the proliferation of discourses justifying and extolling novelty. In order to bring the richness of these new public practices and discourses to the fore, this book has prioritized going beyond official discourses—as reflected most notably in fatwas or imperial decrees—that were invested in holding up the façade of an omnipotent monarchy. I have suggested that one of the key methodologies for going beyond the official-imperial discourse is to understand the cultural-political ideologies as reflected in performance and spectacle. "Performance" includes both the choreographed and ritualized and the improvised performance. Through performance, a range of Ottoman political actors—from the dynasty to urban crowds—sought to claim public space and urban visibility. The struggle over "the theater of the city," therefore, became one of the most important political dynamics of Ottoman early modernity.

On all sides of the struggle over spectacle, religious symbolism played a primary role in creating political meaning. The cover image of this book, an anonymous Austrian painter's depiction of the accession of ʿOsmān II (d. 1622), illustrates the significance of religious authorities in the staging of political power.[2] Placed across from the young sultan, at the time fourteen years old, we see the queen mother. The iconographic symmetry between the sultan and the queen mother represents the

assumed partnership in rule between these two members of the dynasty. Even more prominent than these two royal figures, however, is the chief mufti, who is placed at the center of the frame. This figure must be Şeyhülislam Esad Efendi, who was a scion of one of the most prestigious ʿulamā households in Ottoman history. Alongside other palace figures and foreign envoys, the Austrian painter depicts the Mevlevī musicians and dervishes performing samāʿ for the royal occasion.

The religious symbols of the Ottoman political arena—the fatwa as an expression of informed legal opinion, the Prophet's banner as a symbol of battling injustice within and outside of the Ottoman domains, and Sufi ceremonial—were contested between the center and the centrifugal forces of the city. Of these performances, Sufi ceremonies and rituals have received focused attention in this book as reflections of particular visions of community and authority. Socially, the Sufi mystical concert (samāʿ) envisioned heterogeneous sociabilities that bridged the gap between different social strata, from the nomad to the city-dweller, and between different confessional identities. Politically, anti-puritan defenses of samāʿ explicitly disputed the Ottoman state's efforts to "purify" the public religious space, removing all but legally prescribed ritual. The samāʿ debates further responded to another concern about purity: that of "purifying" the Islamic tradition to remove innovations (bidʿa). To its practitioners, samāʿ was one of the prime examples of a good innovation, hence a perfect counterpoint to the puritan discourse that stigmatized all innovations as illicit corruptions of an unchanging, pure tradition. Furthermore, focusing on performance and its cultural meanings challenges the neat separation between subjects religious and "secular," or, more appropriately, nonreligious. The porousness between two contemporary debates, the debate around the "religious" question of samāʿ and the debate around the "nonreligious" issue of smoking tobacco, shows the inapplicability of this dichotomy to early modernity. The centuries-old arguments that pro-samāʿ authors developed—namely, a defense of communal privacy as a legitimate limit to public authority, the merits of heterogeneous sociability, and the case for good or neutral innovations—were employed by the same authors to defend tobacco and coffeehouse sociability. This concurrence between seemingly unrelated early modern debates indicates a common political agenda of delimiting state-backed moral surveillance in spheres of civic association.

My two methodological interventions—namely, focusing on performance and its contemporary interpretations, and reading religious debates as expressions of social and political visions—aim to recast an important question in a new light. This is the seemingly straightforward question "What was a political text in the early modern period?" The case studies in this book prove the necessity of understanding early modern theological and legal debates as key constituents of Ottoman intellectual history. In using them in this way, I intend to expand the conventional canon of Ottoman intellectual history that is composed of historical works, reform treatises, and, to a lesser extent, ethical-philosophical works.[3] Even though the occasional religious work figures in these discussions, they are often cast in the reductionist binary between legally conformist and legally nonconformist. However, early modern

religious literature is conceptually more imaginative and ambitious than this binary suggests. Above all, this literature shows the misplaced and misleading nature of an exclusively sharia-centered framework of study to understand the role of religion in various spheres of life.

This body of literature also offers a way out of a conundrum that much conventional political writing—particularly advice literature—presents. This conundrum is the presentation of the horizontal relationship between the sultan and the subject as the ultimate political question. The uncritical reproduction of this early modern convention in historiography suppresses the political agencies of a broad array of political actors. To remedy this gap, a thorough appreciation of the key role of early modern Sufism in negotiating political agencies at various levels of the social strata is crucial.

Although a common narrative posits that the political significance of mystical orders waned under the influence of seventeenth-century puritanism, in reality Sufism's role in politics continued to remain paramount, albeit in a new form. Rather than glorifying a messianic ruler as the apex of the universe, the key function of Sufi orders in this period became to transmit Ottoman discourses of civility to the new elite and the urban public sphere in search of new forms of political agency and visibility. Defined as a combination of language, conduct, and social connectedness, Ottoman civility (Rūmī identity) was crafted as part of the distinguishing cultural capital of the elite. From the limited circles of Ottoman bureaucrats and litterateurs, the cultural capital associated with Rūmī distinction found its way to an increasingly upwardly mobile and politicized public. By partaking in discourses of civility, the Ottoman public gained access to cultural capital that allowed them to place themselves in the grand narratives of cosmic, Islamic, or Ottoman history, thereby justifying both political engagement and agency. Sufi orders played a central role in the popularization of these narratives and the cultural capital associated with Rūmī distinction.

The "redistributive" power of Sufi orders was noted with extreme caution in some early modern political works, such as the canonical ethical-political work by the scholar Ḳınalızāde ʿAli Efendi (d. 1572), entitled Aḫlāḳ-ı ʿAlāī. According to Ḳınalızāde, one potential moral disaster in a political community would be for the general public to question the intricacies and secrets of philosophy and sharia. He admonished common people who considered themselves scholarly authorities equal with, or even superior to, the madrasa-educated elite simply by virtue of socializing with the Sufis and learning their teachings:

> If [a person] per chance socialized with some Sufis and read a few couplets from *Mantıku't-Tayr, Gülşen-i Raz, and Zübde-i Hemedānī*, he thinks he is a witty gnostic, a knower of deep truths, and [the equal of] the ʿulamā of sharia. He dares to question [madrasa] students based on snippets of some sciences that he snatched from the mouths of some people and from some Turkish books, and when the student's response does not correspond to what he memorized, he deems the student ignorant.[4]

Ḳınalızāde's condescending remarks betray his apprehension, shared widely among his social class, of the popularization of knowledge and with it the rise of new authority claims. Sufism threatened (or promised, depending on one's vantage point) the

redistribution of authority through knowledge and social capital, a potential best summarized in the maxim "Every man is a caliph in his own realm." In addition to urban publics in a general sense, I have identified specific social groups whose increased political significance and visibility were legitimized by association with Sufi orders. Thus, a close cultural affinity between the secretarial habitus and Sufi orders—mainly the Mevlevīs and Naḳshbandīs—met both practical and ideological needs of Ottoman civil officialdom. On a practical level, Sufi orders provided much of the necessary linguistic training for aspiring civil officials and supplied personnel to the grandee households where civil training and promotion took place. On an ideological level, a linguistically oriented theory of progress gave the civil officials a distinct cultural orientation that distinguished them from the guardians of the juristic sciences, the ʿulamā. Similarly, the changing relationship between the Mevlevīs and the military elite deserves close attention as an expression of the significance of Sufi orders in mediating cultural capital and political legitimacy. The expansion of the Mevlevī network of lodges in the seventeenth century came about as result of the patronage of the military elite. For these new patrons, Mevlevī affiliation was far from a matter of personal spiritual choice; it was an affiliation that placed them in the founding Ottoman myths and narratives. The new political self-image of military patrons was crucially different from that of servitude to the dynasty and corresponded more closely to their new political reality of partnership with the dynasty. The Mevlevī order further reinforced this discourse through producing political narratives of multiple sovereignties. In short, the military elite of the seventeenth century were both patrons of Mevlevī lodges and clients of Mevlevī civility.

Focusing on the cultural and intellectual components of Ottoman public formation shows that early modern publics were intentional and self-aware; they were characterized by reflection on the conditions that enabled the creation of a lively urban public sphere. Assembly itself, for instance, became a topic of discussion in this period. Is socialization between different social strata and religious groups justified? If so, what exactly is the justification? What are the rights of urban communities vis-à-vis public authority? What must the limits to the latter authority be? What is the proper balance between these limits and public order? The same awareness applies to the questions surrounding historical change and novelty. What is a good innovation, and what is a bad innovation? Should public authority intervene in all innovations, or would that constitute privacy? An anti-puritan strand in Ottoman thought developed a cumulative tradition of delimiting public authority in matters pertaining to communal privacy and to innovations. The new functions of Sufism in the decentralized realm of the seventeenth century thus "tamed" the centralist-messianic language of earlier centuries by justifying the delimitation of state-religion in theological and historical terms.

In answering some questions about the early modern public sphere, political expression, and civility, this book has also generated others that I hope will inspire further study. To begin with, I have introduced Ottoman anti-puritanism as an important strand of thought that challenges preconceived assumptions about early

modern religion. Particularly in studies on Islam, a clichéd viewpoint suggests that by its nature, Islamic tradition was incapable of distinguishing between religious and secular; Islam simply pervaded every aspect of life in regions where it was predominant. My analysis of early modern religion, however, suggests the early modern roots of the compartmentalization between the public-political and private-communal aspects of religion.[5] In order to understand this differentiation, textual-intellectual studies must be combined with social-political histories of the groups that produced such intellectual works. In line with this principle, I have emphasized in this book that the early modern differentiation between personal and political aspects of religion did not develop in a vacuum; it developed as a reaction to the notion of state-religion, which was a centrist project that aimed at the identification of religious and political authority. In other words, the compartmentalization of public and private realms was not an amicable separation; it was riddled with disputes over boundaries. In a similar vein, I have emphasized the mutually constitutive nature of "secular" and "religious" by taking *adab* as an example. Although *adab* is often translated as "secular," I underline that *adab* often functioned as a discourse that theorized the boundaries of sharia, and hence is crucial to the understanding of the early modern construction of religion. The increasing differentiation between political and personal, or public and private, Islams requires further study on early modern terms.

Yet another direction for future studies of the early modern Ottoman public sphere presents itself. In this book, I have focused on the testimonies of Muslim male authors nearly exclusively. Despite focusing on sources penned by these authors, however, it has become obvious through my analysis of the "Islamic" treatments of the issues of the period that these issues impinged upon Ottoman society more broadly. For instance, discussions of tobacco show that many of the arguments in favor of this novel import of clearly non-Muslim—first pagan, then Christian—origin had been tested previously in *samāʿ* discussions. In other words, arguments between subjects religious and secular were highly permeable in the early modern period. Furthermore, material goods such as coffee and tobacco were shared across confessional groups, and so were moral arguments about them. Even this partial account, therefore, suggests that the history of the Ottoman public sphere must be written from a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-gendered perspective. It is my hope that future studies will fully realize this important potential for transcending the boundaries that divided different confessional groups by paying attention to performance, sociability, and material culture.

Finally, another important question that emerges from this study is that of the long-term impact of the cultural and intellectual trends that emerged in the seventeenth century. Throughout the book, I have focused on the emergence of two main intellectual trends in this period: Ottoman anti-puritanism and its vision of a delimited central authority, and the concept of multiple sovereignties that facilitated the formation of the public sphere. The lasting legacy of the political justification for the fragmentation of political authority is easier to observe. In this book, I have focused on the emergence of a conception of multiple sovereignties as every man's caliphate

in his own realm. This interpretation of the Sufi notion of caliphate allowed power-holders to justify their place as partners in the Ottoman order. The very language of partnership would characterize the relationship between provincial powerholders, grandee households, and the Ottoman center.[6] The continuity in the nature of politics, therefore, is easily plausible. Further comparative studies between the conceptual worlds of respective powerholders in these periods will uncover the true impact of the seventeenth century on the eighteenth in intellectual terms.

In introducing and describing Ottoman anti-puritanism, I have noted the eighteenth-century reception of the anti-puritan literature produced during the Ḳadızādeli debates. These points merit further scrutiny. The eighteenth-century authors who kept the rich anti-Ḳadızādeli oeuvre alive considered this body of work of not only historical but also intellectual value. Clearly, the theoretical reflections on novelty and innovations, heterogeneous sociability, and the limits of state-religion were of lasting value to Ottoman thinkers and litterateurs of the eighteenth century. In going forward, if one follows the Cambridge School injunction to focus on not only what concepts *are*, but also what concepts *do*, the question of how anti-puritanist thinking shaped eighteenth-century religious and political life remains to be further investigated. How did this tradition, which placed such a high value on circumscribing the religious surveillance of the political authority, respond to the recentralization of Ottoman politics as of the late eighteenth century? Was the continued production of anti-puritan writings a form of nostalgia or a form of criticism? Did the compartmentalization between personal and political aspects of religion continue with full force, or was this trend curbed under the weight of new crises and calls for a strong central authority?

These questions remain to be explored in greater detail for a full appreciation of the long-term impacts of seventeenth-century political and intellectual shifts. Understanding the intellectual dimensions of Ottoman early modernity requires, above all, an appreciation of the key terms through which the Ottoman public sphere expressed their worldviews. The conceptual tools that animated the public debates of the period are not obvious to the modern historian; a simple, retrospective search for the Ottoman translations of modern terms such as "public," "progress," and "communal privacy" in early modern sources would only generate disappointing results. However, these concepts were passionately debated in the early modern Ottoman public sphere. The incommensurability between modern and early modern conceptual vocabularies has long been an obstacle to understanding early modern publics as intellectually creative and expressive agents. My goal in this book has been to discover and explore the specific conceptual worlds of early modern Ottoman publics, toward a fuller appreciation of this rich intellectual and cultural climate. It has been a work of great challenge and passion; my hope is for the book to ease the former and to spark the latter for future studies.

NOTES

1. Certainly, messianic political theologies were known in the Islamic world prior to the sixteenth century. See, for instance, Markiewicz 2019 for the Timurid ideology of messianic kingship and its impact on Ottoman letters in the fifteenth century. However, the sixteenth century was special in that ideology collided with the reality of early modern state building. See Subrahmanyam 2003. For studies of Timurid, Iranian, and Mughal messianic kingship, see Babayan 2002; Manz 2007; Moin 2012. For Ottoman notions of sacred kingship, see Fleischer 1992; Şahin 2013.

2. For the importance of imperial seclusion in early Ottoman ceremony and ideology, see Necipoğlu 1991, 15–21; for the emergence of new visual representations of urban streets as a sign of changing political dynamics, see Kafescioğlu 2019.

3. Bostanzāde 2010, 544–545.

4. To be sure, the study of Sufism in relation to politics has a long history in Ottoman studies. For two foundational studies, see İnalcık 1993; Ocak 2013. Despite these important studies, the insularity of Sufism in intellectual history remains true.

5. Fleischer 2018; Moin 2012, 7–14.

6. *mahdī* and *sāḥib-ḳırān*, respectively.

7. García-Arenal 2006, 5. See also her remarks on apocalyptical thinking as a "history of future" (15).

8. Fleischer 2018.

9. García-Arenal 2006, 15.

10. After this point, the titles continued to be used but in a more down-to earth sense, referring to leadership of the Sunni world. See Şahin 2013, 189; Yılmaz 2018a, 221.

11. For instance, unlike the apocalyptic overtones of *mahdī*/messiah, the term *mujaddīd* (renewer) connoted a more conservative sense of reform as restoring the purity of the early Islamic community. See Garcia-Arenal 2006, 20. For the idea of

renewal (*tajdīd*), and its reception and subversion in early modern Sufism, see Pagani 2007.

12. Hüseyin Yılmaz (2018a) shows how the vocabulary denoting Sufi authority, prophethood, and political power were effectively enmeshed in Ottoman political writing.

13. Moin 2012, 9.

14. Even after the ambitious messianism of the early sixteenth century gave way to a more solemn political discourse, reformism remained an important strand of Ottoman political thought. As Cemal Kafadar remarks, while Ottoman reformist thought had many varieties and strands, these strands—namely, *kānūn*-consciousness and puritan reformism—shared a conception of historical time as a continuous fall from a "Golden Age" situated in the past. See Kafadar 1993.

15. In their article on historical time, Gottfried Hagen and Ethan Menchinger comment on "revelation time" as essentially incompatible with historical time, since the former does not conceive the future as potentially different from the past. This claim disregards a rich Islamic intellectual history of discussions on the nature of revelation, which include the possibility of new linguistic articulations of a nonlinguistic revelation that would potentially unravel in novel forms in the present and the future. See Hagen and Menchinger 2014, 95. The discussion on the nature of revelation is one of the sources on which I base my analysis of an early modern theory of progressive tradition.

16. As Cornell Fleischer emphasizes, the Ottoman polity especially under Süleymān I was "remarkable . . . for innovation that is often extreme, and for experimentation that sometimes verges on the ad hoc." Fleischer 1992, 159. Nevertheless, the justification of such innovation was often couched as practical and administrative necessity, or as necessary evil. The most articulate expression of this notion of innovation as an inevitable necessity is Ibn Khaldun's dynastic cyclism. For the reception of Ibn Khaldun's conception of time in Ottoman letters, see Fleischer 1983; Sariyannis and Tuşalp-Atiyas 2019, 279–325.

17. I use "state-religion" in the specific sense of the instrumentalization of sharia-centered politics to instill obedience and enforce social discipline, as suggested by Derin Terzioğlu (2012–13). The term intends to distinguish the sharia-centered, state-sponsored version of Islam from other contemporary interpretations and hence to challenge the understanding of the official-juristic version as the singular interpretation of religio-political authority.

18. For instance, Kātib Çelebi (d. 1657) argues matter-of-factly that the official fatwās to eradicate the Sufi musical rituals (*samā ʿ*) from public space were motivated by the desire to reinforce the state's political power (*fetvāların aşlı ekser ṭaraf-ı salṭanat cānibini ḥimāye içindir*). Kātib Çelebi 1990, 201. See chapters 2, 5, and 6 of this book for more examples of this contemporary sentiment.

19. For the full exposition of these two discourses, see chapters 5 and 6, respectively.

20. Early modern Ottoman civility was connected with other discourses on civility (namely, *adab* and *akhlāḳ*), but was unique, as it developed within the specific geographical and historical context of early modern Rūm. For the connection between civility as *paedia* and *adab*, see Ahmed 2015, 380. In a recent article, Katharina Ivanyi

has also underlined the close connection between moral conduct (*adab*, *akhlāq*) and the construction of citizenship in the early modern state. See Ivanyi 2020a. Both Ahmed's and Ivanyi's analyses take their cue from Peter Brown in Brown 1984. In my discussion, I use "civility" and refrain from using the term *adab*, as modern scholarship predominantly pairs *adab* with secularity as understood in contemporary terms. For a criticism of this pairing, which does not reflect the historical understanding of *adab*, see Alshaar 2020. Instead, I use the term "civility" to underline the interconnected nature of speech, piety, ethics, and politics. See also chapter 5 in this book.

21. Kafadar 2007b; Özbaran 2017.

22. Fleischer 1986, 253–261; Yılmaz 2018a, 285.

23. Kafadar 2007b, 12.

24. For the important role of Sufi authors in informal training in Ottoman rhetoric, a key component of Rūmī identity, see Gürbüzel 2016, 2020.

25. *Pes herkesin hilāfet-i ilāhiyyeden istiʿdādı mikdārı ḥisse-i muʿāyenesi vardır.* Anḳaravī 2002, 51. For the use of mystical thought in justifying the political authority of various levels of Ottoman bureaucracy and military, see Öztürk, 2015, 434–492.

26. For the elite's various reactions to the political agency of the public, see chapter 1 in this book.

27. For a strong argument showing the Islamic justifications of the limits of sharia, with a focus on juristic theories, see Jackson 2017.

28. For the coexistence of these two modes of governmentality in the early modern state, see chapter 1.

29. Kafadar 2007a; Tezcan 2010.

30. See Zilfi 1986; Çavuşoğlu 1990. Recently, these debates have been placed in a long-term trajectory of Sunna-minded social discipline efforts that the Ottoman state consistently applied from the mid-fifteenth century. For an overview of this historiography, see Tuşalp-Atiyas 2019. See also Krstic 2016, 65–91; Terzioğlu 2012.

31. Throughout the book, I use "Sufi networks" to refer to ethical communities formed around charismatic Sufi sheikhs deliberately, and in contradistinction to "Sufism" as a broad set of mechanisms of ethical self-formation. For the importance of this distinction, see chapter 1.

32. For the Persianate as a connected cultural sphere, see the recent collection of essays in Green 2019.

33. For an overview of the institution of the caliphate until 1517, with reference to relevant literature, see Hayrettin Yücesoy, "Caliph and Caliphate up to 1517," *EI3*.

34. Although many accounts of the caliphate argue that the Ottomans started to use the title "caliph" after they put an end to Mamluk rule in 1517, they used the title in this mystical sense much earlier. For the late provenance of the theory that the caliphate was transferred from the Abbasids through the Mamluks, see Buzpınar 2004. For the early use of the notion of the godly caliphate (*ḫilāfat-i raḥmānī*), during the reign of Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512), see Markiewicz 2019, 151–191.

35. Qurān 38/26, the verse on which Sufis based the notion of the deputyship of God on Earth. Despite Qurānic and other precedents, the full articulation of the

mystical notion of the "perfect man" and the caliphate can be found in the oeuvre of Ibn ʿArabī (d. 1240). See Izutsu 1984, 147–262.

36. Yılmaz 2018a, 199.

37. Yılmaz 2018a, 183, 199.

38. For a study focusing on the broader reception of theories of the caliphate, see Hassan 2018.

39. Markiewicz 2019, 142.

40. For this point, see also Yılmaz 2018a, 281–282.

41. Casale 2015, 508. See also Lambourn 2011;.

42. This bias is the result of the projection of a Habermasian idealized public based on a historically reductionist reading of eighteenth-century Europe onto other contexts. On the historians' emendations of Habermas's portrayal of the early modern public sphere, see Baker 1992; Mah 2000. For a classic argument on the lack of civil society in the Ottoman Empire based on a Weberian framework of patrimonialism, see Mardin 1969.

43. Yılmaz (2018a) shows the broad appeal of notions of divinely ordained rule—not only through this argument, but also by paying attention to processes of vernacularization and by incorporating political authors in diverse social positions. For prophecy and millenarian beliefs as vectors of public opinion, see also Flemming 2018b.

44. For an overview of the impact of Weber's framework on the mis-categorization of Ottoman policy as absolutist, see Şahin 2013, 247–250.

45. For a recent work arguing that the public sphere was a Western phenomenon, based on a genealogy stretching from the Greek polis to the French Revolution, see Warner 2002. For applications of the term to the Ottoman Empire, and to premodern Islamic societies respectively, see Kafadar 2005; Hoexter, Eisenstadt, and Levtzion 2002; Rahimi 2012; Arjomand 2004.

46. For discussion of the Ottomans within the larger framework of early modernity, see Kafadar 1994; Aksan and Goffman 2007; Darling 2008. A recent review of Ottoman scholarship is offered by Şahin 2017a; Markiewicz 2018.

47. Withington 2007, 1018.

48. Campbell 2012, 17. For this argument, see also Beik 2005.

49. Summarizing the interdependence of the official and the nonofficial, Peter R. Campbell defines France as a "baroque state": a state that aimed to rise above its "people" but was inextricably linked with its society. Campbell 2012.

50. Breen 2007, 23. For further references to the early modern state from a similar perspective, see Smith 2005.

51. Peter Lake and Steven Pincus emphasize these two political developments as markers of early modernity. See Lake and Pincus 2006.

52. Michael Breen's discussion of *avocats* in France presents a parallel analysis of the role of *avocats* as intermediaries between the state and society. See Breen 2007.

53. For South Asia, see Hasan 2004. For Safavid Iran, see Matthee 2009.

54. For a classification of diverse modes of public-state relationships, see Chambers and Kopstein 2006. Along similar lines, in a recent study, Noah Salomon criticizes the

expectation that the public sphere must necessarily be defined as an antagonist of the state. On the contrary, he argues, Sudan's Islamist civil society collaborated with the state through dialogue. See Salomon 2018. For Habermas's emphasis on the role of the public "as a critical authority, and as a locus of judgment," see Habermas 1989, particularly 89–129.

55. In using the language of partnership, I refer to Ali Yaycıoğlu's work. Yaycıoğlu uses the term in reference to the eighteenth century, when the "partnership" between the state and local actors, in his case local notables, was made official through written financial agreements such as lifetime contracts (*mālikāne*). See Yaycıoğlu 2012. Despite the absence of such formal settlements, the seventeenth century saw the rise of proto-ʿayān, in Metin Kunt's words, attesting to earlier instances of delegation of imperial power. See also İnalcık 1977, 1980. For details of this discussion, and on the concept of intermediation in the early modern state, see chapter 1 of this book. "Power brokers" is an incisive and fruitful paradigm for studying Sufism in early modern societies, but it has not been explored sufficiently to date. For an important exception, see Emre 2017.

56. For a statement of this position, see Calhoun 1992, 1–50. See also Mah 2000.

57. For an essay cautioning against the idealization of the early modern public sphere's egalitarianism, see Mah 2000. For the gender-exclusive strategies of the public sphere, see Fraser 1990. On the notion of multiple publics, see Warner 2002.

58. "The sovereignty of the people," even in political idioms emphasizing its significance, could be interpreted in a variety of ways, including in the complete opposite way. A well-known example is Thomas Hobbes's reinterpretation of the sovereignty of the people with the principle "The king is the people." See Canovan 2006.

59. On the idea of a performative rather than a solely discursive public forum, see Gardiner 2004. Gardiner emphasizes that Bakhtin's carnivalesque public is more realistic than Habermas's rational public—not only because it accounts for nondiscursive expression, but also because it foregrounds the plurality of publics, along with potential conflict between different publics. In his analysis of the early modern Ottoman coffeehouse, Uğur Kömeçoğlu similarly underlines "the theatrical and carnivalesque forms of expression" that were formed in the coffeehouse and contributed to the formation of a critical public. See Kömeçoğlu 2005, 19.

60. For an essay emphasizing the varieties of public visibility, see Raymond 2004. For essays arguing that claims to moral authority effectively formed the discursive justification of a critical public sphere in Tokugawa Japan and Ming and Qing China, respectively, see Berry 1998; Wakeman 1998.

61. See Eisenstadt and Schluchter 1998. The editors of this special issue on multiple early modernities differentiate between this form of public sphere and "civil society of the western democracy type," where in the latter case the criticism of authority is discursively justified by popular sovereignty.

62. Lake 2017.

63. For a recent volume of essays on changing forms of public expression in early modern Islamicate empires, see Rizvi 2018. For an analysis of changing forms of visibility in the Ottoman Empire, see Artan 1993, 2012. For the changing norms of visibility with special attention to urbanity, see Kaicker 2020; Şahin and Rahimi 2018.

64. İnalcık 1992. Arjomand 2004 takes a similar approach. See also the collection of essays in Hoexter, Eisenstadt, and Levtzion 2002.

65. For the importance of justice in Ottoman administrative mentality, see Darling 2013; Necipoğlu 1991, 84–86.

66. Faroqhi 1992.

67. In several other articles, Faroqhi revists and expounds on the theme of registers of complaints and petitions (*mühimme ve şikayet defterleri*) as indicators of popular political involvement. See Faroqhi 1995.

68. İnalcık 1992. For an overview of Suraiya Faroqhi's contribution to understanding nonelite political activity, see Gara, Kabadayı, and Neumann 2011, 10–19. Faroqhi's early works on the petitions and political activities of the Ottoman public inspired two recent studies on Ottoman civic culture writ large: Anastasopoulos 2012; Gara, Kabadayı, and Neumann 2011. The main themes covered in these two volumes are similar: rebellion and unrest, petitioning the sultan, and local and associational bodies of governance. Both volumes discuss questions of public political participation using the phrase "from the bottom up."

69. Sariyannis 2013. Here, I largely follow Baki Tezcan's characterization of the early modern empire in terms of the expansion of the political nation and the delimitation of royal authority. See Tezcan 2010.

70. On the state of household studies, see Abou-El-Haj 1974; Hathaway 1999; Kunt 2012. For the rise of the vizieral household, see also Yılmaz 2016.

71. Ekin Tuşalp-Atiyas underlines the gap in the study of bureaucratic institutions between their regulation in the sixteenth century and the modernization efforts of the late eighteenth century. See Tuşalp-Atiyas 2013, 6. See also Tezcan 2009b; 2010, 72–76.

72. Kafadar 2007a; Raymond 1991; Yılmaz 2011.

73. For a study of the guilds as civic institutions, see Yi 2011.

74. Kafadar 2007a. For a recent analysis of popular participation in urban protests, see Sariyannis 2019.

75. Cemal Kafadar and Baki Tezcan define "constitution" as the unwritten rules governing the conduct of the sultan. For a historical account of the recourse to social contracts during janissary rebellions, see Kafadar 2007a. Kafadar underlines the use of the term *kanun-ı kadim* as a social contract asserting janissaries' rights in the imperial order. While implicit, this constitutional understanding found explicit expression at times of clash and rebellion. For a definition, see Tezcan 2001, 266; Hüseyin Yılmaz 2015.

76. For the place of the circle of justice in Ottoman political culture, see Darling 2013, 127–154.

77. For the limited nature of Ottoman literacy in the seventeenth century, see Quinn 2016, 85–118. Quinn shows the low rate of book ownership in Istanbul, and more significantly the overwhelming presence of *efendi*s among book owners, a finding that suggest that book ownership was still largely a trait of the madrasa-trained individuals.

78. Moin 2012, 8–15.

CHAPTER I. POLITICS AS SPECTACLE

1. On the Yenikapı Mevlevī Lodge as a janissary site, see Kafadar 2007a, 128. See also chapter 3 in this book.

2. The document codes are, respectively, Topkapı Palace TS MA.e. 797/33; 795/47; 795/37. The vizieral-sultanic communications (telḥis, ḥaṭṭ) are included in five folders from TS.MA.e 795 to 799, all dated August 8, 1648 (18 Receb 1048). The dating is odd; it coincides with the exact day that Sultan İbrāhīm I was eventfully dethroned and replaced by Meḥmed IV. It is likely that the set of documents was retrospectively dated to the beginning of the reign of Meḥmed IV. While some ḥaṭṭ notes on the file match İbrāhīm's handwriting as seen on TSMA E. 7022 (dated 1641), the majority of ḥaṭṭ notes are likely to have belonged to Meḥmed IV.

3. TS Ma.e. 796/41, 1058 B 18: ʿĀdil Köşkü önünde ḥaḳḳından gelinecek büyük kimesne gerekdir. Ḥālā Rūmili'nde aḥz olunan Bıçakçıoğlu nām şaḳī gelmek üzeredir, ol geldikde ʿaḍil köşkü önünde cezāsı virilse münāsib olur. Ve ānā benzer şāḳiler ele girdikçe olur. For the ideological significance of the Tower of Justice, see Necipoğlu 1991, 57–59.

4. Bıçakçıoğlu was among the group of soldiers who supported the ʿulamā who gathered at the Fatih Mosque on February 5, 1623. The protesters demanded the deposition of Sultan Mustafa I, who was deemed insane. In the ensuing armed clash, nineteen mosque-goers, most of whom were students, were killed. See Kātib Çelebi 2007, 704–705; Feridun Emecen, "Mustafa I," DİA.

5. TS Ma.e. 795/99. For a similar case of execution decorum, see TS Ma.e. 798/98. For the practice of ignominius parading in Islamic law, see Lange 2007. While ignonimous parading is discussed in legal literature, the Ottoman practice has not been studied.

6. Bostanzāde 2010, 544–545.

7. For a historiographical survey of the study of politics as performance, see Burke 2005. For Mughal sovereignty in relation to theatricality, see Moin 2012, 110–112.

8. Thompson 1971.

9. Natalie Z. Davis's work on popular violence represents an influential example of the anthropological-historical interpretation of crowd action. For an overview and comparison of Davis's and Thompson's methodologies, see Desan 1989.

10. Darling 2007; 2013, 7–8. For the classical work of Halil İnalcık on decrees of justice, see İnalcık 1965.

11. Kafadar 2007a. For the constitutionalist implications of janissary politics, see also Tezcan 2010, 213–224; Hüseyin Yılmaz 2015.

12. Hüseyin Yılmaz 2015, 245.

13. This pictorial representation was part of a series of miniature depictions of Ottoman cities in his An Account of the Stages of the Campaign on Two Iraḳs (Beyân-ı Menâzil-i Sefer-i Irâkeyn), which chronicles the Eastern campaign of Süleymān I from 1533 to 1536. For Matraḳçı's depiction of Istanbul, see Matraḳçı Naṣūḥ 1976, 162–164; Kuban 2012, 227–230; Du Tanney 1996, 56–64.

14. Doğan Kuban argues that the miniature is representational rather than precise and descriptive; it reflects how Naṣūḥ imagined the capital, as an assembly of monuments.

This observation is supported by factual inaccuracies in the depiction. See Kuban 2012, 227. See also Du Tanney 1996, 56.

15. Kafescioğlu 2009, 59, 136. Necdet Sakaoğlu, "Atmeydanı," *DBİA* 1:414–418.

16. Foucault and Miskowiec 1986, 25.

17. Semavi Eyice, "Üçler Mescidi," *DBİA*, 7:334; Ayvansarayī 2000, 38–39.

18. Evliyā Çelebi 1999–2006, 1:222. Evliyā calls the mosque "Parmaklı Mescid near Dikilitaş."

19. On Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj and his martrydom, see Karamustafa 2007, 25–26. Later Sufis took the expression to be a perfect encapsulation of the experience of self-annihilation—namely, of the mystic's losing his self in the higher divine consciousness to the point that he cannot distinguish between himself and the Godhead.

20. For the full range of testimonies, see Niyazioğlu 2021, 97–122.

21. According to Atāī, himself a member of this order, Maʿşūkī had a large following in Istanbul and Edirne that included a good number of the military. See Öngören 2012, 286–298; Gölpınarlı 2013, 48–54. For the general principles of the Bayrami-Melami doctrine, see Ocak 2013, 258–268. For a recent overview of the Bayrāmī-state conflict in the sixteenth century that reflects the state of scholarship, see Yavuz 2013, 89–130. For a Melāmī source critical of Maʿşuḳī's public preaching, see Erünsal 1994, 95–115.

22. Düzdağ 1972, 196.

23. Evliyā Çelebi 1999–2006, 1:222, also cited in Niyazioğlu 2021, 113.

24. Niyazioğlu 2021.

25. Eyice, "Üçler Mescidi."

26. For this renovation and the text of the tombstone, see Gölpınarlı 2013, 49.

27. For this mosque, known as the Kayalar Mescidi, see Ayvansarayī 2000, 436.

28. For a review of scholarship on the long sixteenth century, understood as the period between 1453 and the late sixteenth century, see Şahin 2017a.

29. For seclusion, see Necipoğlu 1991, 15–21.

30. Boyar and Fleet 2010, 28–71.

31. Darling 2013, 132.

32. See, for instance, the historian Selānikī's criticism of Murād III for discontinuing the ritual of Cuma Selamlığı in Boyar and Fleet 2010, 31–32. İpşirli 2015, 398.

33. Mehmet İpşirli, "Tebdil Gezmek," *DİA*; Uzunçarşılı 1984, 59–61.

34. The literature on Ottoman imperial festivities is rich. For a recent article reflecting the state of the art, see Felek and İşkorkutan 2019.

35. Şahin 2018, 473.

36. Şahin 2018, 496.

37. Necipoğlu 1991, 30.

38. Şahin 2018, 473.

39. Terzioğlu 1995, 92–93.

40. Kafescioğlu 2019, 23.

41. Kuban 2012, 230.

42. *mecmaʿ-ı erbāb-ı tuğyān*. Rāşid Efendi 2013, 2:659. For Atmeydanı and Etmeydanı as public squares and sites of political dissent as of the 1580s, see Kafadar 2005, 79.

43. Tezcan 2010, particularly chapter 6, "The Second Empire Goes Public."

44. By this term, I refer to the periodization developed by Linda Darling (2002). For Ottomanist historiography's engagament with and criticism of the decline narrative, see Howard 1988; Kafadar 1997–98; Quataert 2003.

45. Linda Darling specifices the middle period as starting in 1550, but my understanding, based on the changing constellation of the political public, places the shift in 1580s. In this, I follow the argument of Tezcan 2010. Suraiya Faroqhi also notes the 1570s as a watershed moment, when economic balances shifted dramatically in a way that transformed the social-political sphere. Faroqhi 1987.

46. For an analysis of Ottoman bureaucratic consciousness, see Fleischer 1986; Şahin 2013.

47. For the use of partnership for the eighteenth century, known as the age of ʿayān, see Yaycıoğlu 2017. For similar processes of delegation of power in the seventeenth century, or the rise of "proto-ʿayān," see Kunt 2014. In light of this seventeenth-century background to the rise of local magnates and decentralized ruling practices, I use Yaycıoğlu's framework of "partnership" for the period under consideration in this book.

48. The following account of alternatives to the Ottoman dynasty is based on the seminal article by Feridun Emecen (2011).

49. Emecen 2011; Terzioğlu 1999, 346–354; Kırımlı and Yaycıoğlu 2017.

50. Rumor had it, for instance, that the queen mother Kösem Sultan (d. 1651) was to marry the powerful Bektaş Ağa, a move that would terminate the rule of the House of Osman and start a new dynasty from their progeny. See Emecen 2011.

51. On the rivalry between the House of Osman and powerful households such as the Köprülü and the İbrahim Hanzade, see Emecen 2011.

52. Naʿīmā 2007, 4:1877.; Kafadar 2007a; Tezcan 2010, 222–24; Emecen 2011, 72–73; Sariyannis 2013, 94; Yılmaz 2008.

53. *Kul Allahındır, sen bir mütevellisin.* Evliyā Çelebi 1999–2006, 5:9.

54. In terms of a timeline, Emecen points to the seventeenth century as a period when the sentiment was strongly felt. He considers that this was an important transformation, although it did not come to full fruition until the early nineteenth century. See Emecen 2011, 49–50. On the evolving meanings of the term *devlet*/power-state, see Sariyannis 2013.

55. Greene 2010. Rifaʾat Abou-El-Haj, on the other hand, dates the same transformation to the period between Koçi Bey and Naima, roughly 1630 to 1710. See Abou-El-Haj 2005, 18–23.

56. Faroqhi 1987; İnalcık 1980.

57. İnalcık 1994.

58. For these changes, see also Özel 2013.

59. Barkey 1994.

60. Kafadar 2007a, 116–117; Yılmaz 2011, 71–83.

61. Kafadar 2007a; Yılmaz 2011, 175–243.

62. For studies on the changes in dynastic succession, see Börekçi 2009; also Peirce 1993, 98–103; Tezcan 2010, 46–47.

63. For an exposition of the idea that legitimacy should be considered a contract between the ruler and the ruled, see Hagen 2005.

64. Kafadar 2007a; Tezcan 2010; Yılmaz 2011. Hüseyin Yılmaz synthesizes these two approaches in Yılmaz 2008.

65. For an analysis of these two events, see Yi 2011.

66. For the details of this event, see Kātib Çelebi 2007; 844–845; Naʿīmā 2007, 2:769–771.

67. For an analysis of networks of public politics that formed around provincial judges, see Gürbüzel 2018.

68. For this point, see Kafadar 2007a. Marinos Sariyannis has recently underlined the public dimension of seventeenth-century rebellions in Sariyannis 2019. Sariyannis underlines the derogatory language that the chronicles used in referring to the urban crowds, and their overall disinterest in relaying the commoner's point of view.

69. Raymond 1991; Kafadar 2007a. This is one of the main arguments of Yılmaz 2011, particularly 189–250.

70. Yi 2011. While the discussion here focuses largely on Istanbul's urban public, similar urban networks of mobilization were formed in other major urban centers of the empire. See, for instance, similar studies on Syrian cities: Rafeq 1997; Wilkins 2010.

71. Ṣāfī 2003, 1:31. On İmām Sāfi as a historian, see Kütükoğlu 1994; Murphey 2005, 1:5–24.

72. On this criticism of Aḥmed I, see Rüstem 2016. Rüstem studies the dome closing as the dynasty's response to the wide-scale public criticism, which deemed Sultan Ahmed I unworthy of building an imperial mosque, since he had won no military victories that would earn him the privilege.

73. Kafadar 1993.

74. Zilfi 1988, 96–106.

75. The content of the examinations and their role in promotion remain an under-researched topic. For an exception, see el-Rouayheb 2015, 127–128.

76. Kātib Çelebi 2007, 882–883; Sahillioğlu 1965, 14. For more Ottoman scholarly examinations, see el-Rouayheb 2015, 127–128.

77. Kātib Çelebi 2007, 882.

78. ʿAṭāī 2020, 2:1300–1301. For more examples of scholarly examinations held in mosques, see 1:549; 1078; 1601.

79. On the life and works of Eremia Çelebi Kömürciyan, see Kömürciyan 1952, IX-XXVII; Ivanova 2017. For Eremia Çelebi's description of the Plane Tree Incident, see Kömürciyan 1957.

80. Kömürciyan 1957, 58. Etmeydanı, literally "Meat Square," was the site where the food for janissary barracks was distributed. Rebellions often started with the janissaries toppling the cauldrons, refusing to eat the sultan's food. For this square and its surrounding district, densely populated with janissaries, see Yılmaz 2011, 123–134. The refusal to go to the Friday prayer was a politically symbolic act that denounced the legitimacy of the sultan. See the Friday prayer debate during the 1703 rebellion in Rāşid

Efendi 2013, 659–660. In the Plane Tree Incident, sources other than Eremia do not mention the Friday prayer.

81. The pasha's efforts to suppress the initial protest by force were considered an unwise provocation. See Naʿīmā 2007, 4:1649–1651.

82. Münir Aktepe, "Çınar Vakʿası," *DİA*. There is some variety in accounts of the names and numbers of the officials demanded by the janissaries. With the exception of Abdi Paşa, most sources agree on the number thirty. See Abdi Paşa 2018, 86; Naʿīmā 2007, 4:1650; Kömürciyan 1957, 60.

83. Kömürciyan 1957, 60–62.

84. Abdi Paşa 2018, 88; Kömürciyan 1957, 62.

85. Kömürciyan 1957, 65.

86. Ivanova 2017, 247.

87. Dağlı 2010.

88. Throughout the diary, some entries are revised by others dated a few days later. This feature suggests that the notes were taken on a daily basis, rather than written after the end of the events. Compare, for instance, the entries for July 8 and July 17 in Kömürciyan 1957, 73–74.

89. According to Eremia Çelebi, the list included the sultan's mother, who was forgiven when the child sultan cried profusely. Kömürciyan 1957, 60. Other sources do not include the queen mother. See Meḥmed Ḥalīfe 1986, 54.

90. For a biography of Ṭurḫan Sultan (Küçük Vālide), see Thys-Şenocak 2016, 17–46. For Melekī Ḫatun, see Peirce 1993, 144; Naʿīmā 2007, 4:1657. Her name was spelled alternatively as Mülkī Ḫātun in contemporary sources, which might be a covert allusion to her wealth or greed.

91. Kömürciyan 1957, 64. For Ṭurḫan Sultan's patronage of books, see İsmail Erünsal, "Turhan Vālide Sultan Kütüphanesi," *DİA*. Abdi Paşa's account includes neither a Melekī nor her husband, Şaʿbān Ağa. See Abdi Paşa 2018, 88–89.

92. Kömürciyan 1957, 64–65.

93. Evliyā Çelebi 1999–2006, 5:10.

94. For instance, he describes how the janissaries made cold-blooded jokes about the corpses while simultaneously cutting them up. Evliyā Çelebi 1999–2006, 5:9–10.

95. For the Prophet's banner in relation to palace ceremonial, see Uzunçarşılı 1984, 248–260.

96. Naʿīmā 2007, 4:1320. For the full treatment of 1651, see 4:1319–1356.

97. Uzunçarşılı 1947, 3:249–259; Yi 2004, 213–234.

98. Hamadeh 2008, 11–14. Unlike Hamadeh, who considers the term relevant to an eighteenth-century Istanbulite phenomenon, Faroqhi uses the term *décloisonnement* to define a shift in historiographical constructions of seventeenth-century urban society, whereby the public is imagined less as a set of compartmentalized, isolated groups and more in terms of porous boundaries.

99. Hamadeh 2008, 12.

100. For an overview of the historiographical approaches to the commoner's political agency in the Ottoman Empire, which also reflects on the dearth of studies

on crowds as political actors, see Gara, Kabadayi, and Neumann, 2011, 3–10. For studies on the representation of commoners in early modern historical and political works, see Kafadar 2007; Sariyannis 2005.

101. Sariyannis 2019, 176.

102. Evliyā Çelebi 1999–2006, 5:9.

103. For an overview, see Uzunçarşılı 1947, 3:504–508. For an analysis of this crisis with attention to notions of order, see Konrad 2019.

104. My account of the events is based on Defterdār 1995, 265–282. For detailed analyses of this crisis, see also Yi 2011.

105. Yi 2011, 126.

106. Defterdār 1995: ḥaşerāt, 268; sürbe, 270, 280; erāzil, ḫazele, rezele, 271, 277, 280. For a full analysis of the full host of derogatory references to inobedient publics, see Sariyannis 2005.

107. Defterdār (1995, 280) uses "ḥalḳ" and "şehirli" for these publics, and further legitimizes their actions by saying that they moved by the divine will (sevk-i irādetullah ile).

108. Kātib Çelebi 2007, 1033. For another example of the early usage of the term umūr-i cumhūr as public affairs, see Yılmaz 2018a, 5, 227.

109. Kafadar 2007a, 133. Based on the comparison with the Tunisian and Algerian administrations, Kafadar infers that the term must have referred to a janissary oligarchy.

110. In applying the term "governmentality" to the intersections of religious and political authority in general, and to the distinction between Sufi and Taymiyyan theologies in particular, I follow Ovamir Anjum's analysis in Anjum 2011. While Anjum's argument touches upon the notions of uniform standards and communal autonomy as competing notions of governmentality, he does not develop this, as his main preoccupation is with the argument that Sufism is a site of hierarchy whereas Taymiyyan thought is one of egalitarianism. I argue that within the early modern Ottoman context, the guiding tension was one between uniformity and diversity, rather than between hierarchy and egalitarianism. As I show in this book, egalitarianism was alien to both sides of the debate.

111. Ahmet T. Karamustafa defines Sufi piety with these terms in Karamustafa 2018. Karamustafa underlines that the Shiis, Sufis, and cult of saints emphasized belonging rather than sharia confirmation, noting that "the dominance of shari'a-minded piety was always limited and contested." Karamustafa 2018, 160.

112. For the full articulation of this argument, see Çavuşoğlu 1990. See also Ocak 1983. For the long-term presence of puritan-leaning political reform movements in Ottoman history, see Kafadar 1993." In order to refer to this worldview, Derin Terzioğlu and Ekin Atiyas use the terms "shariʿa-mindedness," or "Sunna-mindedness." See Tuşalp-Atiyas 2019; Terzioğlu 2012. While I employ this terminology in the book, I also acknowledge that a better term is needed, given the differences and steady conflict between the jurist's sharia, the Sufi's sharia, and the puritan preacher's sharia. In this sense, it bears emphasizing that when I refer to a "sharia consciousness," the doctrinal

position to which I refer is not related to the juristic culture; rather, I refer to an emphasis on the eradication of innovations.

113. For the absolutist interludes as a reaction to the rise of new foci of power, see Tezcan 2010, 128–149. For a detailed study of the idealization of authoritarian rule in the declinist political writing of the period, see Çipa 2017.

114. Gürbüzel 2016; Terzioğlu 2010.

115. Çavuşoğlu 1990; Terzioğlu 2010.

116. This point is important in understanding the public sphere, as the notion of a civic culture hinges on the individual's ability to choose a political community. In fact, early scholarly literature that declared Islamic societies incapable of fostering civic political cultures operated based on assumptions that the *umma* did not offer its members any opportunities to form and choose social associations. For the classic statement on this idea, see Gellner 1995, 32–55. Although Gellner's analysis is problematic in its approach to both Islam and nationalism, it remained influential for a long time. For the impact of Gellner's analysis on the theoretical literature on civil society and the Middle East, see Niblock 2007.

117. For the importance of the concept of social discipline in understanding sharia-minded reform, see Terzioğlu 2012–13.

118. Marinos Sariyannis and Baki Tezcan have both noted that one of the important differences between Birgivī and the Ḳadızādeli movement was that the latter discontinued Birgivī's strong criticism of the cash waqf. While they explain this divergence with the Ḳadızādeli social alliance with a mercantile ethic, one might also consider this divergence as a changing political position from criticism to conformist-absolutism. See Sariyannis 2012; Tezcan 2019, 232.

119. The pioneering book in this literature has been Krstić 2011. See also Krstić 2019; Terzioğlu 2012–13; Shafir 2019.

120. For a discussion of the confessionalization literature and its relevance for the Ottoman context, see Terzioğlu 2012–13. For a concise analysis of the link between confessionalization and state building, with references to the relevant historical literature, see Gorski 2003.

121. Burak 2013; Terzioğlu 2013.

122. Greene 1996; Baer 2004.

123. For a historiographical comparison that emphasizes this fundamental difference between the Habsburg and Ottoman contexts, see Yılmaz 2017.

124. Winter 2010; Baltacıoğlu-Brammer 2014. For the Bektāshīs as critics of the Sunnitization process, see Yaycıoğlu 2018, and the literature cited therein.

125. For the importance of intermediation as a key political and religious term, see Gürbüzel 2016, 1–20. In acknowledging the agencies of local communities vis-à-vis legal institutions, legal studies of court cases have assumed an important role. For some of the important works in this growing literature, see Başaran 2014; Peirce 2003.

126. The Ḳadızādeli movement is often studied through third-party accounts, such as those of chroniclers or political observers. Close study of Ḳadızāde Meḥmed's own writings, and of his Ottoman critics, is still in its infancy. In addition to Tezcan 2019, an exceptional study is Curry 2005; see also Curry 2010, 267–291.

127. Ivanyi 2020b; Le Gall 2004; Terzioğlu 2010; Tezcan 2019.

128. Ivanyi 2020b, 89.

129. A related and helpful conceptual distinction is the one between mysticism and Sufism, the latter being a tradition of moral self-discipline in accordance with the precepts of sharia. For this distinction between Sufism and mysticism, see Buehler 2011, 36–58. For a classification of Sufism into ascetic (*zühd*), love-mysticism, and *melāmetī* ideal types with reference to early modern Ottoman Sufism, see Terzioğlu 1999.

130. For Birgivī's opinion on these practices, see Ivanyi 2020b, 90.

131. Ivanova 2017.

132. Ivanova 2017, 253.

133. For studies on neomartyrs, see Zachariadou 1990–91; Gara 2005/6.

134. Ivanova 2017, 258.

135. Armanios 2011, 89–90.

136. Armanios 2011, 65–90.

137. Armanios, 2011, 89.

138. For a review of recent historiographical criticisms of this view, see Edith Gülçin Ambros, Ebru Boyar, Palmira Brummett, Kate Fleet, and Svetla Ianeva, "Ottoman Women in Public Space: An Introduction," in Boyar and Fleet 2016, 1–17.

139. Börekçi 2009; Peirce 2008.

140. Peirce 2003; Ze'evi 1995.

141. Boyar and Fleet 2016, 91–127. It must be noted that Fleet's evidence comes mostly from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Tülay Artan underlines the importance of the timeline, as well as social class. Cf. Artan 2012, 396–401.

CHAPTER 2. OTTOMAN ANTI-PURITANISM

1. al-Ghazālī, *Kimiyā al-Saʿāda*, 1:474, translated and cited in Ingenito 2021, 485.

2. Naẓmi Efendi 2005, 426–427.

3. For a list of the ninety-nine names and their English translations, see Samer Akkach, "Beautiful Names of God," *EI3*. For the Perfect Man as the actualization of the divine names, see Takeshita 1983. In theoretical Sufi texts, such as the corpus of Ibn ʿArabī, the embodiment of divine names is discussed in relation to the Perfect Man (*quṭb*), who embodies all divine names at once. The notion of collective virtue as embodied in hagiographies shows that Ibn ʿArabī's theory was repurposed in novel ways by Sufi communities.

4. In modern historiography, the former understanding of piety as normative conformity is often considered to be the default description of piety in the early modern period. See Ivanyi 2020b; Shafir 2019. The analysis in this chapter suggests that early modern agents defined piety through different modalities. In addition to piety as strict norm abidance (*taḳvā*), one should consider the paradigm of piety as social belonging (*ṣalāḥ*). These two forms of piety corresponded to two visions of governmentality. The former, *taḳvā*, envisioned a homogeneous society with uniform, standardized norms upheld by a strong center. On the other hand, I argue that *ṣalāḥ*, as a socially defined

conception of piety centering on belongingness and membership, was an important vector of the formation and sustenance of a powerful urban political public. For a detailed exposition of this latter conception of piety and its relationship to urban citizenship, see Gürbüzel 2018. For a useful analysis of Islamic visions of community, see Karamustafa 2014. Karamustafa argues that a unified, singular community of Muslims (*umma*) existed but as "an *ideal* and *idealized* conception developed by Muslim cultural elites and religious functionaries as a *normative vision* of Muslim social existence." Karamustafa 2014, 94. In reality, the Islamic community was made up of multiple groups with competing visions of community.

5. In early modern Ottoman biographical collections, the moral authority of the ṣulaḥā was contrasted with the professionalized religious authority of the ʿulamā, assigning the latter a worldly and thus corrupt and corrupting nature (Gürbüzel 2018). This covertly Ghazalian conception of the worldliness of the professionalized scholar-bureaucrat was a consistently shared discourse in social narratives of urban religious life. For the impact of Ghazālī on Ottoman ethical literature of the period, see Özervarlı 2016, particularly 253–260. For explicit references to the importance of Ghazālī within the context of the debates discussed in this chapter, see Müsṭakīmzāḏe 2019, 104, 245. For more on the role of Ghazālī's legacy in Ottoman anti-puritanism, see chapter 5 in this book.

6. In fact, although the continued practice of *samā* ʿ in the mosque has been noted, it has been noted as an exception. See, for an example, Terzioğlu 1999, 117 on Niyāzī-i Mışrī's practice of *ẕikr* at the Grand Mosque of Bursa in the 1670s. Cited in Kafescioğlu 2020.

7. Gürbüzel 2018.

8. The divergent juristic treatments of *samā* ʿ, written by jurists and Sufis alike, have left behind a rich archive. For a detailed overview of this jurisprudential literature, see Koca 2004.

9. Ghazālī's discussion of *samā* ʿ, which allowed the practice, albeit conditionally, was an integral part of the canonical Ottoman work of ethics, the *Aḫlāḳ-ı ʿAlāī* of Kınalızāde ʿAli Çelebi (d. 1572). See Kınalızāde 2007, 252–259.

10. Ahmed 2015, 367–377. For Islamicate conceptions of private religion, see also Karamustafa 2017.

11. Ahmed 2015, 340; emphasis mine.

12. On the connection between legal and other discourses, see Klein 2006.

13. For a treatment of the Islamic city in relation to concepts of privacy, see Abu-Lughod 1987. Following Abu-Lughod, many historians preferred to use the term "semi-private" to designate the communal private that extends beyond the domestic private. For a seminal treatment of communal privacy in early modern Ottoman court records with reference to Aleppo, see Marcus 1986. See also Ergenç 1984.

14. Ayalon 2011.

15. Wilkins 2010, 287.

16. Ayalon 2011, 522.

17. Semerdjian 2012.

18. Semerdjian 2012, 176. Although Semerdjian goes on to suggest that the one case of persecution must be seen as a result of the influence of Ḳāḍīzādeli conservatism, this explanation is not warranted. The explanation is much more complex and involves an understanding of the involvement of the court in matters construed as pertaining to the private sphere. For a similar observation, see Tuğ 2017, 14. Tuğ observes the regular absence of adultery cases, which must point to private prosecution or ṣulḥ outside the courts.

19. Yi 2019. For these conflicts in the seventeenth century: Baer 2011, 81–104 for the Islamization of Istanbul's intramural space spearheaded by the queen mother Turḫan Sultan (d. 1683) and the vizier Fāżıl Aḥmed Paşa (d. 1676); Baer 2011, 121–138 and Şişman 2015, 16–44 for the forced conversion of Sabetai Sevi, as well as Jewish court physicians in the same period; also Yi 2019, particularly 119.

20. Yi notes that non-Muslims outnumbered Muslims in Istanbul at times of war, when the army was away. See Yi 2019, 131.

21. Yi notes that Vānī's policies did not target Jewish residents of Istanbul. Yi 2019, 132. See also Şişman 2015, 90–91 for Vānī Efendi's theories about the common origins of Turks and Jews; Terzioğlu 1999, 144 for rumors about Vānī Efendi having a crypto-Jewish identity.

22. Yi 2019, 137.

23. For methodological discussions on the representativeness of court records, see Ze'evi 1998.

24. For the dependence of political authorities on mass mobilization as a general feature of early modernity, see Lake and Pincus 2006.

25. For a collection of court and mühimme records that shows the extensive processes of surveillance of the Ḳızılbāş at the local level, see Altınay 1932.

26. Semih Ceyhan, "Semā," DİA. For a discussion of samā' focusing on Ahmad Tūsī and al-Ghazālī, see Lewisohn 1997, 1–33. For Qushayrī's treatment of samā', see Qushayrī 2007, 342–357. For a seventeenth-century Mevlevī perspective on samā', see Anḳaravī 2002, 115–139.

27. Della Valle, in Duru 2012, 612.

28. Here I adopt the translation of samā' as "mystical concerts," suggested by Lewisohn 1997. For an alternative translation, "lyrical ritual," that centers the poetic element, see Ingenito 2021, 445–448.

29. Duru 2012, 612.

30. While this chapter largely focuses on mosque and lodge gatherings, the place of samā' and Mevlevī music in the court ceremonial is an important component of the social and cultural history of the ritual. See Feldman 1996, 94. Feldman notes that Mevlevī performers strongly established themselves at the court by the seventeenth century.

31. Kātib Çelebi also insists—albeit with a critical tone—that the Ḫalvetī order valued samā' mainly as a ritual to reach a large number of followers, and to increase the amount of donations to the lodges. See Kātib Çelebi 1990, 57–59.

32. For 'Abdülmecid Sivāsī and his role in the Ḳāḍīzādeli debates, see Kātib Çelebi 1990, 137–139; Naẓmi Efendi 2005, 389–496.

33. Kātib Çelebi 1990, 137.

34. Şemseddīn Sivāsī was the founder of the Şemsiyye branch of the Ḥalvetī order, a branch that had a permanent power base in the Tokat-Zile-Sivas region. When Şemseddīn's fame reached Istanbul, the sultan of the time, Meḥmed III, invited him to accompany the Ottoman army to the Egri campaign in 1596. Although the sheikh himself did not stay in Istanbul except for a short period at the end of the Egri campaign, his disciples became the most significant figures of the seventeenth century. For a biography, see Öngören 2012, 107–110. For two versions of Şemseddin Sivāsī's vita, both penned by the members of his order, see Receb Sivāsī 2020; Naẓmi Efendi 2005, 315–388.

35. Naẓmi Efendi 2005, 392.

36. For two versions of the dream and its interpretation, see Naẓmi Efendi 2005, 392–393. For an earlier, less detailed version of the same dream experience, see Receb Sivāsī 2020, 100–101.

37. For the concept of "intrafaith conversion," see Baer 2011, 105–119. Baer analyzes the concept through the conversion of Sultan Meḥmed IV to a more stringent piety under the influence of Vānī Meḥmed Efendi.

38. Naẓmi Efendi 2005, 393.

39. "The people of tents, namely nomads" (*ehl-i aḫbiyye, yaʿnī göçer evliler*); Naẓmi Efendi 2005, 393; emphasis mine.

40. DeWeese 2014. For a criticism of sharia-centered approaches to early modern Islam, see also chapter 5 in this book.

41. Katz 2012, 184.

42. Cf. Ahmed 2015, 379.

43. Moin 2012, 182–83.

44. Moin 2012, 183.

45. Naẓmi Efendi 2005, 442–444. According to Naẓmi, the chief mufti enjoined the dervishes to practice silent *zikr* instead, since otherwise their act resembled that of the dances and playfulness (*luʿb u lehv*) of the urban crowd. For the juxtaposition of the Sufi *samāʿ* and secular dance performances during public parades, see also Terzioğlu 1995, 93.

46. According to the Ḥalvetī tradition, the two adversaries were only reconciled after an intervention by the Prophet himself; the Prophet appeared in a dream to the chief mufti and asked him to quit harrassing Sivāsī, whom the Prophet called "one of my closest of kin and one of my caliphs." Naẓmi Efendi 2005, 444.

47. Naẓmi Efendi 2005, 519–520; Naʿīmā 2007, 3:1290–1294. The physical attacks on the Ḥalvetī preachers corroborate Madeleine Zilfi's argument that the intensity of the Ḳadızādeli debates was partly a function of the congestion of the cadres in the religious bureaucracy, which created cutthroat rivalries for imperial preaching positions. Yet, turf wars over preaching posts were by no means the only reason for the Ḳadızādeli conflict. After all, Mevlevīs were also heavily targeted despite not occupying public preaching posts like the Ḥalvetīs. See Zilfi 1986.

48. Naẓmi Efendi 2005, 520; Naʿīmā 2007, 4:1709–1710. For a related episode in which Üstüvānī Meḥmed threatened a Ḥalvetī sheikh with death if he did not stop

devrān, see Naʿīmā 2007, 3:1292–1293. In this case, the sheikhulislam Bahāī Efendi (d. 1654) came to the rescue of the Ḫalvetī sheikh.

49. For this statement, see Terzioğlu 1999, 213–234. Baer notes that Vānī's opposition to Sufism was aimed at experiential and communal practices, while he did not object to Sufism as a method of interiorizing the precepts of Sunni Islam. Baer 2011, 113. In this respect, Vānī Efendi approved the juristic-Sufi tradition that found expression in Birgivī, as explained in chapter 1.

50. Baer 2011, 113.

51. For the destruction of the Bektāşī shrine, see Baer 2011, 114–115. For Niyāzī-i Mıṣrī (d. 1694), see Terzioğlu 1999. For Karabaş Velī (d. 1686), see Kurnaz and Tatcı 2001; İbrāhim Ḫās 2013, 188–210.

52. *Fetavā-yı Minḳārizāde*, MS Süleymaniye Library, Nuruosmaniye 2003, f. 70a.

53. For example, see the description of the debates as a disturbance of the social order in Sāḳıb Dede 1867, 1:181–182. For the discourse around the social implications of the Ḳadızādeli debates, see also chapter 6 in this book.

54. Sāḳıb Dede 1867, 2:168. For the influence of Müneccimbaşı at the court of Meḥmed IV, see Baer 2011, 112.

55. *Taraf-ı salṭanat cānibini ḥimāye içindir.* Kātib Çelebi 1990, 201.

56. *Fetavā-yı Minḳārizāde*, MS Süleymaniye Library, Nuruosmaniye 2003, f. 70a.

57. Terzioğlu 1999, 231. For the notion of social discipline as a key consideration of Ottoman religious policies, see also Terzioğlu 2012–13.

58. The chronicle of Naʿīmā provides one of the most detailed accounts of the Ḳadızādeli movement, yet was written about half a century after the end of the movement. Therefore, although treated as a neutral account of these past events, he should be placed within the eighteenth-century anti-puritanism that this chapter defines.

59. For instance, disappointed at the absence of the Mevlevī ceremony in Güzelhisar, Evliyā Çelebi notes that he wrote graffiti on the lodge's walls protesting the ban in strong language. See Evliyā Çelebi 1999–2006,9:81.

60. The concept of *ṣulḥ* was yet another cognate of the Arabic root *ṣ-l-ḥ* that has been explored as a social paradigm in the first section.

61. Ottomanist historiography of Mujaddidism relies on the work of Abu-Manneh (1982). While significant, Abu-Manneh's work disregards the connection of the Mujaddidī order with the Mevlevī and Ḥalveti orders in the eighteenth century; most figures cited by Abu-Manneh had multiple affiliations rather than being exclusively Mujaddidīs. For these connections and their significance, see note 75 below. Furthermore, the network analysis provided by Abu-Manneh has not yet been supplemented by a close analysis of Mujaddidī-Naḳshbandī thought. For an important work that shows the significant revisions that Sirhindī's work was subjected to in its Ottoman reception, see Pagani 2007.

62. Kinra 2020.

63. For a study of Sirhindī's thought, see Friedmann 2014. Friedmann focuses on the early reception of Sirhindī and notes the criticism both from Indian Naḳshbandiyya and from the scholars of Hijaz. See, particularly, Friedmann 2014, 94–101.

64. In their defense of *samāʿ*, Toḳādī and his disciple Müstaḳimzāde diverged from established Naḳshbandī tradition. In his accounts, Toḳādī reports the pushback he received on this issue from other Naḳshbandī sheikhs of Istanbul. See his *Sıyanet-i Dervişān*, MS Süleymaniye Library, Esad Efendi 1849, ff. 54a-72b, at 58a. For an overview of the Mujaddidī position on *samāʿ* in comparison to the larger Naḳshbandiyya, see Şimşek 2003.

65. *Samāʿ* and chess are the two examples that Toḳādī cited in defense of the need to accommodate novelties. In the analysis of the legal permissibility of chess, which impinged upon *samāʿ* as an appropriate analogy, Toḳādī relied on the authority of Ibn Kemāl Paşa (d. 1534). See his *Sıyanet-i Dervişān*, f. 57a.

66. Toḳādī, *Sıyanet-i Dervişān*, f. 59b (*Şerʿa aykırı olmayan her ne ki cemaat-i müminin adet edinirler, sünnete mülhik olur*).

67. Toḳādī, *Sıyanet-i Dervişān*, f. 57b. In addition to *vicdān*, Toḳadī uses the Sufi term *ḫavāṭır* for affect. For this term, see Qushayrī 2007, 106.

68. For the experiential categories of Sufism as sources of knowledge in al-Ghazālī, see Treiger 2012, 48–63. For the various experiential categories of *wajd*, *dhawq*, and *shuhūd* in Qushayrī 2007, 83–85, 95, 108.

69. Both of these questions have been treated as full chapters in *Mevlevī Masters* and its translations. See Nabulusī 2009, 11–23, 65–69; Peçevī 2016, 88–110, 183–190; Müstaḳīmzāde 2019, 99–128.

70. These case studies suggest a strong anti-Ḳadızādeli strand in Ḫalvetī thought, particularly in Ḫalvetī hagiographical writing, that remains to be studied. For an analysis of this strand with regard to ʿÖmer Fuʿādī (d. 1636), see Curry 2005. See also the hagiography of Ḥasan Ünsī Efendi below.

71. Nabulusī 2009. Hereafter *Kitāb al-ʿUḳūd*.

72. For Nabulusī's life and work, see Allen 2019b; Sirriyeh 2005. For the Ottoman and transimperial readership of his work, see, respectively, Shafir 2016, 87–164; Allen 2019b, 296.

73. Allen 2019b, 369.

74. For the specific arguments, see Dallal 2019, 28–38; Sirriyeh 2005, 53–56; Winter 1988.

75. The Mujaddidī order became a widespread order and received steady sponsorship from the Ottoman state in the eighteenth century. While the order has received a good deal of scholarly attention, it has been studied in isolation and as a replica of South Asian Mujaddidism. In this chapter, I underline that Ottoman Mujaddidīs had close connections with anti-puritan circles, and developed doctrines that diverged from Sirhindī. For the most recent treatment of eighteenth-century Ottoman Mujaddidīs, see Yaycıoğlu 2018 and the references therein. In addition to the characters studied in this chapter, another important figure in the Mevlevī-Naḳshbandī rapprochement of

the period was Şeyh Gālib. See Gawrych 1987. Furthermore, a similar relationship between Ottoman anti-puritanism and Mujaddidīya developed in tandem with the Ḥalvetī order. For the importance of Niyazi-i Mısrī's legacy for the Mujaddidīs of Bursa in the eighteenth century, see Gazzizāde 2000, 30–31, 60, 73. Gazzizāde also cites Nabulusī's views on samāʿ (41–42).

76. Nabulusī wrote a commentary on Mirʾāt al-Wujūd of ʿAbdüleḥad Nūri (d. 1651), a work in defense of Ibn ʿArabīan thought and a rebuttal of its moralist critics. For a brief description of this work, see el-Rouayheb 2015, 261–269. For the Ibn Arabian strand in Ḥalvetiye and its influence on Nabulusī, see also 269. For the impact of Nūri's samāʿ treatise in the eighteenth century, see Gevrekzāde 2015, 82.

77. For Nabulusī's references to his father's visit to the lodge, accompanied by the young Nabulusī, see Kitāb al-ʿUḳūd, 66–67.

78. For a study on Mevlevī Masters alongside information on Nabulusī's other writings on music, see Sukkar 2014. Sukkar explains Nabulusī's defense of music with his allegiance to Rūmī, missing the contextual relevance of the work.

79. In addition, a Mevlevī sheikh of the Aleppo lodge penned an Arabic commentary in the nineteenth century. See Müsṭaḳīmzāde 2019, 46–47.

80. On Peçevī Dede's life and works, see Peçevī 2016. For Mevlevī lodges in Hungary, see Ágoston 1991.

81. Gölpınarlı 1953, 397–398.

82. For the tolerant atmosphere that followed the end of the Ḳadızādeli movement and continued throughout the eighteenth century, see Curry 2019, 196.

83. Nabulusī's text, in keeping with anti-Ḳadızādeli writing up until his time, did not cite any names as part of a consistent school of thought. Neither Üstüvānī Meḥmed, the leader of the second wave, whom Nabulūsī met in Damascus, nor Vānī Meḥmed Efendi was mentioned by name. By contrast, Müstakimzāde's account is more explicitly grounded in the Ḳadızādeli events, particularly the first and third waves. Moreover, the author relies on the Sefine-i Nefise of Ṣāḳıb Dede, which has a strong anti-puritan theme. See Müsṭaḳīmzāde 2019, 95–96.

84. Müsṭaḳīmzāde 2019, 90 (bi'l-külliye ehl-i İslâm'a dahi luzûmunun ʿumûmî olduğu). For a similar statement about the global applicability of the Mevlevī take on the Ḳadızādeli debate, see also Peçevī 2016, 109–110.

85. Kafescioğlu 2021; see also Terzioğlu 2012–13.

86. In certain cases, the process of the conversion of an ʿimāret to a mosque was inscribed into the historical memories of Ottoman Sufi orders as acts of oppression, often blamed on local or lesser authorities. For an example, see chapter 3, note 112.

87. Sünnnetçioğlu 2021; Terzioğlu 2012–13.

88. Hodgson 1974, 2:218.

89. Sünnnetçioğlu 2021.

90. Nabulusī and his translators agreed that joining the mosque congregation for prayers was a confirmed sunna (sünnet-i müekkede), but not an obligatory duty (wājib or farḍ). This was in opposition to the Ottoman juristic consensus that considered congregational prayers a duty the nonobservance of which merited punishment (wājib).

Nabulusī 2009, 11–13; Peçevī 2016, 88–89; Müstaḳīmzāde 2019, 99. For the Ottoman juristic consensus and its implications, see Sünnnetçioğlu 2021, particularly 357.

91. For sections emphasizing the Mevlevī gatherings as a venue for conventional mosque functions such as prayer, Qurān recitation, and preaching based on the Prophet's sayings, see Müsṭaḳīmzāde 2019, 99, 129–143.

92. Peçevī 2016, 98–102; Müstaḳīmzāde 2019, 117–127. In Müstaḳimzāde's extended reiteration, quotations from Ibn ʿArabī play a significant role in arguing for the supremacy of ʿilm al-bātın.

93. For a treatment of Ḥasan Ünsī within the context of anti-puritanism, see also Allen 2019b, 322–365.

94. İbrāhim Ḫāṣ 2013, 187–188, 217–218, respectively.

95. For Sufism at the court of Meḥmed IV, see Baer 2011, 112.

96. İbrāhim Ḫāṣ 2013, 224.

97. İbrāhim Ḫāṣ 2013, 187.

98. *şimdilik bu dahi tekyedir.* İbrāhim Ḫāṣ 2013, 228.

99. Baer 2004; Krstić 2019, 170–171.

100. For instance, the treatise of ʿAbdüleḥad Nūrī starts by explaining the terminology around *raḳs* and *devrān,* established through centuries of juristic debate on the issue. Rather exceptionally, Nūrī underlines that even if the Sufi dance was considered *raḳs,* the equation would not warrant a ban on Sufi dances, as there is no consensus on the legal status of *raḳs.* See his *Risâle fî Cevâzi Devrâni's-Sûfiyye*, MS Atatürk Kitaplığı, Muallim Cevdet K 434, 76a. For the importance of terminology—namely, *raḳs* or *devrān*—see also Kātib Çelebi 1990, 56–57.

101. Peçevī 2016, 183. The discussion of mixed socialization is much less embellished in Nabulusī's and Müstakimzāde's versions, but they still mention the coexistence of Muslims and non-Muslims. See Müsṭaḳīmzāde 2019, 229 (*Meclis-i Mevleviyye'de ehl-i İslām zümresi ve sāir milel-i muḥtelife ḥazır olurlar*).

102. Galitekin 1994, 94; Anḳaravī, *Risâle-i usûl-i tarîkat ve bî'at,* MS Süleymaniye Library, Nâfiz Paşa 352, ff. 6a–6b.

103. Feldman 1996, 190.

104. Kömürciyan 1952, 40.

105. Kömürciyan 1952, 40.

106. Peçevī 2016, 131. See also 148 for the extended argument. For *mevlīd,* that is, the ceremonial celebrations of the Prophet's birth, see Dedes 2005.

107. Peçevī 2016, 132.

108. For an example of the relevance of aesthetics, particularly musical aesthetics, to the core ethical concept of moderation (ʿadl), see Ḳınalızāde 2007, 129.

109. Qushayrī 2007, 83; the same maxim is cited in Müsṭaḳīmzāde 2019, 190. The discussion about self-formation through imitating the affect and behavior of a master is known as the question of *tawājud,* that is, feigning trance, in Sufi literature. For Nabulusī's and Aḥmed Dede's takes on the question, see Nabulusī 2009, 47–51; Peçevī 2016, 152–162.

110. Peçevī 2016, 159; Müstaḳīmzāde 2019, 197.

111. For the concept of "love script," with an emphasis on the role of Sufi orders in its articulation and dissemination, see Andrews 2012.

112. Müsṭaḳīmzāde 2019, 81.

113. Krstić 2019.

114. Elsewhere, I provide an analysis of the public sphere that could complement as well as circumscribe the realm of state authority. See Gürbüzel 2018.

CHAPTER 3. SUFI SOVEREIGNTIES IN THE OTTOMAN WORLD

1. A well-known miniature depicting Lala Mustafa Paşa (d. 1580) attending the Mevlevī ceremony in Konya during the Iranian campaign attests to this tradition. Fetvacı 2013, 199–201. For the practice of visiting the Konya Mevlevī Lodge on the way to eastern campaigns and making donations to the lodge, which began with Selīm I (d. 1520), see Tanrıkorur 2000, 2:14–16.

2. Evliyā Çelebi 1999–2006, 1:187.

3. Ṣaḥīḥ Aḥmed Dede 2011, 202; Gölpınarlı 1953, 158–164.

4. Şāḳıb Dede (d. 1735), *Sefine-i Nefise*, 1:124–129; Gölpınarlı 1953, 158. In yet another account of the event, Kātib Çelebi corroborates that the preacher initially joined the sultan on his Baghdad campaign but had to return from Konya on account of his illness. Kātib Çelebi's account does not connect this event with the Mevlevīs, but its correspondence to the later rumors about the conflict at the Mawlānā Lodge is still noteworthy. See Kātib Çelebi 2007, 869.

5. According to Peçevī, Kadızāde Meḥmed, known to "renounce sainthood" (*münkir-i evliyā*), was simply excused from the campaign early on, out of consideration for his old age and unspecified illnesses. See Peçevī 1981,2:496. Other chroniclers, however, note that Ḳadızāde accompanied Murād IV on the campaign even when they do not narrate a strife at the Konya Lodge. See Topçular Katibi Abdülkādir Efendi 2003, 2:1009.

6. Naʿīmā 2007, 2:895; Peçevī 1981, 495. For another Mevlevī miracle related to Evliyā by Murād himself, see Evliyā Çelebi 1999–2006, 1:206.

7. Naʿīmā 2007, 2:868. For *istilā* as pure force, or domination, see Yılmaz 2018a, 166.

8. For these rebellions, see Akdağ 1963; Özel 2012; White 2011.

9. For an overview of military households and the household structure, see Kunt 2012.

10. Duindam 2019.

11. For local households as power magnates in the eighteenth century, see Yaycıoğlu 2012.

12. Emecen 2011, 52–53. The first two households were related to the House of Osman through marriages with princesses.

13. For clarity, I would like to underline that there are two types of Mevlevī sources to which I refer in this section. The first are hagiographies of Rūmī and their Ottoman Turkish renditions, which I cite below in note 72. The second set of sources are biographical dictionaries of the Ottoman Mevlevīs, which were not produced until the

eighteenth-century consolidation and reformation of the order. In order to distinguish these two types of sources, which belong to two separate eras, I refer to the former as "Mevlevī hagiographical sources," and to the latter as "Mevlevī biographical sources." When I refer to them collectively, I use "Mevlevī sources."

14. For these incidents, see Gölpınarlı 1953, 165.

15. Terzioğlu 1999, 174–175. For the Mevlevī influence at the court of Meḥmed IV, see also Baer 2011, 112.

16. Günhan Börekçi studies court favorites as the sultans' efforts to consolidate and extend their power, in Börekçi 2010. Tezcan sees the reign of Murad III in the same light. See Tezcan 2001, 147–163.

17. For the literature on Ottoman early modernity and the delimitation of power, see chapter 1 in this book.

18. Terzioğlu 2010.

19. Naʿīmā 2007, 2:902. For Ibn Tumart, see García-Arenal 2006, 157–192. For Ismail Safavī and the Safavid Sufi order, see Roemer 1986.

20. Anonymous, *Şeyh Bedreddin Simavi, Şeyh İsmail ve Şeyh İbrahim Menakıbı Hakkında Risale.* MS Süleymaniye Library, Hüseyin Hüsnü Paşa 340/6. For the impact of the rise of the Safavids on the Ottoman center's relationship with Sufism, see also Yılmaz 2018a, 258–259.

21. For portrayals of Deccal in Islamic eschatology, see A. Abel, "al-Daḏjdjāl," *EI2.* For studies on Bedreddīn, see Balivet 1995; Ocak 2013. For Ottoman discussions on the "heresy" of İbrahim Gülşeni, see Emre 2017, 271–286.

22. Anonymous, *Şeyh Bedreddin Simavi*, f. 81b.

23. Anonymous, *Şeyh Bedreddin Simavi*, f. 82a.

24. The city-countryside dichotomy corresponds to the economic realities of the age, where the agricultural resources of the countryside led to a wholesale reorganization of labor. The agricultural economy being untenable for a larger sector of society, the population shifted in favor of the town economy. For a detailed analysis of the development, physical manifestations, and socioeconomic impact of these demographic changes, see Özel 2013.

25. Kātib Çelebi 2007, 884, 906. Cengiz Şişman emphasizes the importance of the term *ḫurūc* as an armed political rebellion against the sultan (*ḫurūc ʿaleʾs-sulṭān*) and its differentiation from related terms for opposition, such as *ẓuhūr*, which refers to an unarmed rebellion. See Şişman 2015, 51–52.

26. Kātib Çelebi 2007, 884–886; Naʿīmā 2007, 2:867–868.

27. Naʿīmā 2007, 2:866–867.

28. Kātib Çelebi 2007, 906.

29. The Urmevī affair has been studied by Bruinessen 1990. For Urmevī's life and death, see Naʿīmā 2007, 2:898–903; Peçevī 1981, 494–498.

30. *Tārīḫ-i Naʿīmā*, 2:899.

31. *Tārīḫ-i Naʿīmā*, 2:901; Peçevī 1981, 504.

32. For the discussion around Murād IV's execution of Sufi sheikhs, see Gürbüzel 2018.

33. According to the French traveler d'Arvieux, Faḫreddīn himself was known as an occultist. See Laurent d' Arvieux (d. 1702), *Mémoires du chevalier d'Arvieux, envoyé extraordinaire du Roy à la Porte, consul d'Alep, d'Alger, de Tripoli et autres Échelles du Levant* (Paris, 1735), 1:364, cited in Bruinessen 1990.

34. Naʿīmā 2007, 2:901. A slightly different version of the same story with the same elements, yet proportionally diminished role for the Ma'noğlu daughter, appears in Evliyā Çelebi's travelogue. For an English translation of this story, see Evliyā Çelebi 1988, 189–191.

35. Winter 2010, 189–121.

36. For a study of this historical phenomenon, see Barkey 1994. Barkey underlines organized banditry and provincial rebellion as a bargaining strategy adopted by local leaders to co-opt state recognition.

37. An example, albeit later, of Sufis aligning with rebels was Emīr Sheikh, known as "Abaza Şeyhi" for his cooperation with Abaza Hasan Paşa (d. 1634), who instigated a wide-scale rebellion to avenge the regicide of ʿOsmān II. According to the historian Naima, it was the sheikh who incited the pasha to rebellion (*ifsād ve iğvā*). Naʿīmā 2007, 2:858.

38. Baki Tezcan has recently shown that Ḳadızāde Meḥmed himself was a Naḳshbandī Sufi. See Tezcan 2019. While significant, this consideration does not disqualify the characterization of the Ḳadızādeli movement as an anti-Sufi movement in the sense that the movement targeted Sufi networks as social and political forces. Wherever his personal piety lay, Ḳadızāde Meḥmed did not speak on behalf of a Sufi network.

39. McGowan 2012. McGowan traces this quietist stance back to Rūmī, whose "habitual quietism" shone through his neutral treatment of the Mongols and his negative attitude toward the politically active *aḫī* brotherhoods. However, as he recognizes and as is studied in greater detail by others, Rūmī was hardly a quietist Sufi. For alternative perspectives on Rūmī's political engagement, see Peacock 2015; Emecen 1995, 282–297.

40. This projection is partly the result of the nature of Mevlevī sources. Both of the sources that most historians utilize in writing the histories of the order were written in the eighteenth century. The first account is Ṣāḳıb Dede's (d. 1735) *Sefīne-i Nefīse*, the second is Saḥiḥ Aḥmed Dede's *Mecmuʿātu't-Tevāriḫu'l-Mevleviyye*. The first in particular informs predominantly Gölpınarlı's study of the Mevlevī order, which in turn informs most modern studies on the order. For other primary accounts of the Ottoman Mevlevī order, see Lewis 2000, 941–943.

41. For an inventory of Ottoman imperial donations to the Konya Lodge from Selīm I all the way to Abdülḥamid II (d. 1909), see Tanrıkorur 2000, 14–19. See also Necipoğlu 2005, 61–64 for a discussion of Süleyman's patronage of a Friday mosque next to the shrine of Celāleddin Rūmī. For Murād III's strained relationships with the *çelebi*s, see below.

42. A similar situation applied to the Bektāşi order. While Ottoman authors wrote about Hacı Bektaş with reverence, they often hastened to add that contemporary

Bektāshīs should be treated as separate from the eponymous founder of their order. See, for instance, Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali, *Künḫül-Aḫbār*, 5:58.

43. For the role of dynastic succession in the development of Sufi orders, see Green 2012, 127.

44. Faroqhi 1975. Faroqhi's important suggestion to take major Sūfī orders as not only spiritual but also economic institutions has unfortunately found very few echoes. For a few exceptions of studies focusing on the economic activities at Sufi lodges, see Savaş 1992; Faroqhi 1981.

45. For the use of *çelebi* among the Anatolian principalities, as a sign of alliance with the Mevlevīs, see Emecen 1995. Emecen further mentions İshak Bey of Saruhan's use of *çelebi* alongside "sultan, the exterminator of infidels, the second Alexander."

46. On the interplay between the mystical and political significations of *çelebi*, see Yılmaz 2018a, 123.

47. Lewis 2000, 251–252. Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı shows that the Bakrī genealogy emerged late, after the reign of Sultan Valad. See Gölpınarlı 1952, 35–38. The attribution became standard, however, in the early modern tradition. See, for instance, Mahmud Dede, *Sevākıb*, 25, for the Bakrī genealogy. An alternative ʿAlid genealogy was also in circulation. See Gölpınarlı 1953, 199.

48. Lewis 2000, 152–153.

49. Lewis 2000, 206–207. For a detailed analysis of the different versions of why the family left for Asia Minor, see Lewis 2000, 173–191.

50. Gölpınarlı 1953, 38.

51. Until the reign of Ahmed III (d. 1730), both the Karatay and Sultan Veled madrasas were staffed in accordance with the recommendations of the *çelebi*s. See Gölpınarlı 1953, 169.

52. According to Gölpınarlı, these privileges were challenged in the eighteenth century. Similarly, the preaching post and other staff at the Suleyman I mosque built adjacently to the lodge were also reserved for the *çelebi*s. See Necipoğlu 2005, 64.

53. Maḥmūd Dede, *Sevākıb*, 28–29, on the authority of Eflākī and Molla Jāmī. See also Lewis 2000, 252. For these early Sufi figures, see Karamustafa 2007, 1–27, 124–127. For Rūmī's genealogy as found in Eflākī, see Yılmaz 2018a, 115–116.

54. Lewis 2000, 252. According to Derviş Maḥmūd, it was the Prophet who asked Muḥammed Kwārazmshāh to marry his daughter off to Baha al-Dīn. See *Sevākıb*, 25. Lewis shows that this descent is chronologically untenable, yet was widely accepted in late medieval hagiography. According to Lewis, this type of attribution of political nobility to religious tradition was a common trope in Iranian hagiography.

55. Lewis 2000, 212.

56. The early history of the Mevlevīs had emerged in an Asia Minor where there were three major claimants at once: Mongols, Mamluks, and Seljuks. The latter ruled through princes and frontier principalities out of which grew the Turcoman-ruled principalities of which the Ottomans were but one. For a brief yet comprehensive summary of the political landscape at this time, see Melville 2009.

57. For a full English translation of this work, see Aflākī 2002.

58. Specifically, in parallel with Ottoman claims of esteemed lineage, Ottoman chroniclers in the fifteenth century also argued for the legitimacy of their rule in Anatolia as a consequence of their historically demonstrable status as the rightful heirs of the Seljuk Sultanate. See Imber 1987, 1995.

59. For comprehensive reviews of the *ghazā* debate, see Darling 2011; Kafadar 1995, 62–89.

60. Kafadar emphasizes the Bektāşī order's self-representation as brokers of divine blessing on the Ottoman order in Kafadar 1995, 30.

61. Kemal Aḥmed Dede 2010, 18.

62. Dechant 2011. It bears repetition that this was a shared feature between Mevlevī and Bektāshīidentities. For the latter and their role in conversion, see Faroqhi 1995, 171–185. See also Ocak 1981 for the role of both of these orders in conversion in Asia Minor.

63. For these various accounts, see Dechant 2011. For early Islamic narratives on the Islamization of Mongols, including the topos of "conversion by a Sufi sheikh," see DeWeese 2009. For the continued relevance and circulation of these Sufi-conversion narratives in the early modern period, see DeWeese 2015.

64. For the Mevlevī tradition on Rūmī's role in the conversion of non-Muslims, see Lewis 2000, 330–332.

65. For shared sanctuaries and Christian-Muslim interactions in this period, see Wolper 2003, 74–81. For Rūmī's use of colloquial Greek in his poetry, see Lewis 2000, 720–721.

66. For the lenient, close relationship between Rūmī's circle and Christians under ʿAlaeddin I (1219–1234), see Hasluck 1929, 2:370–378.

67. Aflākī 2002, 358. For Rūmī's relationship with non-Muslims, see also Lewis 2000, 681.

68. The following description is based on the excerpt translated in Duru 2012, 234–236.

69. ʿAbdülmecīd Sivāsī, *Şerh-i Mesnevī*, MS Beyazıt Veliyüddin 1651, ff. 12a-12b.

70. Galitekin 1994.

71. Yılmaz 2018b.

72. The work was translated from a Persian abridgment of Eflākī's *Feats of the Knowers of God* by ʿAbd al Vāḥed b. Jalāl-Al-Dīn Moḥammad al-Hamadānī (d. 1547), a Naḳshbandī author and a resident of the Mevlevī lodge of Cairo. For Hamadānī, see Tahsin Yazıcı, "Abd-Al-Vahed Hamadani," *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. Hamadānī's version of Eflākī was immediately translated into Turkish and presented to Sultan Süleymān the Magnificent. For this translation, see Gölpınarlı 1953, 15. For a study of the illuminated versions of this work, see Haral 2014. For an earlier rendition of the early history of Rūmī and his descendants in Ottoman Turkish, see Lokmānī Dede 2001.

73. Çağman 1979.

74. For a study on the Baghdad miniature school with emphasis on the Baghdad Mevlevī Lodge, see Taner 2020.

75. Taner 2020, 101–102; Fetvacı 2019.

76. Kemal Aḥmed Dede 2010.

77. Aflākī 2002, 103.

78. Haral 2014, 78, 81.

79. Imber 1987.

80. Even after the Ottoman conquest of Mamluk territory, after which the Ottomans adopted a new language of caliphate that claimed transmission of the title from the Mamluks, the Seljuk link continued to be significant. For the changing nature of caliphal claims in the reign of Selim I, see Casale 2010, 34–52.

81. For a transcription of these letters as copied in the historian and chief mufti Hoca Sadeddin's (d.1599) letter collection, see Daş 2003, 282–290.

82. Gölpınarlı 1952, 241.

83. For these versions, see Gölpınarlı 1953, 274–275; Hasluck 1929, 2:610. For competing Bektāshī and Mevlevī narratives on the emergence of ʿOsmān's rule, see Kafadar 1994, 59. While I focus on the Mevlevī versions of the narrative of the origins of Ottoman power, other versions of the sword-donning narrative were in circulation throughout the early modern period. These versions, too, granted authority to the descendants of alleged sword-girders. For an early seventeenth-century iteration, see Tezcan 2010, 135.

84. Darling 1994. Rycaut stayed in Istanbul for five years, from 1660 and 1665.

85. Sir Paul Rycaut (1628–1700), *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire . . .* (London: J.D, 1687), 67.

86. Kafadar (1994) notes that chroniclers mentioned this ceremony as "ancient custom"/*kānūn-ı ḳadīm* from 1603 on, but earlier sources did not mention this ceremony.

87. For the details of this ceremony and its representation in chronicles, see Kafadar 1994. Kafadar notes that neither Bektāshī nor Mevlevī sources of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries refer to the sword-donning anecdote; hence, the claims originated after 1600.

88. Haral 2014, 145–150; New York, Morgan Library M.466, f. 131b. See the image at https://www.themorgan.org/collection/treasures-of-islamic-manuscript-painting/51#. The same story appears in other, non-Mevlevī sources of the late sixteenth century, such as Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali's work. See Necipoğlu 2005, 63. By the eighteenth century, narratives linking Ottoman sultans' success and fate with the Mevlevī order had proliferated even more. For instance, the eighteenth-century historian Mevkufātī claimed that had it not been for the help of the Mevlevī dervishes, Murād II (d. 1451) would have been defeated by the Crimean khans. See Emecen 2011.

89. Kemal Aḥmed Dede 2010.

90. Yılmaz 2018b.

91. In her studies on architectural decorum, Gülru Necipoğlu defines "decorum" as visual, symbolic, and formal representations of social hierarchies. See Necipoğlu 2005, 20. Breaching imperial decorum could invite severe punishment, as in the case of İbrahim Paşa (d. 1536), grand vizier of Süleymān I, who was executed because of disrespect for decorum; the pasha started to use the title *serʿasker sultān* for himself. See

Şahin 2013, 100–102. Later Mevlevī sources often allude to the Ottoman rules of decorum, and the need not to transgress them. For instance, in an anecdote regarding Ādem Dede (d. 1653) of the Galata Mevlevī Lodge, the sheikh distributed alms too generously and was eventually tactfully warned by Sultan Murād IV not to give more alms than the sultan. See Esrar Dede 2000, 11–12.

92. The main studies on the finances of the Konya Mevlevi waqfs are Faroqhi 1988, Ateş 1992, and Orbay 2012. See also Konyalı 1964, 678–683 for a list of the holdings of the waqf of Mevlānā Rūmī.

93. Kunt uses "proto-ʿayan" to refer to power magnates that emerged in the late sixteenth century and played key roles in local government, albeit without the official tax-farming or *malikāne* agreements typical of the heyday of ʿayāns, the eighteenth century. See Kunt 2014. For an overview of the literature on local power magnates, see Yaycıoğlu 2012.

94. The Mevlānā Lodge was no exception in blending together the charitable and family waqf. Sufi endowments could be a combination of a family affair and a spiritual order, as seen in the Mevlevī case. For more examples, see Faroqhi 1975.

95. Doumani 1998.

96. Faroqhi emphasizes the outstanding percentage of illumination costs, ranging from 6 to 11 percent of total expenses. See Faroqhi 1988.

97. For the extra salaries granted to the Mevlānā family, see Tanrıkorur 2000, 8; Ateş 1992, 42.

98. According to an accounting register dated 1690, the salary of Konya *çelebi*s exceeded that of the next highest-earning employee (who, incidentally, was the resident *Mesnevī* reciter) by more than threefold. See Oğuzoğlu 1983.

99. For a detailed analysis of the sources of these incomes, see Ateş 1992; Faroqhi 1988; Orbay 2012. Both Faroqhi and Orbay study the account books of the Mevlānā Lodge, alongside other endowments in Konya and Anatolia during the first half of the seventeenth century. While their main focus is the dire agricultural crisis of the period, they provide a detailed synthesis of the information available on the finances of the waqf.

100. For the amounts contributed by the imperial center, see Faroqhi 1988, 65. For a list of imperial donations to the Konya Lodge in the preceding centuries, see Ateş 1992, 31–32. The constant migration that the neighborhood received was documented in court records. According to the records, in return for tax exemption, the neighborhood residents provided services to the lodge, the mosque, and other public services. See Oğuzoğlu 1983.

101. Faroqhi notes that these sources never entered the account books, despite there being evidence of their utilization by the Mevlevīs. See Faroqhi 1988, 52.

102. For details on these contested privileges, see Ṣākıb Dede, *Sefine-i Nefise*, 1:183–186; Gölpınarlı 1953, 168. For a similar case of friction between the local preacher and the Mevlevī sheikhs, see Emecen 1995.

103. This was also true of the Bektāşī families, whose *çelebi*s controlled revenues that were formally outside the jurisdiction of their lodge. For instance, Faroqhi 1976a, 198,

provides the example of the Bektāşi *tekke* controlling summer pastures that, on paper, belonged to a certain tribe in the Yozgat region. Large lodges like the Mevlevī and Bektāşī lodges acted as local notables until the actual rise of power magnates in the eighteenth century, which challenged their local privileges.

104. A confrontation recorded in the eighteenth century, for instance, involves a mosque preacher who objected to the deferential treatment of the Celāliyye neighborhood, the residents of which were exempt from taxation. Şāḳıb Dede, *Sefine-i Nefise*, 1:183–184, cited in Gölpınarlı 1953, 168.

105. Naʿīmā 2007, 2:868.

106. Evliyā Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, 3:21.

107. For the correspondence between state authorities and the Konya Lodge, see BOA A DVN MHM 56/87; A DVN MHM 62/180; AE.SAMD.I 4/385.

108. Evliyā Çelebi 1999–2006, 19, 21. See chapter 5 in this book for puritan criticism of wearing the characteristic Mevlevī hat.

109. Ali Yaycıoğlu notes that the Konya *çelebi*s maintained their local political power well into the early nineteenth century. See Yaycıoğlu 2017, 86–87.

110. Salakidis 2011.

111. Faroqhi emphasizes that cutting down on charitable services was a coping strategy shared by charitable endowments facing economic crises. Faroqhi 1988. Kayhan Orbay discusses a sharp decline in agricultural revenues as part of a larger pattern of agricultural decline. Orbay 2012.

112. For the narratives around the Edirne Lodge and its changing fortunes, see Evliyā Çelebi 1999–2006, 3:246; Sāḳıb Dede, *Sefine-i Nefise*, 2:20–22. Archival records of the sixteenth century mention this complex as "Murādiye İmāreti" without mentioning a Mevlevī lodge, suggesting the Mevlevī hold might have been interrupted in this period. See Gökbilgin 1952, 203–210.

113. Şāḳıb Dede, *Sefine-i Nefise*, 1:149–151; Gölpınarlı 1953, 156.

114. For Zekeriyazade Yahya as a chief mufti who resisted the strong puritan movement of his age and aimed to ease the pressure on Sufi orders, see Terzioğlu 1999, 229–230. According to Faroqhi, Murād IV did not go through with the execution out of fear of backlash. See Faroqhi 1975.

115. Şāḳıb Dede, *Sefine-i Nefise*, 1:169.

116. Naʿīmā 2007, 2:868.

117. The donation amounted to a 1,050 *akçes* annually, and was notarized at the *ḳadı* court; see Naʿīmā 2007, 2:868, 803. According to archival records, this disputed *mukataa* was returned to the *çelebi*s by the eighteenth century. See BOA AE S SÜL. II. 21/2191, AE S SÜL.II. 5/407.

118. Naʿīmā 2007, 2:868–869. There is in fact one petition preserved in the archives about this disagreement. The short petition addressed to the court complains about mistreatment of the Konya *çelebi*s, yet without any further detail, and is simply signed "the humble ones of the endowments." Both the lack of detail and the lack of names or representatives is atypical. See BOA MAD 12727.

119. See also Gölpınarlı 1953, 270–271.

120. For Meḥmed II's confiscations of endowments, see İnalcık, "Mehmed II," *DİA*. For attempts at bringing endowments under greater state control through the nineteenth century, see Gündüz 1984.

121. Koçi Bey 2008; Murphey 1979.

CHAPTER 4. A NEW VOLUME FOR THE OLD *MESNEVĪ*

1. As one anonymous Ottoman reader underlines in his marginal notes, this took place during an Ottoman campaign in Tabriz. See İsmāʿil Anḳaravī, *Şerḥ-i Cild-i Sābiʿ*, MS Süleymaniye Library, Darülmesnevi 245, f. 109a. [Hereafter Darülmesnevi 245].

2. This work is preserved in Konya Mevlānā Müzesi. For a detailed description of the manuscript and Anḳaravī's study notes on it, see Gölpınarlı 1967, 2:96–103. For the various theories about the origin of this pseudo-*Mesnevī*, see Ceyhan 2005, 322–323. As Ceyhan notes, one of the most plausible theories is that the work was intended as a *nazīre* (parallel poem) to Rūmī's *Mesnevī* by a later author. Another theory that Ceyhan cites but promptly discards is the work's İsmāili origins, which explains its reverence for the number seven.

3. This book has received some interest in the scholarship on the Mevlevī order. However, most scholarly discussions of Book Seven have focused on the foregoing arguments to refute the authenticity of the new volume. See Gölpınarlı 1967, 2:96–103; Tasbihi 2015. However, the proper historical question is not whether the volume was authored by Rūmī or not, but what made such a claim plausible in seventeenth-century intellectual life. Semih Ceyhan's study is the only exception that understands the discussion on Anḳaravī's terms rather than through the lens of authenticity. For a summary of the Ottoman reception of Book Seven, see Ceyhan 2005, 327–332.

4. The details of this puritan criticism and the Mevlevī response will be studied in the next chapter.

5. The claim to divine origins was found in many popular texts of piety, such as the *Muhammediye*, which, upon close inspection, was replete with allusions to learned literature. For the *Muhammediye*'s divine origins and not so divine bibliography, see Grenier 2018. In this chapter I use the phrase "Sufi authority" in the sense used by Muzaffar Alam as "an assertion of the right of the individual to experiment with Islamic religious truth, even if such experimentation is independent of the shari'a." Alam 2004, 6. This right to experiment, based on direct access to the divine, was the basis of Sufi moral authority.

6. While there is a great deal of interest in political writing valorizing powerful rulers, Islamic political works that construe rulership as a cooperation between the court and various levels of intermediaries have remained little studied. Louise Marlow's studies, however, suggests that this form of political thinking was not uncommon in the post-Abbasid political world. See Marlow 2007. For notions of social contract in Persianate political writing, see Arjomand 2013; Shomali and Boroujerdi 2013. For notions of the social contract as a novelty of seventeenth-century Ottoman politics, see chapter 1 in this book.

7. In his study on Ottoman notions of caliphate in the sixteenth century, Hüseyin Yılmaz has emphasized that one of the features of Ottoman political theology was to argue that the sultan combined both formal and spiritual authority in his person. See Yılmaz 2018a, 206–215.

8. For a recent overview of the main tendencies in Ottoman advice writing, see Sariyannis and Tuşalp-Atiyas 2019, 144–187.

9. This reputation was long lived; when Reynold Nicholson penned the first full English translation of the *Mesnevī* in the early twentieth century, he largely followed the reading and interpretation of İsmāʿil Anḳaravī. Nicholson 1926.

10. Gölpınarlı 1953, 143.

11. For a brief description of the work, see Ceyhan 2005, 258–262. For a transliterated edition, see Anḳaravī 1999.

12. One of the important considerations of early modern urban Sufi orders was to delimit the authority of the unlettered (*ümmī*) Sufi sheikh, whose authority rested solely on esoteric grounds. For the Ḥalvetī concern over unlettered sheikhs in the seventeenth century, see Gürbüzel 2016, 133–135.

13. For two exceptions, see Ambrosio 2012; Tasbihi 2020. While focusing on Anḳaravī's writings, these works fail to place him properly in his Ottoman context, and therefore utilize obsolete frameworks such as "*ulamā* vs. Sūfis." For the scholarly literature criticizing this approach, see chapter 1.

14. Kātib Çelebi 1990, 142, where Mevlevīs and Ḥalvetīs are mentioned as the chief opponents of Kadızāde Meḥmed Efendi. For another near-contemporary account of Anḳaravī's role in the debates, see Evliyā Çelebi 1999–2006,1:191. For the life and works of İsmāʾil Rusūḫi Anḳaravī, see Ambrosio 2013; Ceyhan 2005; Sāḳıb Dede, *Sefine-i Nefise*, 2:44.

15. Sāḳıb Dede, *Sefine-i Nefise*, 2:43–44. For similar statements from within the Mevlevī order, see Saḥīḥ Aḥmed Dede 2003, 203.

16. Öngören notes the limited social presence of Mevlevīs throughout the sixteenth century. See Öngören 2012, 218.

17. The endowment registers of the period mention that the lodge was to host gatherings of *samāʿ* and readings of the *Mesnevī*. See *Fatih Mehmet II Vakfiyeleri*, 260, 268, cited in Yücel 2004, 63.

18. For this lodge, see Reşat Ekrem Koçu, "Abid Çelebi Mescidi ve Tekkesi," *İstanbul Ansiklopedisi* 1:57–58. Koçu notes two other sheikhs: Meḥmed Sāḥib Çelebi (d. 1571–1572) and Şeyḫ Ḥacı Meḥmed Efendi (d. 1780/81), yet no records exist of who utilized the lodge in the one century in between, or between ʿĀbid Çelebi and Meḥmed Sāḥib Çelebi. It is certain, however, that the lodge fell into disuse after the eighteenth century.

19. Gölpınarlı 1953, 269; Kafadar 2007a, 128; Ocak 1996; Yılmaz 2018b. Yılmaz dates Ottoman-Mevlevī rapprochement to the reign of Murād II, however this sultan's patronage of a new Mevlevī lodge remained a singular act for the next century, as discussed in the previous chapter of this book. Kafadar and Ocak's timelines place this rapprochement to the turn of the sixteenth century, which is the position with which this book agrees.

20. Le Gall 2005, 127–135, particularly 134–135.

21. Galitekin 1994.

22. Darülmesnevi 245, ff. 176a-179b. One such contentious passage of the *Mesnevī* was well known among not only the Mevlevīs, but also the Malāmīs. See Yavuz 2013, 184–185.

23. For the term Alid Sunnism, see Karakaya-Stump 2021, 70. Another important question, which I hope to treat in greater detail elsewhere, is the question of how the Mevlevīs rewrote the clearly Shiite elements in their recent history, such as the Twelver Shiism of Dīvāne Meḥmed Çelebi (d. after 1545) or Yusuf Sineçāk (d. 1546). See Gölpınarlı 1953, 114–119; Lewis 2000, 945–946. The history of these figures was rewritten by the early eighteenth century, through eliminating the openly Shiite elements in their earlier historiographies, such as their pilgrimages to Mashhad. Another strategy was to differentiate between Mevlevīs and Shamsids, the latter being the more antinomian group within the larger Mevlevī network. While the transition was complete by the eighteenth century, the state of the cult during the seventeenth century remains to be studied. For Gölpınarlı's observations on the eighteenth-century rewriting of the early Shiite history, see Gölpınarlı 1953, 111–114. For the influence of Divānī in Anḳaravī's description of the Mevlevī path, see Gölpınarlı 1953, 194.

24. Gölpınarlı 1953, 269.

25. Gölpınarlı 1953, 248.

26. Ocak 1996.

27. The exact date when the lodge changed hands is unknown. According to Ayvansarāyī, the Galata Lodge had fallen into disuse after the tenure of Maḥmūd Dede, who resided there from 1575 to presumably when he went to the Konya Lodge to write his *Shining Stars,* which was completed in 1590. The lodge was a Ḥalvetī lodge from then until the time of ʿAbdi Dede in 1608/9. See Ayvansarāyī 2000, 368–373. For the rise and spread of the Halvetī order, see Curry 2010, 15–86; for Murād's close connection to the Ḥalvetī order, see Felek 2012.

28. My account of the Mevlevī biographies of Bostan Çelebi is based on Sāḳıb Dede, *Sefine-i Nefise,* 1:154–156.

29. Imām Sāfi provides an exhaustive list of all the holy sites and saintly tombs that the sultan visited; see Ṣāfī 2003, 101–114. The list includes the sultan's visit to Konya during which he visited the shrine of Rūmī (111).

30. For Cünūnī Aḥmed Dede, see Kara 1996. On the Bursa Lodge, see also Kara 1990, 1:117–139; Tanrıkorur 2000, 2:240–265. According to court records, the lodge was active in 1519 under a sheikh named Mustafa b. Ahmed, who did not carry the title "Mevlevī." See Kepecioğlu 2009, 3:332. There are no other official records until the seventeenth century. For this lodge, see also Tanrıkorur 2000, 2:240–242.

31. The endowment deed of the Bursa Lodge explicitly states that Ahmed Çelebi was dispatched to Bursa by Ebubekir Çelebi. See Kara 1996. The document also suggests that despite not being the official *çelebi* recognized by the court at this time, the Konya *çelebi*s could still exert influence in the Mevlevī network.

32. Mehmed Şemseddin, *Yadigar-ı Şemsi: Bursa Dergahları*, edited by Mustafa Kara, Kadir Atlansoy (Bursa: Uludağ Yayınları, 1997), 495, cited in Tanrıkorur 2000, 2:240.

33. MS Süleymaniye, Lala İsmail 737, ff, 81b-86a. Facsimile published in Kara 1996.

34. Kara 1996.

35. Aghazāde Meḥmed Dede (d. 1653) was the first sheikh of the Gelibolu Lodge. See Gölpınarlı 1953, 158.

36. Gölpınarlı 1953, 247; Tanrıkorur 2000, 2:322–323.

37. The first of these viziers, Ekmekçizāde, was likely also the patron of the Yenişehir Lodge. While Gölpınarlı writes that the Yenişehir Lodge was established by a local agha in 1676, Sākıb Dede's biographical compilation suggests that the lodge was already active in the first half of the century. For this lodge, see Kātib Çelebi 2007, 642–643; Sākıb Dede, *Sefine-i Nefise*, 2:130. For the Selanik Lodge, see Machiel Kiel, "Selanik," *DİA*. See also Ágoston 1991; Küçükdağ and Sarıköse 2006.

38. For the Tokat Mevlevī Lodge, see Tanrıkorur 2000, 2:267–268; 278. For Mevlevī-Karamanid relations, see Emecen 1995. Emecen argues that Mevlevīs were the allies of the Karamanlı leadership and supported them in their project to establish themselves as the successors to the Seljuks. For Karamanid architectural patronage of the Konya Lodge, see Tanrıkorur 2000, 2:12–13. Gündüz (2015) emphasizes that the Ottomans did not invest in the Mevlāna Lodge throughout the fifteenth century, despite officially having control of the city.

39. Işın 1997. The endowment is dated 1608. The first sheikh was Kemāl Aḥmed Dede. For the janissary connection and the Yenikapı Lodge, see also Kafadar 2007a.

40. Yücel 2004, 66.

41. Tanrıkorur 2000, 2:367.

42. Toroser 2011, 56. For the theme of Mevlevī-Bektāshī rivalry in the early modern period, see Maḥmud Dede, *Sevāḳıb*, 176–178; Kafadar 1994. For the literature on janissary piety, see Yaycıoğlu 2018.

43. Emecen 1995.

44. For the Kilis Mevlevī Lodge, established by a local janissary, see Tanrıkorur 2000, 2:117–127.

45. For Fırıncızāde Abdi Çelebi, see Reşad Ekrem Koçu, "Abdi Dede," *İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*; Evliyā Çelebi 1999–2006, 1:206.

46. Tanrıkorur 2000, 2:18n5.

47. For shifting patterns of artistic patronage, see Değirmenci 2017; Taner 2019.

48. My analysis of the illuminated manuscripts by the two viziers is based on Değirmenci 2017 and Taner 2019.

49. Emecen 2011; Değirmenci 2011.

50. Taner 2019.

51. Bağcı 1995.

52. Haral 2014, 107–109.

53. For the details of Çerkes Yusuf Paşa's life and career, see Taner 2019.

54. Taner 2019.

55. Anḳaravī, *Şerh-i Cild-i Sābī*ʿ, MS Süleymāniye Library, Darülmesnevī 245, f. 294a.

56. Anḳaravī, *Cāmīʿu'l-Āyāt*, MS Mihrişah Sultan 181, f. 60b.

57. Anḳaravī, *Şerh-i Cild-i Sābī*ʿ, f. 294a. In addition to the passage in Book Seven, Anḳaravī refers to his anonymous critics throughout his works, claiming that they demanded his exile and made attempts on his life.

58. According to oral traditions circulated within the Mevlevī order, these reactions verged on a physical threat to tear down the Galata Mevlevī Lodge where Anḳaravī taught Book Seven. Gölpınarlı identifies these early critics as Abdi and Sabūhī Dedes, without reference to written sources, for which see Gölpınarlı 1953, 143; a marginal note on one copy cites the same names, yet the marginalia were probably added at a much later date. See *Şerh-i Cild-i Sābī*ʿ, MS Darülmesnevī 245, f. 6b. According to Kātib Çelebi, the most vocal critique of Anḳaravī was Doğānī Dede of Yenikapı Mevlevīhane. See his *Fezleke*, 832.

59. For discussions of Book Seven during the nineteenth century, see Ceyhan 2005, 368–369. Ceyhan's short list demonstrates that the book was widely known throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in elite circles, one copy even being produced specifically for Sultan Maḥmūd II in 1835. For two important letters on Book Seven between two prominent bureaucrats, who were also both *Mesnevī-khān*s, Ahmet Cevdet Pasha (d. 1925) and Ābidin Pasha (d.1906), see Yavuz 2012.

60. For a full list of manuscript copies in Istanbul, Ankara, and Konya, see Tasbihi 2015, 250–265.

61. For copies by Derviş Meḥmed (el-Galaṭevī) and Derviş Meḥmed Şeydā, who acted as the copyists of many of Anḳaravī's works, see MS Süleymaniye Yazma Bağışlar 6574, MS Osman Ergin Yazmalar 36, MS Süleymaniye Halet Efendi Eki 79. A full copy of Anḳaravī's commentary written by the sheikh's favorite scribe-disciple, Derviş Ganem, does not include Book Seven yet refers to it frequently. More importantly, the chronogram at the end of the volume refers to the completion of a seven-volume commentary. See MS Süleymāniye Library, Pertev Paşa 307, f. 630a. For a full transcription of Derviş Ganem's chronograms, see Ceyhan 2005, 287–288.

62. For instance, see allusions to Book Seven in Anḳaravī 2002, 41; *Key to Eloquence*, 43, 56.

63. Tanyıldız 2010, 44–45.

64. For a full transcription of this marginal note about the sultan's demand, see Tanyıldız 2010, 140. For the original note, see Anḳaravī, *Şerh-i Mesnevī*, MS Süleymaniye Library, Şehid Ali Paşa 1260, f. 2b.

65. Tanyıldız 2010, 318–319.

66. *ajwiba balīgha mushabbaʿa*. Kātib Çelebi 1941, 2:1588.

67. Kātib Çelebi 2007, 832–833.

68. Aṭāī 2020, 1797 (*1030 senesinde zuhūr eden cild-i sābiʿ bunlarun iltifatı ile şāʿī olub ana daḥi müstaḳill şerh yazmışlardır*).

69. Evliyā Çelebi 1999–2006, 1:645.

70. For instance, on Darülmesnevi 245, f. 14a, the text asserts that had the esteemed Mesnevī commentator Şemʿī Efendi (d. 1602–1603) been alive, he would have agreed with Anḳaravī on the authenticity of the volume. The reader objects in the marginalia: "God forbid! (*ḥāşā, ḥāşā!*) he wouldn't have agreed!"

71. Anḳaravī, *Şerh-i Cild-i Sābiʿ*, f. 294a. Another interesting aspect of this copy is the similarity of the handwriting with three other early copies: MS Süleymāniye Library, Halet Efendi 274, MS Süleymāniye Library, Şehid Ali Paşa 1269, and MS UCLA Box 42 MS 138. The handwriting is quite unique; therefore these four copies might have been produced by the same hand. Furthermore, the colophons are all dated to 1035, adding in the same wording that the date corresponds to the reign of Murād IV. Although the names provided in two of the manuscripts are different, it is still probable that either someone made an effort to distribute the manuscript, or it was profitable to write and sell the book because of its speculative nature.

72. For the portrait of Bursevī as a textual scholar, see Gürbüzel 2020; Heinzelmann 2010.

73. Bursevī, *Ruhu'l Mesnevi* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1287/1871), 1:411, cited in Ceyhan 2005, 330. Like Anḳaravī, Bursevī justifies his preference for the number seven: "The number seven beholds many secrets that the number six is devoid of." Although Ceyhan cites one manuscripts as Bursevī's copy of Book Seven, this manuscript copy contains no traces of being read by Bursevī.

74. For this final argument, see the nineteenth-century debates in Ceyhan 2005, 368–369. For a late proponent of this position, Abidin Paşa, see Yavuz 2012.

75. It bears emphasizing that this controversy was a unique phenomenon of the Ottoman reception of *Mesnevī*. There is no indication that the seventh volume came to be a public debate in Mughal and Safavid contexts prior to the nineteenth century. Muzaffar Alam's study on the scholarly quest for the authentic *Mesnevī* in the Mughal context, for instance, does not note any mention of a seventh volume. Alam 2015.

76. According to Kātib Çelebi, Anḳaravī's claim to distinguishing Rūmī's voice was the sum total of his arguments in favor of the authenticity of Book Seven. See *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*, ed. Tekindağ, 2:1588–1589. For more on this argument, see below.

77. For an elaboration of these objections and Anḳaravī's response, see Darülmesnevī 245, ff. 2a-16a. These are the criteria employed in modern studies. For instance, Ahmet Cevdet Paşa (d. 1925), himself a certified *Mesnevī* reciter, found the book distasteful, emulating "the speech of the opium addicts (*esrārkeş*)." See Yavuz 2012. Gölpınarlı's careful linguistic analysis underlines phrases that could not be in circulation in Rūmī's time, such as *mevlā-yı Rūm* (the master of Rūm), which emerged at a later period. See Gölpınarlı 1967, 96–103.

78. Darülmesnevi 245, f. 48a.

79. See, for instance, the representation of revelation time in Hagen and Menchinger 2014.

80. Pagani 2007, 315. Pagani calls the expansive view of tradition "*khalafī* worldview," to contrast it with the *salafī* conception of tradition. Her article underlines the varieties

within the *khalafī* tradition by contrasting a more conservative-reformist version found in Sirhindī and a more progressive version found in Nabulusī. In this work, I primarily focus on the latter, progressive version as found in anti-puritan literature. My analysis diverges from Pagani's in one aspect of terminology; she cautions against the use of "progressive" for the dynamic view of tradition, since in theory all possible future rein-terpretations of revelation were already present in divine consciousness, or in the Guarded Tablet. However, given that the novelties justified by this theory were new to human history, and recognized as such without compunction, I consider the use of "progressive" appropriate, even necessary, in order to distinguish this view of historical change from its more conservative cognates, where change happens at extended intervals and to restore the perfection and purity of the golden age.

81. Pagani 2007, 300–301. Pagani develops this argument in relation to *ḥaḳīḳa muḥammadiya*, a key concept that emphasizes the transcendent archetype of the prophet as opposed to the person of the prophet. In the same vein, one can consider the Mother of the Books (*Umm-al Kitāb*) as referring to the transcendental archetype of revelation as opposed to its letter. As scholars of the Qurān argue, the Qurān refers to itself as part of a larger book that is known as the Mother of Books (*umm al-kitāb*) or the Guarded Tablet (*lawḥ-i makhfūẓ*). For the concept of extra-Qurānic revelation in early Islam, see Graham 1977, 32–41. For a recent work on Islamic understandings of the Qurān until the eleventh century, see Andani 2019.

82. Lewis, "Persian Literature and the Qurʾān," *Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān.*

83. To be sure, this reading of the *Mesnevī* as revelation was not without alternatives in the early modern context. For a more conservative interpretation of the expression "second Qurān" as a more accessible version of the Holy Book, see Şemʿī 2009, 203.

84. The literature on how premodern scholarship conceptualized revelation as an expansive and infinite action is vast and vastly intriguing. For the discussion about whether the Qurān was "a" revelation or "the" revelation, see, in addition to note 81, van Ess 1996; Daniel A. Madigan, "Revelation and Inspiration," *Encyclopedia of the Qurʾān.*

85. For a seminal work that understands the tension between the finitude of human language and the infinitude of divine knowledge as the founding force of mysticism in Abrahamic religions, see Sells 1994. For the concept of nonlinguistic communication with the divine as a foundational tenet of Islamic esotericism, see Saif 2019. Saif's analysis is based on Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111)'s definition of *ʿilm al-bāṭin* (the science of the esoteric). For further remarks on Ghazālī's thought on Islamic tradition and its progressive trajectory, see Anjum 2011. For Rūmī's ideas of sainthood as recep-tive of divine revelation, see also Renard 1994.

86. As a result of the bias toward written texts, studies of mystical classics prioritize the highly learned readers of these texts, such as commentators. While there is no denial of the significance of textual evidence, the reading public should be concep-tualized in a broader manner, including the aural and oral contexts. For a criticism of the over-reliance on texts at the expense of practices of Sufism, see Knysh 2017, 40–42.

87. In the early seventeenth century, a certain Şeyh Budaḳ, also known as Cān-ı ʿĀlim Efendi (d. 1027/1618), taught the *Mesnevī* at the Fatih Mosque. ʿAṭāī 2020, 1512. A testimony from the middle of the same century shows that *Mesnevī* lessons were taught at the Süleymāniye, and participants learned Persian during these sessions. See Ḥulvī-Tayşi 1993, 628–633. Similarly, an eighteenth-century biographical dictionary of Madina mentions a certain ʿAli al-Zuhrī al-Shirwānī, a Naḳshbandī preacher and *mudarris* who was appointed to the Great Mosque of Madina to recite the *Mesnevī*. See Tunji 2008, 15. I thank Naser Dumairieh for sharing this reference with me. For Naḳshbandīs as *Mesnevī* teachers at public mosques, see also chapter 5.

88. Lewis, "Persian Literature and the Qurʾān," *Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān*.

89. For what remains the most extensive account of the Mevlevī order to this day, see Gölpınarlı 1953.

90. İsmāʿil Anḳaravī, *Cāmiʿuʾl-Āyāt*, MS Süleymāniye Mihrişah Sultan 181. For brief information on this work, see Ceyhan 2005, 166–169. In Arabic rhetoric, the practice of integrating Qurānic verses without explicitly explaining the allusion was known as *iḳtibās*. In his work on rhetoric, Anḳaravī describes this rhetorical device at length, with examples from the Persian poetry of Molla Jāmī. See his *Miftāḥuʾl-Belāgā*, 60–63.

91. The following discussion is based on Anḳaravī, *Minhācuʾl-Fuḳarā*, 385. His two-part classification of revelation is based on the Timurid intellectual Abdurraḥman Jāmī (d. 1414).

92. *Mesnevī*, Book 4, Couplet 1852. See, for an example, the couplet's inscription in MS Süleymaniye Murad Molla 1285, a copy of Anḳaravī's commentary read by Ahmed Agha Balcı Yokuşlu and Mustafa b. Osman.

93. An otherwise little-known waqf employee in Bursa, Ḳaraḳaşzāde was a Naḳshbandī Sufi who resided there, and whose treatises on mysticism were widely read in the Turkish-speaking regions of the empire. Among his works was an early sixteenth-century account of twelve distinct religious groups in Rūm, including eleven Sufi orders and the scholars. Having found the work's categorization useful, yet its language vulgar, Ḳaraḳaşzāde's eloquently written *Light of God for the Converted [to Islam]* (*Nūruʾl-Ḥudā li-man Ihtadā*) updated this book to the eloquent composite language of the Ottoman urban literati. The sixteenth-century account that Karakaşzāde revised and updated was entitled *Menāḳıb-i Ḫvoca-i Cihān ve Netīce-i Cān*. For a critical edition of the work, see Vāḥīdī 1993; in his introduction, Karamustafa introduces Karakaşzāde's reworking of the text (Vāḥīdī 1993, 43–51). Despite Karamustafa's reluctance to identify Karakaşzāde as a Bursan Naḳshbandi author, his preface to his other work, *Mirʿātuʾl-ʿUşşāḳ*, as well as reader notes on his manuscripts, describes him as a madrasa-educated Sufi from Bursa who was active during the reign of Murād IV. See Ḳaraḳaşzāde ʿÖmer, *Mirʿātuʾl-ʿUşşāḳ*, MS Süleymaniye Library, Aşir Efendi 318, f. 9b, 11a; Ḳaraḳaşzāde ʿÖmer, *Nūruʾl-Ḥüdā*, MS Osman Ergin Yazmaları 0303, f. 1a.

94. Ḳaraḳaşzāde ʿÖmer, *Mecmuʿā*, MS Süleymaniya Nafiz Paşa 624 (dated 1602–1605). On Ḳaraḳaşzāde as the author of one of the most popular works of Ottoman Illuminationism, entitled *Mirātuʾl-Uşşāḳ*, see Kurz 2011, 215–233. For the relationship between Illuminationism and a progressive conception of tradition, see chapter 5.

95. For Ḳaraḳaşzāde's references to *Ḥācegān Silsilesi*, see Karakaşzade Ömer el-Bursevī, *Nūru'l-Hudā* (İstanbul: Tasvir-i Efkar, 1286/1870), 114–115, 197. For the Naḳshbandī order in Bursa in the early modern period, see Le Gall 2005.

96. For a seventeenth-century description of the nonlinguistic secrets revealed to the prophet, from which the Mesnevī originated, see Karakaşzade Ömer, *Nūru'l-Hudā*, 152–154, 166–167, 173.

97. For the significance of the Prophet's ascension in Islamic eschatology across a variety of historical contexts, see "Miʿrādj," *EI2*.

98. Ḳaraḳaşzāde, *Nūru'l-Hudā*, 152–154. For a sixteenth-century visual depiction of this anecdote about the divine origins of the *Mesnevī* in the Prophet's ascension, see https://www.themorgan.org/collection/treasures-of-islamic-manuscript-painting/44. For an earlier version of this story, see Aflākī 2002, 410–411. In this version, the unexpressed divine secrets that the Prophet received during the ascension were revealed to saints in a general manner, "without the intermediary of an angel . . . and a dispatched messenger." Aflākī 2002, 411.

99. Anḳaravī's commentary dedicates lengthy space to the number seven as a key to the organization of the earth and heavens. Early on, he collects and provides commentary on a rich repository of traditions that emphasized the importance of the number seven for the classification of knowledge and for the field of logic, for heavens and stars, for the otherworld (e.g., hell has seven gates and seven layers), for the human body (the body was created in seven distinct stages, and its nourishment came from seven sources). For these discussions, see Darülmesnevi 245, ff. 50b-77b.

100. Ceyhan 2005, 328; Annemarie Schimmel, "Sabʿ, Sabʿa," *EI2*. Anḳaravī's introduction dwells at length on the significance of the number seven as a key to the mysteries of the universe and the Qurān, See *Şerḥ-i Cild-i Sābiʿ*, MS Süleymaniye Library, Hasan Hayri Abdullah Efendi 174, ff. 29, 33-38, 45, 48-50, 53-54, 56-58.

101. Darülmesnevi 245, f. 8a: Citing the Qurānic verse 8/31: When Our Signs are rehearsed to them, they say: ["We have heard this (before): if we wished, we could say (words) like these:] these are nothing but tales of the ancients."

102. Darülmesnevi 245, f. 8b.

103. For Anḳaravī's references to studying this earliest copy in Cairo, see Ceyhan 2005, 321–322.

104. For a study of Anḳaravī's readership, see Gürbüzel and Tuşalp-Atiyas 2022.

105. Darülmesnevi 245, f. 10b.

106. For the theme of the competition between Acem and Rum, see Flemming 2018a; Kafadar 2007b.

107. For instance, he found Şemʿi Efendi's commentary insufficient precisely because it was a mere study of the text, whereas a truly enlightening commentary could only be penned by someone "whose speech is in line with sharia, who is strong in ʿilm-i maʿānī, who synthesizes truth and gnosis (ḥaḳāik ve maʿārif)." Cited in Ceyhan 2005, 346. By this move, and by being the first commentator on Book Seven, Anḳaravī set himself above other commentators, past and present.

108. See Shahab Ahmed's categorization of Persianate canon as a creative engagement with the pre-text of revelation. Ahmed 2015, 306–310.

109. Darülmesnevi 245, ff. 108b-109a. There is a double entrende here with the phrase ʿālam-i ghayb, meaning both the world of the unknown, and the supernatural or the divine. For some verses about the divinity (ghaybī, nature) of the book by Anḳaravī and his circles, see Ceyhan 2005, 338.

110. The claim to divine origins was found in many popular texts of piety, such as the *Muhammediye*, which, upon close inspection, was replete with allusions to learned literature. See, for instance, Grenier 2018.

111. For a short summary of his miraculous powers as discussed in eighteenth-century Mevlevī biographies, see Gölpınarlı 1953, 157.

112. For Anḳaravī's praise of Bostan Çelebi as a renewer, see his *Untitled Poem*, cited in Gölpınarlı 1953, 158.

113. Feldman 1996, 85, 191.

114. Müstaḳimzāde, *Şerḥ-i İbārāt*, 198 (*lakin yedinci selam Mesnevi'nin yedinci defteri gibi ihtilaflı olub*).

115. *Mabda ve Maʿād* is a common title in Islamic letters, referring to short works that reflect on man's existence and purpose. These works could be written in various genres, but were mainly in philosophy, theology, and Sufism. See Sait Özervarlı, "Mebde ve Mead." *DİA*.

116. İsmāʿil Anḳaravī, *Mebde ve Meʿād*. MS Leiden Library, Cod. Or. 942/7; MS Atatürk Kitaplığı Osman Ergin Yazma 623, ff. 153b-164b. For this work, see also Ceyhan 2005, 185–191.

117. In his commentary, Anḳaravī gives a short summary of the plot to save it from being lost among other stories contained in the volume, and underlines it as the key story in the volume (Darülmesnevi 245, f. 132b: *bilgil ki bu sifr-i sabiʾ heman bu hikayeden ibaretdir*).

118. Anḳaravī, *Mebde ve Meʿād*, Leiden Cod. Or. 942, f. 168a.

119. Anḳaravī, *Mebde ve Meʿād*, f. 168b.

120. Throughout the commentary, Anḳaravī switches between the personal and political interpretations of the story, positing them as two sides of the same coin. For instance, after a lengthy section interpreting the story as a personal allegory, he alludes to the idea of every man's caliphate (*Her bir kimse kendü şehr ve cismi üzere şahdır*, Darülmesnevi 245, f. 408a). This segueway is then used to transition to a discussion of key political terms such as *justice* and *caliphate*, occasionally reverting to directly addressing authorities (f. 409b-410).

121. Darülmesnevi 245, f. 163a.

122. Darülmesnevi 245, f. 134b.

123. On *meşveret* with reference to its Qurānic provenance, see Anḳaravī, *Şerḥ-i Cild-i Sābiʿ*, Darülmesnevi 245, ff. 172–172b. For the quotation, see f. 341a.

124. ʿAbdülmecid Sivāsī, *Dürer u Gürer*, MS Süleymaniye Library, Esad Efendi 3627, f. 7b.

125. For Sufi preachers as advice writers in this period, see Terzioğlu 2010. For the aforementioned remarks about refraining from advising the sultan publicly, see ʿAbdülmecid Sivāsī, *Dürer u Gürer*, MS Süleymaniye Library, Esad Efendi 3627, ff. 5a-7b. On ʿAbdülmecid Sivāsī's work on the moral and political duties of preachers, written sometime during the reign of Aḥmed I, see Gürbüzel 2016, 103–105.

126. Terzioğlu 2010.

127. See Anḳaravī, *Şerḥ-i Cild-i Sābiʿ*, Darülmesnevi 245, ff. 122a-134b for a passage that summarizes the story and emphasizes that it is the main story of the volume.

128. Anḳaravī, *Şerḥ-i Cild-i Sābiʿ*, Darülmesnevi 245, ff. 21a, 23b-24a, 168a.

129. For instance, see, respectively, a reference to Iranian kings and a brief recapitulation of Ḳıssa-i Dahhak in Anḳaravī, *Şerḥ-i Cild-i Sābiʿ*, Darülmesnevi 245, ff. 292a, 185b-192b. On the Shahnāme's reception as a mirror for princes, see Askari 2016. Askari shows that sections of the *Shahnāme* were embedded in Persian mirrors for princes, showing its constitutive role in Persianate moral-political literature. Book Seven might be considered within this tradition of *Book of Kings*–inspired moral-political writing.

130. On Saʿdi in early modern Ottoman culture, see remarks by Kuru 2013. On allusions to politics and to Shahnāme in Saʿdī's works, see Shomali and Boroujerdi 2013.

131. See, for instance, Saʿdī's treatment of Anushirvan in his *Nasīhat al-Mulūk*, translated and edited in Shomali and Boroujerdi 2013, 65, 77.

132. On this notion of two powers (prophecy and kingship, *dīn u devlet*) in Persianate political thought, see Arjomand 2004.

133. ʿĀlem küfr ile yıkılmaz, zulm ile yıkılır, Anḳaravī, *Şerḥ-i Cild-i Sābiʿ*, MS Darülmesnevi 245, f. 406b. The maxim goes back to Ghazālī, who sought to justify secular power as equally significant for religious notions of caliphate. See Lambton 1980.

CHAPTER 5. LANGUAGE AND HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

1. Meḥmed Murād-ı Naḳşibendī, *Müzeyyel el-ḥifā* [Commentary on *Tuḥfe-i Şāhidī*], MS Atatürk Kitaplığı, Muallim Cevdet Kitapları K 417, 2.

2. *Okur isen Fārisī / Gider dinin yarısı*. For variations on this theme among Ottoman civil officials, see Findley 2014, 36–37.

3. Ottoman imperial regulations recognized the transfer of a secretary's position (*gedik*) to his son. See İnalcık 1940–86, 679.

4. His initiation in the Naḳshbandī order took place under the guidance of Meḥmed Emin Efendi of Bursa. For the circle of Naḳshbandis and their relation to Ottoman anti-puritanism in this period, see chapter 2, note 75.

5. Gibb 1909, 4:213.

6. For the close relationship between rhetorical sciences and the political identity of the civilian bureaucracy, see Tuşalp-Atiyas 2014.

7. For the use of *salon* to denote cultural gatherings at grandee households, see Sievert 2013.

8. Cited and translated in Gibb 1909, 4:214–215. For Hoca Neşʿet's life, see Gibb 1909, 4:211–218; Mustafa İsen, "Hoca Neşʿet," *DİA*.

9. Gottried Hagen considers the differentiation between the public functions and personal experience of religion as an important marker of protomodernity. See Hagen 2006.

10. An extension of this mobility was the common stereotype of the aspirant (dandy) who learned Persian simply to "to show off his eloquence and to distinguish [himself]." See, for instance, Anḳaravī 2001, 167.

11. Baki Tezcan argues that the increased opportunities for upward mobility paved the way for protodemocratization by creating a less stratified society. Tezcan 2010, 10. For the civilianization of Ottoman bureaucracy with attention to secretarial bureaucracy, see İnalcık 1940–86; Findley 2006; Tuşalp-Atiyas 2014, 21–29.

12. For the secretarial-military elite differentiation and rivalry, see Tuşalp-Atiyas 2017. For the secretary-ʿulamā rivalry in early Islamic history, see İnalcık 1940–86, 679.

13. For the rise of the significance of the grand vizier and his household with attention to the Köprülü family, see Yılmaz 2016. For the *ḳalemiye* and household formation, see Tuşalp-Atiyas 2014, 195–216.

14. Tuşalp-Atiyas 2014, 207–208.

15. For the conceptualization of the private salon as a public institution in eighteenth-century France, see Goodman 1992. Goodman argues that by engaging in "private" acts, such as organizing salon gatherings or writing private letters, women were able to play important roles in the Enlightenment. Her analysis rightly complicates the exclusion of the dichotomous treatment of public and private, emphasizing instead the role of private salons in the formation of the public sphere. For the inclusion of commoners in grandee housholds, see Tuşalp-Atiyas 2014, 201.

16. Tuşalp-Atiyas 2014, 204, 209–210.

17. For the idea that "*ḳalemiye* denoted not only an institution, but also a social status and a [specific] culture," see Mehmet İpşirli, "Kalemiye," *DİA*; Tuşalp-Atiyas 2014. An important parallel is Ali Yaycıoğlu's remarks on the New Army as forming a distinct habitus organized around the engineering profession's professional principles, which formed the basis of a shared worldview emphasizing order and predictability. See Yaycıoğlu 2018. The cultural worlds of professional groups and their relationship with each other remains to be studied at greater length. For case studies in the formation of shared cultural idioms of civility around the secretarial profession, see Gürbüzel and Tuşalp-Atiyas 2022; Sezer 2016.

18. For an early modern Ottoman reiteration of the implication of this debate for vernaculars, see below. For these conceptualizations of the Persianate zone, see Ahmed 2015, 73–81; Green 2019, 1–71.

19. My approach is comparable to Christian Mauder's recent chapter in which he considers Persianate identity at the Mamluk court as associated with not only language or ethnicity, but also specific forms of cultural capital. See Mauder 2020.

20. For the connection between linguistic learning and social distinction, see Darling 2012.

21. On Kemalpaşazāde's fatwās on the language of heaven, see Schmidt 2014.

22. Evliyā Çelebi 1999–2006, 10:460. Mauder notes a similar saying that was in circulation at the Mamluk court, with the difference that Turkish was associated with rulership (*siyāsa*). Mauder 2020, 388.

23. Translated and cited in Andrews and Kalpaklı 2005, 29–30.

24. Tezcan 2019.

25. As this chapter demonstrates, the poetry in question (such as works of Rūmī, Ḥafiẓ, or Saʿdī) was as much part of the religious and moral canon as the literary canon (*adab*). On shifting meanings of *adab* as a term that simultaneously verges on the literary, religious, and moral, see Alshaar 2020; Kia 2014. For *Mesnevī* and *Divān-ı Ḥāfiẓ* as sacred texts, see Ahmed 2015, 306–338.

26. Ahmed 2015; Bauer 2019.

27. Both authors observe that many Western academic works equate Islam with a *salafī* understanding of orthodoxy, which has historically had limited and fleeting traction. See Ahmed 2015, 219; Bauer 2019, 194. Instead, they emphasize that the sharia of the jurists was far from being the only normative discourse in Islam. See especially Ahmed 2015, 460–73.

28. Bauer presents his case as an antidote to Western modernity's misconception of Islam and Enlightenment ideals, both at once.

29. For a discussion of the early modern state's impact on the legal and religious spheres, see Krstić 2019.

30. For the connection between the formation of Ottoman Sunnism and the state authority's efforts at social discipline, see Terzioğlu 2012–13.

31. Kātib Çelebi 1990, 142, where Mevlevīs and Ḥalvetīs are mentioned as the chief opponents of Kadızāde Meḥmed Efendi.

32. For the description "sharia-oriented" as the main explanatory term in early modern Ottoman religious change, see Terzioğlu 2012–13. See also Tezcan 2019; Tuşalp-Atiyas 2019. In these studies, the benchmark of Islamic practice and doctrine is presented as sharia, following historical actors' categories. For a criticism of understanding the Islamic solely in legal terms, see Ahmed 2015, 117–129.

33. My aim is not to diminish the significance of early modern legal institutions and developments or their impact on the evolution of Ottoman Sunnism. In line with this understanding, I underline that many learned Sufis of the age, İsmāʿil Anḳaravī being no exception, were well versed in juristic discourse and penned legalistic treatises on issues of the day, such as *samāʿ* and tobacco (see chapters 2 and 6). My aim, however, is to address the prevalent negligence of nonlegalistic discourses in the formation of Ottoman Islamic practice and doctrine.

34. Anḳaravī 2001, 165–248.

35. A prophetic saying enjoins memorizing forty sayings of the Prophet (*arbaʿīn*, lit. "forty") for otherworldly salvation, hence generating a shared tradition of writing and circulating similar compilations of forty prophetic sayings across Islamicate societies. The compiler of an *erbaʿīn* had the authority to select the prophetic sayings, thereby exercising a form of authorship by deciding what aspects of piety are key to his com-

munity. For the Ottoman tradition of *erba'in*, see Abdülkadir Karahan, "Kırk Hadis (Türk Edebiyatı)," *DİA*.

36. Anḳaravī 2001, 165.

37. Anḳaravī emphasizes that his main motivation to write the work was to respond to these two accusations, whereas the rest of the work was written to complete the collection of forty sayings. Anḳaravī 2001, 165–166.

38. The author emphatically states that he uses the method of *taḥḳīḳ*, a term I prefer to translate as "analysis" or "conceptual analysis." For more on *taḥḳīḳ* (verification) and its connection with philosophy and dialectics, see el-Rouayheb 2015, 33–34; on the close relationship between verification and the "books of the Persians," 28–34. El-Rouayheb notes that philosophical studies were commonly referred to as "books of the Persians," yet another example of the cultural associations of Persian, independent of the linguistic medium.

39. While Anḳaravī does not name his contemporaries who invoked this motto, he notes that they traced the motto back to a moral-legal handbook entitled *Şirʿatu'l-İslām*, by the Hanafi jurist Muhammad b. Abu Bakr İmamzade (d. 1177). Manuscript evidence suggests that *Şirʿatu'l-İslām* and its vernacular versions enjoyed broad circulation in mosques and primary schools in this period. Vernacular summaries of this work were circulated as of the sixteenth century as a comprehensive guide to Islamic morality and preaching. For instance, dedicated to the chief architect Sedefkār Meḥmed Ağa, Ḥüsāmeddin Bursevī (d. 1632)'s *Mühimmāt el-Müʾminīn fī Umūri'd-Dünyā ve'd-Dīn* (*Necessary Knowledge for Muslims about Worldly and Religious Affairs*) lists *Şirʿa* as a fundamental book of *mevāʾiẓ* (literally, "sermons," but a general category for Islamic morality). See *Mühimmāt el-Müʾminīn*, MS Topkapı Palace Library Bağdad 189, f. 299b. A simplified Turkish translation by a preacher of the Dragoman Mosque, Mustafa Dede, was taught at the Reyhan Ağa primary school in 1622 (1613–14). See MS Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, İsmihan Sultan 270, f. 399a.

40. For a prophetic hadith that declared Persian the language of hell and found some traction in Ottoman circles in the sixteenth century, see Flemming 2018a, 120. Early debates on the hierarchy between Arabic, the language of the Qurān, and the early Islamic community, and Persian, the language of recent converts, formed the blueprint for later discussions on the relationship between language and piety. For these early debates, see Zadeh 2012, 107–109.

41. Anḳaravī 2001, 167–168.

42. For Anḳaravī's discussion of the permissibility of Persian in prayer, see Anḳaravī 2001, 167–168.

43. For an exposition of this debate and the exceptional attitude of the Hanafi school, see Zadeh 2014, 53–92. This anxiety was remembered by, perhaps even resonated with, early modern Ottomans who reported Abu Ḥanīfa to have complained that as a non-Arab, he was not heeded by Arab nobility. Ṣarı ʿAbdullah Efendi 1872, 121.

44. For the details of this debate in the early Ḥanafi literature, see Zadeh 2014, 53–92, 107–109. Zadeh demonstrates in detail that the debate was connected to broader theological discussions and concerns, such as the inimitability of the Qurān, or the

dispute on whether the Qurān was created or eternal. Catechisms of late medieval Anatolia allowed praying in Turkish, since such leniency was needed for the ongoing Islamization in the region: *Kitab-ı Gunya,* edited by Muzaffer Akkuş (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1995); cited in Yıldırım 2015.

45. Münīrī Belgrādī, *Sübülü'l-Hüdā.* MS İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Atatürk Kitaplığı K 897, ff. 21b-22b.

46. For instance, the language of prayer appeared in the famous Molla Çelebi examination, a set of scholarly examination questions written by Molla Çelebi ʿAmidī (d. ca. 1650), then professor at the Sahn-ı Semān, at the behest of Sultan Murād IV. See Molla Çelebi ʿAmidī, *Risāle-i İmtiḥān,* MS Süleymaniye Library, Esad Efendi 3749, ff. 26b-29b. For Molla Çelebi, his reputation in rational sciences, and his examination, see el-Rouayheb 2015, 46–47.

47. Anḳaravī 2001, 168–169 (*ba-tarīḳ-i tarjama tabligh al-Ḳurān momkin bāshed*). The verse is Q 7:158, cited here with a Persian exegesis of the Qurān entitled *Baḥru'l-Buḥūr fī Tafsīri'l-Masṭūr.* For this exegetical work, see Kātib Çelebi, *Kashf al-Ẓunūn,* 1:222.

48. For a similar Mevlevī discussion, this time by Şeyh Gālib (d. 1799), see Holbrook 1994, 101–102. Şeyh Gālib argued that Abu Ḥanifa's ruling testified to the translatibility of the Qurʾān into any other language.

49. Anḳaravī 2001, 176.

50. For the significance of the *Mesnevī* and music in Mevlevī ritual and socialization, see Gölpınarlı 1953, 370–380. It bears emphasizing, once again, that this is not to say that the puritan position as represented by Ḳadızāde Meḥmed was categorically opposed to poetry or philosophy; but it did not consider these forms of knowledge as a basis of moral norms. In addition, for a critical analysis of the notion that Ḳadızādelis were responsible for the eradication of philosophy from Ottoman intellectual life, see el-Rouayheb 2015.

51. Lewis, "Persian Literature and the Qurʾān," *Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān*; Ahmed 2015, 306–312.

52. For these sections in Kadızāde Meḥmed's catechism, see Kadızāde Meḥmed, *Mecmuʿā-i ʿİlmī ve Gayrihi,,* MS Osman Ergin Collection 834, ff. 22a-27b.

53. Anonymous, *Risale fi'z-Zikr,* MS Süleymaniye Library, Yazma Bağışlar 5570, f. 173a. While the author of this seventeenth-century collection remains unknown, the compiler of the manuscript entitled it *Risāle-i Ḳadızāde,* which suggests that early modern readers considered the work to be in agreement with Ḳadızāde Meḥmed's authorial persona.

54. Terzioğlu 2013, 96–97. Although I focus on religious debates in this chapter, mention must also be made of the related Ottoman literary trope as expressed by the historian Gelibolulu ʿĀlī (d. 1600), who wrote: "Persians may be elegant, but most of them are hypocrites [in faith]." (*Gerçi kim tab ʿ-ı ʿacem nāzik olur / Ekseri ānların münāfıḳ olur.*) Gelibolulu Muṣṭafa Ālī, *Mevāidu'n-Nefāis fī Kavāidü'l-Mecālis,* 156; cited in Özbaran 2017, 96. The word used for hypocrites (*münāfıḳ*) had pejorative religious connotations in Ottoman Turkish; it referred to a person who, despite appearing

faithful, was an infidel. For the repeated appearance of the trope that Persian culture encapsulated unsound religiosity, well into the nineteenth century, see Flemming 2018a.

55. For Fażlızāde ʿAlī's thought, see Kurz 2011; for the transliteration and translation of the passage, see 149.

56. Passage transliterated and cited in Kurz 2011, 51–52n131. For millenarianism around the *hijrī* year 1000, see Fleischer 1992. Fażlızāde's text shows that after the sixteenth century, the year 1000 continued to have cosmic significance, only this time retrospectively as the beginning of a moral decline.

57. For Murād-ı Naḳşibendī's autobiography and information on the Dārülmesnevī, see Şentürk 1997.

58. Anḳaravī 2001, 169–170. In his handbook on rhetoric, Anḳaravī again defines the goal of rhetorical education as the deep comprehension of three exalted texts: the Qurʾān, the Prophet's sayings, and the *Mesnevī*. See Anḳaravī, *Miftāḥ*, 2–3. For a more explicit statement that Arabic and Persian were the two languages of heaven, see Anḳaravī 2001, 166–167.

59. Bursevī, *Rūḥu'l-Mesnevī,*; 6.

60. Anḳaravī 2001, 199.

61. Anonymous, MS Süleymaniye Library, Yazma Bağışlar 7354, f. 173a.

62. Nicholson 1925, 2:337. The section is entitled "How a Certain Shaykh Said to Bayazid: *I am the Ka'ba, Perform a Circumambulation around Me,*" 2:336–337.

63. Cited in Anḳaravī 2002, 214. Nicholson 1925, vol. 2, couplets 2218–2219.

64. Nicholson 1925, 2:337.

65. See, for instance, the following passages in the first volume of his commentary: Tanyıldız 2010, 770, 826.

66. Anḳaravī 2001, 198–199, response to the prophetic hadith "Jurisprudence is the pillar of religion," which was cited as a criticism of the Mevlevī order. Despite not citing Ghazālī explicitly, Anḳaravī's analysis here follows Ghazālī's *Revival of the Religious Sciences* (*Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn*). For a full treatment of the concept of "the science of the afterlife," in Ghazālī's thought and revivalism, see Garden 2014. I thank Evren Sünnetçioğlu for bringing the significance of the term to my attention.

67. Kaya Şahin notes this question as one shared across early modern political cultures. See Şahin 2017, 171.

68. Anḳaravī 2001, 198.

69. For this view of continuous revelation, see chapter 4.

70. In an early seventeenth-century encyclopedia of sciences, the scholar Meḥmed Emīn Şirvānī (d. 1627) equates Illuminationism with Sufism. See Şirvānī 2019, 392. Similarly, Kātib Çelebi writes that Sufism was "established upon the basis of the *ḥikmet* of Illuminationism and borrowed its terminology." Kātib Çelebi, *Mīzān al-Ḥaḳḳ*, 55. Although an important intellectual current in the early modern period, Ottoman Illuminationism has received scant attention. One exception is Marlene Kurz, who defines Illuminationism (*ḥikma*) as a synthesis of mystical and rational forms of knowledge and shows that Anḳaravī and Kātib Çelebi were among key Illuminationist thinkers of the period. See Kurz 2011, 202–212. For a discussion of the close relationship

between Ottoman mystical and philosophical traditions centered around the Akbarian tradition, see el-Rouayheb 2015, 235–271.

71. For Suhrawardī's epistemology, see Ziai 1990. For a facsimile and English edition of Anḳaravī's commentary on *Temples of Light,* see Anḳaravī 1996. Bilal Kuşpınar underlines that the most important reason why Anḳaravī engaged in this commentary was "to remove the stigma of the heretical scent of *ittiḥād* (unification) and *ḥulūl* (incarnation) from the notorious utterances of certain renowned mystics" (Anḳaravī 1996, 59–60).

72. Saif 2019. For nondiscursive thought in Avicenna, see Adamson 2004. Adamson argues that Avicenna's epistemology is not mystical, yet includes the occasional allusion to mysticism; see 108–109. Despite the broader presence of nondiscursive thought in Islamic philosophy, Ottoman authors attributed it distinctively to Illuminationism.

73. *Kitābu't-Terşīḥāt,* by Nasuḥ Efendi of Belgrade (d. 1573), was a philosophically oriented *summa* of mystical Islam. The author intended to "distill" (hence the title, *terşīḥ*) classical works of mystical philosophy by such towering figures as Ḳāşānī, Davūd-ı Ḳayserī, Tūsī, Ibn Arabī, Rūmī, Cāmī, Ghazālī, Suhrawardī, and Kāşifī, with the intention of making these Arabic and Persian works accessible in Turkish. For a modern Turkish edition, see Nasuh Çelebi 2003, 211.

74. For this discussion, see chapter 4. For the identification of extra-Qurānic revelation as *al-ḥikma,* see Graham 1977, 32–41.

75. *Ḥikma* referred to different sets of texts and interpretive traditions throughout history. Khaled el-Rouayheb shows that *hikma,* in the general sense of philosophical studies, was on the rise as a worthy scholarly pursuit in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See el-Rouayheb 2015, 11–59. In Anḳaravī's conception of *ḥikma,* a second influence after Suhrawardi was Ghazāli, as seen in his commentary on Ghazālī's *Mishkātu'l-Anwār.* See Anḳaravī 2011.

76. Anḳaravī 2001, 169.

77. For Kātib Çelebi's Illuminationism, see Kurz 2011, 204–206; Kātib Çelebi 1990, 273–278.

78. Kātib Çelebi 1990, 55–56.

79. For the literature on the condemnation of innovations, see Tuşalp-Atiyas 2019 and the references therein.

80. Anḳaravī, *Cāmiʿu'l-Āyāt,* f. 104 b.

81. Anḳaravī, *Şerh-i Ehadis-i Erbain,* 176. The terms are, respectively, *vācib, müsteḥab, mubāḥ, mekrūḥ, ḥaram.* For this classification as it appears in Islamic law in general and in Meḥmed Birgivī's work in particular, see Ivanyi 2019, 140.

82. On Nabulusī's creative reinterpretation of Birgivī, see Ivanyi 2019; Allen 2019a.

83. Allen 2019a, 154.

84. Allen 2019a. Allen noted that two other issues of divergence between Birgivī and Nabulusī were the authority of esoteric vis-à-vis textual knowledge, and the authority of the ʿulamā to enforce public morality.

85. Ivanyi 2019, 140.

86. For Toḳādī's discussion of the five-partite classification of innovations, which he traces back to Nevevī, see Toḳādī, *Ṣıyānet-i Dervīşān*, f. 59a. For his discussion of innovations more broadly, see ff. 58b-59b.

87. For a seventeenth-century case study of scribal interest in Mevlevī anti-puritanism, see Gürbüzel and Tuşalp-Atiyas 2022.

88. İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnan, "Müstakimzāde'nin Hayatı," in Müstaḳīmzāde 2011, LXV-LXXVII.

89. For Urmevī, see chapter 3 in this book.

90. For Toḳādī's life and works, see Şimşek 2004, 169–215; Müstaḳīmzāde 2011, 364–365.

91. Meḥmed Murād-ı Naḳşibendī, *Müzeyyel el-ḥifā*, 3.

92. Meḥmed Murād-ı Naḳşibendī, *Müzeyyel el-ḥifā*, 4.

93. For the continuity between early modern belletristic learning and nineteenth-century bureaucratic culture, see Findley 2014, 146–151.

94. For a detailed analysis of *Sefine-i Rāġıb* and its copies, see Sievert 2013.

95. For another publicly circulated scribal *mecmuʿā*, see Gürbüzel and Tuşalp-Atiyas, forthcoming. For public libraries as architectural representations of the *mecmuʿā*s of scribes, see Sezer 2016, 251–252.

96. Sievert (2013) compares the library endowments of the secretarial class with that of ʿulamā and finds that the former prioritized belles lettres, history, and biographies significantly more than the latter.

97. See, for instance, the prominence of religious learning in the educational trajectories and reading habits of high-ranking secretaries, demonstrated in Sievert 2013.

98. For the mutually constitutive relationship between religious and secular, see Dressler and Mandair 2011.

99. Gürbüzel and Tuşalp-Atiyas, 2022.

100. For these connections, see Tuşalp-Atiyas 2014, 210. For Mevlevī presence at Rāġıb Paşa's household, see also Sievert 2013.

101. *Mebḥās-ı İmān*, attributed in some collections to Ḳadızade Meḥmed on account of its Ḳadızādeli-like discourse, equates reading Persian with posing as/self-forming as urbane (*şehrī olmak*). See Çiftçi 2019, 176. For this text and an alternative view on its authorship, see also Terzioğlu 2013.

102. Evliyā Çelebi 1999–2006, 6:114.

103. Evliyā Çelebi 1999–2006, 6:114–116; for the Peçūy Mevlevī Lodge, see Ágoston 1991.

CHAPTER 6. OF COFFEEHOUSE SAINTS

1. The story is included in a seventeenth-century manuscript containing popular stories. See Leiden, Cod. Or. 1552. In the famous sixteenth-century depiction of an Ottoman coffeehouse, Değirmenci identifies a Mevlevī dervish from the visual clues in a miniature depicting an Ottoman coffeehouse. See Değirmenci 2015.

2. For a preacher's harangue against smokers and coffeehouses, contrasting the latter's popularity with the abandoned state of mosques and madrasas, see Şeyh Sinān, *Untitled Poem*, MS İbrahim Hakkı Konyalı Kütüphanesi 1342/48.

3. Curry 2010, 80; Grehan 2006; Terzioğlu 2010. Although this chapter focuses primarily on the Ottoman Muslim community's responses, non-Muslim communities developed similar moral discourses around tobacco. For this point, see Fotic 2011; Kermeli 2014.

4. For the literature associating the early modern coffeehouse with secularism, see Çaykent and Tarbuck 2017.

5. For the distinction between these two powers in Ottoman legal culture, see Tuğ 2017, 48–54. While Tuğ's argument is based on the functioning of the Ottoman courts, in this chapter I show that noninstitutional actors, such as Sufis, similarly invoked this distinction at crucial junctures.

6. Kātib Çelebi provides the approximate date 1010/1601 for the appearance of tobacco in Istanbul. See Kātib Çelebi 1990, 65. The historian Peçevī provides 1009/1600 in *Tarih-i Peçevī*, 365. However, based on tobacco cultivation patterns in western Anatolia, Fehmi Yılmaz argues that tobacco entered the Ottoman realms in the late 1570s. See Yılmaz 2005.

7. For a global history of the early modern reception of tobacco, see Goodman 1993. For tobacco in Iran, see Matthee 2005, 117–144; Withington 2014; Norton 2008.

8. For instance, Kātib Çelebi relied almost solely on the Galenic theory of humors in his treatment of tobacco. See Kātib Çelebi 1990, 64–65, 68.

9. For Monardes's treatment of tobacco and its circulation in the Islamic Mediterranean, including the Ottoman Empire, see Gürbüzel 2021.

10. From a vernacular poem attributed to an unknown Mevlānā Fevrī (lit. Mevlānā "Speedy"). Anonymous, *Tütünün Zemmi Hakkında Risale*, MS Süleymaniye Library, Erzincan 144, ff. 83a-109a, at f. 82.

11. Anonymous, *Mebḫās-i İmān*, MS Sofia National Library, Or 734, ff. 42b-43a. For more on this manuscript, see note 59 below.

12. My discussion of Aḳḥiṣārī's treatise on smoking is based on the edition and translation by Yaḥyā Michot; see Aḳḥisārī 2010 (hereafter *Against Smoking*). For the above quotation, see *Against Smoking*, 48.

13. Anonymous, *Mebḫās-i İmān*, f. 43b.

14. Rosenthal 1971, 111–12. In this work, Rosenthal provides a detailed categorization based on the work of the Mālikī jurist Qarāfī (d. 1285), who defines three categories: substances that intoxicate (*al-muskirāt*), those that numb (*al-murqidāt*), and those that corrupt (*al-mufsidāt*). Only the latter two affect the mind, hence clouding judgment. People who consumed these latter could not pray or witness at the court. Justin Stearns has recently shown that Qarāfī's tripartite distinction was invoked in the North African debates on tobacco in the seventeenth century. Using the categorization, some jurists argued that "there is consensus that tobacco is not an intoxicant, and . . . it is neither a narcotic or anesthetic according to the criteria established by al-Qarāfī, the most that can be said of it is that it produces languor (*mufattir*). There is, therefore, no

doubt that it is permitted to smoke it and only the stupid or ignorant could disagree." See Stearns 2021, 157.

15. For a more detailed account of the legal debates on the intoxicating nature of coffee, see Hattox 1985, 46–60. Hattox argues that the initial objection to coffee on the grounds that it was an "intoxicant" (*muskir*) did not hold out for long, given the physically stimulating effects of the drink.

16. For this origin story of coffee, see Kātib Çelebi 1990, 74.

17. Ibn Cānī, *Berg-i Duḫān Ḥaḳḳında*, f. 177b.

18. Ibn Cānī, *Berg-i Duḫān Ḥaḳḳında*, f. 177a. Kātib Çelebi explains that a physician on an English ship sailing from the Atlantic to the Pacific was given the plant on this island, or found the plant on the island. Unlike Ibn Cānī's story, this version eliminates the knowledge and intermediacy of the indigenous peoples. The leaf then spreads to the world from England, by way of France. Kātib Çelebi 1990, 64–65.

19. See the story collection by Nergisī that describes an addict's quest for "British leaf." Nergisī 1997, 660 and 664. For popular invective condemning tobacco for its foreign, British origins, see also *Against Smoking*, 59, with reference to the well-known anti-tobacco treatise by the Egyptian scholar Ibrāḥim al-Laḳanī (d. 1631).

20. Anḳaravī, *Kaff al-Lisān ʿan Ḥukmi'd-Duḫān*, MS Topkapı Palace, Mehmed Reşad 190, f. 4b. For a brief summary of this work by an Ottoman reader, see *Untitled*, MS Süleymāniye Halet Efendi Ek 212/13.

21. Tuşalp-Atiyas 2019.

22. Kātib Çelebi's main objection to tobacco was its pollution of the air. See Kātib Çelebi 1990, 68. Air was one of the six essentials in ancient medicine. Similar arguments against tobacco on the basis of its corrupting the air appeared in Iran. See Matthee 2005, 136.

23. For the comparison between smoking and the tradition that discusses eating leeks and onions before joining a congregation, see Kātib Çelebi 1990, 69. Anḳaravī objects to this argument, saying that just as the foul smell does not lead to a ban on leeks, it cannot lead to a ban on tobacco. See his *Kaff al-Lisān*, f. 3b (Argument six). It may be helpful here to remember anthropological insights about purity and anxiety. As Mary Douglas suggested in a book that has been revisited by many anthropologists since, all social formations have rituals that mark the boundary of the pure and the polluted, the safe and the threatening. Rather than considering purity rituals as "primitive rites," Douglas's study underlines that practices of boundary-drawing between purity and impurity were social strategies through which a given society perpetually reproduced its values and taboos. Where there is a ritual of purification, she argued, there is an implicitly shared understanding of what cleanliness and order look like. Through evoking rituals of purification, these collective ideals are remembered and sustained. Her insights help interpret states of communally shared obsession about cleanliness and corruption as moments when the underlying assumptions about purity and order are perceived to be under threat. Douglas 2013.

24. It was therefore no coincidence that the anti-tobacco preacher Akḥiṣārī called tobacco, alongside opium and hash, a "corrupting substance" (*mufsid*). On one hand,

the preacher wanted to evoke the Islamic tradition that forbade the use of narcotics (*mufsid*), openly comparing tobacco to opium and reminding his listeners of the legal prohibitions against the latter substance. *Against Smoking*, 60–63, 66. Michot translates *fitna* as "calamity"; however, this translation conceals the significant political implications of the term. As Akḥiṣārī's use of the word "corrupting" (*mufsid*) for tobacco demonstrates, his categorization was less a medical-juridical one than a socially oriented one. This is clear in his pairing of f-s-d with its equally evocative counterpart, f-t-n, throughout his discussion of tobacco. *Fasād* and *fitna* were politically and historically charged terms: "A notion of *fitna* [is] defined as disturbances, or even civil war, involving the adoption of doctrinal attitudes which endanger the purity of the Muslim faith; and every mention of *fitna* evokes 'the great *fitna* of Islam' which culminated at Ṣiffīn." Gardet, "Fitna," *EI2*. Unlike the careful categorization of juristic debate summarized above in note 12, Akḥiṣārī uses concepts such as *muskir* (intoxicant) and *mufsid* (corruptive, narcotic) indiscriminately, without much attention to legal terminology. This terminological inattention corroborates Michot's observation that the preacher should be considered more of a social commentator than a jurist.

25. *Against Smoking*, 64–65. This does not mean, however, that the cognitive impacts of tobacco and its implications for determining whether one was of sound mind or not were irrelevant in Ottoman discourse. These debates existed, but were reserved for the more technical juristic literature. Former *fetvā*s of Ebussuʿūd Efendi forbidding individuals who consume opium from becoming *imām*s are scribbled in the marginalia of tobacco treatises because of this juristic connection. For an example of this juxtaposition, see *Against Smoking*, 61. For Ottoman *fetvā*s that disputed the soundness of mind of smokers, see note 71 below.

26. For a comparative study, see Cowan 2014.

27. As an example, see the English translation of the treatise by the physician Davud Anṭākī (d. 1599): "The nature of the drink kauhi, or coffee, and the berry of which it is made, described by an Arabian physician" (Oxford: Henry Hall, 1659). Nicolás Monardes's work on tobacco, which claims that it cures thirty-six diseases, was also translated into Arabic by the late sixteenth century. See Ibn Cānī, *Berg-i Duḫān*.

28. "It has been the world's most radical drink in that its function has been to make people think. And when the people began to think, they became dangerous to tyrants and to foes of liberty of thought and action." Juma 2016; Topik 2009.

29. This account of the coffeehouses of Isfahan is based on Emami 2016.

30. Kafadar 2014. For similar remarks on the importance of the local context for the development of London coffeehouses, see Cowan 2008, 258–262.

31. Peçevī 1981, 366. See also the remarks by the Greek chronicler Papasynadios from Serres, who wrote of the year 1632: "In the month of September Sultan Murad became the new king . . . and he spoilt the coffee shops all over the realm, as well as tobacco, and no one smokes it." Balta 2003, 87.

32. This is not to say that all imperial bans treated these matters together. A number of imperial edicts that were addressed to the producers in western Anatolia (therefore, not to the consumers in Istanbul) banned tobacco on economic grounds.

According to these edicts, tobacco destroyed existing patterns of crop production and trade and created idleness among the workforce. The latter argument, that of the idleness of smokers, was a commentary less on the physical effects of tobacco, as seen in the legal and medical literature, and more on the simple fact that smokers sat around doing nothing for the duration of smoking. The earliest of these edicts is dated to 1609. Similar orders followed in 1610, 1614, 1618, and 1619. The repeated bans were not forceful enough; therefore, starting in 1614, the edicts were reinforced with *fetvā*s from the chief mufti in office. For modern transcriptions of these early orders addressing the producers' side, see Yılmaz 2005, 324–325. The first discussion of bans on coffeehouses was in the late sixteenth century, during the reign of Murād III. Based on *mühimme* registers, Ahmet Yaşar dates the first coffeehouse bans in Istanbul to 1567. See Yaşar 2005. These earlier bans, which came soon after the opening of the first coffeehouse in Istanbul in 1554, justified the closing down of coffeehouses by denouncing them as houses of vice.

33. Yaşar 2005.

34. Matthee 2005, 119.

35. In 1683, the first tax register (*taḥrīr*) that registered tobacco cultivation areas (in the Bursa-Yenişehir region) mentions forty-seven tobacco farmers, all of whom were Muslims and most of whom held the titles *beşe* and *ağa*, signaling janissary connection. See Yılmaz 2005, 27. By the early nineteenth century, one-third of coffeehouse owners in Istanbul came to be composed of *janissary-esnaf*. Kırlı 2000, chap. 2.

36. Peçevī 1981, 366.

37. For imperial hunt as an allegory of military power and might, see Artan 2008. For the staging and narration of violence as a strategy of power, see Lange and Fierro 2009.

38. For literature on the campaign logs of Murād IV, see Aykut 1984; Sahillioğlu 1965; Zeyrek 1999.

39. Kafadar 2007a; Sariyannis 2005.

40. Ṣolaḳzāde 1989, 2:628. On Ḳadızāde Meḥmed's influence on Murād IV, who was inspired to shut down taverns after the preacher's sermons, see also Kātib Çelebi 2007, 840.

41. Naʿīmā 2007, 4:1706.

42. For instance, Anonymous, *Mebḫās-ı İmān*, MS Sofia National Library, Or 734, f. 38a.

43. Anonymous, *Tütünün Zemmi Hakkında Risale*, MS Süleymaniye Library, Erzincan 144, ff. 83a-109a. The same idea appears in Anonymous, *Mebḫās-ı İmān*, the opinion attributed to Üstüvānī (d. 1661), ff. 38a-b. On Islamic legal discourse on banditry, rebellion, and common crime, see Abou El Fadl 2001, 247–263.

44. In addition to Abou El Fadl's work, see the following works for a criticism of the argument that Islamic jurists posed no limitation to political authorities: Feldman 2008; Lange 2014.

45. Baber Johansen similarly differentiates between a moralistic and a juristic typology, where the latter prioritized juristic procedure. Johansen 2002.

46. Abou El Fadl 2001, 327.

47. Atçıl 2017b.

48. *manāsib diniyya*; cited in Johansen 2002.

49. For a history of the reception of Ibn Taymiyya in the Ottoman context, see Terzioğlu 2021. Terzioğlu shows that the Taymiyyan intellectual legacy was not claimed solely by the literalist/puritan line in Ottoman tradition, but was perpetuated by such figures as Dede Cöngi (d. 1567) and Aşık Çelebi (d. 1572). It was not the literalist-traditionalist epistemology of Ibn Taymiyya that appealed to these authors, but "the authorization of a strong state for a stable society founded on sharʿī principles." Terzioğlu 2021, 102. In this sense, Ibn Taymiyya's concept of *siyāsa sharʿiyya* had an important impact on Ottoman political thought, much more than on Ottoman juristic or theological consciousness.

50. Naʿīmā 2007, 4:1706.

51. The text at MS Ibrahim Hakkı Konyalı Library, f. 47 attributes the *fetvā* to Vānī Efendi (d. 1685). Yet, it is quite likely that the *fetvā* was issued earlier, and later attributed to Vānī Efendi, since the text appears among the personal notes of the Dutch diplomat Levinus Warner, who stayed in Istanbul between 1644 and 1664, and Vani Efendi was not appointed to his prominent preaching post at Yenicamii or to the prayer leadership of Meḥmed IV until 1665. For Warner's copy of the *fetvā*, see MS Leiden University Cod. Or. 1159, ff. 6–7.

52. Terzioğlu 2010, 292. Although Terzioğlu initially identified the author as a Ḥalvetī preacher, Baki Tezcan recently showed him to be a Naḳshbandī instead. See Tezcan 2019, 228.

53. Terzioğlu 2010, 294.

54. For the section on coffeehouses and tobacco see Ḳādirī, *Untitled,* MS Topkapı Türkçe Yazmalar Y 2636/YY 519, ff. 30–43.

55. For detailed analyses of Ghazālī's treatment of public order, see Cook 2000, 427–459; Mottahedeh and Stilt 2003, 735–48.

56. Contemporaries carefully distinguished between drinking coffee privately and in a social setting. For the views of a Cairene rabbi, who allowed consuming coffee in private but forbade frequenting the coffeehouse for the sake of drinking coffee, even for medical reasons, see Kafadar 2002. The rabbi in question is Rabbi David ibn Abi Zimra, active in the early sixteenth century.

57. Klein 2006; Cook 2000, 309n14.

58. Tūğī 2010, 156–157.

59. According to Kātib Çelebi, the preacher was involved in lengthy debates with Ḳadızāde Meḥmed Efendi on issues of ritual and doctrine, such as supererogatory prayers during the two months that precede Ramadan. Kātib Çelebi 2007, 837–838.

60. There are several versions of the sermons and stories attributed to Cerrāḥ Şeyḥi preserved in manuscript miscellanies. I base my discussion on an anonymous tract, entitled *Mebḥās-ı İmān* [*Discourse on Faith*], MS Sofia National Library, Or. 743. For the attribution of the following sermon and story to Cerrāḥ Şeyḥi, see *Mebḥās-ı İmān,* ff. 38a, 43b. The existence of several other copies of the treatment in *Discourse on Faith,*

albeit with variations, points to the popularity of this early seventeenth-century canon. See Sakaoğlu 1990; Anonymous, MS Süleymaniye Erzincan 144, ff. 88a-88b.

61. The motifs of having to open up graves, find witches, and eliminate them by pushing a stake in their stomach or by beheading them and placing their heads near their feet match popular narratives about witch beliefs as found in *fetvā*s and other legal documents, such as *mühimme*s. For a good analysis of these beliefs and their connection with social crises, see Aycibin 2008.

62. *Tütünün Zemmi Hakkında Risale*, f. 90a.

63. Yılmaz 2005, 53–54 on the gradual petering out and, finally, end of tobacco bans. A similar relaxation occurs in the second half of the seventeenth century for coffee-houses. The 1633 coffeehouse ban was the final wholesale ban, after which the imperial bans were sporadic and singled out specific coffeehouses for closure rather than being wholesale. See Yaşar 2005.

64. The idea of legalizing tobacco as a way of acquiring additional tax revenue had already been in circulation earlier in the century. See Kātib Çelebi 1990, 171.

65. Anḳaravī, *Kaff al-Lisān*, f. 3b. This double distancing was a position shared by many authors on coffee and tobacco. Kātib Çelebi shares Anḳaravī's negative view of tobacco, but does not condone the bans. See Kātib Çelebi 1990, 168.

66. For studies on communal privacy in the Ottoman world, see Marcus 1986; Mikhail 2007. For a seventeenth-century narrative set at private garden outings, which were also communal *majlise*s, see Aṭāī 1999.

67. For changing norms of privacy, see Artan 1993; Hamadeh 2008. For changing norms of publicity and privacy in early modern Europe, see McKeon 2012.

68. Ghazālī's analysis of different degrees of publicity similarly employed proto-typical spaces—mosques, marketplaces, streets, hammams, and banquets—to corre-spond to varying degrees of publicity. See Cook 2000, 443–445.

69. Kātib Çelebi 1990, 67. For the general ethical-legal principle of not prying into homes, see Mottahadeh and Stilt 2003. Kātib Çelebi ends this section with a verse that evokes the boundary of legal intervention at the home: "What business does a *muhta-sib* [public authority] have inside homes?"

70. Anḳaravī, *Kaff al-Lisān*, f. 6a. The reminder evokes a well-known distinction in Islamic thought on the regulation of public conduct and private conduct. On privacy and legal regulation, see Shahab Ahmed 2015, 379–386; Cook 2000, 57–63. Ahmed underlines that the public-private distinction is not some form of pragmatic hypocrisy; it is a direct product of Islamic hermeneutics in which the seen/unseen (*zahir/batin*) distinction presupposes that social norms are always only partial truth and prone to change. This logic is in line with the notion of *sukut*, of uncertainty in legal interpreta-tion, shared by all Ottoman anti-ban authors studied here.

71. For these *fetvā*s, see Çavuşoğlu 1990, 240–241; For the chief mufti Hocazāde Meḥmed Efendi (d. 1615)'s versified *fetvā* against smoking, particularly during the holy month of Ramadan, possibly composed to be recited during his weekly *majlise*s at the Hagia Sophia Mosque, see *Mecmua*, MS İstanbul Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Şevket Rado Collection 525, f. 49a.

72. For a list of legal tracts that considered smoking legally neutral, see Şükrü Özen, "Tütün," *DİA*. For the employment of a similar argument from legal neutrality (*ibāḥā*) in the early stages of coffee consumption, which likely was one of the inspirations of the anti-ban authors, see Hattox 1985, 61–62. According to Hattox, by counteracting coffee's condemnation because it is an innovation, the legal neutrality argument wished to "[discourage believers] from letting their piety spill over into sanctimonious asceticism" (62).

73. For the category of *mubāh* as "boundary of sharʿ," see Reinhart 1995, 1983.

74. Abou El Fadl 2001, 321–333.

75. Jackson 2017.

76. See the autobiographical section, where he describes himself and his family, in Abu al-Wafaʾ ibn ʿUmar al-ʿUrdi, *Maʾadin al-dhahab fi al-aʾyan al-musharrafa bi-him Halab*, ed. ʿAbdullah al-Ghazali (al-Ṣafāh, al-Kuwayt: Maktabat Dār al-ʿUrūbah, 1987), 205–216. For the ʿUrdhī family and the antinomian tendencies of their revered Sufi sheikh, Shaykh Abu Bakr, see Watenpaugh 2005. For Abuʾl-Wafā ʿUrdhī's treatise on smoking, see Urdhī, *Risāla Muʿtabara fi-Haḳḳiʾd-Duḥān*, MS Süleymaniye Library, Lala İbrahim Paşa 738, ff. 124a-128b.

77. It is highly likely that ʿUrdhī had in mind Sultan Suleiman's chief mufti, Ebussuud, who had issued a *fetvā* against coffee. For Ebussuud's *fetvā*s about coffee, see Karababa and Ger 2010. For ʿUrdhī's argument on legal neutrality, see his *Risāla Muʿtabara*, particularly at f. 128a.

78. For this discussion, see chapter 2 in this book.

79. Kātib Çelebi 1990, 74–75.

80. Kātib Çelebi 2007, 887. Kātib Çelebi (1990, 65–66) makes similar remarks about the futility of the harsh sultanic bans, as well as that of the anti-tobacco sermons of Cerrāḥ Şeyḥi.

81. ʿUrdhi, *Risala Muʿtabara*, f. 125a.

82. ʿUrdhi, *Risala Muʿtabara*, f. 125b. ʿUrdhī's concern was not hypothetical. There were, in fact, legal opinions by figures no less than the chief muftī Zekeriyyazāde Yaḥyā (d. 1644), who argued that smoking should disqualify Muslims from being witnesses at Islamic courts. I thank Evren Sünnetçioğlu for sharing this information with me.

83. Anḳaravī, *Kaff al-Lisān*, f. 5b. He adds: "It is known that forbidding wrong (*nahy aniʾl-munkar*) is not obligatory, but is permitted [only] when it will not lead to corruption or harm. . . . But when the forbidder (*nahi*) knows that his forbidding of that thing will not succeed but will lead to *tenafür el-qulub*, it is permissible to stop *nehy/ terkuhu* since it is a position that has no benefits." Anḳaravī invokes a well-known legal-moral principle that forbids moral disciplining in cases when such disciplining is known to lead to societal evil.

84. Anḳaravī 2001, 246; Cook 2000, 45–46. For a brief summary of the objections to commanding right in Islamic history, see Cook 2000, chap. 8, "Is Anyone Against Forbidding Wrong?," 83–95.

85. Ivanyi 2019, 150.

86. A story by Nergisī (d. 1635), one of the most eloquent prose writers of the century, which describes an addict's search for tobacco, portrays sailors and dervishes as stereotypical smokers. See Nergisī 1997, 657–667.

87. For a comprehensive analysis of a non-sharia Islamic discourse framing the practice of wine-drinking, see Ahmed 2015, 57–71.

88. Nidāi, *Mübāhasāt-ı Mükeyyifāt*, MS İstanbul Araştırmaları Enstitüsü YZ 76, ff. 252b-260a. For the genre of debates among pleasurable substances (*menāḳıb-ı mükeyyifāt*) in Ottoman letters, see also Aynur and Schmidt 2007.

89. Aynur and Schmidt 2007, 97.

90. For Ottoman discussions of courtliness, chivalry, and drinking, see İnalcık 2011, 159–172, 221–229. İnalcık considers this Ottoman discourse a Timurid legacy.

91. Anḳaravī, *Kaff al-Lisān*, f. 2b: "That which enters in the rule of *al-wujūb* is itself *wājib*. That which enters in the rule of *al-nadb* is itself *mandūb*. That which enters in the rule of *al-mubāḥ* is itself *mubāḥ*. These three [a, b, and c] are called good innovations (*al-bidʿa al-ḥusna*)." Tobacco, belonging to the *mubāḥ* category, was therefore a good innovation.

92. For his argument that the claims regarding the medical harms of smoking are unfounded, see Anḳaravī, *Kaff al-Lisān*, ff. 3b-4a.

93. For Altıparmak Efendi and his works, see Joseph Schacht, "Altı Parmak," *EI2*.

94. Şeyh Sinān, *Untitled*, MS Konyalı Kütüphanesi 1342/48. The verse mixes Arabic and Turkish, unlike many popular poems that circulated in Istanbul, which preferred simple Turkish.

95. *Zevḳ* refers to the experiential discovery of spiritual states, and by extension physical states that lead to these experiences. According to Qushayri, Sufis used the words tasting (*dhawq*) and drinking (*shurb*) to "describe the fruits of God's self-manifestation, the results of God's self-unveiling and God's unexpected visitations, which they experience." Of these words, tasting denoted existentially the highest level of experiencing God's self-manifestation. See Qushayrī 2007, 95.

96. *Lehv* and *hevā* are the terms used to refer to "pleasure." These are terms that figure heavily in the debates on *samāʿ*, which the puritan objection seeks to place as the site of pleasure rather than piety.

97. ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nablusī, *al-Ṣulḥ bayn al-iḥvān*, MS Süleymāniye Library, Esad Efendi 3607.

98. Peçevī 1981, 365–366. Peçevī uses *keyf* (pleasure) and *dhawq* (spiritual refinement) interchangeably. A few decades later, when the chief mufti Bahāī Efendi (d. 1654) issued a *fetvā* that permitted smoking, he was criticized and forced to resign. Chroniclers labeled Bahāī Efendi's critics as "non-smokers devoid of spiritual refinement." Bahāī Efendi was known to indulge in smoking as well as other forms of pleasure (*ehl-i dhawq*). He wrote not only a *fetvā* in defense of smoking, but also many poems in which he couched smoking as conducive to spiritual refinery and sophistication. See Naʿīmā 2007, 4:1296.

99. Uzluk 1957, 60–61. For Fāsiḥ Dede's alligiance to the bureaucractic circles of the Köprülü household, see Tuşalp-Atiyas 2014, 204.

100. For his treatise entitled *Tenbakūnāme*, see MS İstanbul Üniversitesi T 5561.

101. On the life and works of Sā'ib-i Tabrīzī and his popularity in the Persianate world, see Paul E. Losensky, "Ṣāʾeb Tabrizi," *Encyclopaedia Iranica*.

102. Discussions of tobacco's effects, its different kinds, and composing poetry about tobacco became a widespread theme in personal miscellanies (*mecmuʿā*) of Ottoman intelligentsia, including religious scholars, by this period. See, for instance, a scholar-bureaucrat's notes on the different characters of various types of tobacco grown in the Ottoman Empire: Elifizāde Feyzi Efendi (d. 1765), *Meşḥūr Olan Esāmī-i Duḫān*, MS İstanbul Araştırmaları Enstitüsü 481/1.

EPILOGUE

1. For an overview of the debate on early modern state formation and its relevance to Ottoman history, see Şahin 2013, 243–253.

2. For this visit by the Austrian embassy of Hans Mollard von Reinek, see Spuler 1935, 332. I thank Yasir Yılmaz for this reference.

3. For an exhaustive classification of the textual sources of political thought, see Yılmaz 2018a, 64–93; Sariyannis and Tuşalp 2019, 5–14.

4. Ḳınalızāde 2007, 278.

5. For a similar suggestion, see Hagen 2006.

6. Yaycıoğlu 2017.

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A.DVN: Divan (Beylikçi) Kalemi Defterleri
AE: Ali Emiri Tasnifi
MAD: Maliyeden Müdevver
Müh: Mühimme defterleri
HAT: Hatt-ı Humayun tasnifi

İE: İbnülemin Tasnifi
TS: Topkapı Palace Archives, Istanbul
YB (04): Yabancı Arşiv Bulgaristan

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INDEX

Abaza Hasan Paşa: participation of *çelebi*s, 99–100, 120–21

uprising, 99, 120, 238n37

Abaza Meḥmed Pasha, 129

Abbasids, 12, 136; and Seljuks, 113

ʿAbdi Çelebi, 135

ʿAbdüleḥad Nūrī, 78, 83–84; on *raḳs* and *devrān*, 235n100

ʿAbdulghanī al-Nabulusī: anti-puritan vision, 83–84, 201, 249–50n90; on innovations, 172–73; *Mevlevī Masters*, 84–85, 89; *Mevlevī Masters*, commentators on, 86

ʿAbdülmecīd Sivāsī, 74, 83, 111; defense of *samāʿ*, 78; dream and interfaith conversion, 75–77

Abu Bakr, caliph: Rumi lineage, 107–8, 130–31

Abu Bakr of Sarakhs, jurist: Rumi lineage, 108

Abu Hamīd al-Ghazālī, 67, 83, 87, 108, 168, 229n5, 67; on public and private, 193, 197; on *samāʿ*, 67–68

Abu'l-Wafa al-ʿUrdhī, 199–200

ʿAcem Aġa Mosque, 88

adab, 79, 175, 212, 216–17n20. *See also* civility

Ādem Dede, 134, 241–42n91

Aġazāde Meḥmed Dede, 134

Ahmad Ghazali, 108

Aḥmed I (r. 1603–1617), 40, 43, 44, 55, 78, 100; accession and sword-donning ceremony, 114; and Bostan Çelebi, 132, 150; coffee-houses, ban, 187; Mevlevī lodge, Edirne, 119; support of Mevlevī order, 132–34. *See also* Sultan Aḥmed Mosque

Aḥmad Sirhindī, 77, 81–82, 249–50n80

Akbar I (r. 1556–1605), 81

ʿAlā al-Dīn Kayḳubād (r. 1219–1237): alchemy, 104; and Bahā al-Dīn as spritual leader, 109, 115

and ʿOsmān I, 113

Aleppo, 70–71, 105, 133, 199, 200

ʿAli: 130–31, and divine secrets, 145; *Mesnevī*, 112; Rumi spiritual lineage, 108, 130–31

al-Tarīka al-Muhammadiyya, 172

Armenian(s): Eremiā Çelebi, 46–47, 90; of Konya, 110–11. *See also* non-Muslim communities

art, 25, 181; architectural history and imperial ideology, 34; Mevlevī production, 112–13; patronage, 135–36; wine and tobacco, 204–5. *See also* miniatures

artisans (*eṣnāf*): communal autonomy, 104; and janissaries, 40; political agency, 28, 40–41, 62; and Sufi sheikhs, 42; uprising and prophet's banner, 48–49, 52; uprisings, 19

Aşık Çelebi: 266n49

ʿAṭṭār, 161, 166, 174

ʿAtīḳ Vālide Mosque, 88

Atpazārī Seyyid ʿOsmān Efendi, 52

Baghdad: production of miniatures, 112; Şoḳulluzāde Hasan Paşa, 136. *See also* Baghdad campaign; lodge(s); Murād IV (r. 1623–1640)

Baha al-Dīn: and ʿAlā al-Dīn Kayḳubād, 115; as the king of scholars (*sultānu'l-ʿulamā*), 108;